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This thesis has two fundamental objectives. On the one hand, at the level of theoretical 
generalization, it aims to make a contribution to the study of collective identities, and more 
specifically, of national identities within the context of European integration. On the other, 
at the level of empirical investigation, it aims to compare how the collective ideals, 
memories, and sentiments of two national communities, Britain and Spain, have conditioned 
the diverse symbolic representations of ‘Europe* which have emerged over the course of 
time in the public spheres of these two particular case-studies.
The thesis is divided into four parts. In my initial introductory section, I outline a theoretical 
and methodological approach to the study of national identity, which fundamentally stresses 
the affective dimension of this phenomenon. Following the insights of Norbert Elias -  as 
well as of earlier sociological thinkers such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and also of 
contemporary authors such as Thomas Scheff and Pierre Bourdieu I argue that national 
identities should be understood as the historically developed (and developing) we-images 
and we-feelings which human beings collectively share about themselves as members of 
national communities. In particular, I focus on the collective emotions of relative superiority 
and inferiority, or pride and shame, which nationalized individuals experience in response to 
their nation’s triumphs and defeats in different fields of international status-competition, 
such as those of political strength, economic prosperity, cultural prestige, moral 
respectability, and so on. At the same time, I emphasize that such national ideals and 
emotions should be analyzed as historically conditioned, politically contested symbols and 
sentiments which are constantly invoked in the discursive struggles for power and 
legitimacy which take place in contemporary nation-state societies.
In the next two sections, I empirically apply this theoretical and methodological approach, 
by carrying out a comparative and historical analysis of the different collective 
representations and symbolic meanings of ‘Europe’ which have gradually emerged in the 
particular national contexts of Britain and Spain, since the end of the Second World War. In 
particular, I focus on the dominant political and media discourses on the EEC/EU which 
arose in these two countries at three critical junctures of their relations with the process of 
European integration: their initial failed attempts to ‘enter Europe’; their eventual successful 
accesions ‘into Europe’; and their diverse responses to the birth of the ‘European Union’, 
which was officially established by the Treaty of Maastricht. My fundamental argument 
throughout this analysis is that while in Britain, the idea of ‘Europe’ became widely 
associated with a decline of national status after the loss of ‘world power’, in Spain, on the 
contrary, this concept symbolized a crucial enhancement of national prestige following the 
collapse of a ‘backward dictatorship’.
Finally, in my concluding section, I suggest that this sharp symbolic and emotional contrast 
between the cases of Britain and Spain demonstrates that the development of the European 
Union has not eroded or eliminated the collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood. On 
the contrary, national we-images and we-feelings should rather be seen as the fundamental 
factors which have conditioned, and are continuing to condition, the degrees of collective 
enthusiasm or hostility which are generally felt towards the project of European integration 
in the different member states of the EU.
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“The question is not whether one thinks national pride 
is a good or bad thing. The fact is that it exists.
If one looks around disinterestedly, it is evident 
all people in all states of the world have to come 
to terms with the problem of national pride. ”
Norbert Elias
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1. Central Questions, Objectives, and Arguments
“Nations are not something eternal They began, so they will come to an end.
A European confederation will probably replace them. ”
Ernest Renan1
More than a century has passed since Renan made this prophetic statement in his celebrated 
lecture What is a nation?, delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882. To what extent can one say that 
this prophetic vision has come true? How far would it be accurate to claim that over the course 
of time, a supranational confederation has begun to replace the nations of Europe, and their 
respective nationalisms? Has the emergence of a European identity diminished the significance 
of Europe’s separate national identities? It is certainly undeniable that since Renan’s day, great 
progress has been made towards the goal of European unification. A new territorial unit has 
gradually emerged which today encompasses fifteen nation-states and is symbolically 
represented by a common name, the ‘European Union’, a number of ‘European’ political and 
legal institutions, a ‘European’ flag, a ‘European’ anthem, the ‘Euro’ currency, ritualized 
commemorations such as ‘Europe Day’, and so on.1 2 In many ways, Renan seems to have hit the 
nail on the head, and Europe does appear to be moving towards an increasingly ‘post-national 
era’ (Touraine 1994).
Nevertheless, one has only to consider the euphoric passions ignited by athletic contests such 
as the World Cup or the Olympic Games in order to realize that the ideals and sentiments of 
nationhood have hardly disappeared within the context of the European Union.3 There is nothing 
on the European level which remotely resembles the collective enthusiasm that is generated by
1 From What is a Nation ?, reprinted in Woolf (ed., 1996:59).
2 The symbolic strategies which the officials of the European Commission have adopted to construct a ‘European 
consciousness’ and to build up a ‘European patriotism’ amongst the nation-states of the EU has been 
comprehensively explored in several articles by the anthropologist Cris Shore (1993, 1995), as well as in his recent 
book Building Europe. The Cultural Politics o f European Integration (2000). See also Shore’s collaborative 
ethnographic studies with Annabel Black (1992, 1994).
3 As Michael Mann has put it, ‘watching the Olympic Games or other events transformed into displays of emotional 
nationalist pageantry, it is difficult to believe that the nation-state is finished’ (1993:118). The igniting of national 
sentiments in modern sports competitions was highlighted and fruitfully investigated by Norbert Elias and Eric 
Dunning in Quest for Excitement (1986).
1
the sporting events in which millions of people indulge in the excitement of watching the 
national representatives compete against each other on football pitches, athletic tracks, and s 
on. Indeed, a quick look at any newspaper can reveal what Michael Billig (1995) has called th 
‘banal nationalism’ of the contemporary world: the taken-for-granted, routine ways in whic 
every nation’s achievements are constantly promoted or ‘flagged’ in the daily language of tfc 
mass media, highlighting national triumphs not just in athletic arenas, but in political, economh 
cultural, and many other spheres of international competition. Within each of the EU’s memb( 
states, governmental decisions and policies concerning ‘Europe’ are in fact typically legitimate 
by invoking the defence of ‘national interests’ (Ruane 1994). Hence, as soon one takes int 
account this continuing resilience of national ideals and sentiments, it becomes clear th; 
Renan’s vision of Europe hardly fits the facts at this stage, and that the conclusion reached b 
Raymond Aron more than thirty years ago still sounds like a much more accurate description c 
reality: ‘I believe that consciousness of the nation remains infinitely stronger than a sense c 
Europe... The old nations still live in the hearts of men, and love of the European nation is nc 
yet bom, assuming that it ever will be’ (1964: 60*61).
However, is it always right to assume that people’s emotional attachments to ‘the ol 
nations’ are necessarily incompatible with ‘a love for the European nation’? Are nations 
sentiments insurmountable obstacles which can only stand in the way of European unification 
Should ‘nationalism’ and ‘Europeanism’ be seen as irreconcilable enemies or polar opposite 
that cannot co-exist with one another? This certainly seems to be a widespread belief. On 
historian of the ‘European idea’, for instance, has written that ‘national consciousness... is mos 
inimical to unity of any sort’ (Albrecht-Carrié 1965: 79). Another writer has suggested tha 
‘national identity... is the biggest stumbling block on the road towards a united Europe 
(Odermatt 1991: 220). Indeed, the project of European integration is often depicted as a heroic 
stmggle against ‘nationalism’. Like in Renan’s prophecy, many supporters of ‘Europeanism1 
hope that loyalty to a new supranational confederation will ultimately transcend, erode, and
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replace the traditional sentiments attached to nation-states, which are seen as selfish and 
dangerous emotions.4
As numerous authors have pointed out, the project of European integration was 
fundamentally launched ‘in opposition to the nationalist, the atavistic instincts’ (Gladwyn 1967: 
58) and ‘the welter of ultra-nationalistic attitudes’ (Davies 1996: 42) which were held to be 
responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. In the years that followed this 
devastating conflict, ‘the reaction against nationalism went naturally together with the notion of 
European solidarity’ (Seton-Watson 1985: 12), and hence ‘committed “Europeans” saw 
European union as replacing the failed nation-states out of which it would be built’ (Wallace 
1990: 63-4). In this way, as Swedberg (1994: 383-384) has written, the ideal of a ‘United 
Europe’ became a sacred ‘totem’ for many European politicians and intellectuals, which was 
symbolically constructed ‘in opposition to the Nazis’ glorification of the national state*. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, when Winston Churchill famously called for the creation of ‘a kind of 
United States of Europe’ in the influential speech he delivered at Zurich in September 1946, he 
fervently condemned the ‘frightful nationalistic quarrels, originated by the Teutonic nations, 
which we have seen even in this twentieth century and in our lifetime, wreck the peace and mar 
the prospects of all mankind’ (1994 [1946]: 6). In order to prevent such a tragedy from falling 
upon the peoples of Europe in the future, the British leader proposed the following remedy, in 
his characteristically eloquent, impassioned rhetoric:
Why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism 
and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent, 
and why should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings in shaping the 
destinies of men?... If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final 
doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against 
all the crimes and follies of the past.(1994 [1946]: 7).
4 This ‘Europeanisf opposition to ‘nationalism’ has a very long and venerable intellectual history. As Alan Bance 
(1992: 3) has shown, during the Enlightenment figures such as Erasmus and Montaigne rejected national pride as 
‘petty self-love’, and proposed to replace it with a utopian project of continental ‘peace and concord’. Derek Heater 
(1992) and Joseph Weiler (1998) have also explored the symbolic value of ‘Europe’ as a pacifist ideal.
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From a ‘Europeanist’ standpoint, some contemporary writers have therefore lamented the fa 
that today, ‘a European feeling' does not yet exist, due to ‘the predominant emotional fixation < 
our nation-states’ (Papcke 1992: 66), and that the ‘nationalism of the peoples’ still remains 01 
of the ‘major problems besetting the idea of a European supemation-state’ (Llobera 1994:207).
In this thesis, I shall take a closer look at the relation between national sentiments and tl 
process of European integration, by analyzing how ‘Europe’ has been collectively perceived an 
symbolically represented in two current member states of the EU: Britain and Spain.5 M 
objective will be to show that it can be highly misleading to make a rigid distinction betwee 
national and European affiliations, as if these two spheres of collective identification wei 
necessarily opposed to each other or mutually incompatible.
Anthony Smith, one of the leading scholars in the field of nations and nationalism, ha 
rightly pointed out that ‘although there have been many studies of the economic organization 
and political institutions of the European Community, relatively little attention has been devote* 
to the cultural and psychological issues associated with European unification -  to questions o 
meaning, values, and symbolism’ (1992: 57). At the same time, the proponents of a nove 
‘anthropology of Europe’ have recently promoted the study of ‘what Europe means to differen 
groups and individuals, and the many ways in which they conceptualize and talk about Europe ii 
relation to their own identity* (Goddard, Llobera, and Shore 1994: 30). My thesis aims to make i 
contribution to this field of sociological and anthropological inquiry, by analyzing how the 
meaning of ‘Europe’ has been influenced in two countries by different national memories, 
aspirations, and sentiments.6
Throughout this study, I shall particularly focus on the rather neglected affective dimension 
of national identity. On the whole, social scientists have not paid much attention to emotional 
phenomena (at least not explicitly), although in recent years there has been a growing interest in
5 Although in both of these countries there are strong sub-state nationalist movements, in this thesis I have focused 
on the national ideals and sentiments represented by the central state, i.e. the concepts of British and Spanish 
nationhood, and their relationship to the process of European integration.
6 Other authors who have promoted this line of research in recent works are Macdonald (ed., 1993), Wilterdink 
(1993), Wilson (ed., 1993), García (ed.t 1994), Zetterholm (ed., 1994), Jenkins and Sofos (eds., 1996), Kapteyn 
(1996), Wintle (1996), Hedetoft (1994, 1997,1998), and Smith and Wright (eds., 1999).
4
the role that feelings and sentiments play in human societies.7 Randall Collins (1990: 27-8), for 
instance, has suggested that many of the central concepts of classic sociological theory such as 
‘solidarity’, ‘values’, ‘conflict’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘status’ implicitly refer to emotional processes, 
and hence that a more direct focus on the emotions would undoubtedly improve our 
understanding of the social world. Similarly, in his recent book Emotion, Social Theory and 
Social Structure (1998), the British sociologist Jack Barbalet has cogently argued that emotions 
such as shame, fear, vengefulness, and resentment are crucial to understand many social 
processes, and therefore that emotion concepts can fruitfully be applied to the development of 
sociological explanation and theory building.
It is noteworthy that the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of sociology devoted considerable 
attention to the emotions, although this aspect of the ‘classical’ legacy seems to have been 
largely forgotten and abandoned. For instance, when Emile Durkheim originally defined the 
nature of ‘social facts' in his Rules o f Sociological Method, he spoke not only of ‘ways of acting 
and thinking’, but also of ‘ways of feeling* which are ‘invested with a coercive power’ by virtue 
of which they ‘exercise control* over the behaviour of individuals (1982 [1895]: 52, my italics). 
Furthermore, in his writings on education, Durkheim explicitly stated that ‘we are not purely 
rational beings; we are also emotional creatures’ (1961 [1925]: 112, my italics]), and he argued 
that people’s ‘moral actions’ were fundamentally grounded on their ‘emotional attachments’ to 
particular social groups.8 Max Weber, as well, was convinced that the nascent science of 
sociology necessarily had to focus on human emotions in order to understand the motives of 
what he called ‘social action’. This is clearly reflected by the fact that when Weber defined the 
central concept of his sociological approach, the ‘interpretation of meaning’, he suggested that
7 See, for instance, the recent volumes on the ‘sociology of emotions’ edited by Kemper (1990) and Bendelow and 
Williams (1998). My own interest in the relationship between emotions and society has been significantly inspired 
by the study of the human being as not only an homo rationalis, but also as an homo emotionalis, which has recently 
been proposed by the Spanish anthropologist José Antonio Jâuregui in his book The Emotional Computer (1995).
8 By ‘moral actions’, Durkheim meant those actions that are motivated not by an individual’s egoistic pursuit of his 
personal self-interests, but rather for the collective good of a society to which he belongs. On this aspect of 
Durkheimian sociology, see Robert T. Hall’s study Emile Durkheim: Ethics and the Sociology o f Morals (1987).
5
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one effective methodological strategy which could be adopted to carry out this scientific 
was what he called ‘emotional empathy’:
Emotional or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through sympathetic particip; 
we can adequately grasp the emotional context in which the action took place.(1978 [1 
20], my italics).
Weber’s interest in the emotions was also particularly evident in his insightful analyse 
political conflict and status competition. For instance, in his lecture on Politics as a Vocation 
pointed out that individuals often strive for positions of high ranking not to enrich themse 
economically, but rather for ‘the prestige feeling that power gives’ (1946a [1919]: 78-80 
fact, both Durkheim and Weber have been key sources of inspiration for this thesis, since 
shall show later in this introductory section, they both emphasised the emotional dimensio 
national identity in their brief writings on this topic.
The importance of the emotions in human life was also repeatedly stressed by another 
figure in the history of sociology, Norbert Elias, whose insightful writings -  after a very 1 
period of almost total neglect -  axe finally gaining the attention which they undoubh 
deserve.9 In the final, concluding synopsis of his magnum opus, The Civilizing Process, E 
wrote:
Every investigation which considers only the consciousness of men, their ‘reason’ 
‘ideas’, while disregarding the structure of drives, the direction of human affects 
passions, can be from the outset only of limited value. Much that is indispensable foi 
understanding of men escapes this approach.( 1994a [1939]: 486)
In particular, Elias emphasized that what he called the ‘emotional make-up’ or ‘habitus’ 
human beings is never exclusively determined by an innate biological programming 
automatic instinct-mechanisms, but is always fundamentally conditioned and moulded by loi
9 This is illustrated by the fact that three introductory studies have been published in English during the course 
the past decade on the work of Elias: Mennell (1992), Van Krieken (1998), and Smith (2001). My o 
understanding of Elias has been crucially guided by these three excellent books.
term sociohistorical processes. In this way, he demonstrated that people’s emotional experiences 
clearly constitute a very important object of sociological investigation:
To be sure, the possibility of feeling fear, just like that of feeling joy, is an unalterable part 
of human nature. But the strength, kind, and structure of the fears and anxieties that 
smoulder or flare in the individual never depend solely on his own ‘nature* nor, at least in 
more complex societies, on the ‘nature’ in the midst of which he lives. They are always 
determined, finally, by the history and the actual structure of his relations to other people, 
by the structure of society; and they change together with it.( 1994a [1939]: 520)
More recently, the American scholar Thomas Scheff -  whose work has been significantly 
inspired by Elias10 -  has also cogently argued that sociology, and the social sciences in general, 
would undoubtedly be enriched by focusing much more attention on the emotional aspects of 
human life. In his latest book, Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality, Scheff has 
suggested that any analysis of social interaction which merely considers the cognitive aspects of 
people’s discourse and their behaviour will always be necessarily incomplete, like the sounds 
made by ‘a pianist playing only the left hand’ (1997: 10-11). This is fundamentally because, as 
Scheff has explained in one of his illuminating studies on the affective dimensions of collective 
identity, ‘the emotions are the psychological sides of social relationships, just as relationships 
are the social aspects of the emotions’ (1994a: 298).
It is above all Elias’s ‘process-sociology’, as well as the insightful writings of Scheff, which 
have inspired the theoretical and methodological approach I have adopted in this thesis. Both of 
these authors are undoubtedly major figures in what is today being called ‘the sociology of 
emotions’. The seminal value of their ideas, however, has largely gone unnoticed, and has hardly 
become a part of the sociological mainstream. At a more general theoretical level, therefore, the 
comparative empirical research I have carried out on my two case-studies also aims to illustrate 
how the study of collective pride and shame which Elias and Scheff have pioneered can improve
10 Scheff discovered Elias’s work rather late in his career, but since then he has begun to employ and further 
develop several of Elias’s concepts, such as the ‘I-we balance’ (1994b). Furthermore, he has called Elias ‘a pioneer 
in the sociology of emotion’ (1997), and has also written an essay entitled ‘Rationality and Emotion’ (1992) that 
explores the concept of shame in The Civilizing Process, and the subtitle of which is ‘A Homage to Norbert Elias’.
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our understanding of national identity -  and, more specifically, of national identities in the 
context of European integration.
Following the insights of these innovative authors, as well as of other leading sociological 
and anthropological thinkers, this thesis shall compare the way in which sentiments of national 
pride, generated by shifting self-images of power and status, have conditioned the diverse 
meanings of ‘Europe’ which have emerged over the course of time in Britain and Spain. In 
particular, borrowing Barbalet’s terminology (1999: 632), I shall focus on the affective meanings 
of ‘Europe’11 that have characterised the dominant discourses in the public spheres of my two 
case-studies -  in other words, the diverse emotional charges which have been attached to this 
concept in these two countries. ‘Europe’ will therefore be studied as a contested, multivocal 
symbol, which has been differently represented in these two countries, depending on its 
perceived impact on national self-esteem.1 2
I have selected these two case-studies not only because they are the two European countries 
with which I am most familiar, both linguistically and culturally, but also because they offer a 
sharp symbolic and emotional contrast which can illustrate very clearly the varying effects 
which the collective sentiments of national pride may have in different sociohistorical contexts 
on the emergence of both positive and negative outlooks towards the EC/EU. As I shall argue 
throughout this thesis, while in Britain the idea of ‘entering Europe’ became widely associated 
with a decline of national status after the loss of ‘world power’, in Spain, on the contrary, this 
event represented a great enhancement of national prestige following the collapse of a ‘backward 
dictatorship’ and the successful transition to ‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’. Hence, EC/EU
11 ‘Meaning, understood in terms of the ordering of references, can relate to both intelligibility and involvement. 
Formal meaning explicates relationships within a whole, thus making something intelligible, whereas what might be 
called affective meaning relates to what involvement a person has with an object or event, that is, how it matters to 
them’ (Barbalet 1999: 632, my italics). Hence, what this thesis aims to explore is how ‘Europe’ has mattered 
emotionally to people in Britain and Spain, the kind of affective involvement they have had with the notion of being 
or becoming ‘European’.
12 The concept of symbolic ‘multivocaiity’ was coined by the anthropologist Victor Turner, who employed it to 
describe symbols which are ‘susceptible of many meanings’ (1974: 55). Turner’s ideas have been further developed 
more recently by Anthony P. Cohen in The Symbolic Construction o f Community (1989).
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membership became a potent source of national pride for Spaniards, in a way which could 
hardly have been possible in Britain.
On the basis of this comparison, I shall propose that instead of making a sharp distinction 
between sociologically imprecise, value-laden terms such as ‘nationalism’ and ‘Europeanism’, 
one should rather consider the way in which national sentiments have provoked different degrees 
of enthusiasm or hostility towards the concept of ‘becoming European’ in each member state of 
the EU. From this perspective, the emotionally charged, collective self-images of nationhood, far 
from being suppressed or eroded by the process of European integration, can in fact be seen as 
the key factors which have determined the emergence of both favourable and unfavourable 
perceptions of the EU.
In the remainder of this introductory section, I shall outline the theoretical understanding of 
national identity which has guided my research, as well as the methodological approach I have 
employed.
2. We-images, we-feelings, and power struggles: a theoretical approach to the 
study of national identity
National identity can be conceptualized as one component of modem selfhood. By the term 
‘selfhood’, I am simply referring to the uniquely human experience of self-consciousness: the 
symbolic conceptions and emotional sensations of a creature which, as George Herbert Mead 
(1934: 136) famously put it, can become ‘an object to itself through a process of social 
interaction with ‘significant others’. In the contemporary world, most human beings think of 
themselves (among many other things) as members of collectivities they refer to as ‘nations*. 
Hence, an individual may routinely state, in relation to himself: ‘I am Spanish’ or ‘I am British*. 
Furthermore, as the athletic status-contest of the Olympic Games vividly illustrates, these same 
human beings often display an acute emotional sensitivity towards the shifting prestige-rank of 
their own particular nations. These symbolic and emotional components of national identity can 
be defined, following Norbert Elias (1991a), as ‘we-images’ and ‘we-feelings’: the ideas and 
sentiments which people acquire not in relation to who they are as unique individuals, but in 
relation to the human communities within which they symbolically classify themselves and to 
which they feel emotionally affiliated. The extent to which the national component of selfhood is 
valued may vary from individual to individual, but it seems undeniable that for many people, 
nationhood remains an important component of their self-understanding, as well as their self­
esteem. At the same time, national identity clearly has a crucial political dimension, which has 
gradually developed over the course of a long-term, sociohistorical process: all modem states 
legitimate their authority more or less successfully, by claiming to represent a particular ‘nation* 
within a particular territory. For this reason, those who are involved in the discursive struggles to 
acquire or maintain positions of power within each state constantly appeal to the collective we- 
images and we-feelings of their respective national communities in order to gain popular 
support.
I shall now explore these theoretical propositions in detail, firstly by delineating the 
symbolic and emotional dimensions of selfhood which can be experienced by individuals in any 
human society, and secondly by characterising the particularities of national identity as a
historically developed, symbolically constructed, emotionally charged, and politically contested 
component of selfhood in modem times.
2.1 The anthropological constants of selfhood: images of superiority or inferiority and 
feelings of pride or shame at both individual T  as well as collective ‘we’ levels
In order to come to grips with any cultural or sociohistorical variation of ‘identity’, such as the 
modem phenomenon of national we-images and we-feelings, one must firstly acquire some 
understanding of self-consciousness as a universal human experience.1 Otherwise, it becomes 
rather difficult to comprehend which variable aspect of human society is actually being 
investigated in the first place. Nowadays, many social scientists frequently employ the term 
‘identity’ without giving any precise indication of what they actually mean by this vague term.1 2 
In my view, this theoretical imprecision can only be overcome by attempting to delineate -  
albeit in a tentative and incomplete manner -  what one could perhaps call the anthropological 
constants o f selfhood. As Elias pointed out in What is Sociology?, an anthropological 
characterization of the universal ‘constants’ which exist in all human societies is indispensable 
to carry out effective analyses of any particular social reality: ‘An empirically based conception 
of the similarities between all possible societies is essential to provide a frame of reference 
within which particular investigations may be carried out’ (1978: 107).3 More recently, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1990: 198), whose work has been significantly inspired by Elias,4 has also
1 It is interesting to note that Marcel Mauss, who was an early pioneer in the study of selfhood as an evolving, 
sociohistorical phenomenon, asserted in the opening paragraphs of his classic essay on ‘the category of the person’, 
that ‘there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time 
of his individuality, both spiritual and physical’ (1985 [1938]: 3). In other words, before presenting his vision of 
how the notion of the ‘self had developed over the centuries, he attempted to define, however briefly and vaguely, 
an anthropological starting point: the universal nature of human self-consciousness.
2 As Brubaker and Cooper have rightly complained, the concept of ‘identity’ tends to mean ‘too much’, ‘too little’, 
or ‘nothing at all’, due to its ‘sheer ambiguity’ (2000: 1).
3 This is one of the things which I have found particularly illuminating in the writings of Elias: his attempt to 
characterize both the universal biological characteristics of the human species, as well as the changing development 
of human societies over the course of a long-term sociohistorical process. Underlying the ‘process-sociology’ of 
Elias, I would argue that there is an insightful anthropological vision, an attempt to define the uniquely malleable 
nature of humankind.
4 In a tribute which was held to honour Elias at the University of Amsterdam, on the occasion of his 90th birthday in 
1987, Bourdieu publically stated that Elias was ‘one of his own intellectual forebears’ (Mennell 1994: 1). Indeed, it
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emphasised that in order to gain a clear grasp of what he calls ‘the social game’ in any giver 
cultural or historical context, sociological research needs to be anthropologically grounded on c 
clear theoretical understanding of ‘the universal characteristics of bodily existence.’5
Following some of the central ideas which have been proposed in the work of Elias and 
Scheff, as well as of other leading sociological and anthropological thinkers, I shall argue here 
that human selfhood can be understood as both a biological and cultural, symbolic and 
emotional, individual and collective phenomenon: an ongoing process of symbolic self­
understanding, as well as a varying emotional state of greater or lesser self-esteem (pride or 
shame), which develops during the course of an individual’s or a group’s relations with other 
individuals or groups.
One can begin by pointing out that all healthy human beings are uniquely equipped with the 
biological capacity to orientate themselves in the world and communicate with others through 
the acquisition of symbols (Elias 1991b). As the great German philosopher Emst Cassirer 
(1944: 25-6) argued, man is fundamentally an animal symbolicum who lives in a ‘symbolic 
universe’ of his own creation.6 7From the beginning of their lives, all newborn human babies nor 
only can but must undergo a socio-psychological process of symbol-learning within a particula; 
linguistic community, and this crucially includes the internalization of symbols abou1 
themselves, or self-symbols. Although it has become fashionable to define the notion o: 
‘identity’ as a purely social, historical, or cultural ‘construction’ which is in no way ‘natural’,
is noteworthy that many of the key terms in Bourdieu’s conceptual vocabulary, such as ‘field’, ‘habitus’, anc 
‘distinction* can all be found in The Civilizing Process.
5 ‘Although it has, in order to constitute itself, to reject all the forms of that biologism which always tends t 
naturalize social differences by reducing them to anthropological invariants, sociology can understand the sods 
game in its most essential aspects only if it takes into account certain of the universal characteristics of bodil 
existence, such as the fact of existing as a separate biological individual, or of being confined to a place and • 
moment, or even the fact of being and knowing oneself destined for death.’(Bourdieu 1990:198)
6 ‘No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion ai 
parts of this universe... Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural lif 
in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as a 
animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. By doing so we can designate his specifi 
difference’ (Cassirer 1944: 25-6). According to Van Krieken (1998: 12-13), Elias was in fact significantly inspire 
by Cassirer’s ‘philosophy of symbolic forms’.
7 In relation to national identities, for instance, Hobsbawm (1994: 35) has written that they are ‘historically nove 
arrangements’ and that ‘there is nothing “natural” about them.’
one should rather conceptualize people’s self-consciousness as the outcome of an ongoing 
interrelation between the psycho-biological potentials of the human brain and the social learning 
process through which the symbolic tools of language are acquired.
It seems evident that many social scientists continue to fall into the same conceptual trap 
which the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset plunged into when he wrote that ‘man has 
no “nature”; he only has history’ (1946: 148).8 In response to this misleading statement, one 
should rather say that if human beings have history, it is because they have a uniquely changeful 
or malleable nature. As Elias argued, human nature and history, or human biology and culture, 
should not be conceptualized as if they were separate, mutually exclusive substances, but rather 
as interrelated, interdependent processes.9 Hence, the fact that a person’s ‘identity’ or self­
understanding has been historically or culturally ‘constructed’ does not mean that it is not also 
‘biologically conditioned’, since humans are, by nature, symbol-using animals who are 
‘constitutionally equipped with organs which enable them to learn constantly’ (Elias 1978: 107). 
Every healthy human child is bom with a physiological potential for acquiring a stock of sound- 
symbols from other people, and these symbols can refer not only to objects, processes, and other 
living beings in the world, but also to the individual himself. This unique symbol-learning 
capacity can be seen as one fundamental component of what Axel Honneth and Hans Joas have 
called the ‘unchanging preconditions of human changeableness’ (1988: 7).10 Hence, the first 
thing one should make clear is that people’s ‘identity’ or self-understanding is simply one 
component of the biologically grounded, socially acquired symbolic universe in which all human
8 This misleading polar dichotomy between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ is evident, for instance, in a recent introductory 
textbook to social anthropology: ‘The truly human in us, as anthropology sees it, is primarily created through our 
engagement with the social and cultural world; it is not individual and natural’ (Eriksen 1995: 30).
9 Arguing against those who continue to think of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in terms of mutually exclusive substances, 
rather than as interdependent processes, Elias wrote: ‘Nature is equated with immutability and innateness, and thus 
conceptually isolated from what is changeable and learned. And what is changeable and learned is classified as 
culture, society, or other representations of what is regarded as not natural. Yet how could human beings learn 
anything, if they were not by nature, that is biologically, equipped for it?’ (1987a: 346). The very same point was 
also made in a similar fashion by the American anthropologist David Bidney, in an insightful article entitled 
‘Human Nature and the Cultural Process’ (1946).
10 Honneth and Joas are two authors which have also cogently defended the need for social scientists to ground their 
empirical analyses on firm anthropological grounding in their insightful book, Human Nature and Social Action 
(1988), which in one of its chapters discusses what they call the ‘historical anthropology’ of Elias.
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beings live -  a symbolic universe which has developed, and is continuously developing, over the 
course of a long-term historical process.
Selfhood, however, is not only a symbolic but also an emotional phenomenon. It is not 
merely a question of cognitively defining and categorising who we are, but also of experiencing 
feelings about ourselves with regard to such classifications and judgements -  particularly when 
this involves a hierarchic evaluation of our relatively superior or inferior status in comparison to 
others. In his Critique o f Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant argued that human beings have a  
natural propensity to ‘self-conceit’, by which he referred to people’s desire to have, and to be 
recognized as having, ‘a greater self-worth than their fellows’ (1952 [1788]: 321-22, cited in 
Wood 1998: 68). Furthermore, in his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, 
Kant defined this general tendency as the ‘enviously competitive vanity’ of humankind, and 
suggested that man’s ‘desire for honour, property, and power’ drives him ‘to seek status among 
his fellows’ (1971 [1784]: 45]). The cross-cultural, anthropological evidence which has 
accumulated since Kant wrote these words suggests that indeed, human beings do generally 
display a keen emotional sensitivity to what Max Weber called ‘status honour’ (1946b [1918- 
20]: 191), and a traditional idiom of Spanish folk culture defines as el qué dirán (literally, ‘the 
what-will-they-say-about-me’). Indeed, it is noteworthy that ethnographers have often 
discovered public shaming ceremonies and punishments of ostracism, which function as the 
main mechanisms of social control in ‘tribal’ societies with no centralized state authorities or 
modem legal systems backed up by written normative codes, police forces, and courts.11 In 
Civilization and its Discontents, Sigmund Freud also referred to this universal human sensitivity, 
when he pointed out that people generally experience feelings of ‘social anxiety’ when they fear 
a loss of love and appreciation from individuals whom they respect (1975 [1930]: 62).
11 This was explored by Bronislaw Malinowski in his classic, insightful study Crime and Custom in Savage Society 
(1989 [1926)]. More recently, the anthropologist George De Vos has described this universal human sensitivity to 
social status as follows: ‘The social world in any culture is marked by various forms of interpersonal evaluation and 
sanctioning. In humans, there gradually evolves interpersonal sensitivity to groups forms of approval and 
disapproval growing out of early dyadic parental approbation or recognition, and the inner enhancement that marks 
receiving social regard. Humans become governed by a potential to experience shame.’(1990: 45)
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Elias, who of course was very familiar with the writings of Kant, Weber and Freud,12 made 
the same anthropological point when he observed that one of the particularities which 
distinguish humans from other animal species is that they not only have survival-interests related 
to the physical nourishment and protection of their bodies, but also status-preoccupations related 
to the way in which they are perceived by their fellow human beings (1994b: xxxiii).13 In 
another essay, he referred to this socio-psychological phenomenon of affective interdependence 
as the human ‘need to love and be loved’ (1991a: 201), ‘the desire for security and constancy in 
the emotive affirmation of one’s person by others’ (1991a: 204). He observed that feelings of 
shame are experienced by an individual when he fears ‘social degradation’, i.e. ‘loss of the love 
or respect of others, to which he attaches or has attached value’ (1994a [1939]: 492). Hence, 
when people find themselves in degrading positions of social exclusion, Elias suggested that the 
principal deprivation they suffer is not so much a deprivation of food, but rather a deprivation of 
‘value’, ‘meaning’, and ‘self-respect’ (1994b: xxxiv). Furthermore, he also argued that *a 
compulsive desire for social prestige’, rather than ‘the simple necessity of economic 
subsistence’, is the primary impulse which motivates people to work, when their material well­
being places them ‘appreciably over the hunger threshold’ (1994a [1939]: 473).
More recently, Bourdieu has also focused much of his sociological attention on what he calls 
‘the game of honour’ (1990: 22) -  in other words, the ongoing status competitions which take 
place in all social contexts for the emotionally gratifying trophy of ‘distinction’, ‘recognition’, or 
‘symbolic capital’: ’
12 Elias initially studied philosophy, and he specifically included Kant in his own personal canon of three ‘great 
men’ of German Kultur, the other two being Goethe and Schiller (Smith 2001: 30). Nevertheless, he ultimately 
turned against the major strands of Kantian thought, and this provoked a serious disagreement, as well as a painful 
conflict, with the supervisor of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Breslau, Richard Honigswald (Elias 
1994c: 88-9, 91-2). On the influence of Weber and Freud in Elias’s writings, see Van Krieken (1998, ch. 2).
13 The Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda has defined human emotions as mechanisms which are triggered by the brain 
to ensure the maintenance of a person's ‘preference states’, or what he calls ‘concern satisfaction’' ‘Emotions... 
result from monitoring whether events promise, or threaten to interfere with concern satisfaction’ (1986: 472). In 
Frijda’s terms, Elias’s point was that humans are not only concerned with the satisfaction of purely physiological 
concerns (the ingestion of food, the maintenance of bodily health, etc.), but also with the satisfaction of status 
concerns (the acquisition of respect from other people).
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Struggles for social recognition are a fundamental dimension of social life... what is at 
stake in them is the accumulation of a particular form of capital, honour in the sense of 
reputation and prestige... there is, therefore, a specific logic behind the accumulation of 
symbolic capital, as capital found on cognition [connaissance] and recognition 
[reconnaissance]... (1990: 22).
Indeed, Bourdieu has related people’s pursuit of social recognition to one of the anthropological 
invariants which he refers to as ‘universal characteristics of bodily existence’: the conscious 
awareness of our mortality, and hence the need to find meaningful reasons and justifications for 
living. In one of his Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Bourdieu eloquently explains this 
human predicament as follows:
Doomed to death, that end which cannot be taken as an end, man is a being without a 
reason for being. It is society, and society alone, which dispenses, to different degrees, the 
justifications and reasons for existing; it is society which, by producing the affairs or 
positions that are said to be ‘important’, produces the acts and agents that are judged to be 
‘important’, for themselves and for the others -  characters objectively and subjectively 
assured of their value and thus liberated from indifference and insignificance... Pascal 
spoke of the ‘misery of man without God’. One might rather posit the ‘misery of man 
without mission or social consecration’. Indeed, without going as far as to say, with 
Durkheim, ‘Society is God’, I would say: God is never anything other than society. What 
is expected of God is only ever obtained from society, which alone has the power to justify 
you, to liberate you from facticity, contingency, and absurdity: but -  and this is doubtless 
the fundamental antinomy -  only in a differential, distinctive, way... and the competition 
for a social life that will be known and recognized, which will free you from 
insignificance, is a struggle to the death for symbolic life and death... The judgement of 
others is the last judgement; and social exclusion is the concrete form of hell and 
damnation. It is also because man is a God unto man that man is a wolf unto man.(1990: 
196, my italics)
One could therefore say, following Bourdieu, that human beings are prestige-seeking animals 
who are emotionally sensitive to the degrees of esteem they receive from other members of their 
own species, and hence are engaged in an ongoing competitive struggle for social distinction. As 
this leading European thinker has emphasised, the respect people receive from others is one of 
the crucial gratifications they need to make their lives meaningful. Indeed, in relatively 
secularized societies where, echoing Nietzche, ‘God has died’ (or at least is a widely contested 
idea), the only ‘significant others’ from which one can expect an emotionally gratifying 
recognition, and therefore a meaningful justification for living, are other human beings of flesh 
and blood.
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In his book The Loneliness o f the Dying, Elias also explored the way in which death is ‘a 
problem of the living’, given that humans are symbol-using animals which, unlike all the other 
creatures of the earth who also die, know that this is their destiny (1985: 3-4). And, like 
Bourdieu, he similarly linked the human consciousness of mortality to the quest for a 
‘meaningful’ life -  in other words, a life that will mean something to others:
Today it is still somewhat difficult to convey the depth of the dependence of people on 
each other. That the meaning of everything a person does lies in what he or she means to 
others, not only those now alive but also to coming generations, that she or he is therefore 
dependent on the continuation of human society through generations, is certainly one of 
the most fundamental of human dependences, those of future on past, of past on future 
generations.(1985: 64)
Hence, Elias stressed that although the Western notion of the ‘autonomous’ and ‘self-sufficient’ 
individual tended to hide the reality of people’s emotional interdependence on each other, the 
loneliness of dying people in modem times -  whether of sick or elderly people in aseptic 
clinics, of prisoners in dark jail cells, of homeless vagrants in urban street comers, or of innocent 
men, women and children being led naked into Nazi gas-chambers — could serve to ‘remind us 
how fundamental and how incomparable is the meaning of people for people’ (1985: 66).14
In the American sociological tradition, this emotional dimension of human selfhood was 
originally explored in a very illuminating matter by Charles Cooley, a largely forgotten, though 
highly original thinker. In his book Human Nature and the Social Order (1922), Cooley 
developed the conception of the ‘my-feeling’ or the ‘self-feeling’, which he defined as the 
‘desire for some sort of appreciation’ from others (1922: 178). In particular, he proposed the idea 
that the self should be seen as a sort of mirror or ‘looking glass’ in which feelings are 
determined by the beliefs which the individual has about how others perceive him:
As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they 
are ours, and pleased or otherwise according as they do or do not answer to what we 
should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another’s mind some thought of
14 Elias’s own mother was executed at Auschwitz, and this loss tormented him throughout his life. As he told two 
Dutch sociologists who interviewed him shortly before he died, ‘1 simply cannot get over the picture of my mother 
in a gas chamber. I cannot get over it* (1994b: 79).
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our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously 
affected by it. A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the 
imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that 
appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification... The thing that 
moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an 
imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind. (1922: 184).
Cooley’s point, therefore, was that human beings typically experience feelings of pride and j
shame in relation to what they think that others think about them.15 If they do not particularly (
I
value the person who denigrates or humiliates them, then this negative opinion may hardly affect |
i
their self-esteem; but if the person who looks down on them is someone whose opinion they do j 
respect, then the feelings of shame may be intense: ‘the character and weight of that other, in j 
whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling’ (1922: 184). Most of 
the time people may not be consciously aware of their sensitivity in relation to how others 
perceive them, for ‘we do not think much of it [self-feeling] so long as it is moderately gratified’ 
(1922: 209). However, Cooley noted that:
if failure or disgrace arrives, if one suddenly finds that the faces of men show coldness or 
contempt instead of the kindliness and deference that he is used to, he will perceive from 
the shock, the fear, the sense of being outcast and helpless, that he was living in the minds 
of others without knowing it, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how 
it bears us up. (1922: 209)
Erving Goffman’s analysis of ‘face-work’ and ‘impression management’ (1967) similarly 
implies that people are constantly monitoring their self-image in their encounters with others, 
and are emotionally sensitive to the amount of deference they receive or believe to be receiving:
A person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact 
with others allows him... If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken 
for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face 
for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to ‘feel good’; if his 
ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will ‘feel bad’ or ‘feel hurt’ 
(1967: 6).
IS It is interesting to note that exactly the same point was made by Charles Darwin in The Expression o f Emotions in 
Men and Animals, when in the last chapter he discussed blushing and its relation to shame: ‘It is not the simple act 
of reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinking what others think of us, which excites a blush’ (Darwin 1872: 
325, cited in Scheff 1990b: 281).
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In Goffman’s detailed empirical studies of people’s ‘interaction rituals’ in everyday life, one can 
observe that selfhood is a risky business in which an individual’s reputation is always potentially 
endangered by his own behaviour, and the extent to which he plays by the rules of the social 
game. A person’s face, as he puts it, is always ‘only on loan to him from society’, and hence ‘it 
will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it’ (1967: 10). If the 
individual does not live up to the standards which are expected of him, his self-image on the 
public stage may be discredited, ‘causing him shame and embarrassment’ (1967: 106). 
Following this Goffmanian theory, it has recently been argued that the key to understanding 
what human beings find ‘funny’ or ‘amusing’ in other people, and hence why they ridicule and 
laugh at them, is the discrediting of the ‘face’ or self-image which a given individual or group 
tries to portray on the social stage of everyday life (E.S. Jauregui 1998), Goffman’s concept of 
‘face’, therefore, also draws our sociological attention to people’s emotional sensitivity in 
relation to their status-ranking as members of social groups, i.e. to the degrees of respect or 
disrespect they receive from significant others.
More recently, following the insightful theoretical footsteps of Cooley and Goffman, 
Thomas Scheff has demonstrated how human behaviour cannot be properly understood without 
considering what he calls the ‘master emotions’ of pride and shame. His approach begins by 
referring to Durkheim’s classic conception of ‘solidarity’, and his emphasis on the ‘external’, 
‘coercive’ character of ‘social facts’ (1982 [1895]). The problem, Scheff notes, is that Durkheim 
never clearly spelled out the causal sequence implied in his model: ‘What are the steps involved, 
such that individuals experience social control as exterior and constraining?’ (1990a: 73). 
Ultimately, the notion of solidarity (the ‘cement* of social bonds) has remained a black box in 
which no explanatory wiring diagram has been drawn. In order to remedy this lack of clarity, 
Scheff argues that it is necessary to elaborate Durkheim’s views through what he calls the 
‘deference-emotion system* (1990a: 71). Essentially, his argument is that people constantly 
monitor the amount of respect or disrespect they are receiving from others, and that this self- 
awareness triggers an automatic, psychological mechanism of varying degrees of pride or
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shame. Scheff has therefore suggested that such emotions ‘arise out of the innately social 
character of human nature* (1994b: 43).
The experience of selfhood, according to this sociological thinker, is an ongoing process in 
which the individual checks the attitudes, opinions, and judgments of others towards him. This, 
in turn, inevitably affects him emotionally: ‘The degree and type of deference, and the attendant 
emotions of pride and shame, make up a subtle system of social sanctions, a system that leads to 
experiencing social influence as constraining’ (1990a: 74). Scheff has therefore fruitfully 
elaborated a number of key concepts of classic sociological theory by illustrating how 
‘Durkheim’s analysis of social influence implies a deference-emotion system in which 
conformity to exterior norms is rewarded by deference and the feeling of pride, and 
nonconformity is punished by lack of deference and feelings of shame’ (1990a: 95).16 An 
individual’s self-esteem, he therefore concludes, is always a sort of ‘balance between pride and 
shame’, which is related to the amount of respect or disrespect that he receives, or in any case 
believes to be receiving, from others.17 In short, following the insights of Scheff, pride can be 
defined as the emotion of high social status, inclusion, and admiration, while shame can be 
defined as the emotion of low social status, exclusion and denigration. We experience pride in 
moments of achievement, success, and acceptance, and shame in moments of error, failure, and 
rejection.
For the purposes of this thesis, however, what has particularly interested me in the work of 
both Elias and Scheff are the innovative and stimulating contributions which these sociologists
16 It is noteworthy that in his Rules o f Sociological Method, Durkheim himself noted at one point that ‘if in my 
mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the 
social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty’ 
(1982 [1895]: 51). In referring to ‘the laughter I provoke’ and ‘the social distance at which I am kept1, Durkheim 
was implicitly referring to the embarrassment or shame which individuals may experience if they do not abide by 
social norms, and are therefore ridiculed or denigrated. Similarly, in The Elementary Forms o f the Religious Life, 
Durkheim implicitly referred to the emotional gratification of pride which is experienced by individuals when their 
morally upright behaviour is rewarded by praise and deference from others: ‘The man who has done his duty finds, 
in the manifestations of every sort expressing the sympathy, esteem, or affection which his fellows have for him, a 
feeling of comfort, of which he does not ordinarily take account, but which sustains him, none the less. The 
sentiments which society has for him raise the sentiments which he has for himself (1976 [1912]: 211).
17 ‘Self-esteem would be a summary measure, representing the balance between pride and shame states in a person’s 
life, taking into account not only duration but also intensity’ (Scheff 1990b: 284).
have made to the study of pride and shame as the emotions of collective prestige and 
humiliation, or group superiority and inferiority.
The human self, as Elias argued, should be seen as both an I-self and a we-self (1987b: xii). 
People learn to say T  within communities of which they say ‘we’.18 Their self-images are 
therefore composed not only of symbolic conceptualizations of themselves as distinct 
individuals in relation to other individuals, but also as members of groups in relation to other 
groups: ‘An individual does not only have an ego-image and an ego-ideal, but also a we-image 
and we-ideal’ (Elias 1996: 152); ‘A person’s we-image and we-ideal form as much part of a 
person’s self-image and self-ideal as the image and ideal of him or herself as the unique person 
to which he or she refers as “I”’ (Elias 1994b: xlii). As Elias put it in his introduction to 
Involvement and Detachment (1987b: xi-xii), people have a ‘remarkable propensity’ to attach a 
part of their self-love to the groups with which they identify. Hence, they may feel flattered or 
humiliated, respected or insulted, admired or despised, not only in relation to their status as 
distinctive individuals, but also with regard to the prestige of the human collectivities within 
which they symbolically classify themselves, and of which they say ‘we’. In The Established 
and the Outsiders, an ethnographic study of a British suburban neighbourhood, Elias and 
Scotson (1994) empirically illustrated this point by showing how an individual’s sense of self- 
worth can be intensely affected by the ‘group charisma’ or ‘group disgrace’ of a community to 
which he or she belongs.19 With these terms, Elias was referring to what he saw as ‘a universal 
human theme’: the tendency of groups which are, in terms of power and status, stronger than
18 This is one of the fundamental themes in Elias’s sociology: the need to stop thinking in terms of what he called 
the homo clausus or ‘we-less 1’, the image of the human being as a solitary, isolated thinker which has characterized 
the Western philosophical tradition. In opposition to the misleading Cartesian notion of cogito ergo sum, ‘I think, 
therefore, I am’, Elias repeatedly emphasised that only because people live in a society in which they have learned a 
communal language can they think of themselves as individuals who are different from other people: ‘the individual 
is only able to say “I” if and because he can at the same time say “we”. The thought “I am”, more still “I think”, 
presupposes the existence of other people and a communal life with them -  in short a group or society. Each “I” is 
irrevocably embedded in a “we”... Only because people live in society with other people can they perceive 
themselves as individuals different from other people’ (1991a: 62,195).
19 The concept of ‘group charisma’ was inspired by Weber’s notion of Gentilcharisma (‘clan charisma’). This was 
explicitly acknowledged by Elias (1998) in a lecture he delivered at the 1964 congress of the German Sociological 
Association, which in that year commmemorated the first centenary of Weber’s birth by holding this annual 
conference in his honour .
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other interdependent groups, to think of themselves in human terms as better than the others 
(1994b: xvi). He therefore suggested that human associations -  particularly those in established 
positions of high rank -  typically develop a ‘self-praising vocabulary’ through which their 
members derive ‘an immense narcissistic gratification’, in contrast to the denigrating terms of 
abuse they generally employ to stigmatise relatively powerless outsiders.20 In his view, people’s 
tendency to derive pleasure from ‘the feeling that one of the groups to which they belong is 
superior to other groups’ was a ‘rather neglected of the dangers which human groups constitute 
for each other’ (1987b: xi-xii).
In his own writings, Scheff has suggested that his concept of the deference-emotion system 
and its fundamental component, the pride-shame balance of greater or lesser self-esteem, is 
applicable not only to the micro-level of interaction between particular individuals, but also to 
the macro-level of relations between large-scale collectivities. It is noteworthy that Cooley, who 
Scheff has repeatedly acknowledged as one of his key sources of inspiration, explicitly pointed 
out that his concept of the ‘looking glass self could also be applied to a ‘group self or ‘we’, 
which should be seen as ‘simply an “I” which includes other persons’ (1922: 209). Similarly, 
Goffman -  who was one of Scheff s teachers at the University of Chicago -  also pointed out in 
some sections of his work that in many relationships, the members of a group could come to 
‘share a face’ (1967: 42), so that improper behaviour on the part of any of them could become a 
source of collective shame and embarrassment. Scheff has developed these ideas further, by 
emphasising that Cooley’s theory of ‘social self-feelings’, as well as Goffman*s analysis of 
‘face-work’ and ‘impression management’ in the everyday interaction of individuals, can have 
‘considerable relevance’ at the societal level of large-scale, group relations (1994b: 179-80).
20 It is noteworthy that Freud, one of Elias’s fundamental sources of inspiration, similarly pointed out in his essay 
On Narcissism that ego-ideals have both a personal and a collective dimension: ‘The ego-ideal is of great 
importance for the understanding of group psychology. Besides its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is 
also the common ideal of a family, a class, or a nation’ (1952 [19141: 410). In The Future o f an Illusion, he also 
suggested that members of ‘cultural units’ such as nations can derive satisfaction of a 'narcissistic nature’ by 
believing that their collective ideals are infinitely superior to those of others (1961 [1927]: 16). This emotional or 
‘libidinaP aspect in the constitution of human groups was also explored by Freud in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego (1959 [1921]).
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In his Treatise of Human Nature, the great Scottish thinker David Hume -  who devoted 
much of his philosophical attention to describing and classifying emotions -  observed that 
‘according as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we... are elated by pride or 
dejected with humility* (1978 [1739]: 277). However, since our ‘idea of ourself clearly includes 
both individual and collective dimensions, or T  and ‘we* layers, we may be ‘elated with pride’ 
or ‘dejected with humility’ not only in relation to our shifting fortunes as individuals, but also as 
members of groups. More recently, Gabriele Taylor, a philosopher inspired by the writings of 
Hume, has defined ‘pride, humiliation, shame, and guilt’ as the ‘emotions of self-assessment’:
In experiencing any one of these emotions the person concerned believes of herself that 
she has deviated from some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in the 
world. The self is the ‘object’ of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an 
assessment of that self.( 1985: 1)
However, what the work of Elias and Scheff has demonstrated, and what has most inspired the 
theoretical approach I have adopted in my research, is that human beings continuously assess 
themselves and their sense of self-worth not only as distinct individuals vis-à-vis other 
individuals, but also as members of societies vis-à-vis other societies. Hence, on both the 
personal as well as the collective level, *individuals and groups seek to increase their pride- 
shame balance, their moment-by-moment social status’ (Scheff 1994a: 286, italics in original).
2.2 National identity as a historically developed, symbolically constructed, emotionally 
charged, and politically contested component of modern selfhood
During the course of a long-term sociohistorical process, membership to collectivities known as 
‘nations’ has become one component of people’s self-images, as well as of their self-respect. 
This phenomenon, therefore, can be seen as a modem variant of human selfhood at the we-level 
of collective identification: a biologically grounded, socially acquired, symbolic self-conception 
of group-membership (‘l a m a  Spaniard’), and an emotional state of greater or lesser self-esteem 
in relation to this idea (a sense of varying pride or shame in accordance with the relative 
prestige-ranking of Spain vis-à-vis other nations). One could say that part of the ‘face’ or the 
self-love of individuals becomes attached to the power and status of their respective national
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collectivities. Hence, national triumphs and defeats can conceivably affect their pride-shame 
balances, their feelings of relative superiority or inferiority, in the same way as their own 
personal successes and failures. On the basis of numerous criteria, the world’s nation-states are 
all tacitly ranked on a competitive ladder of prestige-ranking. Nationalized individuals therefore 
typically view their own country’s classification on this hierarchic pyramid of international 
status as an aspect of their own self-importance in the world.
One of the first thinkers who emphasised this affective aspect of national identity was John 
Stuart Mill, who suggested in his classic essay On Nationality that a sense of ‘collective pride 
and humiliation’ was one of the fundamental characteristics of this phenomenon (1996 [1861]: 
40). The very same observation was also made a few decades later by the most important figures 
in the early years of sociology. Emile Durkheim, for instance, defined patriotism as ‘the ideas 
and feelings as a whole which bind the individual to a certain State’ (1992 [1950]: 73, my 
italics). In particular, he argued that members of nations were bonded by powerful collective 
emotions of ‘national amour propre ’, and that such sentiments ‘frequently succeed in stifling the 
accents of human solidarity’ (1986 [1899]: 211). Similarly, Durkheim’s nephew and disciple, 
Marcel Mauss, observed that national communities had a dangerous tendency to construct 
ridicuously inflated, self-flattering images of their collective importance in the world:
A nation believes in its civilization, in customs, its industry and its fine arts. It fetishizes its 
own literature, its sculpture, its science, its techniques, its morals, its tradition; in a word, 
its character. It is almost always prey to the illusion of being the world’s pre-eminent 
nation. It teaches its literature as if it were the only literature, science as if it alone had 
contributed to it; its techniques as if it had invented them, and its morals as if they were the 
best and the most beautiful... Not even the smallest nations avoid this. Each nation is like 
the villages of our antiquity and our folklore: convinced of their superiority over the 
neighbouring village, their folk fight with the ‘madmen’ opposite... They are heirs to the 
prejudices of ancient clans, ancient tribes, parishes and provinces, because they have 
become the corresponding social unities, and are individualities that have a collective 
character^ 1996 [1920-1]: 91-2)
In his insightful discussion of The Nation’, published posthumously in Economy and Society, 
Max Weber also emphasised this affective aspect of national identification. He argued that the 
members of nations were bonded by collective emotions of ‘solidarity’, and hence that their 
patriotic actions were often motivated not by purely economic concerns, but rather by what he 
called ‘sentiments of prestige’ (1978 [1918-20]: 921-22). In fact, Weber viewed the pursuit of
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‘power prestige’ as the ‘irrational element in all political foreign relations’ (1978 [1918-20]: 
911), and he suggested that a nation ‘forgives if its interests have been damaged’, but never ‘if 
its honour has been offended’ (1946a [1919]: 118). Elias, for his part, pointed out that ‘powerful 
nations’ were the main contemporary exemplars of ‘group charismatic beliefs’ in a unique, 
collectively shared ‘virtue and grace’ (1994b: xli), and he therefore suggested that nationalism, 
‘whatever else it may be... is also a form of self-love’ (1996: 152).
More recently, the emotional sensitivity members of nations typically feel with regard to the 
relative superiority or inferiority of their countries on the world stage has also been stressed by a 
number of important contemporary authors. Anthony Smith, for instance, has defined the idea of 
‘the nation’ as ‘a cultural and political bond which unites in a community of prestige all those 
who share the same myths, memories, symbols, and traditions’ (1992: 62, my italics). Similarly, 
following the insights of Weber on status groups, Murray Milner has observed that the concept 
of ‘the nation’ implies ‘a sense of common identity and morality -  and, in at least certain 
important respects, a common social status’ (1994: 28). Thomas Scheff, whose sociological 
theory of pride and shame I have already discussed extensively, has fruitfully applied his ideas 
on the human ‘deference-emotion system’ to the collective level of national identification. In his 
book Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War (1994b), he has illustrated the empirical 
validity of this approach through a detailed analysis of Adolf Hitler’s speeches after the Treaty 
of Versailles. As Scheff demonstrates, in many of these impassioned public addresses, the Nazi 
leader repeatedly promised the German people that he would wipe out their nation’s shame and 
recover the honour and dignity of their homeland once again in the eyes of the world. Finally, it 
is also worth referring here to Maurizio Viroli’s For Love o f Country, a recent essay in which 
this Italian political philosopher has suggested that ‘the most distinctive feeling of patriotic love 
is shame’ (1995: 166).
It is crucial to note, however, that there can be a national ‘pride-shame balance’ in relation 
to various different spheres of prestige-ranking or status-stratification. Borrowing Bourdieu’s 
language, one could say that there are several competitive ‘fields’ in which this international 
‘game of honour’ is continuously played. The two most obvious ones are undoubtedly political 
power and material wealth. In these particular arenas, what is at stake is the degree of
25
‘influence’ (including, of course, the ‘influence’ of the nation’s military capacities), and the 
‘prosperity’ with which a given nation is supposedly blessed (always defined in contrast with 
that supposedly enjoyed by other nations). It is to such emotionally charged criteria of status­
ranking that politicians typically refer in their frequent discursive appeals to the so-called 
‘national interest’. Another obvious arena in which national self-love may be flattered or 
humiliated is that of athletic excellence. As Bourdieu (1998a: 79) himself has pointed out, the 
Olympic Games can be seen as a ‘patriotic ritual’ in which national television networks 
overhwhelmingly focus their attention on the events most likely to provide narcissistic 
gratification to the national population in question: ‘The sports given prominence and the 
individual games or meets shown must be carefully selected to showcase the national teams 
most likely to win events and thereby gratify national pride.’ Other important criteria of 
international prestige-ranking which are observable in people’s everyday usage of a nationalized 
*we’ are undoubtedly scientific excellence (‘How many Nobel Prize winners have we won in the 
past?’), technological advancement (‘Are we keeping up to date with the Internet revolution?’), 
or artistic creativity (‘What great poets, novelists, playwrights and film-makers have we given to 
the world?’).
At the same time, although this is rarely noted, another crucial competitive sphere in which 
the national ‘face’ may be flattered or denigrated is that of moral respectability. As Freud 
pointed out, an individual who upholds the ethical ideals which are valued in his society 
typically feels emotionally gratified by ‘the narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think oneself 
better than others’ (1975: 80). It is evident that this Freudian observation can also apply to 
collective levels of self-understanding, such as nationhood. This was in fact explicitly pointed 
out by Durkheim, in his insightful lectures on the ‘civic morals’ of patriotism:
As long as there are states, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more 
warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but 
in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution 
(1992 [1950]: 75). 21
21 These Durkheimian lectures, which in the original manuscript were entitled The Nature o f Morals and Rights, 
were originally delivered at the Sorbonne between 1890 and 1900, and later repeated at the same university, first in
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Hence, a nation’s presumed moral worthiness can also become a crucial mark of ‘distinction* or 
‘disgrace* in the hierarchic global ladder of international prestige.
In the contemporary world, there are many other layers of we-images and we-feelings aside 
from the national one: less inclusive groupings such as the family, the city, the region, and so on, 
and more inclusive ones such as supranational associations, religious communities, and 
ultimately the ‘global village* of humanity as a whole (Elias 1991a: 202). To some extent, it is 
clear that as webs of human contact and interdependence have spread throughout the world, the 
‘circles of collective identification’ have gradually expanded (De Swaan 1995). Elias illustrated 
this point through a comparison with the gruesomely violent forms of recreation which prevailed 
in the days of Ancient Rome:
No doubt the scope of identification is wider than in earlier times. We no longer regard it 
as a Sunday entertainment to see people hanged, quartered, broken on the wheel. We 
watch football, not gladiatorial contests. As compared with antiquity, our identification 
with other people, our sharing in their suffering and death, has increased. To watch hungry 
lions devouring living people piece by piece, or gladiators trying by ruse and deceit to 
wound and murder each other, is scarcely a diversion that we would anticipate with the 
same relish as the Roman senators decked in purple, or the Roman people. No feeling of 
identity, it seems, united those spectators with these other people who, below in the bloody 
arena, were fighting for their lives.(l994: 2-3)
At the same time, however, Elias emphasised that the ‘emotional tinge of we-identity’ had a 
tendency to grow fainter and fainter, as the circles of identification got wider and wider, from 
the family, to the nation-state, to supranational units such as the European Union, and finally to 
the all-encompassing notion of humankind (1991a: 203). Indeed, he observed that in many 
contemporary nation-states, a contradictory code of moral norms appeared to have arisen, in 
which nationalist and humanist values uneasily co-existed with each other. The use of violence 
against all human beings was generally forbidden, but in the context of war this ethical taboo 
could conceivably be broken for the good of ‘the nation’:
In contemporary nation-states the supreme code of one and the same society may impress
1904, and then in 1912. They were first published in French as Leçons de Sociologie, in 1950, and later on in 
English, with the title Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, in 1957.
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upon its members that the single human being, the individual, is the supreme value, and al 
the same time that the sovereign collectivity, the nation-state, is the supreme value tc 
which all individual aims and interests -  even the physical survival of individuals -  are tc 
be subordinated.(Elias 1996: 160)
Several decades earlier, in the same lectures on the ‘civic morals* of patriotism which I cited 
earlier, Emile Durkheim had similarly noted that ‘one of the gravest conflicts’ of his times was 
the tension which had arisen between the ideal of loyalty to the national state, and that of moral 
respect for humankind in general -  between what he called ‘patriotism’ and ‘world patriotism’ 
(1992 [1950]: 72). Today, although it is undeniable that in many countries the defense of ‘human 
rights’ has become a sacred moral principle, the national we-layer of collective identification has 
simultaneously remained an important component of people’s emotional make-up or ‘habitus’.22 
Hence, a curious situation has arisen whereby we-feelings of national pride may conceivably be 
derived in the sphere of moral respectability by the belief that one’s nation is supposedly ‘not 
nationalistic’, but is rather a leading defender of revered ideals such as ‘peace’, ‘freedom’, and 
‘democracy’.
Following Elias’s terminology (1994a [1939]), one could say that a sociogenetic process of 
nation-building has led to a psychogenetic process of identity-formation: the self-awareness of 
people as members of rival, competitive nations, and the related feelings of pride or shame in 
relation to their particular nation’s successes and failures on the world stage. The human 
population has always been divided into ‘survival units’: relatively self-sufficient collectivities 
that have been emotionally bonded by we-images and we-feelings of collective self-love, and 
which have organized themselves to provide security for their members from all external threats 
(Elias 1978: 137-39, Mennell 1994a). What has always existed among such collectivities is the 
phenomenon of social identification, which the Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan has concisely 
defined as:
a process in which people come to feel that other human beings are much ‘the same’ as 
they are and still others are more ‘unlike’ them. It occurs in the course of group formation, 
as part of the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion from which groups emerge in dynamic 
competition. It is both a cognitive and an emotional phenomenon: perceived similarities
22 On the national ‘we-layer’ of people's habitus, see Elias (1991a: 182-3).
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and differences provide a basis for affective involvement and detachment, and the other 
way around.(1995: 25)
These survival units have typically exercised comparatively strict control over the use of 
physical violence in the relations between their members, while simultaneously allowing and 
often encouraging their members to use physical violence against non-members.23 For this 
reason, Elias also referred to them as ‘attack-and-defence units’, and he pointed out that 
‘amongst the greatest dangers to humans are humans. In the name of protecting themselves from 
destruction, groups of people again and again threaten other groups with destruction’ (Elias 
. 1985: 4). Indeed, from the earliest times, he suggested that societies formed by human beings 
have therefore been ‘Janus-faced’, since they have been characterized by ‘inward pacification’ 
and ‘outward threat’ (Elias 1985: 4). Over the course of history, however, it is clear that there 
has been a long-term trend towards the development of increasingly larger survival units, and the 
expansion of emotional identification throughout wider territorial spaces: ‘From small bands of 
twenty-five to fifty members, perhaps living in caves, humans coalesced into tribes of several 
hundred or several thousand, and nowadays more and more into states of millions of people’ 
(Elias 1987c: 225). Nation-states, therefore, can be seen as modem variants of earlier human 
survival units.24 They are inwardly pacified and outwardly defensive associations, which have 
developed their own particular brand of collective we-images and we-feelings.25
23 It is noteworthy that in his classic ethnographic study of the Nuer, the British anthropologist Edward Evans- 
Pritchard observed that amongst these ‘stateless’ people of Sudan, who had no centralized system of authority, 
individuals of the same village felt morally obliged to settle disputes among themselves, and men could in principle 
only fight each other with wooden clubs. However, this respect for others became much weaker between distant 
villages or tribes, and in such cases it was much more common, and often strongly encouraged, for men to fight to 
the death with spears if a conflict arose.(1940: 162-72)
24 The idea that modem nation-states should be viewed as the contemporary versions of small-scale, ancient tribal 
communities has also been proposed and explored by two social anthropologists: Harold Isaacs in his book The 
Idols o f the Tribe (1975) and José Antonio Jauregui in his Las Réglas del Juego: Las Tribus (The Rules of the 
Game: The Tribes, 1977).
25 Given the dichotomy of inward pacification and outward threat which characterizes the modem, national variant 
of human survival units, Elias suggested that ‘a curious split runs through our civilization -  our civilization 
understood now as being that of humanity as a whole. In intra-state affairs, violence between people is tabooed, and 
when possible, punished; in inter-state affairs another code holds good. Every large state is in constant preparation 
for violence with other states, and when it comes to such violence, those who perpetrate it are extremely highly 
valued, and in many cases praised and rewarded.’ For this reason, the author of The Civilizing Process suggested in 
The Germans that ‘we are basically still living exactly as our forefathers did in the period of their so-called 
barbarism.’(1996: 176-7)
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As Durkheim originally argued in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Lifey every human 
society develops ‘collective ideals’ and ‘collective sentiments’ about itself, which are regularly 
reaffirmed through the celebration of ritual gatherings. This, according to Durkheim, was the 
perennial aspect of ‘religion’, understood as a form of collective self-worship in which all gods 
are nothing but symbolic representations of the groups which adore them. In his view, therefore, 
the collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood, as well as the patriotic ceremonies in which 
national communities are regularly venerated, should be viewed as modem variations of a 
common human theme:
Thus there is something in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols 
in which religious thought has successfully enveloped itself. There can be no society 
which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the 
collective sentiments and the collective ideals which make its unity and its personality. 
Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, 
and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in 
common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from 
regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the result which they produce, or the 
processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an 
assembly of Christians, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt, or the 
promulation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life? (1976 
[1915]: 427).
Independently of whether or not one accepts this argument as a valid sociological explanation of 
religion, it seems to me that in the Elementary Forms, Durkheim accurately pointed to the 
symbolic and emotional dimensions of collective identification as a universal phenomenon of 
human societies. Nationalism, with its paraphernalia of flags, anthems, and so on, can clearly be 
seen as a modem variant of what Durkheim called ‘totemism’: an emotionally charged, symbolic 
representation of a collectivity which regularly venerates itself in ritualized ceremonies. The 
question one must then ask is: what are the particular features which distinguish national we- i 
images and we-feelings from earlier collective totems, ideals and sentiments? 26
26 Indeed, as Ruth Wallace (1973) has shown in an illuminating article entitled ‘The Secular Ethic and the Spirit of 
Patriotism’, Durkheim himself actually saw national ideals and sentiments as the secular substitutes which could 
provide modem individuals with a sacred object of moral devotion and collective sacrifice, in the same way that 
religious totems and belief-systems had done in the past. It is also noteworthy that Ernest Gellner (1983: 56) 
referred to Durkeim’s theory of religion in his celebrated study of nationalism: ‘Durkheim taught that in religious 
worship, society adores its own camouflaged image. In a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and 
openly, spurning the camouflage.’
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In an insightful, though little known essay entitled ‘Processes of state-formation and nation 
building*, Elias (1970) explained the specificity of national self-consciousness by referring to 
‘an overall change in the distribution of power chances in society*: a long-term process which 
transformed dynastic states, where ‘the resources of power are very unevenly distributed 
between ruling elites and the mass of the population*, into modem nation-states, where these 
power-differences certainly did not disappear, but became less unequal. At the socio-structural 
level of institutions, this was reflected in the emergence of ‘nation-wide parties and party 
governments’ which adopted ‘ideologies designed to convince the mass of the population that 
they regard the improvement of their conditions, the advance of the welfare of the nation, as 
their central task’ (1970: 282-3). At the symbolic level of we-images, it was reflected in the 
change from people’s conceptions of themselves as the ‘subjects’ of a King, to their self­
understanding as ‘citizens’ of a nation.
More recently, Benedict Anderson has similarly argued that the concept of the modem 
sovereign nation ‘was bom in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying 
the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm’ (1991: 7). Hence, regardless 
of the actual inequality and exploitation that may continue to prevail in contemporary nation­
states, ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship* (1991: 7). In 
Anderson’s view, it is this sense of ‘fraternal love’ amongst compatriots which has made it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people ‘not so much to kill as 
willingly to die’ for their nations (1991: 7). At the same time, following this author, modem 
nations can be understood as ‘imagined communities’ in the sense that for the most part, the 
members of these large-scale collectivities do not personally know each other or interact in face- 
to-face relationships, but they typically conceive of themselves as one fraternal community of 
solidarity, with a shared historical past and a common future destiny: ‘The members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (1991: 6). The spread of texts in 
vernacular languages through the growth of capitalist printing industries, and later on of other 
media technologies such as newspapers and broadcasting, have played (and continue to play) a 
fundamental role in the dissemination of a national self-consciousness across wide stretches of
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geographical space. Hence, the members of any modem nation-state become aware of 
themselves, and constantly reproduce their emotive affiliation with each other, largely through 
the symbols and rituals disseminated by mass media institutions (Thompson 1995), such as the 
daily news broadcasts in which the nation’s political, economic, moral, and cultural health is 
monitored, the televised sports competitions in which ‘our nation’ may triumph or fail in athletic 
arenas, and so on. j
From Emest Gellner’s (1983) work, one can also define the specificity of national self- J 
images and sentiments by referring to the long-term sociohistorical process which transformed 
the world of ‘agrarian’ or ‘food producing’ societies into ‘industrial’ ones. In the former, J 
political and cultural boundaries were seldom congruent, since the dominant minority of land- I 
owning elites, who shared a literate ‘high culture’, had no interest in promoting linguistic | 
homogeneity amongst their subordinate peasants, who were divided into various different groups | 
of illiterate ‘low cultures’: ^
In the characteristic agro-polity, the ruling class forms a small minority of the population, 
rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultural producers, or peasants... The * 
whole system favours horizontal lines of cultural cleavage... The state is interested in I 
extracting taxes, maintaining the peace, and not much else, and has no interest in j 
promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.(1983: 10) I
I
However, the gradual development of a new economic division of labour, that of industrialism, I 
required the spread of a common mass culture and sentiment within sharply delineated territorial | 
boundaries. Hence, in order to create a mobile population with a shared linguistic code of I 
communication and a common sense of identification, nationalist movements did not so much j 
‘awaken’ ancient nations to self-consciousness, but largely ‘invented’ them where they did not j 
previously exist. This, as Gellner has argued, was performed primarily by the imposition of | 
compulsory national systems of education, which spread a homogenous, literate ‘high culture’ I 
throughout a state’s territory (even if this was typically obscured by nationalist ideologies which 
claimed to be defending an old, traditional folk culture):
It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around. Admittedly, 
nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural 
wealth, though it uses them selectively, and it most often transforms them radically... The I 
basic deception and self-deception of nationalism is this: nationalism is essentially the |
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general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken 
up the lives of the majority... But this is the opposite of what nationalism affirms and what 
nationalists fervently believe. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk 
culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the 
peasants.(1983: 57)
Hence, although it may be true that modem nation-states have largely grown out of dominant 
medieval languages and cultures, such as those of England in Britain and Castille in Spain 
(Llobera 1994), it is clear that many other potential ‘nations’ were suppressed or completely 
obliterated in the process of nation-building.27 As Eric Hobsbawm has similarly argued, 
following Gellner’s insights, there is clearly an ‘element of artifact, invention and social 
engineering which enters into the making of nations’, and hence one should say that ‘nations do 
not make states and nationalism but the other way around’ (1990: 10). Of course, the 
effectiveness of the central state’s identity-construction as the legitimate representative of a 
particular ‘nation’ has been more successful in some territories than in others, as the 
contemporary struggles in areas such as Catalonia, Euskadi, Scotland, and Wales illustrate.
In short, national we-images and we-feelings should be seen as the historically contingent, 
sociopsychological outcome of long-term processes involving the development of modem 
industrial states, which have legitimated their authority more or less successfully by claiming to 
represent a particular ‘nation’ within a particular territory. This has been achieved partly through 
the sheer military potency of dominant cultural groups, but furthermore by providing physical 
security, material benefits, and psychological rewards of collective self-love to populations: the 
internal pacification of state territories through effective monopolies of violence and taxation 
(Elias 1994a [1939]), the distribution of welfare throughout the national citizenry (De Swaan 
1988), and the narcissistic gratification of belonging to a ‘great nation’, as narrated by official 
national systems of education. As Elias (1991a: 210) put it, in all nation-states ‘the institutions of 
public education are dedicated to an extreme degree to deepening and consolidating a we-feeling
27 In this sense, I completely agree with Montserrat Guibemau (1996: 51), when she states that: '1 consider the fact 
that some nations survived and created their own state as a matter of historical accident, as it is also an accident that 
some of the nations became divided or absorbed into alien states.’
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based exclusively on the national tradition*.28 Using Durkheimian terms once again, one could 
say that the profane, bureaucratic apparatus of the modem state has been typically legitimated by 
the claim that it serves the sacred national community and its future generations. Hence, because 
the authority of a state is always based on the idea that it represents ‘the nation’ within a 
particular territory, those who are involved in the political struggle to acquire or maintain 
positions of power typically appeal to the collective we-feelings of this community in order to 
gain popular support.
The defense of ‘the nation’, the ‘national interest’, or ‘national pride’ is therefore one of the 
fundamental symbolic strategies of political legitimation in contemporary state societies.29 One 
can observe that ‘the good of the nation’ constantly becomes an object of discursive dispute 
among those who are competing to represent the population in question. Hence, the political 
arena of each nation-state (which people collectively view, listen, or read about across wide 
territories, through the vehicles of the mass media) can largely be seen as a constant struggle 
between rival leaders who claim to best represent, defend, and maintain the security, prosperity, 
and prestige of ‘the nation’ in question. As William Bloom has cogently argued, in modem 
nation-states there is an ongoing competition among political elites to appropriate what he calls 
the ‘national identity dynamic’:
The political attractiveness of the national identity dynamic, of the mobilisation of mass 
national sentiment, is that it is the widest possible mobilisation that is available within a 
state... If a politician, therefore, can symbolically associate her/himself with national 
identity and mobilise it, s/he will then possess a virtual monopoly of popular support 
(1990: 81).
The concept of ‘the nation’ can therefore be seen as an emotionally charged, political symbol 
which is constantly invoked and manipulated by aspiring or established leaders, in their daily
28 In relation to the ‘nationalisation’ of people’s habitus through education, Elias (1987a: x) further noted that ‘the 
history books of nations, particularly those destined for children, are full of battles won and enemies defeated’. For 
this reason, he suggested that national war victories ‘gained in the course of mutual woundings and killings’ had 
become ‘a source of collective pride and rejoicing’ with ‘a firmly entrenched tradition.’
29 In this sense, nationalism can clearly be defined as an ideology, following the neat definition of this term which 
has been proposed by John B. Thompson: ‘meaning in the service of power’ (1990).
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struggles to acquire popular support within particular territories.30 31One could say that there is an 
ongoing political contest to flatter the narcissistic sentiments of national self-love among the 
mass public by offering to populations what one could call conflicting paradigms of national
<5 1
greatness in the various competitive spheres of international status-ranking: political power, 
economic prosperity, moral respectability and so on. One has only to read the press or watch the 
evening news on any particular day in order to observe the way in which contemporary 
politicians typically present themselves and their programmes as the most effective guardians of 
the national ‘face*, and its related we-feelings of collective pride and shame.32 As Elias put it, 
‘people in power can usually count on a warm response of approval and often of affection or 
love from their compatriots they praise or add to the glory of the social unit they all form with 
each other* (1987a: xii).
The British anthropologist Abner Cohen has suggested that in all societies, authority is 
typically legitimated and loyalty is often invoked by the manipulation of collective symbols 
which are emotively charged due to their relation to people’s conceptions of themselves and 
their existential condition in the world. For this reason, ‘the totality of the self is thus subject to 
the most intensive competition between various types of power groups’ (1974: 60). Humans 
everywhere face what Cohen refers to as ‘the perennial problems of existence’: evil, misfortune, 
illness, decay, and death. However, in modem as well as in pre-modem societies, individuals are 
not totally helpless in the face of such difficulties, because collective solutions and remedies are 
always on offer from competing political groups:
30 As the anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1993: 39) has argued, the concept of ‘the nation’ must be seen as a 
politically contested symbol which can have ‘multiple meanings offered as alternatives’ and may be ‘competed over 
by different groups manoeuvering to capture the symbol’s definition and its legitimating effects.* Bourdieu (1991: 
105) has also referred to ‘nations’ as one example of what he calls the symbolic ‘struggle over classifications’ 
which characterise the discursive power contests in which competing political factions aim to impose ‘the definition 
of the social world that is best suited to their interests.’
31 My use of this concept has been inspired by the anthropologist Victor Turner (1974: 17), who suggested that the 
political process of any society can be viewed as a conflictive ‘arena* in which there is an ongoing ‘social drama’, a 
‘trial of strength between influential paradigm-bearers’ who offer conflicting representations of ‘the good life’. In 
my case, I have been interested in the way in which political leaders in modem nation-states put forward conflicting 
paradigms of how their respective nations can maintain their ‘greatness’ in the world.
32 This discursive strategy evidently applies not only to ‘the nation’ which the official central state claims to 
represent, but also to the case of rival peripheral ‘nations’, whose representatives may aspire to establish their own 
political autonomy.
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We do not face these problems of human existence on our own. For most of us, the major 
groups, the great corporations to which we belong, take care of this side of our life... They 
teach us that we die, but continue to live within our lineage, motherland, nation, the party. 
We are made to identify with and project ourselves into a continuing, eternal force which 
is larger than ourselves, within which we should continue to live after our death. This is 
developed and inculcated in ceremonies of all sorts: state funerals, cenotaphs, memorial 
services.(1974: 62)
This is how one should understand the potency of ‘the nation* as a politically contested | 
component of modem selfhood: its emotive power resides in its relation to people’s images of | 
themselves as members of a ‘historic’ national community, which both stretches back into the  ̂
past, and extends forward into the future. In what Weber famously called the ‘disenchanted’ | 
world of modernity (1946c [1919]: 155), national self-images may therefore provide a secular | 
substitute for religion, an emotional palliative which helps people to confront the problem of J 
mortality and the meaning of life. Although many human beings may no longer believe in a | 
heavenly afterlife of eternal bliss, they may find some solace in the idea that ‘the nation’ to j 
which they devoted their lives will continue to exist after they die, and will honour them in the I 
future for their services to the fatherland. As Elias pointed out, a national we-image ‘grants the J 
individual a chance of survival beyond actual physical existence: survival in the memory of the | 
chain of generations’ (1991a: 223-4). 33 In this sense, following the insights of Bourdieu on .!
i
human mortality which I discussed earlier, the ‘recognition’ or ‘distinction’ which people ■ 
receive not for what they accomplish as individuals, but for what they achieve collectively as 1 
members of nations, may also become a meaningful justification for living. j
As Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 109-119) has cogently argued, the ideology of nationalism j 
should indeed be seen as a form of ‘collectivized’ or ‘group immortality’, a way of alleviating I 
the fear of mortal insignificance through the belief that ‘we’ as individuals will die, but ‘our j 
nation’ will continue to survive after we disappear from the face of the earth. This is
33 From this perspective, nationalism has recently been defined by the anthropologist Josep Llobera (1994) as ‘the 
God of modernity’. The same point has also been made by Anderson (1991) and Smith (1991).
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undoubtedly one of the fundamental reasons for nationalism’s emotional potency as a political 
discourse of power-legitimation:
The construction of group immortality can be interpreted as an attempt to harness the 
energy generated by death-anxiety in the service of specific group interests and, of course, 
the interests of the group’s extant or aspiring elites.(1992: 123)
Furthermore, this pursuit of ‘collectivized immortality’ through the continuing survival of ‘the 
nation’ can itself become an issue of prestige-competition and status-stratification, since it may 
be publically proclaimed (and widely believed) that other weaker nations may sink into the 
‘dustbin of history’, but ‘ours’ never will:
Generally speaking, the strategy of group immortality consists in exempting one’s own 
group from the condition of transience which extends to all other categories and 
collectivities of the human species. Other groups are temporalized; their presence in 
history is made into an episode. Those groups make a brief entry onto the historical stage 
which is bound to be promptly followed by an exit.(1992: 119)
Hence, it is certainly not infrequent to hear political leaders making emotionally charged claims 
about how their programmes and their policies are the ones which will ensure the continuing 
prosperity, dignity, and happiness of our nation's children. As the political philosopher David 
Miller has written, national identity involves ‘an essentially historical understanding in which 
the present generation are seen as heirs to a tradition which they then pass on to their successors’ 
(1995: 175). In this sense, the collective emotions of national pride or shame may also be 
derived by imagining the continuing triumphs, as well the potential humiliations, which ‘our 
nation’ may experience in the future, when we are no longer on this side of the grave.
In Abner Cohen’s terms, ‘the nation’ can therefore be seen as a ‘bivocal symbol’ of 
modernity, in the sense that it can simultaneously fulfil both personal, existentialist functions of 
self-meaning, as well as political functions of power-legitimation.34 A national self-image may 
not only provide individuals with an emotionally appealing answer to the question ‘Who am I?’,
34 ‘The most dominant symbols are essentially bivocal, being rooted, on the one hand, in the human condition, in 
what may be called “selfhood”, and on the other in the relations of power’ (1979: 87); ‘the more potent the symbol, 
the more total the involvement of the self (1977: 123).
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but for this very reason it may also determine their response to the question: ‘Who should I 
support with my obedience, my consent, my vote, my money, or perhaps even my life?’ In other 
words, a person’s self-awareness of himself as a national citizen, and his emotional sensitivity in 
relation to the well-being and prestige of his country, both today and in the future, may crucially 
determine his political affiliations to those leaders who are perceived as its most effective 
sentinels. For all of these reasons, the emotively charged we-image of ‘the nation’ is always an 
extremely contested object of political dispute in the media-transmitted political struggles of 
each modem state society. The ‘pride-shame balance’ of the national ‘face’ is monitored on a 
daily basis in the press and in television news broadcasts, and leaders are constantly judged 
according to their capacity or inadequacy to maintain the nation’s reputation in the world, in the 
different competitive fields of international prestige-ranking.
In this thesis, therefore, national identity will be understood as a symbolically constmcted, 
emotionally charged, and politically contested component of modem selfhood that has 
developed, and is developing, over the course of a long-term sociohistorical process. To identify 
with a nation involves: (1) a symbolic understanding or we-image of oneself as a member of a 
nation which is (subjectively) classified on a hierarchic ladder of global prestige, in various 
arenas or fields of international status-competition (e.g. political power, economic prosperity, 
moral respectability, athletic excellence, etc.); and (2) a shifting emotional state or we-feeling of 
greater or lesser self-esteem, pride or shame, in relation to what is perceived to be the particular 
ranking of one’s nation in these different ‘games of international honour’. Such we-images and 
we-feelings, however, evidently do not emerge out of the blue, in some sort of sociocultural 
vacuum. On the contrary, these collective ideals and sentiments must necessarily be analyzed as 
(3) historically conditioned, politically contested symbols and sentiments which are constantly 
invoked in the ongoing, discursive struggles for power and legitimacy that take place in 
contemporary nation-state societies.
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3. Methodological considerations: The study of ‘Europe’ as a historically 
conditioned, emotionally charged, and politically contested symbol
In the opening chapter of this introductory section, I stated that the approach I have adopted for 
the study of national identity has been inspired above all by Norbert Elias’s ‘process-sociology’. 
I shall now explain more clearly what I mean by this, in order to justify the particular 
methodological strategy I have employed in my research. The whole of Elias’s oeuvre can be 
understood as an attempt to demonstrate the interrelations between long-term sociohistorical 
processes and the psychological make-up or emotional ‘habitus’ of individuals. His most famous 
application of this approach is of course The Civilizing Process (1994a [1939]), which 
essentially tries to illustrate the connections between the ‘sociogenesis’ of the modem state and 
the ‘psychogenesis’ of relatively ‘pacified’ and ‘self-controlled’ individuals (in contrast to the 
relatively ‘unrestrained’ and violent habitus which prevailed in earlier times). Leaving aside the 
numerous controversies which this ambitious argument has provoked, and irrespective of the 
extent to which it is empirically accurate or ‘reality-congruent’,1 what in my view seems 
undeniable is that in The Civilizing Process, Elias inaugurated a new, highly innovative research 
programme which broke down the disciplinary boundaries between history, sociology, and 
psychology: a novel synthesis which aimed to discover the sociohistorical processes which have 
moulded the malleable psyche of human beings over the course of time. Indeed, in the final 
concluding synopsis of this book, Elias himself described the investigations he had carried out as 
those of ‘a science that does not yet exist’, a new project for which he proposed two possible 
names: ‘historical psychology* and ‘historical social psychology’ (1994 [1939]: 484).* 2
! The concept of ‘reality-congruence’ was employed by Elias (1987b) himself to refer to the degrees of empirical 
validity or ‘object-adequacy* which a particular symbolic depiction of the world may have. The conclusions he 
proposed in the final chapter of The Civilizing Process have been attacked with particular vigour by social 
anthropologists, many of whom have viewed this book as a misguided, ethnocentric glorification of a supposedly 
superior, less violent, Western ‘civilization’. For a review of these criticisms, which in my view are based on a 
complete misreading of Elias’s original text, see Mennell (1992) and Van Krieken (1998).
2 Recently, however, Arpad Szakolczai (2000) has proposed that Elias’s work should be placed within the larger 
framework of what he calls ‘reflexive historical sociology’ -  an approach which, according to this Hungarian 
scholar, characterized the later writings of Max Weber, and whose later protagonists include Michel Foucault, Franz 
Borkenau, Eric Voegelin, and Lewis Mumford.
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For the methodological purposes of this thesis, however, the most relevant of Elias’s works 
is undoubtedly The Germans (1996), a much less known collection of essays in which he 
attempted to apply his unique sociological outlook to the study of national sentiments. In this 
book, Elias proposed what one could perhaps call a sociohistorical psychology of national pride. 
His fundamental methodological point was that in order to understand the collective emotions of 
a national community, the sociologist above all has to delve into its past, in order to analyze the 
particular historical trajectory of its vicissitudes on the world stage. In this way, one can focus 
on the we-images of relative inferiority or superiority, and the we-feelings of pride and shame, 
which have emerged during the course of a particular nation’s history, in its competitive 
struggles for power and status with other national collectivities. Elias actually compared the 
sociologist’s task in this field of study to the objectives which his great intellectual mentor, the 
founder of psychoanalysis, had set himself when he began to explore the anxieties and 
insecurities of his mental patients:
The central question is how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented 
into the habitus of its individual members. Sociologists face a task here which distantly 
recalls the task which Freud tackled. He attempted to show the connection between the 
outcome of the conflict-ridden channelling of drives in a person’s development and his or 
her resulting habitus. But there are also analogous connections between a people’s long­
term fortunes and experiences and their social habitus at any subsequent time. At this layer 
of the personality structure -  let us for the time being call it the ‘we layer’ -  there are often 
complex symptoms of disturbance at work which are scarcely less in strength and in 
capacity to cause suffering than the individual neuroses.(1996: 19)
In particular, Elias stressed the importance of focusing on the collective we-feelings of national 
pride, a sensitive topic which was generally avoided due its morally repugnant associations with 
the horrors of the Third Reich, but which in his view the sociologist had a scientific duty to 
dissect and explore:
The problem of national pride remains undiscussed. The memory of the distorted form of 
national pride prevalent under the National Socialist regime has made this topic 
unmentionable. I think one should not hesitate to grasp the nettle. There are indeed forms 
of national pride which are dangerous and insulting. But the question is not whether one 
thinks national pride is a good or bad thing. The fact is that it exists. If one looks around 
disinterestedly, it is evident that all people in all states in the world have to come to terms 
with the problem of national pride... Even in the most powerful countries, national pride is 
and remains a sore spot in the personality structure of the people concerned. This is 
particularly true of countries which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a 
lower position within the pyramid of states.(1996: 17)
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These eloquent passages from The Germans have been key sources of inspiration for the 
comparative-historical research which I have carried out in this thesis.
Following Elias, my first methodological task has therefore been to delve into the British and 
Spanish past, in order to trace the particular trajectories of these two nation-states in the global 
‘pyramid of states’. My fundamental objective has been to understand the relationship between 
collective we-feelings of national pride and the affective meanings of ‘Europe’ which have 
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century in my two case-studies. Hence, I have 
particularly focused on what EC/EU membership came to represent in these two countries as a 
result of their particular positions on the world stage at the time the process of European 
integration was initiated, in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the British case, this has 
essentially involved coining to grips with the predicament of an established ‘world power’, 
resisting the necessity of ‘entering Europe’ until it was clear there was ‘no other alternative’. In 
the Spanish case, it has fundamentally involved analyzing the humiliating situation of a 
denigrated outsider, aspiring to be ‘accepted by Europe’ in order to overcome the shameful 
stigma of Francoist ‘backwardness’. Hence, my first methodological task has involved a 
thorough examination of the secondary sources which are available for these two countries on 
this particular historical period. For this purpose, I have primarily relied on works written by 
historians, but in some cases also by political scientists, international relations scholars, 
intellectuals, and journalists.
At the same time, however, I have also combined this ‘Eliasian* investigation into the 
historical and socio-psychological roots of national we-feelings in Britain and Spain, with a 
second, equally important methodological endeavour: an analysis of the dominant political and 
media discourses on ‘Europe’ which have emerged in the public spheres of these two case- 3
3 I have purposely avoided employing the term ‘discourse analysis’, since this is associated primarily with the 
techniques which have been developed by the sociolinguist Teun Van Dijk (1988) and his school. In my view, this 
methodological strategy is seriously flawed from a sociological perspective, because it involves a largely de- 
contextualized, ahistorical study of linguistic utterances and grammatical constructions. At the same lime, it focuses 
almost exclusively on the cognitive aspects of language, and pays little or no attention to the emotional dimensions 
of discourse which have been the central concern of my own research.
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studies.4 In order to do so, I have attempted to bring together a Durkheimian focus on collectiv 
symbols and sentiments with a Weberian analysis of political conflict, by studying what on 
could call the politics o f national symbolism and the politics o f national sentiment. Durkheim, a 
I have already suggested, was undoubtedly a sociological pioneer in the study of how emotions 
solidarity is generated in human societies through the medium of collective symbols and rituals 
The problem with his approach, however, is that it overwhelmingly stresses the function o 
symbols and rituals in the maintenance of a homogenous, unified, consensual ‘society', withou 
considering the way in which symbols and rituals may be employed as strategic weapons in th< 
ongoing conflicts which take place in all societies between rival political factions.5 It is for thi: 
reason that in my view, Durkheim’s teachings on the construction of emotional solidarity 
through symbolism and ritual need to be combined with Weber's insights on the political 
struggle for power and authority: the passionate, discursive war in which words ‘are noi 
plowshares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought’, but rather ‘swords against the enemies’ 
that are employed by politicians as *a means of canvassing votes and winning over others’ 
(1946c [1919]: 145). From this perspective, one can analyze how competing political groups 
manipulate emotionally charged, collective symbols and employ rituals strategically to defend or 
attain power vis-à-vis other groups (Lukes 1975: 302). As Randall Collins has cogently argued, 
if Durkheim's insights on symbolism and ritual are combined with the Weberian tradition of 
‘conflict sociology’, one can analyze how rival political leaders attempt to monopolize what he 
calls ‘the means of emotional production’, in order to generate collective enthusiasm for their 
programmes:
Ritual is a weapon usable by some groups to dominate others, by manipulating emotional 
solidarity as well as the lines of group identification to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others. Politics may thus be described as a struggle by, with, and over ‘the 
means of emotional production' (1987: 117).
4 In my use of the term ‘public sphere’, I am following the classic definition proposed by Jürgen Habermas: ‘By 
“public sphere” we mean first of all a domain of social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed... 
Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion... When 
the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence- 
newspapers... radio and television are the media of the public sphere’ (1991: 398).
5 As Stephen Lukes (1982: 23) has put it, ‘power... is the great blind spot of Durkheimian sociology’, which is 
characterised by ‘a systematic neglect of politics.’
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In spite of the remarkable progress which the project of European integration has made this 
century, every member state of the EU has clearly maintained its own nationally bounded arena 
of political conflict, its own symbolic battlefield of discursive struggles. National we-images and 
we-feelings have therefore functioned and continue to function as highly contested objects of 
political dispute in each country. In my research, therefore, I have attempted to analyze how the 
collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood have been invoked in the respective public 
spheres of my two case-studies, in order to build up legitimacy and popular support for different 
positions towards ‘Europe’.
This particular methodological focus has been promoted in recent times by a number of 
authors from different disciplines who have been working in the field of study which one could 
broadly classify under the heading of ‘political symbolism and ritual’. For instance, in an 
illuminating book entitled Two-Dimensional Man, Abner Cohen has argued that power and 
symbolism are the two major variables that pervade human social life, in modem as much as in 
pre-modem contexts: ‘Everyhwere political man is also symbolist man’ (1974: 137). Hence, 
according to this anthropologist, a proper understanding of any society necessarily requires an 
analysis of the interrelations between symbolism and politics. Cohen defines symbols as 
‘objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of 
disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions, and impel men to action’, while politics 
refers to ‘the processes involved in the distribution, maintenance, exercise and struggle for 
power’ (1974: xi). Although symbols exist in their own right and may be analyzed for their own 
intrinsic values, ‘they are nearly always manipulated, consciously or unconsciously, in the 
struggle for, and maintenance of, power between individuals and groups’ (1974: 11). Hence, 
Cohen has suggested that the political process can be analyzed as an ongoing discursive contest 
in which competing factions invoke emotionally charged symbols in their attempts to acquire or 
maintain power and legitimacy.
Another anthropologist, David Kertzer, has also argued that ‘politics is expressed through 
symbolism’, and therefore that to understand the political process in any society, it is necessary 
to analyze ‘how political actors consciously and unconsciously manipulate symbols’ (1988: 2).
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Kertzer has particularly emphasized the importance of rituals as powerful tools of politic 
action in which leaders attempt to guide cognition and channel emotion so that their author! 
may be legitimated and their policies may gain enthusiastic support. In his view, the power < 
rituals resides in the fact that they are ‘able to unite a particular image of the universe with 
strong emotional attachment to that image' (1988: 40). He also stresses that the political use c 
symbolism and ritual is not necessarily a conservative force to maintain a particular power orde: 
On the contrary, he rightly argues that the manipulation of symbols and rituals is equal! 
important in the process of political contestation and change. The point is that people’ 
allegiance and enthusiasm for any political cause, whether for the defense of the status quo o 
for the overthrow of a government, is always drummed up through the utilisation of symbolisn 
and ritual: ‘Symbolism is necessary to prop up the governing political order, but it is alsc 
essential in overthrowing it and replacing it with a different political system' (1988: 147).
For the most part, anthropologists have generally carried out studies of symbolism and ritual 
in small-scale ethnographic investigations of ‘tribal’ communities.6 In his own work, however, 
Kertzer has emphasised that the study of political symbols and ceremonies can be particularly 
important and fruitful in our own contemporary, industrialized societies. This is because the 
modem nation-state is not like the traditional village in which all members of the community 
know each other and interact in face-to-face relationships, but instead has no palpable existence 
outside the symbolism through which it is envisioned: ‘Living in a society that extends well 
beyond our observation, we can relate to the larger political entity only through abstract 
symbolic means. We are, indeed, ruled by power holders whom we never encounter except in 
highly symbolic representations' (1988: 8). As Michael Walzer has similarly put it, ‘the state is 
invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, 
imagined before it can be conceived' (1967: 194).
6 As one practitioner in this field has put it: ‘Social anthropologists have consistently neglected the study of ritual, 
especially political ritual, in modern Western society. Until very recently most have preferred to continue their 
traditional interest in the exotic, whether in distant lands or among peasant groups closer to home. Though ritual 
plays an important role in modern European politics, only a few pioneers have been prepared to study the topic’ 
(MacClancy 1993: 119).
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Within the field of political science, the figure who has done the most to promote a 
methodological focus on political symbolism and ritual is undoubtedly Murray Edelman. More 
than three decades ago, in his insightful writings on ‘the symbolic uses of politics’ and ‘politics 
as a spectator sport’ (1964: 5), this author suggested that:
For most men most of the time, politics is a series of pictures in the mind, placed there by 
television news, newspapers, magazines, and discussions. The pictures create a moving 
panorama whic take place in a world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its 
members come to fear or cheer, often with passion and sometimes with action... Politics is 
for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience 
teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent... The 
parade of ‘news’ about political acts reported to us by the mass media and drunk up by the 
public as drama is the raw material of such symbolization.(1964: 5)
From Edelman’s perspective, the political process can therefore be analyzed as an ongoing 
discursive contest in which leaders invoke emotive symbols of threat or reassurance in their 
attempts to acquire power and legitimacy:
The point is that every political institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular 
response in its audiences... So government not only confers benefits; its forms also placate 
or arouse spectators... For the spectators of the political scene every act contributes to a 
pattern of ongoing events that spells threat or reassurance. This is the basic dichotomy for 
the mass public.(1964: 12-13, my italics).
Hence, Edelman suggests that if the conventional study of politics concentrates on ‘how people 
get the things they want through government’, his approach focuses on ‘the mechanisms through 
which politics influences what they want, what they fear, what they regard as possible, and even 
who they are’, by analyzing ‘the meanings for large publics of the acts and gestures of leaders’ 
(1964: 20).
For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant aspect of Edelman’s work is of course his 
emphasis on the national dimension of contemporary political symbolism and ritual. For 
instance, this author has drawn attention to the ‘patriotic ceremonies affirming the greatness, 
heroism, and nobility of the nation’ as key vehicles in the symbolic legitimation of modem 
states. At the same time, in his book on ‘politics as symbolic action’, Edelman has focused on 
the constant invocations which are made in contemporary political discourses with regard to the 
defense of the so-called ‘national interest’ -  i.e. the attempts which politicians typically make to
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wrap themselves up in the national flag, in order to ‘mobilize mass publics behind particular 
concrete interest groupings* (1971: 12). The effectiveness of this tactic is that ‘it conveys the 
message that these interests are the “national interests”: that the whole nation is involved in them 
and must patriotically support them* (1971: 157).
Following these and other authors in the growing field of political symbolism and situal,7 in 
my research I have analyzed how the collective we-images and we-feelings of nationhood have 
been invoked in Britain and Spain to rally support for both positive and negative outlooks 
towards ‘Europe*. More specifically, I have tried to focus on how sentiments of national pride 
(and shame) have been manipulated to defend different postures towards the EC/EU in 
conflicting political discourses and rituals of legitimation or de-legitimation. In this way, as 
Gerard Delanty has suggested, my aim has been to study the concept of ‘Europe’ as a 
sociocultural construction ‘which means different things to different people in different contexts’ 
(1995:3), and to analyze the discursive struggles over the definition of this idea as a kind of 
symbolic football match: ‘the ball is Europe, the players the identity projects, and the pitch the 
geo-political reality on which the game, in this instance the discourse, is played’ (1995: 4). The 
very same point has been stressed by the proponents of an ‘anthropology of Europe’:
We should recognize the plurality and diversity of the many different Europes that exist, 
and have existed, and the ways in which these different meanings might be deployed to 
different effect. The way to see these different ‘Europes* is as cultural conceptions 
advanced by diverse groups competing for hegemony in the political arena.(Goddard, 
Llobera, and Shore 1994: 30)
From this perspective, I have attempted to analyze what Alan Milward has recently called ‘the 
symbolic role of “Europe” in political rhetoric’ (1997: 15), through an exploration of how this 
concept has been employed by rival political leaders, in their discursive attempts to build up 
popular support for themselves in each of my case-studies.
Given the objectives of my research, I have also been particularly inspired by Weber’s 
classic essay Politics as a Vocation, in which he pointed out that political leaders often try to
7 See also Geertz (1973), Alexander (ed., 1987), Thompson (1990), Abeles and Rossade (eds., 1993), Perez-Diaz 
(1993), Desfor-Edles (1998).
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build up popular support for themselves not only by offering material rewards to their potential 
followers, but also by enticing their egos with what he called ‘premiums of vanity* (1946a 
[1919]: 81).8 Throughout this thesis, I shall illustrate how in both Britain and Spain, political 
leaders have attempted to promote EC/EU membership by offering to their respective publics 
what one could call, following Weber, premiums of national vanity -  in other words, self- 
flattering we-images of their nation's status-position in the world. More specifically, I shall 
focus on the three key spheres of international prestige-ranking which have been particularly 
relevant in the debates over ‘Europe* that have taken place in both case-studies: political power, 
economic prosperity, and moral respectability. The difference, as I shall argue, is that given the 
different historical trajectories of these two countries, in the British case it was rather difficult to 
combine the idea of ‘belonging to Europe' with collective we-feelings of national self-love, 
while in the Spanish case ‘Europe’ could more smoothly be transformed into an emotionally 
appealing source of national pride.
With regard to this aspect of my research, the fundamental source of data has been the 
national press of my two case-studies, in which I have analyzed both the rhetoric on ‘Europe’ 
that has been employed in ritualized political speeches, as well as in the headlines, articles, 
editorials, and cartoons of the leading newspapers.9 The reason I have opted for this 
methodological strategy is that, as I pointed out in the previous section of this introductory 
chapter, it is fundamentally through the mass media that national populations are routinely 
informed about their country’s successes and failures in the different fields of international 
power rivalry and status competition. As Anderson has argued, one of the fundamental ways in 
which the citizens of modem nation-states ‘imagine’ themselves as fraternal communities of
8 Weber defined ‘vanity’ in another section of this same essay as ‘the need to personally to stand in the foreground 
as clearly as possible’ (1946a [1919]: 116).
9 With regard to the selection of newspapers, in order to be as comprehensive as possible, I have carried out an 
exhaustive analysis of all the leading national dailies in both of my case-studies. Hence, for my analysis of Britain, I 
have looked at both the main broadsheets, The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, and The Independent (as 
well as their respective Sunday editions), and the leading tabloid papers: The Daily Mirror, The Daily Express, The 
Sun, and the Daily Mail. In the Spanish case, for the Franco period I have looked at Arriba, ABC, and Ya, and for 
the democratic period 1 have analyzed El Pais, ABC, and Diario-16.
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fellow countrymen is through the daily ‘mass ceremony’ in which the national press is read 
every morning by millions of people who do not personally know each other:
The significance of this mass ceremony -  Hegel observed that newspapers serve modem 
man as a substitute for morning prayers -  is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, 
in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs 
is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence 
he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.(1991: 35)
In this way, the readers of national newspapers are ‘symbolically integrated into a public whose 
common concerns are shown by the narrative of the world represented’ (Chaney 1993: 117). 
Alexis de Tocqueville made this very same point in his classic study Democracy in America:
Only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before a thousand readers... 
Newspapers do not multiply simply because they are cheap, but according to the more or 
less frequent need felt by a great number of people to communicate with one another and 
act together... A newspaper can only survive if it gives publicity to feelings or principles 
common to a large number of men.(1994 [1835]: 517-19)
As the social psychologist Michael Billig has illustrated, the language of the national press 
reproduces the symbolic categorizations which classify ‘us’ every day as members of particular 
‘nations* (‘Home News’/ ‘National events’), in relation to ‘others’ (‘Foreign News’/ 
’International events’):
All broadsheets, whatever their politics, maintain a principle of news ‘apartheid’ - keeping 
‘home’ news and ‘foreign’ news paginally separate... Without conscious awareness, we 
find our way around the familiar territory of our newspaper. As we do so, we are 
habitually at home in a textual structure which uses the homeland’s national boundaries, 
dividing the world into ‘homeland’ and ‘foreign’.(Billig 1995: 118)
The discourse of every newspaper is filled with underlying assumptions about ‘the nation’ in 
which ‘we’ live. There are, for instance, constant references to ‘the Prime Minister’, 'the 
economy’, 'the country’, ‘the weather’. No further specification is necessary: it is taken for 
granted that 'the Prime Minister’ or 'the economy’ is ‘our’ Prime Minister and ‘our’ economy. 
Editorials, in particular, employ the national ‘we’, ‘us’, and ‘our’ in speaking to and for ‘the 
nation’. They morally judge political figures according to their capacities to maintain national 
security, prosperity, and prestige. Such language, as Billig argues, indicates ‘the nation’ at the
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center of the reader’s and the writer’s shared symbolic universe. It unconsciously reminds ‘us’ 
everyday of who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ stand in the global hierarchy of international prestige, 
in the competitive fields of politics, economics, ethics, science, art, sports, and so on.
The methodological approach of my thesis has therefore combined two fundamental tasks. 
Firstly, I have attempted to acquire an accurate sociohistorical understanding of the national 
pride-shame balance in my two case studies, and its relationship to the process of European 
integration. In particular, following the insights of Elias, as well as Scheff, I have focused on the 
dominant national self-images and collective emotional sensitivities of these two nation-states, 
and how they developed in relation to the post-war project of European unification. Secondly, 
against the background of this historical and socio-psychological contextualization, I have 
analyzed the dominant political and media discourses on ‘Europe’ which emerged in my two 
case studies during three critical time-periods in the history of Britain’s and Spain’s relations 
with the EEC/EU: their initial failed attempts to enter ‘the Common Market’, their ultimately 
successful entries into the ‘European Economic Community’, and the 1991 summit meeting at 
which the Maastricht Treaty was agreed and hence the ‘European Union* was officially bom. I 
have chosen these three episodes because they all clearly represent critical junctures in which 
‘Europe’ became an important issue for debate in the public spheres of my two case-studies. 
Hence, they offer three ideal historical contexts in which one can compare the influence of 
national we-images and we-feelings on the emergence of different contested outlooks towards 
‘Europe’.
Following the insights of the authors I have mentioned earlier in the field of political 
symbolism and ritual, throughout my research I have paid particular attention to the political 
ceremonies or ‘media performances* (Elliot 1980) in which the relationship of ‘the nation’ to 
‘Europe’ was defined in emotionally charged discourses -  such as the televised ‘messages to the 
nation* in which the decisions to enter the EEC were officially announced by British and 
Spanish leaders, the signature rituals in which their respective entries into ‘Europe’ were 
formalized with much ceremonial pomp, and the press conferences in which the outcome of the
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‘historic* Maastricht negotiations were publicly announced. Throughout my analysis of thes 
key episodes, my central focus has therefore been the ‘political spectacle’10 in which aspiring o 
established leaders have put forward their rival visions of ‘Europe* during ritualized ceremonie 
transmitted by the mass media, and the leading national newspapers have voiced their agreemen 
or disagreement with regard to such viewpoints in their editorials, cartoons, and so on.
Many previous studies which have explored the relation between national identities anc 
collective attitudes to Europe have done so primarily through quantitative analyses 01 
‘Eurobarometer* surveys (e.g. Hewstone 1986, Reif 1993). However, although these 
investigations may certainly provide some indication of general trends in public sentiment at a 
particular moment in time (and indeed throughout this thesis I have occasionally cited the results 
of such studies amongst the British and Spanish populations), there is clearly no way one can 
carry out a historically contextualized, interpretative exploration of what ‘Europe* means in 
different national contexts, and what affective charge this symbol carries, merely through an 
analysis of opinion polls. In this sense, I completely agree with Anthony Smith, who in his 
seminal article ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity*, pointed out that ‘in few areas 
is the attitude questionnaire of such doubtful utility as in the domain of cultural values and 
meanings’ (1992: 57). Smith therefore suggested that what was clearly lacking in this field of 
research was a series of case-studies which would analyze collective perceptions of Europe over 
time in different nation-states, ‘as recorded in political traditions and symbolism, in national 
mythologies and historical memories, and as relayed in... the mass media*. Following these 
methodological suggestions, in this thesis I have aimed to capture the dominant collective 
perceptions and affective meanings of ‘Europe* in my two case studies, through an analysis of 
the emotionally charged statements of political leaders trying to sell themselves to the public, as 
well as the discourse of mass-circulation newspapers, who also attempt to reach an audience as 
wide as possible. As 1 pointed out earlier in this introductory chapter, such symbolic *50
10 I am borrowing this concept from Murray Edelman, who has argued in one of his books that the political news 
transmitted by the media ‘comprise a spectacle’ and ‘serve as a meaning machine: a generator of points of view and 
therefore of perceptions, anxieties aspirations, and strategies... generators of meanings that shape political 
quiescence, arousal, support or opposition to causes’ (1988: 10).
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representations evidently do not fall from the sky, in some sort of sociocultural vacuum, but are 
clearly constrained by the particular historical trajectories and collective memories of a given 
national community. Hence, my objective has been to study the public sphere in each of my 
case-studies as a competitive discursive arena or ‘symbolic market’ (Bourdieu 1991) in which 
the invocation of national we-images and we-feelings in political and media discourses has been 
conditioned by each particular country’s past fortunes on the world stage.
Since my argument is built up chronologically in my two case-studies, and involves the 
narration of a continuous historical trajectory for each of these two countries, I have divided the 
thesis into an initial section on Britain, in which the three mentioned episodes are analyzed in 
one block of three chapters, and another section on Spain in which the same three time-periods 
are studied in another three chapters. In this way, the reader is first immersed into the history of 
the British pride-shame balance and its relationship to ‘Europe’, which is illustrated in these 
three critical junctures, and afterwards is led into the contrasting historical experience of Spain 
and its relation to ‘Europe’ during these same key time-periods. Finally, in the concluding 
chapter, I sum up the fundamental arguments of the thesis, by comparing and contrasting each of 
the three episodes which I have analyzed in my two case-studies, as well as drawing out the 





‘Europe’ as a symbol of 
national decline

“We are with Europe, but not of it We are linked, but not 
compromised. We are interested and associated, nctf
absorbed. We belong to no single continent, èwi to all 
We have our own dream and our own task. ”
Winston Churchill
B
4. Attempts to ‘enter Europe’: A painful adaptation to the nation’s loss of 
‘world power’
When the project of European integration began to take shape in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the United Kingdom was still hierarchically ranked as a ‘world power* with global 
aspirations and responsibilities. After its heroic war victory, Britain enjoyed a place amongst the 
so-called ‘Big Three*, with a secure place at the ‘Top Table* of international diplomacy. This 
was a time when British children were still being taught geography with school maps in which a 
very substantial portion of the globe had been shaded in red, the colour-symbol of ‘the Empire’.1 
As two writers from this country have recalled, ‘it was still a time when there seemed nothing 
comic or incongruous about the prefix “Great” for Britain* (N. Beloff 1973: 15), or when a 
popular saying asserted that ‘to be bom an Englishman was to have drawn the top card in life’ 
(Haseler 1996: ix). Hence, from such a standpoint of global power and prestige, the very idea of 
Britain’s submersion in a European federation was simply inconceivable amongst the vast 
majority of its political elites, since the United Kingdom was considered to be much more than 
‘just another European country.’1 2 At that time, the dominant paradigm of British national 
greatness was still that of a nation which could allow itself much greater aspirations on the world 
stage, through its special ties with the United States, as well as the leadership of its Empire-cum- 
Commonwealth: ‘Yes, Britain was in Europe but not only in Europe... To think of Britain as just 
a western European nation would have been to belittle her national and international status* 
(Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 6).
Hence, when the war came to an end there was ‘a profound difference in outlook and 
psychology on the two sides of the Channel’ (Kitzinger 1973: 21). While most of the continental 
countries had suffered extremely harsh blows to their national self-confidence through the
1 As the Labour politician Giles Radice (1992: 4) has recalled: ‘When I was a child in India during the last days of 
the British Raj, I used to gaze at a map of the world, a quarter of which was coloured in red.’
2 This claim was made by Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary in the post-war Labour administration headed by 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Cited in Haseler (1996: 125).
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humiliating experience of defeat and foreign occupation, British pride was enormously enhanced 
by its prestigious role in the Allied victory: The war had been different for the British and it had 
left them not with a sense of national failure and a feeling of national inadequacy, but with a 
sense of national achievement and an illusion of power’ (Camps 1964: 3). If Europe’s post-war 
unification was fundamentally driven by the need to achieve the economic, political, and moral 
‘rescue’ of its devastated nation-states through a collective pooling of strength (Milward 1992), 
it seems evident that this necessity was felt much more acutely on ‘the Continent’ than in Britain. 
On the whole, the British people still maintained a much more inflated and ambitious self-image 
of their place in the world’s hierarchic ladder of power and status:
After the Second World War most states in Western Europe were concerned primarily with 
their own economic recovery, and with rediscovering a sense of national identity of a war 
that had resulted in defeat and national humiliation for the Germans, and that had involved 
the division of almost all the other nations of Western Europe between fascists and anti­
fascists, collaborators and resistance fighters. While these states were formulating their 
foreign policies in line with such objectives, Britain continued to formulate its foreign 
policy in global terms.(George 1990: 13)
The Europeanist call to ‘unite or perish’ therefore made relatively little sense in the British 
context of post-war self-confidence, for the situation did not appear to be so desperate. On the 
contrary, the British people could easily derive considerable collective pride from the relatively 
strong and prestigious status which they still enjoyed after their courageous war effort, in 
comparison to the ravaged continental countries. At the same time, they had very little reason to 
doubt what they generally perceived as the uparalleled excellence, fairness, efficiency and 
stability of their nation’s political institutions. On the contrary, the war victory had renewed 
many British people’s self-gratifying faith in the supposedly unrivalled moral superiority of their 
country’s democratic traditions and its sovereign Parliament. In short, as David Marquand (1995: 
184) has written, ‘in 1945 [Britain] was the proudest state in Western Europe, with the most to 
be proud of.’ There seemed absolutely no reason to risk Britain’s global prestige, economic self- 
interest, and political autonomy with supranational ‘European’ experiments, for the traditional 
framework of the nation-state had served the British people very well.
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Hence, at least initially, Britain’s governing elites generally maintained a rather distant and 
paternalistic stance towards the supranational project of European integration which began to 
take shape in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. Instead of actively participating in this process, 
they preferred to pursue a foreign policy that remained fully consistent with the distinctive status 
of a proudly independent global giant. From their perspective, the notion of pooling sovereignty 
in a European federation may have been entirely appropriate for ‘them’, the utterly devastated, 
unstable continental countries, but not for ‘us’, the British people, a nation which could still 
undoubtedly afford the luxury of higher ambitions, as well as the honourable burden of greater, 
world-wide responsibilities: ‘In the heady postwar years, Britain would have considered a 
stridently European posture far too parochial. Europe began at Calais; if Britain had a consistent 
stance at all, it was as a warm but detached supporter* (Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 6-7).
By the early 1960’s, however, this collectively shared sense of lofty national self-confidence 
had begun to dissolve, due to the gradual weakening of British status in a bipolar world now 
clearly dominated by the two undisputed ‘superpowers’, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
During that year, the Conservative government led by Harold Macmillan ultimately decided to 
put foward an application to join the European Communities, the only option which remained in 
order to find a new source of national strength. At that point, the economic success of the EEC, 
in contrast to the declining situation of the UK,3 caused British leaders to fear the dangers of 
being excluded from such a prosperous club, as well as of losing political influence on the world 
stage. As one author has put it, when Britain turned to Europe, this occured ‘more by a process 
of elimination than one of choice’ (Allen 1988: 169), only when the attempt to maintain a 
distinctive ‘world power’ status had completely failed, and there seemed to be no other 
alternative if further status-decline was to be avoided. In Britain, the application to ‘join Europe’ 
was thus hardly an easy policy to promote and sell to the public, for it inevitably appeared to
3 T h r o u g h o u t  th e  1 9 5 0 ’ s , th e  a v e r a g e  g r o w t h  ra te  w i t h i n  E C S C / E E C  c o u n t r ie s  w a s  4  p e r  c e n t, c o m p a r e d  w i t h  a
f i g u r e  o f  2 . 3  p e r  c e n t  f o r  B r i t a i n  ( f i g u r e s  c ite d  in  S a n d e r s  1 9 9 0 :  1 4 4 ) .
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symbolize the definitive collapse of much greater aspirations, the end of a ‘global vocation’, and 
therefore a humiliating lowering of British rank in the hierarchic global ladder of international 
prestige. Hence, from the beginning, one can observe that the decision to ‘become European’ 
inevitably provoked a passionate outbreak of discursive controversies in the British public 
sphere. To make matters worse, the road to the EEC proved to be a rather long and 
embarrassingly difficult one, since both this initial attempt, as well as a second try under the 
premiership of Harold Wilson in 1967, were blocked by Charles de Gaulle. In both cases, the 
French leader proclaimed that Britain lacked sufficiently ‘European’ credentials to enter the 
exclusive, ‘members only’ club in which Monsieur le President had clearly become the self- 
appointed pontifex maximus, in his efforts to reconstruct la grandeur de la France, after the 
collective humiliations this nation suffered during World War H. In this chapter, therefore, I shall 
illustrate how in the British case, the approximation towards ‘Europe’ represented a painful 
adaptation to the loss of a widely cherished ‘world power’ status, and hence could not easily be 
transformed into an uncontested, potent source of national pride.
4.1 The decline of British power and status: from self-confident ‘national greatness’ to self- 
doubting collective anxiety
One of the best ways to illustrate the proud we-image which characterized the emotionally 
charged discourse of British leaders after the war victory is by considering the eloquent rhetoric 
of Sir Winston Churchill. Indeed, this self-confident grandeur was displayed quite clearly by 
Churchill during his influential Zurich speech of 1946, which I cited earlier, in which he 
famously called for the creation of ‘a sort of United States of Europe’.4 This public address can 
be seen as one of the most significant political rituals which got the ball of European integration 
rolling after the war, and it earned Churchill a rightful place among the so-called ‘founding
4 The Times, 2 0  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 4 6 .  T h e  re s t o f  t h e  q u o t a t io n s  c it e d  f r o m  C h u r c h i H ’s s p e e c h  a re  a ls o  t a k e n  f r o m  this
n e w s p a p e r ’s r e p o r t s .
fathers’ or ‘patron saints’ of European unity (Milward 1992). Nevertheless, the discourse which 
he employed made it totally plain that in Churchill’s mind, Britain would in no way be a part of 
this continental association. Rather, along with the world’s other ‘great powers’, the United 
Kingdom would warmly encourage the construction of European unity from the sidelines:
Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and, I trust, Soviet 
Russia -  for then, indeed, all would be well -  must be the friends and sponsors of the new 
Europe and must champion its right to live.
Churchill’s grand, idealistic proposal, therefore, did not envision Britain within the future 
‘United States of Europe’, since this would be completely incongruent with the ‘distinction’ or 
‘status honmour’ it enjoyed as one of the world’s giants. Of course, the ex-Prime Minister 
assured that Britain would certainly support this honourable project from its powerful position of 
global strength and influence (and in this way it could derive some extra amounts of self- 
gratifying national pride in the sphere of moral respectability). Hence, from this perspective, 
while ‘they, the Europeans’ needed to unite in order to survive, ‘we, the British’ were not seen as 
a part of this continental grouping, because this was a national ‘we’ which could allow itself 
greater, much more prestigious aspirations. As Ralf Dahrendorf (1982: 136) has summed up this 
condescending, collective British attitude: ‘Europe, that was the others’.
Indeed, it is worth considering Churchillian discourse in some detail, given the historic 
influence of this cherished war leader, and his symbolic role as one of the most popular totemic 
emblems of modem British nationhood (as is illustrated, for instance, by the prominent place 
reserved to artistic representations of his famous portly figure, with a cigar in one hand and the 
sign of Victory held up with the other, in key places of the national homeland such as London’s 
Trafalgar Square). Such an analysis demonstrates that the paradigm of British national greatness 
which Churchill clearly believed in and publicly promoted was one of Anglo-American world 
leadership. In the preface to the first volume of his widely read History o f the English-Speaking 
Peoples, he wrote:
For the second time in the present century the British Empire and the United States have
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stood together facing the perils of war on the largest scale known among men, and since 
the cannons ceased to fire and the bombs to burst we have become more conscious of our 
common duty to the human race... Vast numbers of people on both sides of the Atlantic 
and throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations have felt a sense of 
brotherhood^1956: vii)
Churchill emphasized that there was absolutely no contradiction between this powerful 
partnership of ‘the English-speaking peoples’ and ‘the erection of structures like the United 
States of Europe’ (1956: vii). However, he made it clear that the national we-image which he 
stood for sought the maintenance of British national status and collective pride through an 
Atlantic union with the United States, rather than by merging with the continental Europeans. 
The power potential which Churchill foresaw in this transatlantic, Anglo-American bond was 
also made patent at a dinner in the White House after his election victory in 1951, during which 
he triumphantly proclaimed: ‘Do you not feel, round this table, that there is a gathering of the 
governance of the world, not to dominate it, mind you, but to save it?’(cited in N. Beloff 1973: 
80) Such words reflected a remarkably self-confident and narcissistically gratifying vision of 
global power which was to be exercised by ‘the English-speaking peoples’. Furthermore, this 
Anglo-American project was simultaneously promoted as a collective victory in the international 
‘status game’ of moral respectability, through the bold claim that all of humanity would 
supposedly be served by such an alliance.
It was Churchill, furthermore, who also laid out a highly influential vision of Britain’s place 
in the world which located the United Kingdom at the intersection of three great circles: the 
Empire/Commonwealth, America, and Europe. Britain’s links with ‘the Continent’ were thus 
perceived as merely one aspect of the nation’s global importance, a relatively minor component 
of its we-image as an established ‘world power’. In an essay written in 1930, Churchill 
proclaimed:
We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested 
and associated, but not absorbed. We belong to no single continent, but to all. We have our 
own dream and our own task.(Cited in Reynolds 1988: 225)
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Twenty-three years later, when as Prime Minister he rejected Britain’s participation in the 
project of the European Defence Community, Churchill reiterated this idea once again in a 
parliamentary speech:
Where do we stand? We are not members of the EDC, not do we intend to be merged in a 
federal European system... We are with them, but not of them. We have our 
Commonwealth and Empire.5
Hence, although Churchill was undoubtedly a passionate promoter of European unity, it is also 
clear that he never abandoned ‘the idea of Britain’s extra-European status as head of a world­
wide community and joint leader, with the United States, of the English-speaking world’ (N. 
Beloff 1963: 47). From this perspective, which was widely shared, both Britain’s imperial links 
and responsibilities, as well as the ‘special relationship’ with America, were viewed as much 
greater sources of national pride than the highly unattractive, rather demeaning concept of losing 
sovereignty by joining a supranational European federation. As George (1990: 39) has put it, ‘the 
Churchillian doctrine of the three spheres of influence was the prevalent view: Britain was a 
global power, and only incidentally a European power.’
Although the war had seriously weakened Britain economically, the discourse of its leaders 
largely continued to display the resilience of this proud, self-confident we-image. In spite of the 
relative inferiority of its military might and its material strength in comparison to the USA and 
the USSR, Britain was nevertheless portrayed as a nation with an unparalleled moral prestige 
which still had a unique influence and a special, distinctive role to play on the world stage 
(Blackwell 1993: 98-100). As the Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee put it in an emotive 
speech delivered in 1946:
It is for us to show that the British way of life, with its freedom and democracy, with its 
kindliness, and with its acceptance of the moral values on which alone true civilization can 
be founded, can in peace as in war be an example to the whole world.(Cited in Blackwell 
1993: 99)
5 The Times, 12 May 1953.
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In the discourse of Attlee’s post-war government, the idea of Britain’s moral world leadership 
was linked both to the progressive development of the Commonwealth countries, as well as to 
the construction of the welfare state at home. This project demanded firm control of the national 
economy, and hence the leading figures of the Labour government feared that its success could 
be put in danger by transferring sovereignty to a supranational European authority. As the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, declared in 1950:
We are determined not to put these gains in peril through allowing vital decisions on great 
issues of national economic policy to be transferred from the British Parliament at 
Westminster to some supra-national European assembly... We intend to hold what we have 
gained here in this island.(Cited in Northedge 1974: 145-6)
The achievement of better living standards and welfare services in Britain was itself promoted as 
an important source of national pride in the moral sphere, an example of social improvement that 
should be imitated by other countries in Europe and throughout the world.
Monarchic figures also played a very important role in the maintenance of Britain’s proud 
national we-image. For instance, the discourse employed by King George VI after the war 
victory similarly emphasized the idea of Britain’s ethical preeminence, and the way in which its 
respected voice could still have a major impact on the destiny of humanity:
In the supreme councils of the world, she [Britain] speaks not merely with an authority 
based on physical force and war potential, but also with a moral authority, and with an 
unrivaled experience in the handling of men and human affairs.(Cited in Blackwell 1993: 
100)
Indeed, as David Cannadine (1983: 150-54) has shown, spectacular royal rituals such as the 
coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953 continued to celebrate ‘the continuity of Britain as a great 
power*. Hence, the new Queen’s dress displayed embroidered emblems of all the dominions, 
numerous regiments of Commonwealth and colonial troops marched in solemn procession, and 
at one point the archbishop of Canterbury even proclaimed euphorically that the British nation 
had approached the Kingdom of Heaven on that very special day. Indeed, the discourse
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employed by the monarch in her address continued to reflect the British desire to maintain its old 
grandeur in the world, even if this was becoming increasingly difficult:
I am sure that this, my coronation, is not a symbol of power and splendour that are gone, 
but a declaration of our hopes in the future.(Cited in Cannadine 1983: 150)
According to Marquand (1995), for many years after the war a ‘whig imperialist vision* of 
nationhood dominated the mentality of Britain’s entire political class:
Young or old, the myths and symbols that embodied the whig imperialist vision conveyed 
a simple message. The British state was a uniquely imperial state, and the British a 
uniquely imperial people, constituted as a people by their decision to pursue an oceanic 
rather than a European destiny... Almost certainly, it cut across the boundaries of class as 
well as of ideology... For, on the central questons of identity and nationhood -  
fundamental to any state -  the whig imperialist vision enjoyed a kind of hegemony.(1995: 
187)
Similarly, Hugo Young (1998: 14) has pointed out that during this initial post-war period, 
‘hardly anywhere, on the left and the right, in the journalistic or literary or political milieus, was 
the concept of Britain’s solitary greatness, uniquely positioned at the hub of several global 
groupings, subjected to serious reassessment.’ The belief that Britain remained a great power 
was ‘a given of national politics’, and the consensus was that ‘the island nation belonged not to 
the continent, but to the world’ (H. Young 1998: 25,43-4).
Hence, one could say that during this period, the dominant national we-image continued to 
place Britain on a much higher plane of status and prestige, in comparison to the lower ranking 
which was ascribed to the continental European countries: ‘The British felt themselves to occupy 
significantly higher ground in all their dealings with “the Europeans’” (Robbins 1998: 308). 
Although the greatest days of imperial glory may have been over, it was widely believed that the 
United Kingdom could still play a distinctive global role, playing the part of wise ‘Greeks’ who 
enjoyed a privileged position in America’s ‘Roman Empire’ (Hartley 1963: 60). Hence, even if it 
may have admitted that Britain was no longer the dominant power in the world, its position was 
seen as being ‘at the right hand of the new dominant power, the US, acting as a sort of first 
lieutenant’ (George 1990: 39). As Alan Milward has put it in his detailed study of this period,
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British foreign policy-making throughout the early post-war decades was based on the belief that 
Britain ‘was still in some sense a great power whose foreign policy should reflect that position’, 
a view that ‘drove it towards rhetoric and away from realistic policies’ (1992: 395).
For the most part, the British governing elite therefore maintained a stance of relative 
indifference and aloofness towards the major steps which were initially taken in the process of 
supranational European unification, the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. It had been widely assumed that the Commonwealth, as well as the 
‘special relationship’ with the Americans, would be sufficient to maintain national prosperity and 
prestige, without having to resort to a humiliating submersion in the pooling of national 
sovereignties which the EEC represented. The customs union agreed in the Treaty of Rome was 
seen as a first step towards supranationalism, an unpalatable concept for all those who still 
believed in Britain’s distinctive, independent importance on the world stage. Furthermore, it also 
implied a common external tariff which appeared to be incompatible with Britain’s traditionally 
wider patterns of trading in the world’s ‘open seas’ (Porter 1987: 124-125). In particular, the 
EEC represented a threat to Britain’s system of trade preferences with the Commonwealth 
countries, and hence to what had traditionally been an important source of cheap food and raw 
materials.
The Commonwealth factor, moreover, was not merely an economic issue, but also one which 
was emotionally and morally charged. In the first place, to some extent it continued to provide 
the British we-image with a ‘fake illusion of global power’ (N. Beloff 1963: 90). Furthermore, 
many British people had relatives in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
South Africa. Therefore, the possibility of constructing a tariff wall around Britain on 
Commonwealth products, which could potentially be imposed by ‘foreign’ European authorities, 
was seen as a totally immoral, unacceptable policy -  a ruthless betrayal or turning of one’s back 
on these beloved members of the British ‘family of nations’. As the Tory politician Lord 
Selboume put it: ‘The continental nations may be charming neighbours and good friends, but
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they are not to be preferred to our own kith and kin who owe allegiance to the Queen’ (Jowell 
and Hoinville 1976: 9-10).
The EEC therefore clashed not only with Britain’s self-perceptions of its proud role in the 
world as joint leader of the Western world, along with the United States, but also with what were 
perceived to be its national economic interests and ties of loyalty with the Commonwealth. 
Hence, to some extent, British leaders attempted to frustrate the objectives of ‘the Six’ by 
promoting the alternative of a wider, looser trading unit: the European Free Trade Association, 
or EFTA (Greenwood 1992: 68-73). The appeal of this rival project was that it would lower 
tariffs amongst its members, while allowing each of them to set its own duties on external trade 
from outside the group. It would thus give Britain the advantages of free trade with European 
countries, without losing its Commonwealth preferences or giving up any aspects of its national 
sovereignty.
However, in the end this British aspiration to maintain an ‘independent global role’ failed 
miserably. Instead, as two authors from this country have candidly recognized, Britain suffered a 
painful downfall ‘from primacy back to mere ordinariness’ (Hill 1988: 34), or ‘from palmy 
greatness to anxious mediocrity’ (Holmes 1994: vii). One early indication of British weakness 
was the Suez crisis in 1956, which Hugo Young (1998: 99, 108) has eloquently defined as ‘the 
terminal calamity of Empire’ and ‘the death-blow for Britain’s fading belief in her imperial 
reach’. The humiliating failure of this military operation in Egypt, as a result of America’s 
staunch opposition, was clearly a ‘psychological shock’ (Sanders 1990: 89) which made evident 
the reduction of British power, and stimulated the growth of anti-imperialist nationalism 
throughout much of the Commonwealth.
Suez, furthermore, was only one symptom of a more widespread national infirmity. In 1960, 
the cancellation of the Blue Streak nuclear missile programme, as well as Harold Macmillan’s 
failed attempt to act as a peace-maker between the USA and the USSR at a ‘superpower’ summit 
in Paris, further revealed that Britain could no longer be considered a truly significant player in 
the ‘world power’ league. By this stage, Britain had lost much of its old imperial prestige, it had
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become entirely dependent on the United States for its defensive nuclear capacity, and in fact it 
was now even beginning to slip in the economic league tables in comparison to the members oi 
the European Common Market (Sanders 1990: 143-44). In 1959, the EFTA agreement had 
joined Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland together in a free 
trade partnership of non-EEC nations, but it quickly became very evident that these ‘Outer 
Seven’ seemed to be no match for ‘the Six’. At this point, ‘the post-war view that the British 
economy was fundamentally stronger than any other in Western Europe had to be abandoned in 
the face of the evidence* (George 1990:41).
The fear of isolation and decline thus grew, and politicians such as the ex-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting began to voice this concern in ‘pro-European’ publications 
which defended the need for Britain to join the EEC before it was too late:
Is there a way of extricating ourselves from the predicament in which we are now placed? 
Can we avoid being excluded from Europe and priced out of the Common Market or shall 
we be confined to the role of impotent spectators of a continental comunity growing and 
expanding in wealth and power at our expense? (1960: 113)
Indeed, the Americans themselves now increasingly saw Britain as 'just another country in 
Europe’, and began to put pressure on their supposedly ‘special’ British friends to give up their 
global aspirations and take part in the EEC as a way of fortifying Western unity against the 
Soviet Union. From the perspective of the United States, Britain’s economic integration in 
Europe was simply seen as ‘the natural corollary’ to Britain’s military role in NATO (Sanders 
1990: 146). Indeed, the Kennedy administration proposed a new ‘Grand Design* in the Western 
world’s struggle against Communism based on two fundamental pillars: one in America and the 
other in Western Europe. Within this framework, Britain was now considered as simply one part 
of the wider EEC pillar. As one analyst of British foreign policy has put it:
The picture which more and more Americans tended to form of Britain in the second half 
of the 1950s was of an ageing, self-satisfied prima donna who insisted on holding the 
limelight though the glory of her youth were long passed, while her friends were forming 
successful business partnerships after their retirement from the political theater.(Northedge 
1974: 171)
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Indeed, it was an American ex-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who famously ridiculed 
Britain’s delusions of grandeur in a public address delivered during these years:
Great Britain has lost an Empire and not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate 
power role -  that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with 
the United States, a role based on being the head of a ‘Commonwealth* which has no 
political structure, or unity, or strength... this role is about to be played out.6
Even ‘the English-speaking peoples’ across the ocean, therefore, seemed to be telling the British 
that they should swallow their pride and face the facts. Policy-makers in Britain therefore began 
to fear that if their country did not join ‘the Six’, the United States would soon begin to consider 
the emergent EEC, rather than a weak, isolated UK, as its most important and powerful partner 
in the West (J. W. Young 1993: 71).
Hence, however difficult it may have been to admit it, Britain’s old national we-image of 
global preeminence increasingly began to lose its plausibility, and the decision to ‘join Europe’ 
was in fact a key aspect of this country’s painful adaptation to the new reality of reduced power 
and status. When other, more ambitious and prestigious alternatives had failed, British leaders 
ultimately turned to the EEC as the only option which remained to avoid the possibility of 
becoming ‘an insignificant has-been, living with its memories’ (Northedge 1974: 228). In the 
British case, one could therefore say that ‘Europe’ was a sort of last straw rather than a widely 
desired aspiration.
4.2 The First Attempt: Macmillan’s struggle to promote ‘Europe’ amidst passionate cries 
of ‘Shame!’
Given this particular context of national we-images and we-feelings, it is perhaps not very 
surprising that when Prime Minister Macmillan timidly announced the decision of his 
government to open negotiations with the European Common Market on 31 July 1961, he was
6 C i t e d  i n  The Times, 6  D e c e m b e r  1 9 6 2 .
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immediately interrupted by an emotive cry which was yelled from both sides of the Parliament 
floor: ‘Shame!’7 The Conservative leader’s tone was extremely cautious, and he assured his 
audience that Britain would only join the EEC if it gained terms of entry which fully guaranteed 
the country’s economic interests, as well as those of its Commonwealth. The shyness with which 
Macmillan made this controversial announcement was ingeniously captured by a cartoon that 
was published on the following day by The Guardian [reproduced on the following page]. It 
showed the Prime Minister coyly dipping his toe into the English Channel, as he looked out 
towards the territory of the ‘COMMON MARKET* in the distance, while the ankle of his other 
foot remained tied down to British soil by the weight of a heavy anchor. Nevertheless, in spite 
Macmillan’s evident reticence with regard to this difficult decision, his prudently uttered words 
were enough to enrage a member of his own party, Mr Anthony Fell, who interrupted the Prime 
Minister and called him a ‘national disaster* for ‘his decision to gamble with British 
sovereignty*.
During the parliamentary debates which followed Macmillan’s announcement, another Tory, 
Sir Derek Walker-Smith, proclaimed that he found ‘something humiliating’ in the belief that his 
country’s economic strength could only be preserved by joining the EEC, since it was ‘on 
Britain’s special and separate position that its greatness had rested.’8 At the same time, the leader 
of the Labour Party at that time, Hugh Gaitskell, also warned Macmillan that British opinion was 
‘simply not ripe’ for the idea of a Federal Europe. He pointed out that ‘the very idea of switching 
preferences which have been in favour of the Commonwealth into preferences against them is 
difficult to stomach’. In his view, this was ‘not purely an economic issue’, but also a question of 
‘moral obligations’ to ‘our great multirracial Commonwealth - of whose development we are all 
so proud.’ Another member of the Labour Party, Miss Jennie Lee, similarly intervened in a
On this event, see The Times and The Guardian, 1 August 1961.
%The Guardian, 3 August 1961. All the other interventions cited from the parliamentary debates on the EEC 
: application are also taken from the reports in this newspaper.
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The Guardian, 1 August 1961
hostile manner to warn the Prime Minister that the British people had ‘too much pride, as well 
sense’ to think they could solve their own problems by ‘looking for a bunkhole’ in Europe.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Macmillan’s announcement was also greeted wi 
loud cheers which warmly supported the move towards ‘Europe’ as a new hope for Britain 
future. In fact, what was essentially inaugurated on that day was a symbolic and emotional batt 
concerning the fate of ‘the nation’ and its relationship to the European Community, which to 
considerable extent is still going on today. It was a passionate conflict between two rival vision: 
the older we-image which saw British national pride as fundamentally linked to the leadership c 
its Commonwealth and its distinctive global preeminence through the ‘special relationship’ witl 
the United States, in opposition to a new we-image which aimed to find a new source of powe 
and status through collaboration in the project of European unity.
In the discourse with which Macmillan cautiously attempted to legitimate the decision tc 
begin negotiations with the EEC,* 9 he emphasized that the best hope for security and prosperity, 
both for Britain as well as for its Commonwealth, could now only be found through the 
opportunities offered by the Common Market. Otherwise, if the British people did not accept that 
the glory days of the past were over, the future could be a gloomy one:
In a changing world, if we are not to be left behind and drop out of the main stream of 
world life we must be prepared to adapt our methods.
In a context of Cold War fears and tensions, the Prime Minister warned that Britain could no 
longer seek in isolation ‘a security which our geographical position no longer gives us’. Taking 
part in the project of European integration was therefore presented as a new, morally respectable 
national project: a way to put Britain ‘in the vanguard of the movement towards a greater unity 
of the Free World’.
_ j
9A11 quotations from The Guardian and The Times, 1 and 3 August 1961.
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Macmillan, in any case, attempted to reassure those who were concerned about the 
supranational aspects of the Common Market by claiming that the EEC was ‘an economic 
community, not a defence alliance or a foreign policy community or a cultural community/ He 
asserted that the ideal of a federal Europe which would follow the model of the United States 
was a ‘false analogy’, and that
the only practicable concept would be a confederation or Commonwealth which would 
retain the great traditions of and pride of individual nations while working together in 
clearly defined spheres for their common interests.
Membership of the EEC was therefore presented not only as the best guarantee for British 
security and prosperity, but also as an option which in no way threatened the nation’s ‘great 
traditions’ or its ‘pride’. At that time, the concept of a Europe des patries favoured by the French 
President Charles de Gaulle had indeed watered down the supranationalist aspect of the EEC, 
and hence made it more acceptable to many British minds.
As Britain’s negotiations with the EEC proceeded, the Prime Minister delivered a televised 
address to the country in which he continued to promote the virtues and advantages of the 
European option.10 During this media-transmitted political ritual on ‘the state of the nation’, 
Macmillan essentially asked the public to give up the old ideals of the past and wake up to a new 
reality in which Europe was now the right way forward for Britain:
Now it’s no good pretending. Some people naturally feel like this, that we can go back to 
the old world, before the war. A lot of people do look backward, but the real test you must 
bring to this question is are you going to look forward?
This policy shift was also justified once again in the competitive status-sphere of morality: 
membership of the EEC was depicted as a potential source of ethical pride for Britain because it 
represented ‘the end of Europe’s quarrels’ and therefore a ‘work of peace and progress’. At this 
point in national history, Macmillan assured his countrymen that the best way to maintain a
,0A l l  q u o t a t io n s  f r o m  The Times, 2 1  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 6 2 .
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dignified, respectable position in the world was through the European solution: he claimed that 
the ‘great historic reason’ why his government had applied to enter the EEC was ‘to preserve the 
power and strength of Britain in the world’. It was thus a direct appeal to the British people’s 
collectively shared pride-shame balance. ‘Europe’ was now undoubtedly the right way forward, 
the most realistic alternative to retain as much national strength as possible, given that the old 
global ‘greatness’ of the past had been lost for good:
if we were not in Europe our influence would begin to decline, and with the decline of our 
influence in Europe we should lose our influence in the world outside.
The Prime Minister was thus essentially arguing that ‘Europe’ was now the best Britain could do 
to preserve as much influence and status as possible, even if admittedly it was not all that its 
people might have desired.
However, the traditional British we-image could hardly have died down so easily, and in fact 
was kept fully alive by the harsh, discursive counter-attack which was soon delivered by 
Gaitskell. On the day after Macmillan’s address, the leader of the Labour Party seized his own 
opportunity to speak to ‘the nation’ through a television broadcast, and proclaimed that the 
Common Market was certainly not the only way for Britain to be ‘strong and prosperous’ in the 
world.11 Indeed, he warned that membership in a European federation would be a devastating 
blow to everything that Britain had represented since its very foundation:
Let us be clear what it means. We become no more than Texas and California in the United 
States of Europe. It means the end of a thousand years of history. It means the end of the 
Commonwealth, for the Commonwealth cannot be just a province of Europe.
Gaitskell proclaimed that the British people felt much stronger emotional ties to countries like 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, with ‘our institutions and language’, than with the 
countries of Europe. Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, the Labour leader totally rejected
m A 1I q u o t a t io n s  f r o m  The Times , 2 2  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 6 2 .
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the idea that the EEC represented the right choice for global ‘peace and progress’. In his view, 
the British Commonwealth represented the greatest hope for humanity’s welfare as a whole, 
given its world-wide character, and so it was presented as a much more appropriate and 
honourable source of national pride in the sphere of morality:
The Commonwealth is a tremendous force for peace because it embraces so many races 
and so many continents. Do not think the British people, given the chance to decide as they 
should be, will in a moment of folly throw away a tremendous heritage of history.
The two main British leaders therefore put forward two radically opposed views: ‘Europe’ as the 
best, most realistic hope for the maintenance of Britain’s influence on the world stage, versus 
‘Europe’ as an unacceptable, humiliating reduction of Britain’s historic role. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that they both proclaimed ‘the good of the nation’ as their fundamental concern, 
even if this ‘good* was defined in diametrically opposed terms: either ‘in Europe’ or ‘outside 
Europe’.
This passionate discursive battle also flared up in the annual conferences of the two leading 
parties, held in October 1962.12 At the Labour conference in Brighton, Gaitskell once again 
reiterated that ‘going into Europe’ would ultimately imply ‘the end of Britain as an independent 
nation-state’, ‘the end of a thousand years of history’, and ‘the end of the Commonwealth’:
How can one seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre of the 
Commonwealth, is a province of Europe, which is what federation means, it could continue 
to exist as the mother country of a series of independent nations? It is sheer nonsense.
Somewhat ironically, this allowed Conservatives such as R.A. Butler to claim during their own 
party conference in Llandudno that they were the ones who stood for modem, forward-looking, 
‘European’ progress, and to accuse their Labour rivals of archaic backwardness:
The socialists have decided to look backward and to leave the future to us. For them a 
thousand years of history books. For us the future.
12A I1  q u o t a t io n s  f r o m  The Times, 4  a n d  12  O c t o b e r  1 9 6 2 .
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However, like Macmillan, this same ‘pro-European’ Tory also assured that this in no way 
implied a threat to national character, traditions, or sovereignty:
British policy is opposed to any extinction of national identity. We shall agree to nothing 
which undermines the essential powers of Parliament or the domestic authority of our law 
courts in criminal and civil cases.
Edward Heath, the chief negotiator in the British government’s talks with the EEC, guaranteed in 
his own intervention that ‘we are not being asked to go into a federation’, but rather to take part 
in a cooperative grouping of European states that could eventually match the strength of the 
world’s two great superpowers:
The voice of Europe has not been heard very much in recent years. We want that voice, 
with all its old traditions and civilisations, speaking loudly, clearly and unitedly, and from 
strength in the modem world.
The discourse of Britain’s leading politicians therefore revealed an ongoing clash between 
‘Europe’ as a dangerous threat to the nation’s ‘status honour’ and dignity, versus ‘Europe’ as an 
effective strategy which could resurrect national power and status in the aftermath of imperial 
decline. One way or the other, the maintenance of British ‘group charisma’ was clearly the 
fundamental issue in the debate.
This same symbolic battle could also be perceived in the discourse of the editorials which 
were published in the country’s leading newspapers after Macmillan announced Britain’s 
application to join the EEC. On one extreme, dailies such as The Guardian illustrated a clear 
conversion to the idea that at this stage of its history, Britain now had no choice but to take part 
in the European project in order to grow economically and maintain as much strength as possible 
in the world:
The central argument for joining the Common Market, above and beyond the precise 
computation of economic gains and losses at this moment, is that the European Community 
is a going concern, that it is dynamic and expansionist in its economic behaviour; and that 
Britain can hope for more influence in Europe and in the world if she joins than if she stays 
outside.13
Like the Prime Minister, this newspaper recognized the inevitable emotional resistance that EEC 
membership provoked amongst the British public, since it appeared to imply the recognition of a 
national defeat, the end of ‘world power*, and hence a lowering of rank in the global ‘pyramid of 
states*. Nevertheless, its editorial insisted that there was truly no alternative other than ‘entering 
Europe’, even if admittedly, for many British people this was rather like swallowing a bitter pill 
in order to cure the symptoms of a devastating illness:
It is, of course, painful for a people with a long and proud tradition of independence to 
admit that their country’s voice is growing feebler. Nevertheless, it is a fact; and it must 
have taken some courage for a Conservative Prime Minister to admit it.
Other newspapers, such as the Daily Mirror, similarly agreed that on the vital question of 
whether ‘Britain can have more world influence as a Common Market member or as an 
outsider’, the answer was clear: ‘Britain must take a full part in the economic AND political 
growth of a united Western Europe.’14 Hence, from this perspective, ‘Europe* may have been a 
rather bitter-tasting medicine, but it was undoubtedly a necessary cure to save a declining 
Britain.
Not all newspapers, however, were willing to accept the argument that Europe was now the 
only ‘realistic* and ‘rational’ choice to defend Britain’s prosperity and prestige in the world. The 
Times, for instance, while not rejecting the principle of EEC membership, maintained a much 
more cautious, wait-and-see attitude:
The truth is that this is not one of those ultimately simple issues that, once stripped of 
inessentials, resolve themselves into a plain Yes or No. It is not a moral issue. It is a matter
n The Guardian, 3 August 1961.
uDaily Mirror, 1 August 1961.
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of making up a complex account of advantages and disadvantages. Some items in it cannot 
yet be filled in.15
At the same time, one could also find a stubborn, passionate defence of Britain’s imperial we- 
image, and hence a completely hostile reaction to the European idea, in the discourse employed 
by the Daily Express. The editorial published by this mass-circulation newspaper16 on the day 
after Macmillan announced his decision to begin negotiations with the EEC was entitled ‘THE 
PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DECEIVED’, and it made the following claims:
Nobody reading the Prime Minister’s statement about the approach to the Common Market 
can doubt for one moment that he is embarking on a decisive reversal in the nation’s way 
of life... If Britain enters the Common Market she takes the first long step towards 
inclusion in a European confederation. The Parliament of Westminster must, in the end, 
become a subordinate assembly. The sovereignty of Britain will be obliterated in an over­
riding European supremacy... How can a Britain which has lost her sovereignty remain a 
member, still less the leader, of the British Commonwealth of Nations? It is utterly 
impossible... No party will ever win the people with the cry ‘Britain, part of Europe.’17
The discursive clash of the politicians was therefore also reflected in newspaper editorials such 
as these. For some, ‘Europe’ was now a new potential source of prosperity and prestige in a 
declining Britain that had lost its old strength. For others, nothing could be more humiliating 
than the defeatist claim that the glory days of the past were over, and that at this point Britain 
had no choice but to commit national suicide by becoming ‘a province in the United States of 
Europe.’ It was thus the perfect example of a symbolic struggle to manipulate national 
sentiments of collective pride and shame, either to support or to contest the idea of joining the 
EEC.
In the end, however, this first attempt to enter the Common Market was vetoed by President 
de Gaulle, who feared that British entry would reduce France’s preeminent position within the
xsThe Times, 31 July 1961.
l6According to figures cited in Seymour-Ure (1991:28-9), throughout the 1960’s the Daily Express and the Daily 
Mirror were the the two British newspapers with the highest circulation, with the latter selling an average of 
5,016,000 copies a day in 1965, and the former reaching a figure of 3,987,000 daily copies sold. By contrast, The 
Times sold 260,000 copies a day, while The Guardian was selling an average of 212,000 daily copies.
17Daily Mirror, 1 August 1961.
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EEC and subordinate it to the dictates of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ partnership formed by London and 
Washington. As De Gaulle himself put it in the press conference during which he announced his 
veto on 14 January 1963, if Britain entered the EEC ‘in the end there would appear a colossal 
Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership, which would swallow up the 
European Community’ (cited in Greenwood 1992: 85). From De Gaulle’s perspective, Europe 
was to be guided by a strong France which would be aimed by its own nuclear capacity and 
hence not subordinated to American dominance within the NATO system of defence. The key 
incident which confirmed his suspicions of Britain’s close bilateral links with the United States, 
or in any case provided him with an ideal justification for his veto, was a meeting at Nassau in 
December 1962, in which Macmillan and President Kennedy agreed that America would provide 
the British with Polaris nuclear missiles, without consulting de Gaulle. For the French president, 
this demonstrated that Britain’s potential entry into the EEC represented a ‘Trojan horse* which 
America wanted to employ to exert its dominance in Europe. Ironically, the man who had made 
the EEC more palatable to many British minds by rejecting its supranationalist dimension and 
promoting the notion of a ‘Europe of independent states’, ultimately excluded the UK because of 
its ties of friendship with the United States. This predicament was perfectlt illustrated by a 
cartoon which was published on the day after De Gaulle’s veto was announced on the front page 
of the Daily Express, which depicted the French President as a massive gendarme which blocked 
Macmillan and Kennedy’s attempt to sneak into the territory of the Common Market, reserved 
only for ‘real Europeans’ (reproduced on the following page].
Hence, after promoting the idea that the membership of the Common Market now represented 
the best conceivable option to maintain Britain’s influence and prosperity in the world, the 
Macmillan government ultimately failed to achieve what was in any case a highly contested 
objective. Indeed, the varying responses in the press to De Gaulle’s veto illustrated the 
continuing divisions in Britain concerning ‘Europe’ and its relationship to ‘the good of the 
nation’. The day after the veto, some newspapers, such as The Guardian, The Times, or the Daily
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Mirror lamented this outcome and accused the French President of having a narrow-minded, 
utterly selfish and chauvinistic conception of Europe, as well as an absurd anti-Americanism:
For Britain to join the kind of Europe which President de Gaulle wants would be 
unthinkable. In the last resort Britain is an Atlantic power before she is a European one, 
and her ties to the United States matter at least as much to her as her ties with Continental 
Europe.18
The pure Gaullist doctrine could prove as disruptive to Europe as any impurities that might 
have found their way inside through the admission of Britain... [De Gaulle’s] constant 
bogey has been a revived Anglo-Saxon dominance... To defeat that he clings to his own 
form of insularity -  the independent French nuclear arm...19
[De Gaulle's] desire is that France, regardless of the harsh manner in which the Twentieth 
Century has reduced her significance and stature, shall dominate the remnants of European 
power. Never has pride been based upon such folly. His fear is that British participation 
will open the floodgate of American influence in Europe and diminish his own. As if the 
West could conceivably thrive without American sympathy and strength.20
At the same time, however, the Europhobic Daily Express characteristically called De Gaulle’s 
decision *a blessing’. On the day the negotiations with the EEC officially ended, it published a 
front-page editorial entitled ‘GLORY, GLORY HALLELUJAH!’ which celebrated Britain’s 
liberation from the European trap [reproduced on the following page]:
At last the miserable, misguided and long drawn-out negotiations in Bruseels on the 
Common Market have come to an end... It is over, and it should never have begun... Many 
may be mourning the failure of Britain. They are foolish. This is not a day of misery at all. 
It is a day of rejoicing, a day when Britain has failed to cut her throat!... A deplorable and 
dangerous chapter is closed. An era of hope and opportunity opens up.21
A cartoon published in this same newspaper reiterated this point, by portraying De Gaulle as the 
madame of a boutique which had tried to force Macmillan into an extremely tight and 
suffocating ‘European’ corset, and sarcastically suggested: ‘Voilà Madame! My Style 
Continentale! -  created for you! It suits you? Oui? Non!’ [reproduced on the following page].
n The Guardian, 15 January 1963.
l9The Times, 15 January 1963.
20Daily Mirror, 15 January 1963.
zlDaily Express, 15 January 1963.
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According to the historian K. O. Morgan, in spite of the Macmillan government’s symbolic 
efforts to sell the European idea throughout the negotiations, British public opinion had largely 
remained ‘insular and unconvinced of the virtues of getting closer to unreliable European 
foreigners’, and when De Gaulle announced his veto, many people felt ‘sanguine, almost 
relieved’ (1990: 220). Another analyst of this period has similarly noted that ‘the British people 
clearly had their doubts about “joining Europe”, and one of the dominant reactions to the failure 
of the negotiations was relief at not having to get mixed up in “all that’” (Camps 1964: 505-6). 
This popular sentiment was perfectly illustrated by another cartoon published in the Daily 
Express, which pictured the classic English ‘bobby’ in a British village, who pointed to the 
graffiti ‘VIVE DE GAULLE!* which someone had painted on a wall, and asked a group of 
smiling, self-satisfied onlookers: ‘All right -  which one was it?’ [reproduced on the following 
page]. Indeed, opinion polls which were carried out during this period show a considerable lack 
of enthusiasm for the EEC amongst the British public between 1961 and 1963, with support for 
membership remaining broadly within the 40% to 50% range (Spence 1976: 19-22). Hence, 
Britain’s entry into “Europe” had ultimately been blocked by the French President, but given the 
widespread division of opinions on this matter, it was rather unclear whether this was a cause for 
national mourning or celebration.
4,3 The Second Attempt: Wilson depicts EEC membership as ‘the beginning of a new 
greatness for Britain’
It was not until 1967 that Britain, this time under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, once again 
knocked on the European door to find a solution to its declining economic situation, as well as a 
new source of political influence. At the time of the first attempt, Wilson had voiced his 
opposition to the idea of EEC entry, as a result of ‘Britain’s position in the world, due to our 
special relation with the Commonwealth’ (cited in Kitzinger 1968: 11). Indeed, after his election 
victory in 1964, he was still proudly maintaining the traditional British we-image with 
proclamations such as ‘we are a world power and a world influence or we are nothing’ (cited in
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Daily Express, January 31 1963
Robbins 1994: 272). Nevertheless, only a few years later, his own government also came to the 
conclusion that Britain had become too weak to ‘go it alone’ in a world of powerful economic 
giants, and that there was after all ‘no alternative to Europe’. Therefore, on 2 May 1967, Wilson 
announced his decision to re-open negotiations with the EEC in the House of Commons. At this 
point, British economic growth was significantly lower than any member of ‘the Six’ (Sanders 
1990: 145), and there was much concern about the country’s capacity to compete in an advanced 
industrial world and keep up with modem technological progress, unless it joined forces with the 
countries of the EEC. The Commonwealth was no longer seen as a viable alternative for the 
maintenance of national prosperity and influence, and it was feared that ‘economic stagnation 
would inevitably lead to political isolation, with Britain not at the intersection of three circles but 
in no circle at all’ (Greenwood 1992: 92). Furthermore, the Americans continued to pressure the 
British to abandon their lingering, unrealistic attachment to a ‘world power’ status, and hence to 
take part in the project of European unity, as a way of strengthening the NATO alliance against 
their common ‘threatening Other’, the Soviet Union. Hence, as in the previous attempt to join the 
Common Market, the dominant belief was that even if ‘Europe’ may not have been the ideal 
aspiration that people may have wished for, there was now no choice for a weakened Britain but 
to accept its reduced stature and maintain as much strength as possible by joining the EEC (J.W. 
Young 1993: 93-5).
Indeed, Wilson’s discursive efforts to legitimate this second application to the EEC clearly 
revealed a conversion to the idea that given Britain’s undeniably diminished position, entry into 
the Common Market now represented the only available option to ensure the maintenance of 
national pride in the economic, political, and moral spheres of global status-ranking. As he put it 
in the parliamentary address in which attempted to discursively legitimate his decision to re- 
apply for EEC membership:
We believe in the need to make effective our enormous potential industrial strength by 
giving that strength a chance to operate on a European and not a national scale or series of 
national scales. It is only if we can do this that we can exercise everything which comes 
from industrial strength and independence in terms of European influence on world affairs. 
A stronger and more united Europe would enable all the countries of the community to
77
play a still greater part in the vitally important north-south war against world hunger, 
poverty, and disease...22
Like Macmillan before him, Wilson also appeared on television to justify his government’s 
decision, and once again a direct appeal was made to national we-feelings. The Prime Minister 
made it clear that above all, ‘Europe’ represented a novel source of British power and status: ‘It 
is the beginning of a new greatness for Britain. I believe this is a great historical turning point.’23 
With Edward Heath now in the position of leader of the Tory opposition, Wilson’s decision 
was ‘warmly welcomed’ and ‘wholeheatedly supported’ by the other leading British party,24 and 
hence in this case there was consensus amongst the country’s main leaders on the question of 
EEC membership. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe the way in which these politicians 
struggled between each other to guarantee that they could best defend national interests and 
uphold national pride in this new approximation towards ‘Europe’. In an earlier speech delivered 
in March 1966, after Heath praised the French government for suggesting that they would favour 
a new British application, Wilson ridiculed the Conservative leader for shamefully behaving like 
a submissive puppy in relation to the EEC:
Now one encouraging gesture from the French Government, which I welcome, and the 
Conservative leader rolls on his back like a spaniel. I don’t want you to misunderstand me. 
Please, no letters from angry dog lovers. Some of my best friends are spaniels, but I 
wouldn’t put them in charge of negotiations into the Common Market... Given a fair wind, 
we will negotiate our way into the Common Market, head held high, not crawl in...(Cited 
in Kitzinger 1968: 109-110)
Heath logically responded by denouncing Wilson’s accusation as a ‘nauseating, filthy 
insinuation’ which in no way represented his wholehearted commitment to the honourable 
defense of Britain’s interests and her prestige. Hence, a widespread agreement amongst Britain’s 
leading politicians may have now existed on the importance of EEC membership, but of course
n The Times, 5 May 1967
23Daily Mirror, 9 May 1967.
24Cited in The Times, 3 May 1967
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each party leader attempted to present himself as the most effective guardian of the national 
‘face* within this new context.
At the time of this second application, the discourse of most newspapers also reflected a 
general acceptance of the idea that the old we-image of global power and grandeur was 
becoming increasingly outdated, and hence that membership of the EEC was now the most 
realistic, rational, and dignified option to defend ‘the good of the nation’. For instance, in an 
editorial significantly entitled ‘POST-IMPERIAL BUT PRE-EUROPEAN’, The Times argued 
that:
No realistic alternative to joining Europe exists; we are not doing well enough to go on as 
we are; isolation is a miserable expedient; Americanism is a subordination to a greater 
power. Only as a European power can Britain join in a power group comparable to the 
great continental powers and do so on a footing of equality.
The Guardian put forward an almost identical argument:
The world now knows how Britain sees its role. We no longer pretend that we can stand 
alone among the Great Powers. We have and can retain wider links -  through the 
Commonwealth and through the Atlantic Alliance. But if Britain is to play the larger part 
in world affairs which it thinks it ought to, it can do so only by acting in concert with its 
European neighbours.25 6
Even tabloids such as The Sun and the Daily Mirror humbly accepted that there was no choice 
but to face the facts and accept the reality of a reduced ‘European* position -  one which, 
nonetheless, offered a new horizon of hopeful prospects for Britain:
Britain is no longer a great power presiding over an empire on which the sun never sets. 
Everybody knows this but the effort of mental re-adjustment has not been easy. It is not 
completed yet... The choice for Britain is either to fall behind and be engulfed by American 
capital or to join with others in a larger economic unit... Britain in Europe could be the start 
of another 1,000 years of history. Very different years. But very exciting and rewarding 
years.27
25The Times, 1 May 1967.
26The Guardian, 3 May 1967.
11 The Sun, 3 May 1967.
79
L I
The issue sadly remains the same, with a choice for the people of Britain: Are we to endure 
a lingering demise in genteel poverty in a lagoon of history with Prince Philip on a horse 
outside Buck Palace seeling Royal Family postcards at a dollar a time to American tourists 
and the rest of us playing bingo? Or are we to stop the world because we want to get on?28
Hence, from this perspective, what was now seen as shameful or embarrassing was the absurd, 
unrealistic fantasies of those who still believed that they were living in the age of an Imperial 
Britannia that ruled the waves. In opposition to this, ‘Europe* was presented as the option of 
calculating rationality and wisdom -  perhaps a little difficult to accept, but nervertheless the only 
realistic alternative which remained in order to keep the national ship afloat, and ultimately to 
find a new source of political strength, economic prosperity and moral respectability in the 
future. As the diplomat Lord Gladwyn Jebb put it in a strongly pro-European book which was 
published at the time of this second application:
In his little backwater, the Englishman might soon get accustomed to his Victory Gin. But 
it would be sad indeed if it were towards such a future that our young people were 
marching... So lest worse befall let us examine together the European Idea, the glorious 
conception of the United States of Europe -  a new type of unity, an example to the rest of 
the world, a great hope for peace. (1967: 11)
For those who shared this conversion to the EEC cause, the traditional vision of British imperial 
power was completely rejected because it no longer represented an ethically appropriate source 
of national pride, and ‘Europe’ was now viewed as the most appropriate substitute to renovate 
collective self-esteem.
The old national we-image, however, was not completely dead. The Daily Express, in 
particular, continued to uphold the claim that membership of the EEC would be an absolute 
catastrophe for the British nation and everything it stood for. On the day after Wilson’s 
announcement, its editorial proclaimed:
What a melancholy spectacle was presented yesterday in the House of Commons! The 
three party leaders, like the three witches in Macbeth, joining hands over a policy of 
disaster! To the applause of his fellow chieftains, the Prime Minister makes the
28Daily Mirror, 3 May 1967.
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announcement everybody knew he was going to make. He will apply for membership of 
the Common Market... The MPs who cheered him yesterday should realise that acceptance 
of the Rome Treaty means a vast lessening of their own powers.29
At the same time, anti-EEC organizations such as the Keep Britain Out Campaign voiced their 
opposition to the government’s decision by organizing a mock funeral next to the Houses of 
Parliament, round a coffin draped with the following slogan: ‘Common Market -  Death to 
British Democracy’ (Kitzinger 1973: 247). Hence, one can observe that there was hardly 
complete unanimity over whether ‘Europe’ could really represent a proper source of national 
prestige for Britain. One could say that the collective pride-shame balance remained unstable in 
relation to this issue. The British national self-image was in a process of contested redefinition, 
and inevitably there was a continuing emotional resistance to the claim that the only possible 
destiny for the country was ‘European’.
Once again, however, the whole debate turned out to be a somewhat futile exercise, since this 
second attempt to join the EEC was also blocked on 27 November 1967 by the recalcitrant De 
Gaulle. On this occasion, the French President humiliated the British by arguing that they were 
not economically fit to join the Common Market, due to a forced devaluation of the Pound which 
had recently taken place (J.W. Young 1993: 101). The French President, furthermore, continued 
his role as the self-appointed guardian of ‘Europeanness’, by insisting that Britain still remained 
‘a state which through its politics, its economy, its currency, is not at present a part of Europe*.30 
On issues such as nuclear weapons and NATO policy, Britain remained too closely tied to the 
USA for De Gaulle’s taste. Hence, although the French leader’s hostility to supranationalism and 
his defence of state sovereignty had again made the EEC more attractive to the British, his 
dislike of American control made the UK’s entry impossible. For the second time, the fate of the 
British people was therefore decided by the whim of the French leader, and this event was once
29Daily Express, 3 M a y  1 9 6 7 .
30 C i t e d  in  The Times, 2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 6 7 .
again a painful illustration of national weakness which inevitably stung the national ego. A: 
Morgan has put it:
The whole episode left a continuing impression of Britain still searching for a role in 
international affairs. One role was dissolving in the heat and dust of Africa; a successoi 
had not yet arisen. Britain’s prestige was further dented in consequence. (1990: 273)
This sense of national weakness and impotence was perfectly encapsulated by another ingenious 
cartoon published on the front page of the Daily Express. Under the headline ‘DE GAULLE 
SLAPS DOWN WILSON’S BID FOR EUROPE’, it depicted a towering de Gaulle who, with a 
mere puff of his potent breath, effortlessly blew away a minuscule Harold Wilson, the second 
Prime Minister who had dared to climb the ladder of the Common Market but who, like 
Macmillan before him, had failed miserably before he reached the top [reproduced on the 
following page].
As with the previous veto, much of the British press defended the nation’s ‘status honour’ by 
mocking De Gaulle’s stubborn hostility to ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and defending the idea that Britain 
should continue to pursue its European goal in spite of the French leader’s stubborn opposition. 
The Times, for instance, called De Gaulle ‘the voice of doom’ and described him as a ‘Don 
Quixote’ whose inflated, fantastical image of his country’s power had led him to knock down 
windmills such as Britain’s European aspirations:
Unfortunately for the General, the vanquished windmills have a habit of getting up again... 
and the French government must be certain that Britain really won’t take ‘no’ for an 
answer, and that the moment the General leaves the Elysee the British Government, be it 
Labour or Conservative, will have ready its renewed application to join the Common 
Market...31
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I N  15 minutes today President de Caulle hit 
'  Britain's move to join the Common Market 
with a veto so final and crushing that even his 
staunch supporters gasped.
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Daily Express, November 28 1967
Others, such as the Daily Mirror, denounced the French leader as ‘obstinate and arrogant', but 
urged the government to ‘get its own house in order for De Gaulle’s funeral’, so that Britain 
could ‘get into Europe’ as soon as possible.32
At the same time, however, the Euro-phobic Daily Express battled on with its passionate 
defence of Britain’s ‘true destiny’ in the world, arguing that De Gaulle’s veto should finally 
convince the country’s leaders that nothing good could ever come out of European 
entanglements:
This new and — surely -  final ‘No’ from De Gaulle should unite all sections of British 
political opinion in seeking out a more natural and glorious role for Britain - and in making 
the effort and sacrifices needed to achieve it. For seven years, under two parties, Britain 
has been pursuing a phantom in Europe... The only pity is that, in spite of the known 
preference of the majority of the British people, it has required the decision of a 
Frenchman to call Britain back to her true destiny. That destiny lies first of all with the 
Commonwealth and the Anglo-Saxon nations.33
The same discursive conflicts thus went on in the British public sphere, with the United 
Kingdom still out of the EEC after two failed attempts. In some minds, British national pride 
could only be regenerated at this point in the nation’s history by being accepted into the 
European club, while for others, nothing could be more demeaning and humiliating.
4.4 Conclusion: ‘Europe’ as a contested source of potential British pride
In a book entitled A State of England, published at the time of Britain’s first application to enter 
the EEC, the historian Anthony Hartley wrote:
We are a country that has known greatness and will never get the smell of it out of our 
nostrils until it is replaced by the bitterness of death... I have no wish to see our moment of 
ultimate lethargy, the twitching of wasted limbs and blinking of myopic eyes that marks 
the patient’s lapse into a Final coma.(1963: 126)
22Daily Mirror, 28 November 1967.
33Daily Express, 28 November 1967.
83
This intellectual warned his fellow countrymen that Britain was beginning to suffer severely 
from ‘the creeping paralysis which afflicts empires in their decline’ (1963: 126), and he 
suggested that the only way to avoid further decadence or ‘the descent into limbo’ (1963: 226) 
would be to join the European Community. By taking part in this larger whole, he argued, 
Britain could compensate for its current weaknesses and discover a new stimulus for economic 
growth, as well as a new, morally worthwhile collective purpose. Europe, in short, was the only 
possible remedy which could overcome the frustrations arising from the collapse of British 
power: v
The idea of European unity has taken on just enough substance to save us from the worst of 
the nostalgia and bitterness that follow the end of empires. We have been presented with a 
ready-made substitute for that self-indulgent contemplation of diminished greatness, to 
which we seemed ready to abandon ourselves.(1963: 238)
Nevertheless, Hartley acknowledged that the mental and emotional adjustment which ‘going into 
Europe’ required would not be easy:
No doubt, we shall not enter Europe without passing through a phase of political and 
psychological crisis. If our entry into the Community is the cure which will rid us of the 
neuroses engendered by loss of power and constriction of opportunity, then the process of 
debate and negotiation preceding it can be compared only to the moments during which 
these subconscious motivations are brought up on to the level of consciousness, producing 
screams and hysteria.(1963: 237) I
I have cited extensively from the work of this author, for I think it accurately and eloquently 
sums up the complex British predicament which has been traced in this chapter. At the same 
time, it illustrates a British intellectual’s acute patriotic concerns at this time of national decline, 
and his belief that participation in the project of European unity was the only way to recover 
collective strength and dignity. Britain’s approximation to the EEC was indeed a difficult 
process that produced its fair share of ‘screams and hysteria’, because it essentially involved 
having to recognize a loss of international status-ranking, and hence to accept a new position of 
relative weakness and inferiority. As I have attempted to illustrate, British participation in the 
European project of supranational integration was initially avoided because it was widely felt
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that this was something which Britain could surely do without, even if it was entirely appropriate 
for other, less fortunate countries. A we-image of distinctive global power and prestige was thus 
maintained for many years, based on the idea of Anglo-American world leadership, until it 
became increasingly evident that this no longer coincided with the reality of Britain’s diminished 
stature.
In his fascinating analyses of the ‘interaction rituals* which take place between individuals in 
their everyday encounters with each other, Erving Goffman (1967) described the losses of ‘face’ 
which can occur whenever the self-image that an actor tries to represent on the public stage is 
suddenly discredited, provoking uncomfortable feelings of embarrassment, as well as the fear 
that such behaviour will provoke the laughter and ridicule of others (E.S. Jauregui 1998). As I 
suggested earlier in chapter 2, if one applies this insight to the level of national we-images, one 
could say that for many people, Britain’s decision to apply for EEC membership implied a loss 
of collective face, for it signified a collapse of this country’s initially greater pretensions of 
power and prestige on the world stage -  a recognition that a self-flattering we-image of global 
status-ranking no longer coincided with reality. To some extent, as one author has put it, it made 
the British look rather like ‘impoverished supplicants’ or ‘decayed aristocrats, obliged by 
adverse circumstances to eat in a soup kitchen for the needy’ (Barzini 1983: 55, 60-61). It is 
interesting to observe how, as this chapter has shown, leaders such as Macmillan and Wilson did 
their utmost to symbolically depict the EEC option in the most favourable terms possible for the 
national pride-shame balance, by suggesting that the British people should not lose their faith in 
themselves, since they would be able to achieve a new form of ‘national greatness’ through 
participation in the noble, morally worthy project of European integration. Nevertheless, the 
discursive controversies which this decision provoked illustrate that in many British minds, 
‘Europe’ inevitably provoked an unpalatable sense of shrunk status and national defeatism. Even 
if EEC membership may have become recognized by many people as a pragmatic necessity, it 
was rather difficult to make it sound like a patriotic triumph that one should get excited about. In 
other words, there was a sort of widespread resignation about the inevitability of ‘becoming
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European*, but ‘there was little real enthusiasm’ (Camps 1964: 506). Hence, although discursive 
efforts were certainly made by the country’s leaders to present the European Community as a 
new potential source of national pride, this was hardly an uncontested claim. The next chapter 
will illustrate how this same symbolic and emotional battle continued in this country’s public 
sphere, as Britain ultimately succeeded in its third attempt to *go into Europe*.
8 6
5. ‘Going into Europe’: A resigned acceptance of diminished status
It was ultimately under the leadership of a Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, that 
Britain officially ‘entered Europe’ on 1 January 1973. Heath’s personal commitment to the 
project of European integration went back to his earliest days in politics. In 1950, he delivered 
his maiden speech in Parliament on the need for European unity, and even at this early stage of 
widespread British aloofness, he supported his country’s participation in the Schuman plan. 
Heath was also a member of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States for Europe, 
and led the British government’s negotiations with the EEC during Macmillan’s application for 
membership. Nevertheless, such ardent ‘Europeanism* in no way implied an abandonment of 
national pride or a rejection of patriotic values. On the contrary, from Heath’s perspective, the 
European Community clearly represented the greatest hope for the recovery of British power, 
prosperity, and prestige. He firmly believed in what one could call the ‘European’ paradigm of 
British national greatness: the idea that a declining United Kingdom could only be resurrected 
and newly strengthened at this point of its history through membership of the EEC. Indeed, 
according to one of his ministers, he actually saw Britain’s entry into Europe as ‘the way back to 
being a Great Power’ (cited in J.W. Young 1993: 107). This was a vision which, as the previous 
chapter showed, had already begun to arise during Macmillan’s and Wilson’s applications to the 
EEC, and it reached a culmination in the emotive, patriotic discourse which Heath employed in 
order to legitimate and promote his own government’s successful attempt to join the European 
Community.
Nevertheless, the Conservative leader’s determined symbolic efforts to equate European 
membership with a resurgence of British national pride inevitably continued to meet much 
resistance. For one thing, Harold Wilson, now as leader of the opposition, fervently opposed the 
agreement which Heath’s negotiating team reached with the EEC, because he proclaimed that it 
completely failed to protect vital ‘national interests’ and was forcing the British people to accept 
shameful conditions of entry into the Common Market. Although he could hardly reject the 
principle of ‘going into Europe’, given that his own government had previously attempted to do
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so, the Labour Party was bitterly divided on the whole question of EEC membership, and was 
unwilling to allow the Conservative Prime Minister an easy triumph on this matter. Hence, in 
spite of Heath’s patrotic discursive appeals, the EEC issue still remained a hotly contested one, 
and as I shall illustrate, there was considerable public indifference and hostility to the Common 
Market as membership became official.
The debate over ‘Europe* eventually reached an important climax on June 5 1975, when 
under the renewed leadership of Wilson, the British people were granted the opportunity to vote 
in favour or against the EEC in the first referendum of their country’s history. During the 
campaigning that preceded this public consultation, the conflict of national paradigms erupted 
once again, with leaders on each side of the debate appealing to the collective pride-shame 
balance of the British people, either in favour or against membership of the Common Market. 
This chapter will therefore focus on the way in which the discursive political battle of British 
we-images and we-feelings flared up at the time of the country’s ‘entry into Europe’, and how it 
was provisionally resolved during the referendum campaign in which a ‘Yes to Europe’ 
ultimately prevailed.
5.1 ‘A Greater Britain in a Greater Europe*: Edward Heath's patriotic flag-waving in 
favour of EEC membership
Charles de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 eliminated the major obstacle which until that point had 
blocked British entry into the European Community. His successor, Georges Pompidou, was less 
hostile to the idea of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ entry into the Common Market, and this new situation
i/
opened the door to a renewal of Britain’s negotiations with the EEC. Nevertheless, after the 
second veto in 1967, British public opinion had again turned against ‘Europe’, and the idea of 
initiating another attempt to enter the EEC was hardly a popular one. In April 1970, polls 
suggested that support for membership had fallen to 19 per cent (George 1990: 49), and the idea 
that the United Kingdom did not need ‘Europe* in order to be strong and prosperous had been 
revived: ‘At the emotional level, in the face of two European rebuffs, the British public had to
8 8
believe that Britain could go it alone, partly to restore self-confidence, partly to save face and 
partly as a defiant reaction to having been scorned* (Spence 1976: 27). Furthermore, at the 
purely pragmatic level of living costs, the EEC had become widely associated in British minds 
with the rise of food prices, and this fear had intensified people’s hostility to the Common 
Market (Hedges 1976: 39).
In fact, the performance of the British economy had improved in recent times, and some 
analysts began to doubt the need to enter the EEC (J.W. Young 1992: 106). For instance, one 
‘anti-European* publication which appeared during this period resurrected the idea that the 
immense economic resources of Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand, 
as well as the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, could still allow Britain to recover its 
‘lost national greatness*, instead of reducing the country’s status ‘to the role of a member of an 
association of Continental nations’ (Einzig 1970: viii). The author of this publication, a fervent 
defender of Britain’s global grandeur, was convinced that those who defended the idea of EEC 
membership were misguided defeatists:
I simply fail to understand men and women whose ancestors have lived on this island for a 
great many generations who feel enthusiasm bordering on fanaticism over a solution that 
would mean the end of hopes of recovering British national greatness, all for the sake of 
being admitted into an utterly undependable alliance which is liable to disintegrate at any 
moment.(1970: ix)
This was therefore a time in which, as Hugo Young (1998: 223) has put it, ‘popular feeling for 
the whole idea [of joining the European Community] was at rock bottom.’
Given this mood of renewed suspicion and hostility towards the EEC, it is not very surprising 
that during the election campaign in which Edward Heath ultimately emerged victorious on 18 
June 1970, the EEC was ‘an extremely muted issue’ (Kitzinger 1973: 151) which was treated 
with great caution. According to a British journalist’s account of this period (Spanier 1973: 20), 
‘if you went into a pub or attended a political rally in the election of that summer of 1970... you 
would have heard little but doubt and dislike if the subject of the Common Market came up.’ At 
the most, the party leaders committed themselves to negotiating terms of entry which could
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guarantee national prosperity within the EEC, but without displaying too much enthusiasm for 
what remained a largely unpopular policy.
Nevertheless, once in power, Heath’s government displayed a keen determination to achieve 
Britain’s entry ‘into Europe’, and negotiations were soon initiated with the Six. In spite of the 
considerable difficulties which still existed, particularly with regard to the traditionally 
privileged access of Commonwealth products into the British market, a meeting between Heath 
and Pompidou in May 1971 ensured that this time the French would not say non. The British 
Prime Minister’s relative lack of interest in the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, as 
well as his enthusiasm for developing an independent European defence policy and even an 
Anglo-French nuclear deterrent, appears to have been the key factor which convinced President 
Pompidou that Britain could no longer be considered the ‘trojan horse’ of the Americans (H. 
Young 1998: 234-38). Hence, following this successful summit, arrangements were soon 
finalized for British membership of the EEC’s institutions, and in July the government published 
a policy document or White Paper in which it put forward its fundamental reasons for taking the 
country along the European path.1
As in the case of the earlier failed attempts under Macmillan and Wilson, the Heath 
government’s official legitimating discourse in favour of ‘Europe’ essentially followed the same 
predictable arguments: Britain was no longer an Empire or a ‘world power’, its international 
influence had weakened considerably, and therefore at this point the best conceivable guarantee 
for regaining economic and political strength could only be found in the EEC. The document 
acknowledged that preferential trade with the Commonwealth would be damaged to some extent, 
and that food prices would inevitably rise due to the Common Agricultural Policy. Indeed, the 
only special concession that the British negotiators had managed to achieve was a five-year 
transition period during which New Zealand dairy products would continue to have privileged
!The entire document was published by The Times on 8 July 1971. All the citations which follow are taken from this 
newspaper.
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access to its traditional market. Afterwards, however, Britain would in principle have to respect 
the tariff rules of the EEC club in relation to products from outside the Common Market. 
Nevertheless, even if the agreement reached may not have been perfect, the White Paper argued 
that there was ultimately no realistic alternative to the EEC:
The choice for Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Community and join in 
building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose to stand 
aside from this great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from the narrow - and 
narrowing - base we have known in recent years. As a full member of the Community we 
would have more opportunity and strength to influence events than we could possibly have 
on our own... There is no alternative grouping of countries with similar circumstances and 
interests which could offer us the same opportunities to safeguard our national security and 
prosperity.
The European Community was thus defined as a ‘great enterprise* which could save the nation 
from its ‘narrow - and narrowing’ position as a weakened global giant. At the same time, a 
‘vocabulary of reassurance* (H. Young 1998: 248) was employed in this official document to 
portray the potential loss of national sovereignty within the EEC in the most favourable light 
possible: ‘what is being proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national 
sovereignties in the general interest.’ The Conservative government's White Paper therefore 
concluded that while Britain’s past may have been ‘imperial*, its future could only be 
‘European*:
A decision not to join, when at last we have the power to do so, would be a rejection of an 
historic opportunity... In a single generation we should have renounced an imperial past 
and rejected a European future.
However, the most emotionally charged occasion for patriotic flag-waving in favour of 
‘Europe* was undoubtedly Heath’s nationwide television broadcast on the following day, in 
which the Prime Minister explained to the ‘imagined community* of Britain his government’s 
fundamental reasons for taking the country ‘into Europe’.2 It is worth considering this ritualized
entire address was published by The Times on 9 July 1971. All the citations which follow are taken from this 
newspaper.
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media performance in some detail, for it exemplifies particularly well how an impassioned 
appeal to national symbolism, memories, and sentiments was carried out by this leader in a 
determined discursive attempt to build up popular support for Britain’s membership of the 
European Community. As in his government’s official White Paper on EEC entry, the 
fundamental claim of Heath’s televised address was that ‘Europe’ now represented the only path 
which could allow Britain to overcome its recent loss of power in the world, and to recuperate its 
‘proper place’ in the global hierarchy of international status-ranking:
Why should we go in? As Prime Minister, my answer is that we must go in if we want to 
remain Great Britain, and have the chance of becoming a Greater Britain. Not a guarantee 
but the chance, the opportunity, to take up once again our proper place in the world. Let’s 
look at the facts. Today we don’t occupy the place in the world we once did... The 
European Community provides us with our chance. It opens up one of the biggest markets 
in the world to us. It gives us the opportunity to grow again, to become a Greater Britain in 
a Greater Europe.
Heath’s recommendation to ‘the ordinary people’ was therefore that ‘the facts* about Britain’s 
diminished stature had to be acknowledged, however difficult this may have been. As he put it, 
the painful reality, whether the national ‘us’ of Britain liked it or not, was that ‘we don’t occupy 
the place in the world we once did*. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister assured his countrymen 
that there was no reason to despair: the EEC offered a new chance of grandeur, a new source of 
‘national greatness’, dignity, and collective pride.
To those who saw the EEC as a betrayal of the Commonwealth, Heath guaranteed that 
Britain’s ‘old friends’ had not been ‘let down’ in the negotiations. Furthermore, he suggested 
that by gaining access to a market which was greater than those possessed by the American and 
Soviet ‘superpowers’, the ‘sheer prosperity’ which awaited the British people would ultimately 
be the best service to the country’s future generations:
This country belongs to us all, but the future of this country belongs to those who are 
young or still unborn. And in reaching our decision we must keep them in mind. What kind 




‘Entering Europe’ was thus the ideal way to feel self-confident and proud about the opportunities 
created for future members of ‘the nation’. Thanks to this decision, the coining generations 
would not frown upon their ancestors for taking the wrong historical turn, but instead would 
honour them for acting with forward-looking wisdom. It was a claim which illustrated how, as I 
noted in my introductory section, nationhood can involve a collective sense of emotional 
identification with unborn members of the national collectivity, and how national pride (or 
shame) may be derived from imagining how future generations will judge one’s performance in 
the present.
Heath also identified the European project of integration with the morally worthwhile task of 
world peace and the achievement of national security. The importance of this point was stressed 
by invoking painful collective memories of the war that many British citizens, including himself, 
had suffered:
Many of you have fought in Europe, as I did, or have lost fathers, or brothers or husbands 
who fell fighting in Europe. I say to you now, with that experience in my memory, that 
joining the Community, working together with them for our joint security and prosperity, is 
the best guarantee we can give ourselves of a lasting peace in Europe.
He then went on to address the worries of those who saw ‘Europe’ as a threat to British ways of 
life, to the uniqueness or the cultural personality of ‘the nation’, and claimed that there was 
absolutely no need to worry about the loss of ‘Britishness’:
When we talk about Europe, let’s be very clear. We are talking about a whole group of 
different countries acting with one mind. But those different countries are no less different 
because they act together. The French are no less French, the Dutch no less Dutch for 
being members of the community for 20 years. Anyone who goes to any of the countries 
can see that for themselves. Nor shall we be any less British.
In fact, Heath specifically referred to totemic collective symbols of national distinctiveness such 
as the royal family, Parliament, and British law, and went on to remind his audience that all other 
members of the EEC retained such collectively cherished aspects of their national life. The Prime 
Minister therefore concluded in a reassuring tone of patriotic complicity: ‘So shall we.’ And as 
for ‘our vital national interests’, once again Heath guaranted that this was hardly a cause for
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concern, since ‘any decisions affecting our vital national interests have to be made with our 
agreement/ The idea that national sovereignty could conceivably be diminished or lost through 
EEC membership was thus flatly denied.
In short, Heath’s address to his countrymen was a remarkable symbolic exercise of 
emotionally charged, patriotic chanting in favour of ‘Europe*. The EEC promised ‘the nation’ an 
increase of political power, economic prosperity, physical security, as well as an opportunity to 
make a crucil contribution to the morally worthy project of world peace. It was thus presented as 
the best conceivable way to fulfil the duties owed to Britain’s unborn, future generations. Heath 
therefore did his utmost to persuade his countrymen that there was absolutely nothing 
humiliating about ‘Europe’, no reason to feel ashamed. On the contrary, as the Prime Minister 
put it in his concluding words, there was in fact a hopeful promise of renewing Britain’s 
collective self-esteem, by once again feeling proud of one’s role in the endlessly flowing river of 
national and world history:
I believe that history will recall that when we faced this great challenge we were not afraid. 
We were not afraid because for the first time in a long time we had the chance to go out 
and do something. A chance to shape the future. A chance to lead, not to follow. And don’t 
you think it’s about time? Can you honestly say that there haven’t been times in recent 
years when you’ve had the feeling that this country was losing out, in all sorts of ways? 
We’re worth more than that. We’ve given the world a lot and we’ve got a lot more still to 
give... For 25 years we’ve been looking for something to get us going again. Now here it 
is. We must recognize it for what it is. We have the chance of new greatness. Now we must 
take it.
Such a passionate patriotic address can be seen from a Durkheimian perspective as a political 
leader’s attempt to transform ‘Europe’ into a new emotionally charged, totemic object of 
collective devotion, because of what it was claimed to represent for the sacred national 
collectivity and its future generations. At the same time, following Max Weber’s terminology in 
Politics as a Vocation, one could further say that Prime Minister Heath was clearly offering the 
British people ‘prestige-feelings of social honour’, or ‘premiums of national vanity’, in order to 
promote the concept of EEC membership amongst the public. ‘Europe’, he declared, was 
promising Britain a chance to lead instead of following others, an opportunity to win rather than
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to continue losing out, the possibility of giving the world a lot more, the chance of new 
greatness, and so on.3
However, as in the past, there was hardly a unanimous political consensus in the British 
public sphere on this symbolic identification of ‘Europe’ with national power, status, and pride. 
In fact, on the following day, Harold Wilson took advantage of his own opportunity to address 
‘the nation* on television, by launching a bitter discursive attack on the agreement Heath’s 
negotiating team had reached with the EEC, and claiming that it shamefully failed to maintain 
the nation’s honour and dignity in the world.4 As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the 
Labour Party was extremely divided on ‘the Europe question’ during this period. On the one 
hand, there was a convinced ‘pro-European* faction of moderates led by Roy Jenkins, who 
viewed the EEC not only as the most effective strategy to strengthen the British economy, but 
also as a morally worthy project which could transcend the narrow defence of ‘national interests’ 
and further the Labour party’s traditional commitment to the cause of global solidarity. At the 
same time, however, many Labour MPs, particularly on the extreme left of the party, saw the 
EEC ‘as a capitalist, bureaucratic institution, supported only by elite groups in Britain but likely 
to harm working-class interests’ (J.W. Young 1993: 114). The supranationalist dimension of the 
European project was essentially seen by these politicians as a threat to the British state’s full 
control of the national economy, and hence to the aspiration of building ‘a socialist Jerusalem on 
England’s green and pleasant land’ (King 1977: 37).
It is noteworthy, for instance, that popular trades union leaders such as Jack Jones delivered 
passionate anti-EEC speeches during this period, proclaiming that the only people who would 
benefit from the Common Market were those who had no genuine patriotic concerns for ‘the 
British people’: ‘The only people who stand to gain are a tiny number of financial interests, the
3Hugo Young (1998: 254), however, has pointed out that Heath’s efforts to build up popular support for the EEC 
were seriously hampered by the fact that he was ‘an entirely uninspiring orator’, whose voice ‘had the levitation of a 
lead balloon.’
4Wilson’s television speech was published by The Times on 10 July 1971. All the citations which follow from this 
address are taken from this newspaper.
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big money boys who have no loyalty to their country’ (cited in Kitzinger 1973: 268). This left- 
wing ‘anti-Europeanism’ may seem bizarre, coming from an ideological tradition which usually 
identifies itself with the destruction of national frontiers and the brotherhood of all peoples. As 
Marx and Engels famously put it in The Communist Manifesto, ‘the working men have no 
country’. However, like Hugh Gaitskell in the famous ‘thousand years of history’ speech I 
analyzed in the previous chapter, Labour’s current ‘anti-marketeers’ believed that the most 
morally honourable and truly ‘internationalist’ role that Britain could play in the world remained 
its leadership of a multi-racial Commonwealth which represented the best hope for global 
solidarity, instead of tying itself to what was seen as a parochial, selfish, inward-looking club of 
rich, white ‘European’ nations. Moreover, they perceived the EEC as ‘a sibling of NATO’ 
which, far from contributing to the unity of the European continent, could only perpetuate the 
Cold War division between its Eastern and Western blocs (Lord 1993: 112).
Already at this stage, the leading figure of the party’s left-wing, Tony Benn, began to 
demand that no matter what the government or Parliament decided, a national referendum would 
be necessary to settle the European question. Given the unpopularity of the EEC which opinion 
surveys seemed to suggest, anti-marketeers such as Benn were convinced that a popular vote 
would go their way. At the same time, an additional complication for Wilson was that James 
Callaghan, a rival aspirant to the Labour party leadership, also initiated a public campaign 
against EEC membership. In an emotionally charged speech delivered in May 1971, Callaghan 
made use of a fundamental national totem, the sacred tongue of the British tribe, in order to turn 
collective we-feelings against the European Community. The EEC, he proclaimed, had to be 
avoided, because it could endanger ‘the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton’. Indeed, 
he went as far as saying that ‘going into Europe’ would represent a ‘complete rupture of our 
identity’, since it would replace Britain’s traditional ties of friendship with the Commonwealth 
and the United States with what he called ‘an aroma of continental claustrophobia’ (cited in H. 
Young 1998: 273). Indeed, many Labour politicians were convinced that the European issue 
could be employed as a very useful symbolic weapon which would effectively erode the
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popularity of Heath’s Conservative government, since when the negotiations came to an end in 
the summer of 1971, polls suggested that only one in four Britons were in favour of EEC 
membership (J.W. Young 1993:113).
Hence, although it would have been totally inconsistent for Wilson to oppose the principle of 
EEC membership, he was under great pressure from much of his own party to turn against the 
widely despised ‘Common Market’. In the end, the Labour leader’s strategy was therefore not to 
oppose the principle of joining the European Community, but rather to claim that the terms of 
entry achieved by Heath’s Tory government were not only humiliating to the national ‘face’, but 
also represented a serious threat to its economic well-being. In his own television performance, 
he therefore maintained that, as in 1967, he was certainly in favour of joining the EEC if the 
terms agreed were truly beneficial to the country and worthy of the British people. However, for 
the time being, he proclaimed that ‘the price of admission’ was way too costly, as a result of the 
Heath government’s utter incompetence. In opposition to the paradise of national power, 
prosperity, and prestige promised by the Prime Minister, Wilson suggested that Commonwealth 
exports had been put in jeopardy, that food prices would go up, and that unemployment was 
bound to rise in Britain as a result of EEC membership. Furthermore, he accused the Heath 
government of a putting forward a totally shameful and defeatist underestimation of national 
strength, as if Common Market membership was a matter of national life and death.‘This White 
Paper by the Government appals me,’ Wilson declared, ‘by suggesting that Britain is finished if 
we do not go in.’ The implication was therefore that the situation was not really so desperate, 
that ‘Europe’ was not some sort of life raft to which Britain necessarily had to cling out of sheer 
desperation, and that the people of this country could still freely decide their fate with much 
greater collective dignity and self-respect.
The majority of the Labour Party confirmed its opposition to EEC entry at its Conference in 
early October 1971, when it voted against the terms of accession achieved by the Conservative
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government by a ratio of five to one.5 During this event, numerous ‘anti-European’ addresses 
were delivered by leading figures of the party. James Callaghan, for instance, called the Prime 
Minister a ‘Euro-fanatic’ who wanted to sign the Treaty of Rome without the people’s consent, 
and defended Britain’s traditional we-image of global expansiveness in opposition to the 
comparatively minuscule and parochial Common Market:
Will you turn away from the open seas and mould yourself to Europe? Mr Heath said ‘yes’. 
The Labour Movement says no.
At the same time, Harold Wilson reiterated once again that the terms of entry achieved by the 
Conservatives were ‘humiliating’, and that they could only lead to ‘crippling Britain’s strength.’ 
He called on all members of the Labour Party to unite against the Conservatives on this crucial 
matter, in order to advance towards the recovery of national self-confidence and to make 
possible the creation of ‘a greater Britain than we have ever known.’
Nevertheless, during this same conference, Roy Jenkins reaffirmed his total commitment to 
Britain’s entry into the EEC and warned that he would never allow ‘the flame of Labour 
Europeanism to be put out’. In his own intervention, he argued that those who argued that 
‘Britain was different, that she was not Europe, that we won the war and “they” lost it, and that 
we were a great power on our own’ had caused the country’s influence in the world to decline 
for fifteen years. In his view, the EEC was undoubtedly the crucial ‘spark’ which the British 
economy needed to grow, and moreover, it was a morally praiseworthy enterprise from the 
perspective of socialist internationalism:
By going in we can help to underpin world peace. By going in we can cooperate with the 
social democratic parties of Western Europe to make a reality of some of the socialist 
internationalism we have talked about for so long.
5S e e  The Times, 4 - 6  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 1 . A l l  c it a t io n s  w h i c h  f o l l o w  a r e  f r o m  t h is  n e w s p a p e r .
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For Jenkins and his supporters within the Labour Party, therefore, ‘Europe’ was clearly the most 
promising hope for the recovery of British national pride in the political, economic, and moral 
spheres of international status-ranking.
Meanwhile, within the Conservative Party itself, Heath also had to face a great deal of 
opposition from the far right, led by the sharp-tongued Enoch Powell, who saw the EEC as a 
shamefully humiliating, unacceptable threat to national sovereignty and independence (and 
therefore to the collective honour and self-respect of the British people). At the Party’s own 
Conference a few days later,6 Powell warned that a politically united European Community 
would completely eliminate Britain’s proud, separate, distinctive voice in the world. Amid loud 
cheers, he refused to accept the arguments of all those who claimed that there was now ‘no 
alternative’ to such an utterly disgraceful situation:
I do not believe this nation, which has maintained and defended its independence for a 
thousand years, will now submit to see it merged or lost; nor did I become a member of our 
sovereign parliament in order to consent to that sovereignty being abated or transferred. 
Come what may, I cannot and I will not.
However, the majority of the Tories rallied behind their ‘Europeanist’ leader enthusiastically, 
and voted by a ratio of eight to one in favour of EEC entry. In line with the discursive style of 
the Prime Minister, key speakers such as the Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, defined 
‘Europe’ as a major boost to Britain’s authority, influence and stature in the world, a chance ‘to 
project herself on a stage wider than the British islands’. Another emotive high point of 
patriotic, ‘pro-European’ fervour was also reached by Norman St John-Stevas, the Tory MP for 
Chelmsford, who drew loud cheers from the crowd when he rejected the idea that the British 
monarchy could ever be threatened by a future ‘European President’:
That is rubbish. The Queen of England is more than a match for any continental president. 
The only thing that is likely to happen is we go into the Common Market is that she might 
become the Empress of Europe.
6S e e  The Times, 1 4 - 1 6  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 1 . A l l  c it a t io n s  w h i c h  f o l l o w  a re  f r o m  t h is  n e w s p a p e r .
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Finally, on the last day of the Conference, the Prime Minister himself delivered an emotionally 
charged closing address in which the European Community was once again identified with the 
resurgence of British influence and prestige in the global pyramid of states: ‘a real change in the 
standing of Britain among the nations of the world.’
The manipulation of British national symbolism and sentiment, whether in favour or against 
the concept of EEC membership, was also very evident in the propaganda of the different 
associations which emerged during this period in Britain to rally support for their respective 
causes. The ‘pro-market’ European Movement, for instance, published a monthly tabloid called 
the British European, which was distributed across the country by volunteers at holiday resorts, 
railway stations, football matches, and so on. It displayed the Union Jack with the headline ‘It’s 
time we carried our flag into Europe!’, and in bold type proclaimed on the front page: ‘It’s time 
Britain woke up, stopped being a looker-on, and grabbed a share of the European gravy!’7 8
Meanwhile, however, organizations such as the Keep Britain Out Campaign battled back with 
accusations of national betrayal, publishing advertisements which announced the government’s 
decision to sell their own country:
HM Government Ltd. auctioneers and valuers.
FOR SALE BY ROME TREATY the Freehold of England and Scotland, Wales and the 
Northern Part of Ireland, together with the undisputed right to frame and impose laws upon 
the land and upon all of Her Majesty’s subjects.
Negotiations proceeding. Stop the greatest sell-out ever. Keep us out of The Six. Britain 
must not become no. 7.
It is also interesting to observe how the two top-selling newspapers at that time, the Daily 
Mirror and the Daily Express,9 represented the European issue during this period, igniting
7Cited in Kitzinger (1973: 222).
8Cited in Kitzinger (1973: 247).
9 According to figures cited in Seymour-Ure (1991: 29-30), in the early 1970’s the average daily circulation of the 
Daily Mirror was 4,570,000, while the Daily Express was selling an average of 3,563,000 copies a day. In third 
place was The Daily Mail (1,890,000), followed by The Sun (1,615,000), The Daily Telegraph (1,409,000), The 
Times (388,000), and The Guardian (304,000).
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sentiments in order to build up support for both the ‘pro* and the ‘anti’ cause. On one 
the Mirror fully accepted the argument that the only conceivable source of national 
^ ‘'Strength and self-esteem, once the reality of Britain’s loss of power was accepted, could be found 
in ‘Europe’. When the Government’s White Paper was published, this newspaper’s editorial 
stated:
Are a people who for centuries were the makers of history -  and who can again help make 
history -  to become mere lookers-on from an off-shore island of dwindling significance? 
Surely the answer is clear. The terms are known. The prizes are immense. The challenge 
must be accepted.10
On the opposite pole, however, the Express continued to label all such ‘pro-Europeanism’ as 
nothing short of national treason. It called the Government’s agreement with the EEC ‘The Great 
Betrayal’, and asserted that its chief negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, had sold away Britain’s 
distinctive cultural personality to the highest postor: ‘It’s not sugar that Rippon is selling short. 
It’s your way of life.’ According to this newspaper, the document presented by the nation’s 
leaders to legitimate their decision to go ‘into Europe’ could not properly be called a White 
Paper, but a ‘Black Paper’ which essentially outlined the humiliating national defeat which 
Heath’s government was responsible for -  in other words, ‘How Britain’s Greatness will be 
Surrendered’.* 11
This same impassioned debate concerning ‘Europe’ was even observable on a spiritual and 
religious plane. On the whole, the official representatives of the main official churches 
manifested their full support of EEC membership and the benefits it would bring to the national 
soul. The General Synod of the Church of England, for instance, published a report in which it 
defined the enlargement of the EEC as ‘an exhilarating and spirit-stretching experience for the 
Church of England as much as for England as a whole’, and even proposed a prayer for the 
future of Europe which began as follows:
™Daily Mirror, 8 July 1971 (Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 344).
11Daily Express, 14 May 1971 (Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 344).
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We offer up to thee the attempt to create a United Europe. We do not pray that Europe be 
strong or rich. We pray that her historic peoples may unite in peace after being so tom by 
wars.(Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 253-4)
Similarly, the Roman Catholic Institute of International Affairs issued an official statement 
which declared that:
Christians who, by definition, believe in the breaking down of barriers between races 
cannot but welcome the opportunities for contact with the European peoples which the 
Common Market offers.(ibid.: 252)
Nevertheless, at least in some British minds, the EEC appeared to symbolize a frightening re- 
emergence of Papal domination. For instance, a pamphlet published by an organization known as 
the Protestant Alliance, entitled The Queen and the Common Market, made the following 
ominous warning:
Unless faithful protestants stand up and be counted, Europe is about to realize the false 
anti-Scriptural ideal of One World One Church. The One World is Communist. The One 
Church is the Church of Rome. The Church of England and the apostate Churches will be 
swallowed up. This Common Market in Churches and States is a league with the World, 
the Flesh and the Devil.(ibid: 257)
A similar fear was also voiced by a very concerned British citizen, Mr Harold Eldred, who wrote 
an irate letter to The Times on 21 July 1971, in which he asserted:
If Great Britain becomes a member of the EEC, she will be allied to countries one of which 
(at least) is dominated by the Roman Catholic Church from whose yoke we broke free at 
the Reformation. To bring us back under the rule of the Papacy would be the most 
retrograde step and the biggest disaster of all.(ibid: 258)
Hence, even at the level of spiritual beliefs and religious affiliations, there was some 
disagreement about whether ‘Europe* could guide the British flock towards the path of heavenly 
salvation or infernal damnation.
At the political level, the issue of EEC membership was ultimately settled by a Parliamentary 
vote on October 28 1971, when a majority of 244 (356 versus 112) gave a ‘Yes to Europe’ on the
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terms negotiated by the government.12 The cross-party divisions on the matter were illustrated by 
the fact that 68 Labour MP’s, led by the ‘pro-European’ Roy Jenkins, disobeyed their party’s 
leadership and voted in favour of the government’s proposal for entry, while 39 Conservative 
followers of Enoch Powell voted with the Opposition. Heath, in any case, characteristically 
attempted to turn the event into an occasion for patriotic rejoicing and collective national 
effervescence [see picture reproduced on the following page]. Standing outside the door of his 
residence at 10 Downing Street, a classic symbol of British political authority and leadership, the 
Prime Minister proclaimed:
Parliament has now decided that Britain should, in principle, join the European Economic 
Communities on the basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated. Today’s 
decision has been reached by a clear majority of the elected representatives of the people: 
men and women who, irrespective of party political differences, share the conviction that 
this decision is right for their country... Now we stand ready to take our first step into a 
new world full of new opportunities. Our historic decision has been made: the British 
people accept the challenge. Let us show ourselves to that new world as we would wish it 
to see us: confident, proud, and strong.13
Such words once again illustrated a concern and a sensitivity for the recovery of collective self­
esteem, in this insecure period of British status-anxiety: a preoccupation with how ‘we’ would 
wish the world to see ‘us’ at this difficult time of change and transition. The Prime Minister was 
implicitly saying that no loss of national ‘face; should be feared, and that no threat of collective 
shame or humiliation existed. On the contrary, he proclaimed that the British people could stmt 
‘into Europe’ with their head held high: ‘confident, proud, and strong.’
A brief political ritual was also organized to celebrate the Commons vote in favour of 
‘Europe’ at the cliffs of Dover, where the ex-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan lit a huge beacon 
that shone across the Channel [reproduced on the following page].14 A few moments later, an 
answering beacon was lit on the French coast at Calais to symbolize a new union of fraternity
,2 S e e  The Times , 2 9  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 1 .
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between the Continent and Britain. Speaking in front of a crowd of more than 500 people, 
Macmillan defined ‘Europe’ as ‘not a sofa for us’, but a new, active, honourable role for the 
British people: ‘a springboard from which we can bring peace and prosperity to the world’. He 
also proclaimed that the Parliamentary approval of Britain’s EEC membership was ‘a vindication 
of the European movement which Sir Winston Churchill had helped to found in 1947.’ A revered 
national totem such as Churchill was therefore remoulded by Macmillan in order to fit the 
| present circumstances of the country, as a way of legitimating its membership of the European 
! Community. After all, as the previous chapter illustrated, Sir Winston himself had always 
defended the idea that Britain was a ‘world power’ which was merely ‘with Europe, but not of 
it’.
Nevertheless, in spite of all the government’s propagandists efforts to channel national we- 
feelings in favour of ‘Europe’, this task of symbolic legitimation clearly remained a rather 
I difficult one in the British context of collective memories and sentiments. As soon as the
I
| Parliamentary vote had taken place, the ‘anti-European’ Common Market Safeguards Campaign
j issued a public statement which suggested that all true British patriots should rebel against the
I Government’s shameful, treacherous act:
I
I It is now therefore the duty of every patriotic citizen -  everyone who wants to save the
I country from the national decline inevitable if we are driven into the EEC -  to resist the
Government’s proposed legislation by all means in our power.(Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 
239)
In fact, although the Heath government attempted to identify EEC membership with a renewal of 
British national pride, these discursive efforts ‘failed to shake people out of their apathy’ (N. 
Beloff 1973: 266). Some opinion polls actually suggested that although a majority of people had 
now resigned themselves to the uncomfortable fact that there was now ‘no alternative to Europe’,
in order to protect ‘the national interest’, it was still the case that only a relatively small minority
were in favour of going in (Lord 1993: 120). Even one of Heath’s official spokesmen was forced 
to candidly confess: ‘It’s like going to the dentist: the country knows we’ve got to join, but it 




therefore still remained a cause for which it was rather difficult to drum up patriotic enthusiasm, 
as the official date of membership approached.
5.2 ‘We’re in -  but without the fireworks’: Political ceremonies of legitimation and 
counter-rituals of contestation during Britain’s accession ‘into Europe’
Britain’s official entry into the EEC took place on 1 January 1973. However, almost a year 
before this date, on 22 January 1972, a formal ceremony took place at the Palais d ’Egmont, in 
Brussels, to mark the signing of the Treaty of Accession which made Britain, along with Ireland, 
Norway, and Denmark, full members of the European Community.15 It is worth considering this 
political ritual in some detail, for it can serve to further illustrate the symbolic strategies of 
legitimation which were carried out by the country’s leaders in order to justify this event in the 
national life and transform it into a cause for patriotic joy.
The signing was attended by the EEC’s main authorities at that time, as well as respected 
‘founding fathers’ such as Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European 
Commission. The entire ceremony was broadcast live on television and radio, so that the British 
people could all collectively participate in this ‘historic occasion’ from their homes, and every 
attempt was predictably made to present the signing of the treaty as a hugely important national 
triumph. In a newspaper article published on that day, Heath wrote:
The British voice in the counsels of Europe gives us an opportunity to increase our 
influence in world affairs and thus our ability to protect our own interests... I have no doubt 
that today and all it stands for will come to be regarded as one of the major milestones in 
our history and in the peaceful and prosperous evolution of the peoples of Europe.16
,5My account of this event is based on the reports in The Sunday Times and The Observer, 23 January 1972.
l6Daily Mail, 22 January 1972.
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During the course of the ceremony itself,17 the Prime Minister delivered a speech in which he 
again attempted to harmonize people’s emotional attachments to ‘the nation’ with the 
supranational project of European unity. Indeed, he emphasized that the national and European 
levels of collective identification did not necessarily have to clash:
Clear thinking will be needed to recognise that each of us within the Community will 
remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the achievements of our national 
history and tradition. But, at the same time, as the enlargement of the Community makes 
clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognise our common European heritage, our 
mutual interests and our European destiny. Imagination will be required to develop 
institutions which respect the traditions and the individuality of the member states, but at 
the same time have the strength to guide the future course of the enlarged Community.18
Hence, presumably because he was very conscious of the particularly strong clash between 
British national sentiments and the project of European integration, Heath stressed the 
importance of building a European Community which fully respected the ‘traditions’ and the 
‘individuality’ of its respective member states.
At the same time, the British leader’s speech was filled with emotive references to the 
morally worthwhile task of world peace and global solidarity which he proclaimed the European 
project should be committed to. Hence, a discursive attempt was made to bring together not only 
the national and the European, but also the universal, cosmopolitan level of collective emotional 
identification:
Britain, with her Commonwealth links, has also much to contribute to the universal nature 
of Europe’s responsibilities. The collective history of the countries represented here 
encompasses a large part of the history of the world itself. I am not thinking of the age of 
imperialism, now past; but of the lasting and creative effects of the spread of language and 
of culture, of commerce and of administration by people from Europe across land and sea 
to the other continents of the world. These are the essential ties which today bind Europe in 
frienship with the rest of mankind.
17The pomp of the occasion was partly marred by the fact that the Prime Minister was splattered with black ink by a 
woman protester, although the reason for this bizarre attack apparently had nothing to do with the EEC. The 
incident, in any case, held up the signature ceremony for more than an hour, while Heath was cleaned up in the 
British Embassy and made to look respectable once again for this solemn gathering of international authorities.
18The entire address was published by The Sunday Times, 23 January 1972. All citations are taken from this 
newspaper.
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The concept of ‘imperialism’ was thus now denigrated by this British leader as a morally 
shameful anachronism. In his view, the only respectable role for Europe’s nations, within which 
Britain was now clearly included, would be to work together towards cooperation at a global 
level, and hence towards the unification of humanity as a whole. By linking ‘Europe’ with the 
ideal of a universal cosmopolitan solidarity, the EEC was thus presented as an honourable source 
of collective pride in the sphere of morality.
Heath’s speech at the signature ritual undoubtedly struck an emotive chord in those British 
minds which had fully converted to the European cause. At the same time, however, the lack of 
consensus over the issue of EEC membership was once again very evident in the British public 
sphere. For one thing, the leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson, simbolically displayed his 
total lack of respect for the ceremony in Brussels by attending a football match of his favourite 
team in Highbury, instead of taking part in the government’s official Euro-celebrations. At the 
same time, an ‘anti-European’ protest demonstration took place in London on the day of the 
Brussels ceremony. A crowd of approximately 150 people chanted ‘Heath traitor!* and ‘No to 
Europe!’, in front of the building which housed the Common Market Commission’s 
representative. During this ‘anti-European’ ritual of contestation, a delegation of MPs led by 
Labour’s Douglas Jay delivered a letter of protest to this EEC institution, which stated that 
Parliament had not yet assented to the treaty of accession, and that the British people were firmly 
opposed to it. The Common Market Safeguards Campaign also organized a conference in which 
anti-marketeers from different parties voiced their rejection of the document which Heath had 
put his signature on. And two days later, the spokesman of the right, Enoch Powell, launched his 
own personal discursive counter-attack against the Brussels ceremony by delivering a speech in 
which he proclaimed that the British people would never tolerate such a disgraceful reduction of 
their self-governing powers, and hence their collective dignity as an ‘historic independent 
nation’:
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To propose to the British Parliament and people that they should be taxed, governed, 
judged, and legislated by an authority outside the realm is a perilous enterprise... The 
people of Britain will not suffer it.19
According to a British journalist’s account of this period, in spite of the Government's efforts 
to whip up patriotic enthusiasm about EEC membership, many people’s residual we-feelings of 
emotional allegiance to the Commonwealth countries continued to present a formidable obstacle 
which made it extremely difficult for them to accept the shift towards Europe, or in any case to 
view it as a national triumph:
[There was] a nagging feeling in Britain that our real friends were not these foreign- 
language speaking aliens across the Channel, but the English-speaking, cricket playing lath 
and kin across the oceans. We were resigned to the liquidation of the Empire and 
increasingly aware that that the Commonwealth was too politically and materially 
diversified to provide an effective international entity. But these facts could not destroy the 
long traditions of friendship and the many family relationships which linked Britain with 
the white settlers in the one-time colonies.(N. Beloff 1973: 268-8).
Hence, the emotional climate in Britain at the time of the country’s ‘entry into Europe* was 
defined by this observer as ‘not so much euphoria as resignation’ (ibid.: 271). This general mood 
was in fact perfectly encapsulated in a cartoon published by The Guardian on the day before the 
signature ceremony in Brussels took place [reproduced on the following page].20 It showed the 
Prime Minister dragging a reluctant Briton, who wore a jumper displaying the Union Jack, into 
the enclosed territory of the European Community. A sign welcomed the British newscomers 
with some enticing promises about the future that lay ahead for them in the EEC: ‘FORGET 
THE PAST! JOIN THE FRENCH EURO LEGION! Make exciting new friends, Opportunities 
for Incentive, Good Cooking, Travel.’ However, as Heath proudly signed the Treaty of 
Accesion, the unconvinced Briton turned his head nostalgically towards Europe’s entrance gate, 
where a sombre-looking Britannia and her children had been left behind for good.
t9T h e  G u a r d i a n ,  2 5  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 2 .
20The Guardian, 2 2  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 2 .
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In any case, irrespective of the considerable lack of public enthusiasm, the Treaty of 
Accession was officially ratified by Parliament in July 1972, and on the first day of the following 
year, Britain officially became a member of the European Economic Community. This occasion 
was symbolically marked with a new round of discursive media performances and political 
rituals which attempted to portray the event as a motive for collective patriotic rejoicing.21 A 
nation-wide cultural festival, the so-called ‘Fanfare for Europe*, was organized by the Heath 
government to symbolically mark Britain’s admission into the EEC, in which musicians, theatre 
groups, craftsmen, and other artists from all the member states participated [see advertisement 
reproduced on the following page. On the eve of the entry, a torchlight parade ceremony was 
organized by the European Movement in London, where approximately 300 people marched to 
celebrate the event and presented a silver tankard to George Thomson, one of the two new 
commissioners which would represent Britain in Brussels. Thomson declared:
This is a unique new year. What dictators have failed to do by force, democracies are 
undertaking by peaceful consent. Twenty-five years from now, if we build the right 
foundations in 1973, our children will enjoy a richer quality of life than could have been 
conceivable had we remained separate.22
The other new British Commissioner, Sir Christopher Soames, defined the occasion as ‘the 
beginning of a great adventure’ for Britain, and proclaimed that ‘we now set out to develop over 
the years a European Union which, with its own personality, strength, and sense of purpose, will 
have a major impact on world affairs.’23
The Prime Minister himself also continued his untiring discursive crusade to build up 
patriotic enthusiasm for the EEC amongst the British people. In a newspaper article published in 
The Times on the official entry date, Heath continued to insist on his vision of ‘Europe’ as the
21My account of these events is based on the reports in The Times and The Guardian.
Z2The Guardian, 1 January 1973.
^Tke Times, 1 January 1973.
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only way to save Britain from further decline, and to find a new secure source of power, 
prosperity, and collective self-esteem:
Since the last war we have been through a difficult time in our history... We have had to 
deal with a formidable succession of economic difficulties and we have seen other 
countries move ahead of us in prosperity and influence... Even more fundamentally, people 
in this country, faced with the difficulties which I have mentioned, were beginning to feel 
that our role as a country was to put up with the second best and to muddle through our 
difficulties as best we could. I believe that we can go back to associating ourselves with 
genuine achievement and success. We shall be able once again to help guide events rather 
than submit to them. That is the real significance of our entry into the European 
Community.
The Prime Minister therefore carried on with his determined symbolic appeals to the national 
pride-shame balance: if Britain wanted to avoid remaining ‘second best* in the world’s 
international hierarchy of status-ranking, the only way to do so at this stage was to pool its 
strength with the other members of the EEC.
On the day after membership became official, a special banquet ceremony was also held in 
London at the great hall of Hampton Court, as a further way of symbolically marking Britain’s 
entry ‘into Europe’ and promoting its importance for the nation’s future. During this official 
gathering, Heath made a particularly daring Europeanist speech, in which he stressed that the 
objectives of the EEC should not merely be limited to the sphere of economic self-interest:
We have been accustomed during these years to hear the Community described as the 
Common Market. I hope that this is a habit which we can now abandon. Certainly the 
unified market is a fact of enormous significance. But it is only the first step in a journey 
which will carry us well beyond questions of tariffs and trade. For what we are building is 
a Community whose scope covers virtually the whole field of human endeavour.24
In an attempt to further legitimate this firm espousal of the Europeanist cause, Heath resorted to 
the same symbolic strategy which had been employed earlier by Harold Macmillan in a speech 
cited earlier in this chapter. Once again, the revered totemic figure of Winston Churchill was
u The Tim es„ 3 J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
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invoked by the Prime Minister, as a way of channeling national we-feelings in favour of 
‘Europe*:
Twenty-five years ago, at the first gathering of the European Movement at The Hague, Sir 
Winston Churchill looked forward to the day when ‘men and women of every country will 
think as much of being European as of belonging to their native land, and wherever they go 
in this wide domain they will feel truly, here 1 am at home.* Tonight, as we meet on the eve 
of the Fanfare for Europe festival to mark British entry into the Community, we are one 
step nearer to making Churchill*s dream a reality.
In the emotive setting of this banquet ceremony, the historical facts about Churchill* s preference 
for a world led by the ‘English-speaking peoples* (rather than ‘the Europeans’), were 
conveniently swept under the carpet by Heath to serve the purposes of his Conservative 
government. To cite Churchill’s support for European unity was an effective way of saying that 
it was perfectly compatible to be both a ‘good British patriot’ and a ‘good European*. After all, if 
Churchill, an exemplary national leader who had devoted himself to the survival and prosperity 
of Britain during the last war, had promoted the Europeanist cause, there would appear to be no 
patriotic reasons for opposing it. Implicitly, the Prime Minister was therefore claiming that to be 
in favour of European unification was in no way a patriotic sin. On the contrary, to do so was to 
respect the historic legacy of a statesman who was greatly revered for his service to the British 
people.
Nevertheless, as usual, the Heath Government’s official ceremonies of legitimation were 
surrounded by a conflictive atmosphere of discursive contestation. In the first place, Harold 
Wilson continued to denounce the terms agreed with the EEC as ‘utterly crippling’.25 Hence, he 
boycotted the government’s patriotic banquet ceremony in London because he said he did not 
feel like celebrating an event which was not ‘in the best interests of the British people.’26 Instead, 
the Leader of the Opposition promised that if he was re-elected, there would be a re-negotiation 
withS Brussels, and the British people would be given the chance to vote in favour or against the Il
lsThe Times, 1 J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
2$The Times, 3  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
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question of EEC membership. By that stage, Wilson’s Shadow Cabinet had officially decided to 
entice the public by promising that under a future Labour government, ‘the nation’ would 
ultimately be granted the opportunity to give its own verdict on ‘Europe’ through either a 
referendum or a general election.
At the same time, on the eve of the entry ‘into Europe’, British ‘anti-marketeers’ organized 
another one of their classic protest demonstrations in Essex, by staging a mock funeral for the 
‘dead British nation’ through the village of Hullbridge, with their heads bowed and wearing 
black armbands.27 Furthermore, opinion polls published by the press on the day EEC 
membership became official suggested that only 38 per cent of people were happy with this 
prospect, while 39 per cent were unhappy, and 23 per cent were ‘don’t knows’. On the day 
membership became official, The Guardian therefore summed up the national mood with the 
following front page headline: ‘We’re in - but without the fireworks’. The opening paragraph of 
this top story stated that:
Britain passed peacefully into Europe at mignight last night without any special 
celebrations. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had occurred, and a date 
which will be entered in the history books as long as histories are written, was taken by 
most people as a matter of course, [reproduced on the following page]
Indeed, it seems as if every time the Heath Government tried to organize a ceremony with the 
goal of turning the ‘entry into Europe’ into a cause for patriotic celebration, such symbolic 
efforts were typically confronted by counter-rituals of de-legitimation. This tendency was 
displayed once again on the night of January 3, when an attempt was made to give Britain’s 
membership of the EEC a ‘royal touch’ of monarchic support. A special gala had been organized 
at the Royal Opera House in London’s Covent Garden to launch the Fanfare for Europe festival, 
with the presence of Queen Elizabeth II. However, when the British monarch and the Duke of 
Edinburgh, dutifully escorted by the Prime Minister, arrived on the scene, they were greeted by a
11 The Times , 1 J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
l lThe Tim es„ 1 J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
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crowd of approximately 300 protesters, who booed and threw stink bombs at them [see report on 
the following page]. These ‘anti-European* extremists displayed a gallows with an effigy of 
Heath hanging from it. The word ‘TRAITOR’ was written across its chest. The police had to 
intervene to control the situation, while the royal couple and the Prime Minister entered the 
opera house.
On the very next day, another demonstration of popular discontent took place when the 
Prime Minister was opening an art exhibition related to the Fanfare for Europe celebrations in 
London’s West End. Suddenly, an angry middle-aged woman angrily swung her bag at Heath 
and accused him once again of being unloyal to his own country with the same harsh insult: 
‘Traitor!’ The Prime Minister’s security men quickly grabbed the bag-swiging protester and 
dragged her away. In itself, this incident could have remained a trivial anecdote of little 
consequence. However, what is interesting for the purposes of this thesis is that the Euro-phobic 
Daily Express seized upon the event and transformed it into its main front-page story on the 
following day. Under a massive headline in huge bold-face print which proclaimed ‘EUROPE: 
Woman takes a swing at Heath -  FED UP’, this newspaper depicted the personal protest of this 
angry bag-swinger, Mrs. Beula Henry, as an incident which symbolized the collective sentiments 
of outrage which the ‘ordinary people’ of Britain felt against the treacherous Prime Minister who 
had forced them to ‘go into Europe* against their will [reproduced on the following page].
Nevertheless, if one looks at the editorials of the main national newspapers on the official 
day of entry, it is clear that many of them fully adopted the same discursive tone of patriotic 
rejoicing employed by the Conservative government, and some even showed considerable 
enthusiasm for the ideal of a politically united Europe that went far beyond the concept of a 
‘Common Market’:
There is every reason to be delighted that this is the day Britain joins the European 
Community... It is through a successful economic and political contribution of the 
community that Britain will most certainly solve her own problems, and a successful
29The Times, The Guardian, Daily Express, a n d  Daily Mirror, 4  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 3 .
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contribution will also be of benefit to the rest of the world. At last Britain has again a large 
area of fresh opportunity... Europe needs an idea, and it needs to have more appeal to 
human nature than mere geographical propinquity or economic interest provide. The 
people of Europe should be able to see themselves as a European nation with a particular 
character and aims .(The Times) I
Today is the Day of the Great Happening. January the first, 1973, begins one of the ! 
significant New Years in the history of our nation. AT LAST, the British are members of 
the European Economic Community, so modestly called the Common Market. This is 
more than the most elaborate trading agreement in the history of states. It is more than the 
greatest trading bloc in the entire world. It is a community of nations who will grow ever 
closer as the years pass by. And one day, perhaps a long time from now, it will achieve the 
persistent dream of a United States of Europe. We should, every one of us, be brimful of 
rejoicing and hope.(Dm7y Mirror) j
Happy New Europe!... From today, the Common Market means not THEM, but US... The | 
Sun believes the changes that come in the long run will be mostly for the better. Britain i 
will respond well to the opportunities and the pressures of being part of the greatest trading 
group the world has seen... A HAPPY NEW YEAR! AND A HAPPY (AND PEACEFUL ' 
AND PROSPEROUS) NEW EUROPE TO US ALL! {The Sun) I
Other newspapers, however, while supporting the entry as a potentially great opportunity for the 
future of Britain, pointed to the lack of consensus on this issue and the difficulty of stirring up 
public enthusiasm for EEC membership:
Tf the trumpet shall give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle?’ Well, 
it’s a pity that the Fanfare for Europe is not more harmonious, but in politics as in music 
dissonance has always been inevitable if the Second Fiddles play a different tune. In this 
case, it must be acknowledged that a large part of the country is not ecstatic about the 
score. The journey into Europe will be bumpy and discordant.(77ie Guardian)
Whether or not January 1, 1973 is regarded as a sunshine day for Britain still depends 
largely on how they react to the opportunities which now beckon. Enlargement of the 
Community from six to nine members could spell the final atrophy of a once great nation; 
or, more probably, it could mark a new and splendid chapter in our long history... Certainly 
this newspaper has for many years supported the cause of European unity, in the wake of 
two terrible world wars which almost destroyed European civilization. But it would be idle 
to pretend that public opinion shares that view. Enthusiasm, scepticism, and opposition, in 
perhaps roughly equal proportions, are apparent on the day of British entry.{Daily 
Telegraph)
There is bound to be some sadness and regret. No groom marries without a wistful glance 
back to his bachelor freedom. No fanfare for Europe, however cheery, can quite be made to 
harmonise with Rule Britannia. But ask yourselves how much hope and glory this land of 
ours would really enjoy if left on its own... Yes, there is much for us to do now. And 
everything to play for. We’re in. And we’re on our way. On this morning, as we put our 
first foot into Europe, we give you the toast: ‘A happy New Year. And an exciting new 
era.’ {Daily Mail)
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Meanwhile, however, the Daily Express continued to voice its fervent opposition to the EEC 
in its own particular style. On the official date of entry ‘into Europe*, it showed the picture of a 
baby girl whose birth on the first day of the year had coincided with this ‘historic’ event in the 
national life. The headline was: ‘Debby, the Euro-baby who couldn’t care less* [reproduced on 
the following page]. The mother of the child was cited as looking on her first bom as ‘British*, 
but the newspaper ominously warned that in twenty years* time things could be different, for 
babies bom in Britain could be officially registered by ‘foreign’ authorities in Brussels as 
‘citizens of Europe*. At the same time, its front-page editorial argued that:
For Britain to enter the Market is a mistake for at least three resons:
It tends to separate her from her historic areas of development.
It creates a set of circumstances in which Europeans may be treated preferentially to people 
of British stock.
It does not carry the approval of the majority of the British people although it has been 
approved by Parliament.
At the most, the Express claimed that if there was now no choice but to resign oneself to this 
unhappy situation, then British leaders should simply ensure that the country attained the 
maximum possible benefits from its European entanglements:
If our future is in Europe, in partnership with peoples so different from us, then Britain 
alone can ensure her own people’s rightful share of influence and prosperity... Britain has a 
powerful role to play. Her traditions of political stability, her skills in finance and business 
are what Europe needs. They equip her to lead... So watch out Europe -  Here we come!
From this newspaper's perspective, ‘the Europeans’ were therefore still very much an ‘Other*, 
distinct from and less important than ‘people of British stock*. Hence, if EEC membership was 
now an inevitable reality, as a result of the undeniable decline of British power, the only 
acceptable goal would be to ensure national dominance within this new context. The discourse 
employed was therefore one that unashamedly displayed a narcissistic desire for national 
superiority over the European Other: ‘So watch out Europe -  Here we come!’
The emotional atmosphere in Britain at the time of entry therefore reflected much patriotic 
enthusiasm amongst those who had fully convened to the Europeanized we-image of national
115
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greatness espoused by Heath, but there was also a considerable degree of reluctance, resignation, 
and hostility towards ‘Europe’. The idea that EEC membership could represent a new, 
honourable source of national pride still remained a hotly contested one. It seems as if the 
symbolic association of ‘going into Europe’ with the decline of British power and status, and 
hence with a discomforting sense of disgraceful national defeatism, continued to represent a 
major socio-psychological obstacle for those who wished to build up public support for the 
European cause. As the historian K.O. Morgan has put it:
The mood when Britain joined was one of wary acceptance, since no obvious alternative 
could be found. It even appeared a kind of surrender, a recognition that the loss of Empire 
and the breakdown of an equal partnership with the Americans had left Britain as an 
enfeebled and divided offshore island with nowhere else to tum.(1990:342)
To make things worse, the first year of official EEC membership was marked by high inflation, 
increasing unemployment, and widespread strikes in Britain, which caused the popularity of both 
Heath and ‘Europe’ to quickly sink simultaneously (J.W. Young 1990: 118-19; Spence 1976: 
31). According to figures cited in Northedge (1974: 352), by July 1973 only 42 per cent of the 
British people approved the Common Market, as compared with 48 per cent who disapproved. In 
fact, the numerous surveys carried out on the issue of the EEC during the four years of Heath’s 
Premiership suggest that ‘at no time between 1970 and 1974 did public opinion register 
enthusiasm for the EC’ (Lord 1993: 118).
5.3 The Referendum Debate of 1975: ‘Europe’ as national salvation versus ‘Europe’ as 
national disaster
In February 1974, the man who had successfully taken Britain ‘into Europe’ lost power in a 
general election, and Harold Wilson once again took over the reins of government. As I have 
shown, in spite of the patriotic triumphalism with which Prime Minister Heath had attempted to 
surround the official entry into the EEC, the Labour opposition always contested such Euro­
enthusiasm by claiming that the Conservatives had completely failed to protect the ‘national
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interest’ in their negotiations with Brussels. Hence, during the election campaign which brought 
Wilson back to 10 Downing Street, the Labour Party’s manifesto promised to renegotiate the 
terms of entry with the EEC, in order to gain a better deal for the British people. It particularly 
stressed that under a new Labour government, the country’s financial contribution to the 
Community budget would be reduced, its parliamentary powers over industrial, regional, and 
fiscal policies would be secured, and the Common Agricultural Policy would be reformed so that 
low-cost food producers from the Commonwealth countries could continue to have privileged 
access to the British market. Furthermore, the Labour Party guaranteed that there would 
ultimately be a popular vote on the question of EEC membership, in order to allow ‘the nation’ 
to choose freely whether or not it wanted to remain ‘in Europe*.
The offer of a renegotiation with the EEC evidently had important electoral advantages for 
Wilson. In the first place, it allowed him to present his party as the supposedly more ardent 
defender of the ‘national interest*, and to depict Heath as a weak leader whose excessive and 
shameful submissiveness to European foreigners was seriously harming Britain. At the same 
time, the promise to hold a popular vote on the ‘Europe question’ made it possible for Labour to 
present itself as a party which was far more democratic than the Conservatives. Back in the 1970 
electoral campaign, Heath himself had declared that it would be unacceptable to enter the 
European Community without ‘the full-hearted consent of Parliament and people’. Opinion 
polls, however, continued to suggest that such a ‘full-hearted consent* hardly existed at the 
popular level. Hence, the Labour Party capitalized on this situation, accusing Heath of 
contradicting his own words by forcibly taking the country ‘into Europe’ against its will, and in 
its manifesto, it proclaimed that ‘the right to decide the final issue of British entry will be 
restored to the British people’ (cited in Spence 1976: 33; my emphasis). The Conservative 
Premier was further harmed by the fact that in the closing days of the electoral campaign, Enoch 
Powell recommended that Tory opponents of the EEC should vote Labour in order to protect the 
independence of their country (J.W. Young 1993: 119). Heath’s electoral defeat therefore
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suggests that in the end, the Conservative leader’s struggle to present the ‘entry into Europe’ as a 
great national victory had ultimately failed to convince much of the British public.30
At the same time, the decision to offer a popular vote on ‘Europe’ was not just a potentially 
advantageous electoral strategy, but also a useful mechanism to maintain the unity of the Labour 
Party, which remained extremely divided over the issue of EEC membership. By offering a 
process of renegotiation with Brussels, as well as placing the ultimate verdict on this question in 
the hands of the public, Wilson hoped to steer a pragmatic, mid-way course which would 
hopefully avoid an open fissure between Tony Benn’s left-wing group of fervent anti-marketeers 
and the ‘pro-European’ sector of moderates led by Roy Jenkins. It has been suggested that in 
fact, the Labour leader's ultimate strategy was to outmaneuvre and weaken the party’s leftists, by 
successfully achieving the public’s approval of EEC membership (George 1994: 77). In any 
case, for the purposes of this thesis, what is crucially relevant about the referendum debate is that 
it offers a particularly vivid illustration of how national symbols and sentiments were mobilised 
by different British political figures in order to legitimate or de-legitimate the concept of EEC 
membership.
As Wilson had promised, this popular vote on ‘Europe’ was preceded by a process of 
renegotiation in which some significant concessions were granted to Britain by its Community 
partners. At a European Council meeting held at Dublin in March 1975, a number of British sore 
points were at least partly soothed: privileged access to the Common Market was achieved for 
New Zealand butter at least until 1980 (rather than 1977, as previously agreed under Heath), a 
special ‘correcting mechanism’ was agreed to reduce the UK’s contribution to the EEC budget, 
and an official statement was made which safeguarded Britain’s power to pursue its own 
regional and industrial policies. These new terms allowed Wilson and the man who had become
30I am not suggesting that Heath’s defeat was due only or primarily to the EEC. There were other, more crucial 
factors which led to his downfall - in particular, the industrial strife which erupted in Britain during his Premiership. 
Nevertheless, it seems evident that the EEC also had a negative impact, especially as a result of Powell’s support of 
Labour (H. Young 1998:258).
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his Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, to proclaim that under their leadership, the ‘national 
interest* had now been firmly secured within the EEC. As George (1994: 86) has put it, the 
agreements allowed the Prime Minister to present himself ‘as a “St George figure’*, who knew 
how to stand up to foreign dragons and would never sell his country short.’ The deal on New 
Zealand dairy products, in particular, was depicted as a major national victory: a demonstration 
that even if Britain had ‘entered Europe’, she had not abandoned her ‘kith and kin’ in the 
Commonwealth. These renegotiated terms were approved by a majority, of 16-7 in Wilson’s 
cabinet, and so the Labour government officially adopted a ‘pro* stance towards EEC 
membership when the promised referendum took place in June -  although dissenting ministers, 
such as Tony Benn and Peter Shore, were allowed to freely voice their ‘anti-European’ views.
The celebration of this popular vote on the controversial ‘Europe’ question led to the creation 
of cross-party alliances on both the ‘pro’ and ‘anti* platforms. Factional and ideological 
differences were provisionally dissolved within the ‘Yes* and ‘No’ groupings, in order to 
campaign patriotically for the idea that ‘staying in Europe’ was either a wonderful opportunity or 
a terrible catastrophe for ‘the nation*. The pro-marketeers united in an umbrella organization 
known as Britain in Europe, whose leading figures were the so-called ‘Euro-pals’, Edward Heath 
and Roy Jenkins, while the anti-marketeer groups merged together in an association known as 
the National Referendum Campaign, whose most visible protagonists were Enoch Powell and 
Tony Benn. Both sides received an identical amount of funding from the government, and were 
allowed equal time on television, as in any general election. However, the ‘pros’ were greatly 
aided by the fact that they received much more private financial support, demonstrating that they 
had the bulk of British business and industry on their side, as well as by the presence of 
relatively moderate, respected political leaders from the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal 
parties. The ‘antis’, on the contrary, received relatively little funding aside from the official 
governmental grant, and were handicapped by the fact that their cause brought together a rather 
bizarre alliance of extremists from both the right and the left. Aside from Powell and Benn, the 
‘no’ campaign was supported not only by the British Communist Party and various Trotskyist
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and Maoist groups, but also by the ultra-rightist National Front. Both the ‘pros’ and the ‘antis’, in 
any case, clearly did their utmost to channel collective we-feelings of national pride towards 
their respective causes.
The Britain in Europe organization, for instance, chose as its publicity logo a dove, the 
symbol of international peace, which was coloured with the design of the Union Jack, in order to 
prevent the antis from monopolising the symbolism of the national flag (Butler and Kitzinger 
1976: 93 [reproduced on the following page]). It also sent a pamphlet to all British households, 
entitled ‘Why You Should Vote Yes’, which identified EEC membership with the maintenance 
of national greatness in the three key spheres of economic might, political power, and moral 
respectability.31 The European Community, it argued, made good sense for ‘our jobs and 
prosperity’, for ‘world peace*, and for ‘our children’s future.’ By remaining in the Common 
Market, Britain was doing what all of its allies wished, including the United States and the 
Commonwealth countries, while if it pulled out, ‘we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with 
none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships.’ In opposition to those who claimed that 
the EEC represented a loss of autonomy and independence, the pamphlet stated that in a globally 
interdependent world, the real test of sovereignty was ‘how we can protect our own interests and 
exercise British influence in the world.’ At this stage of the country’s history, it was argued that 
the best way to do so would be ‘to work with our friends and neighbours* by remaining in the 
European Community. What this actually involved in practice was not specified in any precise 
way, although the pamphlet attempted to reassure those who feared European supranationalism 
by claiming that ‘all decisions of any importance must be agreed by every member.’
At the same time, much emphasis was laid on the idea that the nation’s cultural traditions 
would in no way be threatened by the EEC:
We can work together and still stay British. The Community does not mean dull
uniformity. It hasn’t made the French eat German food or the Dutch drink Italian beer. Nor
3,T h e  e n t i r e  ‘ Y e s ’ p a m p h le t  w a s  p u b lis h e d  in  th e  a p p e n d i x  o f  B u t le r  a n d  K i t z i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 6 :  2 9 1 - 9 4 ) .  A l l  c it a t io n s  a re
t a k e n  f r o m  th is  s o u r c e .
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Publicity Logo for the Britain in Europe Campaign of the 1975 Referendum
will it damage our British traditions and way of life. The position of the Queen is not 
affected.
Finally, after arguing that in the end there was no realistic alternative to the EEC in order to 
maintain Britain’s safety and prosperity, the pamphlet ended with an emotively charged, moral 
appeal. To vote ‘Yes’, it suggested, was ultimately to ‘believe in Britain’ and to fulfil one’s 
proper patriotic obligations to ‘the nation* -  an idea which was reinforced by a quotation taken 
from one of Heath’s speeches during the campaign:
So do our duty to the world and our hope for the new greatness of Britain. We believe in 
Britain - for Britain in Europe. For your own and your children’s future it makes good 
sense to stay in.
‘Are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to 
shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?’ Edward Heath, 5th April 1975
All of these ideas were of course reinforced during public rallies and media performances in 
which Heath and Jenkins became the most outspoken figures in the ‘pro-European* campaign. 
The following excerpts from speeches and press articles can serve as an indication of the kind of 
passionate, patriotic discourse which was employed by these politicians, in order to link ‘Europe* 
with the maintenance of national pride, dignity, and self-respect:
One of the sadder aspects of the campaign is the way the anti-Marketeers are talking 
Britain down. They tell us that the British people are too weak to hold their own in the 
European Community... I reject totally that kind of defeatist talk. They may have lost faith 
but I have not,(Edward Heath, May 12 1975, cited in Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 183)
The European Community presents us with the opportunity to channel our experience and 
skill towards great and constructive causes: the security of the western democracies, the 
renewal of prosperity for the benefit of all our people, and new sources of help for the 
developing nations of the world. These are noble objectives. They can only be achieved by 
Britain inside the European Community. It is this which gives us the opportunity in the 
modem world to fulfil ourselves as a nation.(Edward Heath in The Times, June 2 1975)
For Britain to leave the Common Market would be like going into an old people’s home 
for declining nations... I do not think it would be a very comfortable old people’s home. 
(Roy Jenkins, June 2 1975, cited in King 1977: 116)
There are people who genuinely believe, from good but mistaken motives, that we can best 
protect our security and independence by standing alone... I do not challenge the good faith 
of those who think we should return to the isolation of 35 years ago; but their ideas make 
as little sense as pulling the bedclothes over your head on a winter morning in the hope that 
time will stop and there will be no need to get up and go to work.(Roy Jenkins in the Daily 
Express, June 5 1975)
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From this ‘pro-European’ perspective, withdrawing from the EEC was therefore presented as the 
option of a shameful national defeatism, as a sign of fear and weakness, and hence as a 
humiliating path that could only lead to further British decline. It was only through ‘Europe’, as 
Heath put it in his emotive legitimating discourse, that ‘the nation’ could find fulfilment.
The ‘antis’, of course, presented a diametrically opposed picture of the European 
Community. They depicted Common Market membership not merely as an economic disaster, 
but above all as a threat to the very continuity of Britain as an independent, self-governing 
nation. In its own pamphlet, entitled ‘Why You Should Vote No’, the National Referendum 
Capaign claimed that ‘the fundamental question is whether or not we remain free to rule 
ourselves in our own way.’32 It ominously warned in its opening paragraphs that the Common 
Market ‘sets out by stages to merge Britain with France,- Germany, Italy, and other countries into 
a single nation’, and hence would ultimately ‘take away from us the right to rule ourselves which 
we have enjoyed for centuries.’ From this perspective, it was the pro-marketeers who were seen 
as ‘defeatists’; they were the ones who had lost faith in Britain’s national greatness and were 
shunning their patriotic duties towards the country’s future generations:
Those who want Britain in the Common Market are defeatists; they see no independent 
future for our country. Your vote will affect the future of your country for generations to 
come. We say: Let’s rule ourselves, while trading and remaining friendly with other 
nations. We say: No rule from Brussels. We say: Vote no.
The pamphlet went on to list a catalogue of economic catastrophes which would supposedly be 
provoked by remaining in the Common Market: the massive rise of food prices and 
unemployment, the growth of a huge trade deficit, the increase of taxes to fund ‘the Brussels 
budget’, and the complete severing of Commonwealth links.
32T h e  e n t ir e  ‘ N o ’ p a m p h le t  w a s  a ls o  p u b l i s h e d  in  t h e  a p p e n d i x  o f  B u t l e r  a n d  K i t z i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 6 :  3 0 1 -4 ) .  A l l  citations
a re  ta k e n  f r o m  th is  s o u r c e .
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The ‘No* leaflet then drew attention once again to the danger of European supranational 
powers, and proclaimed that the ‘real aim* of the Common Market was ‘to become one single 
country in which Britain would be reduced to a mere province/ It suggested that the construction 
of a European Parliament with full legislative powers may have been a entirely logical, 
acceptable choice for Continental countries which in recent times had been 'ruled by dictators, 
defeated or occupied' and who were ‘more used to abandoning their political institutions than we 
are/ However, it insisted to the voter that there was still time to avoid this calamity in Britain: 
‘Unless you want to be ruled more and more by a Continental Parliament in which Britain would 
be in a small minority, you should vote NO/
In opposition to the claim that there was ‘no alternative’ to ‘Europe’, the anti-marketeers 
argued that membership in the European Free Trade Area would be more than sufficient to 
maintain national prosperity, ‘without the burden of dear food or the loss of the British people’s 
democratic rights/ At the same time, on the question of defense, they suggested that the 
Common Market had little to offer in terms of military security, and that in any case this would 
be amply guaranteed by the continued British membership of NATO. Furthermore, he ‘antis’ 
also rejected the moral accusation that they were narrow-minded, egoistic ‘little Englanders’, and 
they claimed, on the contrary, that the British people could still continue to cooperate with other 
countries ‘as good internationalists, while preserving our own democratic rights/ Hence, their 
pamphlet concluded that Britain could remain economically prosperous, politically free, and 
ethically respectable without having to resort to the dictatorial EEC: ‘If you want a rich and 
secure future for the British peoples, a free and democratic society, living in friendship with all 
nations -  but governing ourselves: VOTE NO/
As noted earlier, on the ‘anti’ side the two most vocal figures who constantly reiterated these 
‘No’ arguments in speeches and media interventions were the odd tandem formed by Powell and 
Benn. The following excerpts from public addresses and press articles they published during the 
campaign can serve as illustrative examples of the kind of de-legitimating discourse with which 
they strove to contest the patriotic Euro-enthusiasm of Heath and Jenkins:
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Belonging to the Common Market may be the sign of hope and vitality for Italy or for 
Luxembourg. For the United Kingdom it spells living death.(Powell in Birmingham, cited 
in The Times, June 3 1975)
The nation is being invited to confirm the surrender, and the permanent surrender, of its 
most precious possession: its political independence and parliamentary self-government, 
the right to live under laws and to pay taxes authorized only by Parliament and to be 
governed by policies for which the excecutive is fully accountable through Paliament to the 
electorate... The renunciation of nationhood through Community membership is 
fundamental, deliberate, and relatively imminent.(Powell in Thé Times, June 4 1975)
Britain used to be the workshop of the world and can be again. Let’s back the British 
people, not sack the British people. There’s nothing wrong with Britain that British people 
cannot put right themselves... The Press, the Television, the big battalions, are telling you 
that beggars can’t be choosers, that as a nation we are finished, that we can’t be trusted to 
run our own affairs, and will be better off pushed around by a lot of Brussels bureaucrats... 
Because, make no mistake about it, if Britain stays in the Community it will be the end of 
us as a completely self-governing nation.(Benn in the Daily Mirror, June 4 1975)
One can therefore see the way in which the referendum debate became a passionate struggle to 
manipulate the national pride-shame balance, either in favour of against the question of EEC 
membership. While politicians such as Heath and Jenkins attempted to flatter the national we- 
image by identifying ‘Europe* with British prosperity and prestige, others like Powell and Benn 
counter-attacked by equating the EEC with a humiliating surrender of national independence -  
indeed, with the very disappearance of nationhood itself. While the ‘pros’ claimed that to vote 
‘Yes’ was to have faith and confidence in the continuing strength of the United Kingdom, the 
‘antis’ declared that remaining in the EEC would imply that the British people had completely 
lost all their self-respect, that they had become a nation of shameless beggars or desperate losers, 
and hence that they were even prepared to accept orders from foreigners. As Peter Shore, another 
prominent figure in the ‘No’ campaign, put it in one of his campaign speeches:
What the advocates of membership are saying, insistently and insidiously, is that we are 
finished as a country; that the long, famous story of the British nation and people has 
ended; that we are now so weak and powerless that we must accept terms and conditions, 
penalties and limitations, almost as though we had suffered defeat in war; that we have no 
option but to remain in the Common Market cage.(Cited in King 1977: 119)
However, as I noted earlier, the ‘Yes’ side not only had the support of the Britain in Europe 
campaigners, but also of Prime Minister Wilson and the majority of his cabinet. The Labour
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government sent out its own propaganda in favour of EEC membership, and so in the end all 
British households actually received two ‘pro* leaflets and only one ‘anti’. The governmental 
pamphlet, entitled ‘Britain’s New Deal in Europe’, focused primarily on the new terms of 
membership which had been negotiated with the Community, and hence on the pragmatic 
economic motives for remaining in the Common Market.33 It opened with a letter from Wilson 
which stressed that ‘big and significant improvements’ had now been achieved which made 
continued membership in the EEC the right choice to safeguard British interests. The Common 
Market was described as ‘one of the biggest concentrations of industrial and trading power in the 
world*, and its aims were said to be the following:
To bring together the peoples of Europe. To raise living standards and improve working
conditions. To promote growth and boost world trade. To help the poorer regions of
Europe and the rest of the world. To help maintain peace and freedom.
EEC membership was thus associated with the rather vague idea of ‘bringing together the 
peoples of Europe’, as well as with the maintenance of prosperity and peace, but it is noteworthy 
that absolutely no reference was made to the potential development of a political union. What the 
governmental pamphlet primarily stressed was that on the key economic issues, written in capital 
letters as ‘FOOD and MONEY and JOBS’, the new terms fully protected British interests. It then 
reiterated many of the same arguments of the leaflet sent by the Britain in Europe campaigners: 
that the Commonwealth countries wanted Britain to stay in the Community; that there was no 
reason to fear ‘faceless bureaucrats’ in Brussels or the possibility of being deprived of ‘our 
national identity’, since all important policy-making powers remained in British hands; that 
membership of the Common Market was in the end the best way ‘to advance and protect our 
interests’, which was after all ‘the essence of sovereignty’; and that abandoning the EEC at this 
point would leave Britain economically and political isolated: ‘Outside we are on our own.’
33T h e  e n t i r e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p a m p h le t  w a s  a ls o  p u b lis h e d  in  t h e  a p p e n d ix  o f  B u t l e r  a n d  K i t z i n g e r  ( 1 9 7 6 :  2 9 5 - 3 0 0 ) .
A l l  c i t a t i o n s  a re  ta k e n  f r o m  t h is  s o u r c e .
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Throughout the campaign, Prime Minister Wilson maintained a relatively low-key profile, 
concentrating above all on the so-called ‘bread-and-butter" issues of EEC membership -  i.e. the 
economic benefits of the Common Market which the governmental pamphlet had outlined. His 
attitude was largely that of a cool-minded pragmatist, trying to build a consensus on ‘Europe" 
within his divided party and the country at large, by referring to ‘hard economic facts’ which 
supposedly demonstrated that EEC membership was by far the best option for the future welfare 
of the British people. For instance, he made an important intervention for the ‘Yes’ cause when, 
three weeks before polling day, Tony Benn made a speech in which he claimed that EEC 
membership had already cost Britain the loss of half a million jobs, and that this trend would 
inevitably continue unless the country pulled out of the Common Market. Wilson immediately 
denied the charge, and declared: ‘I believe that the opposite is the truth’ (King 1977: 120-1) 
Throughout the campaign, the Labour Prime Minister also made a point of denying that there 
was any real threat to Britain’s status as a sovereign, independent nation-state. Three days before 
the referendum, he defined the idea that power would eventually be handed over from 
Westminster to Brussels as ‘rubbish’, and guaranteed that ‘the power of Parliament will always 
be supreme so far as Britain is concerned.’34 But this opposition to the supranational integration 
of ‘Europe’ at the political level in no way clashed with his full support for Britain’s continued 
membership of the EEC. On the last day of the campaign, Wilson demonstrated his commitment 
to the ‘pro-European’ cause with a particularly emotive discursive performance. At a rally in 
Cardiff, the Labour leader also identified a ‘Yes’ vote with the patriotic duty of serving future 
members of the national collectivity:
Tomorrow is the decisive day in the affairs of our people. When all the arguments have 
died down and this campaign comes to an end and when the dust is finally settled, 
tomorrow’s decision will be seen not just as a vote, but as a vote about the future of our 
young people, our children and those who come after them.(Cited in Butler and Kitzinger 
1976: 189).
34Daily Mirror, 3 June 1975.
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Another important supporter of ‘Europe’ was Margaret Thatcher, the recently elected head of 
the Conservative Party, and hence leader of the opposition at that time. Although she maintained 
a relatively aloof stance in the referendum debate, in comparison to more passionate 
‘Europeanists’ such as Heath and Jenkins, Thatcher clearly positioned herself on the ‘pro’ side. 
This inevitably seems somewhat ironic and inconsistent, given the notorious Euro-phobia she 
later displayed when she became Prime Minister. In fact, however, the seeds of her later hostility 
to the EEC were already visible. For the Thatcher of 1975, remaining in the Common Market 
was clearly a good thing for Britain because it made sense from an economic and a geopolitical 
perspective. In her view, the EEC was crucial to maintain the British people’s standard of living, 
and to maintain peace and security throughout Western Europe.35 However, she also emphasized 
quite clearly in her own discursive performances that she was totally against the development of 
a federalist ‘United States of Europe’.. What she desired was merely ‘closer and closer 
cooperation between the countries of the Community.*
One can therefore see how in the referendum campaign, political figures such as Wilson and 
Thatcher positioned themselves on the ‘pro-European* side, while simultaneously rejecting the 
ideal of a politically integrated Europe that would involve the loss of national decision-making 
powers. Their message to the voter was that no contradiction existed between supporting a ‘Yes’ 
in favour of Britain’s membership of the EEC, while saying ‘No’ to the concept of a European 
supranational union and the loss of national independence.
Hence, although Thatcher made clear her anti-federalist stance, this did not stop her from 
demonstrating her allegiance to the ‘pro-European’ cause in a very overt manner. On the eve of 
the referendum, she appeared at the final pro-EEC rally in London with a colourful, 
propagandists jumper that displayed all the flags of the European Community’s member states, 
including, of course, the Union Jack [reproduced on the following page].36 Standing next to a
35See the report on Thatcher’s campaign interventions in The Guardian, 3 June 1975. All further citations in this 
paragraph are taken from this source.
36Daily Express, 5 June 1975. All citations from this event are taken from this source.
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statue of Winston Churchill, the classic symbolic Iegitimator of Tory ‘Europeanism’, she 
declared: ‘I hope within 48 hours we shall know the result and that it will be a splendid and 
decisive Yes to Europe.’ She then lit a torch next to the statue, which would remain alight 
throughout the final night of the campaign. This last political ceremony of the Yes campaigners 
was also attended by the old veteran leader Harold Macmillan, the first Prime Minister who had 
attempted to get Britain ‘into Europe* in 1961. His grandson, Adam Macmillan, delivered a 
speech in which the Churchill totem was typically employed once again to channel we-feelings 
of national duty in favour of ‘Europe’:
Sir Winston Churchill helped found the European Movement 30 years ago. I trust our dear 
country will tomorrow prove worthy of his leadership and so secure our future and that of 
the Western civilized world.
However, in opposition to this manipulation of the Churchill symbol by the ‘pro-Europeans’, the 
‘antis’ proclaimed in their own propaganda that on the contrary, the spirit of Sir Winston was on 
their side. To prove their point, throughout the campaign they often quoted a statement Churchill 
had made in 1944: ‘Each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall 
always choose the open sea. Furthermore, on the eve of the referendum the ‘antis’ attempted 
to steer national sentiments against EEC membership, by issuing a public statement which 
identified the obligations of ‘true patriotism’ with a ‘No* vote:
There is nothing wrong with Britain that the British people cannot put right. Make 
tomorrow Britain’s Independence Day by voting ‘No’.38
As for the press, it seems clear that every major national newspaper had by this stage fully 
converted to the idea that remaining ‘in Europe’ represented the only possible alternative which 
could realistically maintain British power, prosperity, and prestige. As the day of the referendum 1
11 The Times, 2 June 1975. It is interesting to note that Churchill’s grandson, a Conservative MP, aided the ‘pro’ side 
in this emotive debate, by declaring that it was ‘mischievous and misleading* to suggest that his grandfather had 
been an opponent of European unity, or of Britain’s participation in this project. 
liThe Times, 5 June 1975.
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approached, the editorials of the main ‘serious’ dailies all identified a ‘Yes to Europe’ with a 
‘Yes’ to the the future happiness of the British people. The Times, for instance, laid much stress 
on ‘Europe’ as the option which offered the British people a new national vocation, a new 
collective sense of purpose, and a new moral ideal: the development of a wider European loyalty 
that would not obliterate national allegiances, but could ennoble them by making the country 
reach outwards to cooperate and work together with other nations. It therefore offered a potential 
source of ethical pride and self-esteem:
European idealism... invites us to accept and to develop a loyalty to the Continent as well 
as to our island and invites us to see our self-interest as involving the collective interest of 
a group of nations working together for the purposes of European development... We 
accept the ideal of Europe because it involves an outgoing of will towards nations who 
belong to the same European family as the four nations of the United Kingdom. It is 
through Europe that Britain will gain most and serve best; in 1975 Britain is as much in 
need of an opportunity for service, for purpose, as for any opportunity of gain.39
The Guardian, on the other hand, emphasized above all the sense of security, strength and 
stability provided by membership in a wider European grouping of states, as opposed to the 
feeling of danger, weakness and isolation which pulling out of the EEC would imply:
Do we... want to go into the twenty-first century as a small and separate nation or as part of 
a greater Western Europe? As yet nobody can forecast whether the spirit of Marx, Mao, 
‘Ein Volk Ein Reich’, or Jean Monnet will be the dominant influence in Europe a 
generation hence. It is strongly probable, however, that Britain will be safer and more 
prosperous within a democratic Western Europe, and that with Britain as a full member 
Western Europe will be more securely democratic and less exposed to outside buffeting in 
a troubled world. Parliament took the right choice for Britain in 1972. The people should 
endorse it today.40
Finally, as in much of the ‘pro-market’ propaganda that has already been analyzed, the discourse 
employed by the Telegraph made every effort to equate voting ‘for Europe’ with voting ‘for 
Britain’, and hence with the proper fulfilment of one’s patriotic obligations:
39r / ie  Times, 5  J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
4QThe Guardian, 5  J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
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A vote against Europe would threaten us with a future of confusion and accelerating 
economic decline. Only a resounding Yes can put Britain positively on course towards 
better times. Those who vote Yes demonstrate their confidence in Britain’s future. Those 
who say NO reveal their lack of faith. Membership of the Community does not offer the 
panacea for our ills; but it provides by far the best chance of securing the conditions in 
which Britain can by her own efforts, recover prosperity and stability. Thursday, therefore, 
will bring a choice of historic importance. The nation, it must be hoped, will show its sense 
of the occasion by a massive vote. If that vote is a reassertion of British will to play a 
proper part in Europe and the wider world, it will be a vote for Britain.41
The particular emphases of these different editorials may have varied slightly, but they all 
contained the same fundamental message: ‘Europe’ was essentially right for ‘the nation’ in the 
three key status-spheres of economic prosperity, political power, and moral respectability.
As for the more populist tabloid papers, they also promoted the cause of continued EEC 
membership in their own particular style, through passionate patriotic invocations about the need 
to do what was undoubtedly best for Britain and the future survival of its national greatness. For 
the Daily Mirror, voting ‘Yes’ was a question of abandoning the past of imperial nostalgia and 
embracing a future of modem European prosperity:
Tomorrow the people of Britain decide their future. And the future of their children. A 
future INSIDE Europe. Or OUTSIDE...
Tomorrow, June 5 1975, can be the day when Britain finally turns away from the past and 
says a confident YES to the future...
YES to a future in which we play a leading and prosperous role as part of a Great Western 
Europe.42
The Daily Mail mocked all of those who still seriously believed in the possibility of ‘going it 
alone’ in the modem world, and warned that exiting the EEC could only make Britain a weak, 
humiliated has-been. Yet again, it was argued that only by remaining ‘in Europe’ could the great 
legacy of Sir Winston Churchill be respected, and that only a ‘Yes’ vote would be able to 
guarantee prosperity, peace, and security for the country’s future generations:
4]Sunday Telegraph,  1 J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
42Daily Mirror, 4  J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
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The anti-marketeers make it sound as if going it alone was a romantic adventure like the 
days in 1940 when we stood alone because nobody else could or would join us in the 
defence of civilisation. But it will be nothing of the kind. For this time we shall be stepping 
outside of the arena and into the sidelines of history...
Vote No tomorrow -  and the work that Churchill started at Zurich all those years ago will 
be shattered in a single day. Vote Yes -  and we shall at least have prospects of friends and 
partners, the prospect of power to direct and influence our own future -  and the world's 
future -  , the prospect of handing on to our children a Continent more securely rooted in 
the habits of peace than the Continent we ourselves inherited.43
The Sun stressed Britain’s economic weakness at that time, and hence its absolute need to remain 
tied to the EEC in order to survive and prosper. It ridiculed the claims that Britain would lose 
either its sovereignty or its cultural personality in Europe, and emphasized the dangers of 
isolation which leaving the EEC would entail:
When the world says that Britains hasn’t a snowball in hell’s chance of going it alone, is 
that the time to say NO?...
You can vote YES -  FOR A FUTURE TOGETHER.
Or NO -  TO A FUTURE ALONE...
[All members of the EC] have gained in wealth. In jobs. In social benefits. In freedom. 
And what have they lost? Sovereignty?
Rubbish!
-Are the French a soupcon less French?
-Are the Germans a sauerkraut less German?
-Are the Italians a pizza less Italian?
OF COURSE THEY ARE NOT!
And neither would the British be any less British...
No one runs Britain but the British. So why listen to the desperate men who want us to be 
afraid of the rest of Europe?...
The Sun urges you to keep Britain in Europe.
Because, baby, it’s cold outside!44
Finally, even the previously Euro-phobic Daily Express had by that stage conceded that Britain 
had no choice but to accept its diminished stature in the world, and hence to secure its future 
welfare by saying ‘Yes’ to EEC membership. This newspaper had ultimately accepted that, in 
the end, there was no realistic alternative to ‘Europe’. All other options should be feared, for they 
could easily lead to further national isolation and decline:
43Daily Mail, 4 J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
“ The Sun, 4  J u n e  1 9 7 5 .
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Two tides have carried Britain to the Market. One is the tide of hope: that we will have a 
new role in the world through the Market, and that the Market itself will be more 
purposeful in the world because of it. These things are still true, but less true than they 
were... The other is the tide of fear: that we now have no other role to play, no other trading 
system to live in, no other credibility to keep us in funds as we try to put up our society and 
our economy in better shape. Unhappily, this is even truer than it used to be. The Pro- 
Marketeers have put this fear to good effect... They are right.45
Hence, all these popular newspapers also presented the same patriotic case in favour of EEC 
membership. ‘Europe’, they argued, should not be feared. It would not lead to a humiliating 
national disaster. It did not stand for the ‘death of the nation’. On the contrary, at this stage it was 
undoubtedly the best hope for the survival of national prosperity and prestige. It was pulling out 
of ‘Europe’ that represented very serious dangers, for Britain could simply not ‘go it alone’ at 
this stage of its history.
One can therefore see that at the time of the referendum campaign, the ‘pro’ cause was 
overwhelmingly stronger in Britain. It had the official support of the Labour Prime Minister and 
his government, the Conservative leader of the opposition, moderate figures from the two main 
parties such as Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins, and the bulk of the mass media. Hence, as I have 
illustrated, a huge amount of emotionally charged, patriotic propaganda identified EEC 
membership with the maintenance of national well-being and self-esteem, while pulling out of 
‘Europe’ was depicted as an extremely dangerous minefield. At the same time, the ‘Yes’ case 
was strengthened by the fact that the potential implications of European supranationalism and 
political integration were largely understated, denied, or explicitly rejected by the ‘pros*. Indeed, 
it was perfectly possible, according to leaders such as Wilson and Thatcher, to be in favour of 
EEC membership, and to simultaneously defend the maintenance of all the traditional powers of 
the British nation-state. To use Murray Edelman’s terms, a major discursive crusade was 
therefore fought by the ‘Yes’ campaigners to make the EEC symbolically reassuring to the 
British public, and to make all other alternatives symbolically threatening. Meanwhile, the ‘antis’ 
put forward a radically contrary view, stressing economic dangers of the Common Market such
45Daily Express, 5 June 1975.
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as the rise of unemployment and high food prices, as well as the shameful loss of national 
independence implied by EEC membership. While the ‘pros' tended to minimize the 
supranational dimensions of ‘Europe*, the supporters of a ‘No’ exaggerated them to the extreme 
of identifying the EEC with the complete disappearance of nationhood itself.
The referendum campaign can thus be seen as a discursive battle in which rival, conflicting 
versions of ‘British patriotism’ were put forward. For the ‘Yes’ campaigners, the patriotic duties 
of service owed to the country’s future generations could only be fufilled by keeping Britain ‘in 
Europe’, while for the ‘No’ men, exactly the opposite was true. In this way, both sides attempted 
to manipulate collective we-feelings of national pride towards their cause. In the end, however, 
the arguments of the ‘pro-Europeans’ clearly won the day, and the British people voted by a ratio 
of two to one in favour of continued EEC membership (67.2% to 32.8%).46 ‘Yes' majorities 
were obtained throughout the United Kingdom, in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland- Hence, the odd alliance on the ‘No’ side between extremist figures from the left and the 
right of the political spectrum was ultimately no match for the potent combination of relatively 
moderate, influential leaders who campaigned in favour of ‘Europe’ and their allies in the mass 
media.
This victory ‘for Europe’ was logically interpreted as a great historic triumph for ‘the nation’ 
by the ‘Yes’ campaigners. Hence, when the results were announced, they organized a final 
patriotic ritual to celebrate the referendum’s outcome at the Waldorf Hotel in London.47 The 
main discursive performances were of course delivered by Heath, who proclaimed that the 
British people had shown ‘their true sense of vision and destiny’, and by Jenkins, who described 
the result as ‘a second D-Day for British resurgence in Europe, based not on sulky acquiescence 
but on enthusiastic cooperation.’ Meanwhile, the humiliated leader of the leftist anti-marketeers, 
Tony Benn, meekly accepted the verdict, declaring to the media that he had read ‘loud and clear’
46A detailed account of the results can be found in Butler and Kitzinger (1976) and King (1977).
47Daily Express, 7 June 1975. All citations from this event are taken from this source.
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the British people's clear wish to remain in the EEC. ‘Minorities,’ he asserted, ‘learn to accept 
majority decisions.’48
Nevertheless, Enoch Powell stubbornly refused to accept the legitimacy of the results. In a 
public statement to the media, he claimed that ‘the vast majority of those voting had no notion 
that they were saying Yes or No to Britain continuing as a nation at all.’ He predicted that over 
time, the British people would gradually realize that ‘their Yes vote to Europe was No to Britain 
as a nation’, and that they would ultimately rebel against this unnaceptable situation (Cited in 
King 1977: 134). The Prime Minister, however, triumphantly proclaimed that after over a decade 
of controversies, the ‘Europe’ question had finally been settled for good in Britain under his 
leadership. Speaking from the steps of 10 Downing Street, Wilson declared:
It was a free vote, without constraint, following a free democratic campaign condicted 
constructively and without rancour. It means 14 years of national argument over. It means 
that all those who have had reservations about Britain’s commitment should now join 
without stint, in the task of overcoming economic problems that assail us as a nation, and 
work wholeheartedly with our partners in Europe and our friends everywhere to meet the 
challenges confronting the whole nation.49
Today, these words sound extremely ironic, for it is evident that this referendum hardly put an 
end to the ‘national argument’ about ‘Europe’ in Britain.
In the end, as Butler and Kitzinger (1976: 280) concluded in their detailed study of the 
referendum, the British people’s verdict ‘was unequivocal, but it was also unenthusiastic.* They 
clearly accepted the recommendation that the EEC was the most ‘rational’ and ‘sensible’ strategy 
to protect Britain’s economic future. At the same time, however, it was still difficult for ‘Europe’ 
to be perceived as an exciting national triumph or a great source of collective prestige. After over 
two year of Common Market membership, most people simply showed their resigned support for 
a situation which had come to be recognized as a necessary prop for the maintenance of as much
n The Times, 7 June 1975. However, in spite of this assertion, Benn did not actually cease to be an ‘anti-marketeer’ 
after the referendum. In fact, he continued to voice his opposition to the EEC, after being demoted from the 
Department of Industry to the Department of Energy (George 1994: 96-7).
4977ie Times, 7 June 1975.
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national strength as possible in this difficult period of British history. By then, ‘Europe’ had 
become accepted as the tolerated status quo, and it was feared that leaving it at that stage could 
provoke a dangerous disruption of the country’s economic life.
What the referendum’s results suggested was that the majority of the British people had
ultimately accepted the fundamental argument which had been employed since Macmillan’s day !
]
to discursively legitimate the idea of EEC membership: that Britain was no longer an Empire or i 
the ‘World Power’ that it had been, that the ‘special relationship’ with America was no longer so J 
special, that there was no way to ‘go it alone’, and hence that there was now ‘no alternative’ | 
other than the EEC in order to maintain British influence in the world. After all, as I have shown, 
the ‘pro’ propaganda essentially stressed the renewed prosperity and influence which a post- ! 
imperial Britain could derive from the Common Market, while minimizing or flatly rejecting the |
i
potential for increasing supranational integration within the EEC. The ‘Yes’ was thus not I 
primarily motivated by an eager conversion to the supranational ideals of European integration, j 
but above all by the widespread fear that pulling out of the Common Market at that time would !
have undoubtedly been much more risky for the British people than staying in: ‘To that extent, .
thought it may have been a marriage service, it had elements of a shotgun wedding’ (Butler and I 
Kitzinger 1976: 280). As one voter put it, to justify his ‘Yes’ in favour of EEC membership: ‘It | 
was the only thing, wasn’t it? If we didn’t go in, we’d be finished’ (cited in Hedges 1976: 75). j




In this chapter, I have illustrated how ‘Europe’ continued to be a highly contested issue in the |
British political arena, from the time of Heath’s successful application to join the EEC until the 1
i
passionate confrontations which surrounded the 1975 referendum campaign. I have shown how |
as Prime Minister, Heath clearly did his utmost to discursively legitimate EEC membership |
through the frequent invocation of national symbolism and the appeal to national sentiments, I
during numerous propagandistic media spectacles and political ceremonies. The Conservative J
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leader repeatedly attempted to equate ‘Europe’ with the revival of British ‘national greatness’, 
and to tranform the EEC into a source of collective pride, by proclaiming that it could contribute 
in a crucial manner to the maintenance of national pride in the three key spheres of economic 
prosperity, political power, and moral prestige. On some occasions, Heath even dared to state 
quite openly that the project of the European Community was not just a ‘Common Market’ 
limited to the sphere of economics, but that it also encompassed an ideal of political unity, and 
he remoulded the revered totemic figure of Winston Churchill in order to symbolically legitimate 
his Europeanism from a patriotic perspective.
The discursive efforts of the Prime Minister, however, were continuously resisted by the 
Labour leader of the opposition, who confronted the Prime Minister with a battery of discursive 
counter-attacks in which he accused Heath of completely failing to uphold the nation’s ‘status 
honour* and to effectively defend the ‘national interest’ in his government’s negotiations with 
the EEC. At the same time, the rebellious Conservative faction led by Enoch Powell, the widely 
read Daily Express, and numerous ‘anti-European’ organizations also attempted to symbolically 
delegitimate Heath’s attempt to identify membership of the EEC with the maintenance of British 
power and status, by depicting the entry ‘into Europe’ as a digraceful national defeat, and even a 
form of national treason. Hence, not surprisingly, British public opinion remained largely 
divided on the ‘Europe’ question as membership became official on the first day of 1973.
Once Wilson regained power, with the promise that he would renegotiate the terms of 
Britain’s EEC membership and would let ‘the people’ decide if they wanted to remain ‘in 
Europe*, he eventually readopted the discursive position that the Common Market was a good 
thing for ‘the nation’. After the agreements reached at Dublin summit of 1975, the Labour Prime 
Minister ensured that the ‘national interest’ had now been protected, and that it was therefore 
safe for Britain to remain in the Common Market. Hence, when the promised referendum took 
place, the Labour government ultimately recommended a ‘Yes to Europe’, primarily through the 
invocation of pragmatic reasons of economic necessity. As I have shown, the campaigning for 
this popular vote provoked a passionate battle of national paradigms, in which each side strove to
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depict their cause as the truly patriotic defense of the sacred national collectivity and its future 
generations. ‘Europe’ was alternatively depicted by the ‘pros’ as the option of national strength, 
prosperity, pride, and prestige, or as the path of national weakness, defeatism, shame, and 
humiliation by the ‘antis*. Rival national we-images were thus the fundamental symbolic 
legitimators which were employed by both sides in the debate. However, the ‘pro’ cause was 
clearly better equipped both in terms of economic support and political leadership, and the | 
British people ultimately said ‘Yes to Europe* by a very wide margin. j
Nevertheless, it seems as if this ‘Yes’ was in the end a rather faint-hearted one,50 since as I I 
have pointed out, it was based not so much on the inherent attractiveness of ‘Europe*, but rather J 
on the belief that no other feasible options were now available to a weakened, diminished I 
Britain. Indeed, this motivation was encapsulated in the slogan ‘there is no alternative*, often j 
employed by the ‘pros’, which appears to imply that remaining ‘in Europe* represented the better i 
of two evils, rather than something which was considered to be emotionally appealing in itself, j 
As Hugo Young (1998: 296) has put it, what settled the referendum was ‘fear rather than I
I
exultation: the fear of the unknown, as represented by a world outside Europe... not, alas, the |
enthusiasm of the British people for dealing in their newly discovered destiny.* Indeed, with the I
i
advantage of hindsight, given that Britain’s ‘Euro-sceptic’ or ‘Euro-phobic* reputation has | 
continued up to the present day, it seems evident that the ‘Yes* of 1975 was motivated primarily J 
by the pragmatic calculation of economic needs and the wary acceptance of Britain’s dependence I 
on the Common Market at that stage of its history, rather than on a passionate, widespread J
adoption of Europeanism as a new national vocation and an emotive source of collective pride. I
I
This will be further illustrated in my third and final chapter on the British case, which will focus | 
on the discursive controversies concerning ‘Europe’ that erupted once again in the early 1990’s, |
at the time of the Maastricht summit.
50I am borrowing this expression from Jowell and Hoinville (1976: 6): ‘we were only just Europeans; full-hearted 
numerical consent concealed a very faint-hearted emotional consent.’
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6. Maastricht: Avoiding the ‘conveyor belt to federalism’
In the previous chapter, I noted how during the 1975 referendum campaign, both Prime Minister 
Wilson and the Conservative leader of the opposition, Margaret Thatcher, supported a ‘Yes to 
Europe’, while denying that this in any way implied a threat to Britain’s status as a fully 
sovereign, independent nation-state. At that time, ‘the Common Market’ was portrayed by these 
figures as a fundamentally economic partnership that safeguarded Britain’s ‘national interests’, 
without involving a shameful reduction of the nation’s self-governing powers. From this 
perspective, a politician such as Thatcher could define herself as a ‘pro-European’, while fully 
rejecting the concept of a federal ‘United States of Europe’. By the end of the 1980’s, however, 
the supranational dimension of the European project was gathering increasing strength. With 
Jacques Delors at the head of the European Commission, plans were drawn up for the creation of 
a single European currency and a central European bank, as well as the introduction of a 
European social charter to protect the welfare of workers, and the development of a common 
European foreign policy. Delors openly advocated federalism as the right road for Europe, and in 
an address to the European Parliament delivered in July 1988, he predicted that in ten years, 80% 
of laws affecting economic and social policies would be passed at the European rather than the 
national level (cited in George 1994: 193).
These bold proposals for deeper European integration provoked a new outbreak of discursive 
clashes in Britain concerning the nation’s relationship to Europe, which reached a high point at 
the time of the Maastricht summit in December 1991, when the Treaty of European Union* was 
officially agreed. If in the 1960’$ and 1970’s, the debate had been about whether or not Britain 
should ‘go into Europe’, in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s it became a passionate conflict 
regarding how ‘the nation’ should deal with the growing tide of supranationalism in the 
European Community. Once again, Eurosceptics and Europhiles attempted to invoke national 
symbols and mobilize national sentiments in order to promote their respective causes amongst 
the British public.
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Before analyzing the polemics that surrounded the Maastricht summit itself, which will be 
the main focus of this chapter, I shall firstly contextualize this event by looking at the conflicting 
discourses on European integration which emerged during Thatcher’s final years as Prime 
Minister.
6.1 Thatcher’s symbolic crusade against the ‘suppression of nationhood’ by a ‘European 
superstate’
Although Thatcher always supported the completion of the Single European Market, she 
depicted the federalist project of economic and political union promoted by Jacques Delors as a 
highly dangerous threat to Britain’s ‘historic independence’, and hence to the maintenance of 
national pride. On 20 September 1988, in the famous speech she delivered at the College of 
Europe in Bruges, the British Prime Minister proclaimed:
To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European 
conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives we seek to 
achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, 
Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to 
try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality... Our pride lies in being 
British or Belgian or Dutch or German.1
From Thatcher’s perspective, the survival of ‘nationhood’ and ‘our (national) pride’ was 
therefore totally incompatible with the construction of a federal Europe -  a project which was 
denigrated as ‘folly’, something which only lunatics could possibly encourage. In her view, the 
patriotic self-respect of each country could only be maintained by respecting all the traditional 
powers of the nation-state. She wholehartedly supported a ‘family of European nations’ in which 
the member states would collaborate closely at the level of inter-governmental cooperation, but 
this had to be achieved in a way that preserved ‘the different traditions, parliamentary powers 
and sense of national pride in one’s own country’. Furthermore, the ‘social dimension’ of Europe
1 The Times, 2 1  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 8 .
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promoted by Delors to protect the rights of workers was also condemned by the British Prime 
Minister as a totally illegitimate interference of the European Commission in the national 
economies of the member states, which threatened the accomplishments of her own 
government’s laissez-faire policies: ‘We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the 
state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate 
exercising a new dominance from Brussels.’ This highly influential speech became a sort of 
symbolic milestone for British Euro-scepticism, and it even led to the creation of a ‘Bruges 
group’ of Conservative MPs who supported the principles laid out by the Prime Minister (H. 
Young 1998:423).
Thatcher’s hostility to European integration, however, provoked intense divisions within her 
own party between those who supported her negative attitude to the ‘creeping federalism’ of 
Brussels, and those who believed she was severely harming Britain’s ‘national interests’ and 
making ‘the nation’ look ridiculous in the eyes of the world, by isolating the country from the 
European mainstream. These conflicts became very evident, for instance, during the campaign 
for the European elections of June 1989. On the one hand, Thatcher insisted that she would 
vigorously oppose the construction of ‘a socialist superstate in Brussels which submerges our 
identity and snuffs out our sovereignty’, and referred to the ‘historic greatness* of Britain to 
defend her position:
When we talk of the United Kingdom, we are not talking of some flimsy or recent creation. 
We are talking of a great and ancient citadel within whose walls the people of these islands 
have sheltered for almost four centuries. Within whose walls liberty, justice, and human 
progress have flourished in a manner unsurpassed anywhere else in the world.2
In Thatcher's discourse, therefore, Britain was depicted as a proud nation that could not possibly 
tolerate the further ‘surrender’ of its self-governing powers to ‘alien’ European institutions. 
Indeed, a running theme of her premiership was the ‘revival of Britain*, the return of ‘British
2 The Tim es , 1 3  M a y  1 9 8 9 .
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greatness’ after many years of shameful decline (Larsen 1997: 45-6). This ideal was reinforced 
by the nation’s ‘victory’ in the Falklands War and the re-kindling of the ‘special relationship’ 
with the United States, with Ronald Reagan as Thatcher’s favoured partner in the Western 
world’s struggle against the ‘evil Soviet empire’. From this standpoint of renewed national 
grandeur, the potential submersion of Britain in a federal Europe and the replacement of the 
pound by a common European currency was presented as an utterly humiliating, unacceptable 
reduction of the nation’s standing in the world. Britain was ‘no ordinary country’, and hence it 
was a nation that still had a much greater role to play on the world stage. Thatcher’s discourse 
therefore illustrated a continuity with other symbolic representations I have analyzed in previous 
chapters of ‘Europe* as a demeaning notion from the British perspective.
Not all Conservatives, however, agreed with Thatcher’s increasingly Europhobic stance. 
Edward Heath, for instance, intervened during the same campaign in a television appearance, 
during which he attempted to ignite national sentiments against the Prime Minister, by stating 
that her ‘anachronistic attitudes’ would humiliate Britain, by turning her into ‘a second-rate 
power in a two-tier Community’.3 Similarly, Michael Heseltine criticized Thatcher’s ‘gruding’ 
approach to Europe, and warned that ‘we cannot fight for Britain’s self-interest from the 
touchlines of history’.4 In a book which was published during this period, entitled The Challenge 
of Europe: Can Britain Win?, Heseltine suggested that the truly patriotic thing to do at this stage 
of British history was to fully commit the nation to a European future:
I have no doubt that our country must take its place on the bigger stage... I yield to no 
none in my pride in Britain’s past; it makes me all the more impatient to build on it... The 
tide of history has carried us close to Europe’s shore. We should accept that destiny; the 
wind will never be more favourable... There is no empire to sustain us; we are no longer 
an industrial super-power; we can no longer pretend that Britain is in any sense an equal 
partner of the United States. There is nowhere for us to go except as part of a European 
consortium... There are those who fear that in moving closer to Europe, Britain will lose 
her identity. On the contrary, I believe that within Europe she will find a much greater 
one.(1989: xiv, 14)
3 The Times, 15 May 1989.
4 The Times, 15 May 1989
141
Hence, from the perspective of Conservatives such as Heath and Heseltine, the Prime Minister 
was severely harming the nation through a misguided, illusory defense of national sovereignty, 
because for them it was only by joining forces with the other member states of the European 
Community that Britain could gain any real influence in the world. In their view, Europe would 
hardly ‘suppress’ nationhood, as Thatcher feared. On the contrary, Europe was the only way to 
maintain British prestige and national pride at this stage of its history.
The Conservatives performed very poorly in these European elections, losing ten seats to the 
Labour Party, and this defeat was interpreted as a rejection of Thatcher’s antagonistic, ‘Little 
Englander’ rhetoric against Brussels.5 Polls at the time suggested that 55% of the British people 
considered membership of the European Community *a good thing’, and so Thatcher’s 
antagonism towards Europe was increasingly seen by leading Conservatives as an electoral 
liability. At this point, Labour had become much more enthusiastic about Europe, since the 
social dimension promoted by Delors was seen as an effective strategy to combat Thatcher’s 
ffee-market policies. The European Community was thus no longer portrayed as a ‘capitalist 
club’ by Labour’s leaders, because it now coincided to a much greater extent with the aims 
defended in the party’s own brand of patriotic discourse in defense of ‘the British people’. 
Hence, after previously advocating complete withdrawal from the EC in the general election of 
1983, Labour now presented itself as the more ‘pro-European’ of the two main British parties, 
offering a clear alternative to Thatcher’s increasing hostility to the EC (Pilkington 1995: 213-5).
During the course of the following year, in July 1990, another significant episode took place 
which provoked an emotionally charged debate on Europe in the British public sphere. In an 
interview with The Spectator Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Nicholas 
Ridley, defined the project of a European single currency ‘as a German racket to take over the
5 The Times , 19 J u n e  1 9 8 9 .
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whole of Europe’, in which the French were behaving ‘like poodles’. Referring to the growing 
ambitions of the European Commission, he declared:
When I look at the institutions to which it is proposed that sovereignty is to be handed 
over, I’m aghast. Seventeen unelected reject politicians with no accountability to 
anybody... I’m not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You 
might as well give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly.6
The public outcry that such statements provoked in the media ultimately led to Ridley’s 
resignation from Thatcher’s government. Nevertheless, his views were apparently not very far 
from those of the Prime Minister herself. In fact, in the midst of this scandal, The Independent on 
Sunday published the minutes of a confidential meeting during which Thatcher and a panel of 
advisers had discussed the potential dangers of German nationalism in the wake of its 
reunification.7 During the course of this reunion, German ‘national character’ was described as a 
mixture of ‘angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, 
sentimentality’. It was suggested that Germans had *a tendency to over-estimate their own 
strengths and capabilities’, and that although their ambitions for physical conquest seemed to 
have dwindled, they might again be ‘brainwashed into barbarism’. Indeed, it was claimed that 
‘the way in which the Germans currently used their elbows and threw their weight about in the 
European Community suggested that a lot had still not changed’. A cartoon on the front page of 
The Spectator summed up Ridley’s claims by portraying him as a daring vandalist who had 
painted a black moustache on a poster of Helmut Kohl, in such a way that it made him look like 
Adolf Hitler [reproduced on the following page].
An editorial in The Independent on Sunday condemned such attitudes as an illustration of 
‘Downing Street paranoia’ which reflected ‘the feelings of a generation for whom Britain’s 
victory was the last, unquestionable triumph before a post-war history of disappointments’. This 
newspaper’s view was that the Germans had become ‘a cultured and civilised people again’,
6 The Times, 13 July 1990.
7 The Independent on Sunday, 15 July 1990.
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whose democratic institutions ‘are, in many ways, in better order than our own’. In any case, 
even if German nationalism were to reemerge, it was argued that the project of European 
integration offered the best guarantee against this potential threat:
Even if atavistic fears were well founded, the only conceivable strategy for living with a 
powerful neighbour whose intentions were uncertain would be the one which the French, 
Italians, and Dutch have pursued ever since the Messina conference in 1957. The whole 
object of the European Community was to lay down a system of law which could govern 
the relations of European states in those areas which had proved so inflammatory in the 
past.8
The EC, concluded this article, was ‘the only game in town’, but Britain was playing its hand ! 
‘like a drunken gambler with the most blithe and reckless disgregard for our European morrow.’ j 
An editorial in The Guardian, similarly, mocked the anxiety over Germany and Europe in the I 
Prime Minister’s circle. It suggested that ‘Britain’s economic fortunes are umbilically tied to J
Europe’, and that there was only one thing the nation could do ensure its future prosperity, I
I
influence, and prestige: *We can be a full, democratic part of a Europe that binds over the old |
wounds, renounces the old wars, and seeks to create something better. That is what West I
Germany, voluntarily and with commitment has done’.9 |
Nevertheless, Ridley’s outburst was not without supporters. An article published in The j 
Times, for instance, commended him for drawing attention to what the supposedly ‘real truth j 
about Europe united’ -  in other words, the ‘federalism by stealth’ that was being carried out by j 
the European Commission, in order to create ‘a United States of Europe in which the nation will I
have been reduced to the status of regions’. Little by little, the author of this text warned, the ,
European Commission had been ‘invading Britain, assuming powers which for centuries have 
been our own’, and Ridley had been right to bring this issue to the centre of political debate: ‘If 
we are to submerge our national identity in a larger European mass, we will at least now be
8 The Independent on Sunday, 15 July 1990.
9 The Guardian, 13 July 1990.
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doing it while we are awake and alert’.10 1An editorial in this same newspaper warned that, in 
fact, it was not entirely inappropriate to associate the dominance of Brussels with German 
power:
Increased use of majority votes in the Community, coupled with the dominance of the 
Germany over that of lesser states, could lead to the edicts of Brussels merely reflecting 
German attitudes and goals... Pretending the EC is not about power is simply absurd. And 
when the strongest member, Germany, becomes stronger still, other members should 
naturally ponder whether this matters, and if so, in what way.11
The article was illustrated with cartoon which showed a panic-stricken Ridley, fearfully pointing 
at the march of the ‘EMU army’: a group of ‘goose-stepping’ Nazi soldiers [see next page].
The Times also published a poll in the midst of the Ridley Affair according to which 53% of 
British respondents stated that they feared the reunification of Germany would lead to a return of 
fascism.12 Indeed, it is interesting to observe how the divisions on this issue were reflected in 
letters sent by various British citizens to this newspaper:
What I cannot understand, or condone, is the narrow-mindedness of people who cannot see 
the fundamental reality of today -  that no nation in the Community could survive 
economically outside it. Britain is fortunate to be a member of a club which is growing in 
importance and stature every day and it ill behoves a government minister to level 
schoolboy jives at another member or at the duly appointed officers of the club.13
Do people not understand that out future lies in a strong Europe? The continued prestige 
that Mrs Thatcher so longs for in Britain can only be maintained in the long term by 
everybody committing themselves to a united continent.14
Might it not be that Mr Ridley, in his recent interview, was voicing the feelings and even 
convictions of many thousands of people in this country, who have memories and 
knowledge of more than the last 40 years, and are thereby becoming increasingly uneasy 
by some of the recent trends in Europe?15
10 The Times, 13 July 1990.
11 The Times, 16 July 1990.
12 The Times, 13 July 1990.
13 G. Kelly, The Times, 13 July 1990.
14 W. Kings, The Times, 13 July 1990.
15 J. Stobart, The Times, 13 July 1990.
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I support Nicholas Ridley, intemperate or not. We were asked whether we wished to join a 
common market for our goods, not a common country to which we would have to 
surrender our freedom and individuality.16
These rival standpoints illustrate how Ridley’s outburst against Germany and the European 
Commission were seen by some as an embarrassing, harmful episode which would further 
damage Britain’s reputation in Europe, while others saw it as a valid warning against the 
dangerous threats that the nation was being confronted with due to the rise of supranationalist 
institutions in Europe (behind which the ugly face of a resurgent German power was supposedly 
hidden).
These controversies inevitably continued, as further steps were taken during this period in the 
process of European integration. On 28 October 1990, at a special European Council meeting 
held in Rome, Britain was outvoted by eleven to one in the decision to aim for a single currency 
by the end of the decade. In the press conference that followed this reunion, the British Prime 
Minister furiously proclaimed that she would veto any attempt to impose a single currency, and 
would never put to Parliament a bill to abolish the pound.17 On the following day, in a highly 
emotive discursive performance delivered in the House of Commons, she denounced the 
proposals on economic and monetary union agreed by her eleven EC partners as ‘the back door 
to a federal Europe’, and depicted Jacques Delors as a dangerous threat to British independence 
that had to be stopped at all costs for the good of the nation:
The President of the European Commission, Mr Delors, said at a press conference the other 
day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community. 
He wanted the Commission to be the Executive and the Council of Ministers to be the 
Senate. No. No. No.18
16 M. Coffman, The Times, 13 July 1990.
17 The Times, 29 October 1990.
18 The Times, 31 October 1990.
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The capacity of Thatcher’s discourse to ignite patriotic sentiments in defense of the British 
pound was perfectly encapsulated in the following letter, sent to The Times on the following day 
by Maurice Wood, an Anglican Bishop:
The United Kingdom and the Commonwealth find their deep and lasting cohesion vividly 
affirmed by the Sovereign’s head on every stamp, every coin, and every note. Our family 
of nations, each owing allegiance to her Majesty the Queen in a variety of ways, would 
become immeasurably fragmented by an impersonal and dull set of common European 
coins and notes. The Prime Minister has a shrewd sense of broad national identity, when 
she calmly resists a single European currency. We are not only a major European country, 
but we are a world power in and through the Commonwealth and the Sovereign’s head 
symbolises this strong and cohesive and continuing unity. The Prime Minister is 
courageous and correct in this matter. She deserves our open support.19
One can observe in such discourse a continuing emotional resistance to European integration as 
something which could severely diminish national greatness, based on the popular attachment to 
a self-flattering we-image of Britain as *a world power in and through the Commonwealth’. In 
fact, it was precisely at this point that the top-selling newspaper The Sun20 launched its own 
fierce symbolic attack against Jacques Delors, in an attempt to whip up nationalist rage against 
the Frenchman who was supposedly trying to run British people’s lives from Brussels 
[reproduced on the following page]. Under the headline, ‘UP YOURS DELORS’, the newspaper 
stated:
At midday tomorrow Sun readers are urged to tell the French fool where to stuff his 
ECU... We want you to tell Froggie Common Market chief Jacques Delors exactly what 
you think of him and his countrymen. At the stroke of noon tomorrow, we invite all true 
blue Brits to face France and yell ‘Up yours, Delors’. The ear-bashing from our millions of 
readers will wake the EC President up to the fact that he will NEVER run our country. His 
bid to replace the pound with the faceless ECU is the last straw after centuries of Froggy 
Brit-baiting... Remember, folks, it won’t be long before the garlic-breathed bastilles will 
be here in droves once the Channel Tunnel is open. So grab your megaphones, tum south, 
and let’em hear the British lion ROAR. And the best of British to you all!21
19 The Times, 1 November 1990.
20 In the early 1990’s, The Sun was by far the most popular newspaper in Britain, enjoying an average daily 
circulation of 3,698,000 copies. In second place was The Daily Mirror (2,931,000), after which came The Daily 
Telegraph (1,068,000), The Guardian (422.000), The Times (399,000), and The Independent (388,000). Figures 
cited in Los Medios en la Construcción de la Unidad Europea, Madrid, FUNDESCO (1993).
21 The Sun, 1 November 1990.
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In the crude, xenophobic discourse employed by this tabloid newspaper, the pound was depicted 
as a sacred symbol of British nationhood was being threatened by a despicable foreigner. This 
attack, furthermore, was extended to the entire French nation, which was negatively stereotyped 
as slimy, disgusting animal (the ‘frogs’), in contrast to the positive we-image of proud strength 
and nobility represented by the symbol of the ‘British lion’.
In the midst of this anti-Delors campaign, however, Thatcher’s Europhobic version of British 
patriotism received a major setback, when her deputy Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
decided to resign on 2 November, in protest at her hostility towards the European Community. In 
his letter of resignation, Howe stated that the Prime Minister’s attitude would make it very 
difficult for Britain to hold and retain a position of influence in Europe.22 The objective of his 
resignation, therefore, was to discredit her supposedly patriotic campaign in defence of ‘the 
nation’. A few days later, Howe delivered a scathing speech in Parliament to further explain his 
decision, in which he harshly attacked the Prime Minister’s stance on Europe once again. As in 
other episodes I have analyzed in previous chapters, Howe invoked the revered symbol of 
Winston Churchill in order to legitimate his Europeanist position from a patriotic standpoint:
We commit a serious error if we think always in terms of surrendering sovereignty and 
seek to stand pat for all time on a given deal by proclaiming, as the Prime Minister did two 
weeks ago, that we have surrendered enough. The European enterprise is not and should 
not be seen like that, as some kind of zero sum gain. Sir Winton Churchill put it much 
more positively 40 years ago when he said: ‘Is is not possible and not less agreeable to 
regard this sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty as the gradual assumption by all the 
nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and 
distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions?’ I find Winston 
Churchill’s perception a good deal more convincing and encouraging for the interests of 
the nation than the nightmare image sometimes conjured up by the Prime Minister, who 
sometimes seems to look out on a Continent that is positively teeming with ill intentioned 
people scheming, in her words, to extinguish democracy, to dissolve our national identity, 
to lead us through the back door to a federal Europe.23
22 The Times, 2 November 1990.
23 The Times, 14 November 1990.
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From Howe’s perspective, the Prime Minister’s antagonistic attitudes were hardly doing a good 
service to the British people. On the contrary, as in earlier periods, there was a real danger that 
Britain might suffer serious consequences by ‘missing the bus’ of European integration once
again:
The tragedy is... that the Prime Minister’s perceived attitude towards Europe is running 
increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation. It risks minimising our influence and 
maximising our chances of being once again shut out. We have paid heavily in the past for 
late starts and squandered opportunities in Europe. We dare not let that happen again. If we 
detach ourselves completely as party or as a nation from the middle ground of Europe, the 
effects will be incalculable and very hard to ever correct.24
Implicitly, Howe was suggesting that Thatcher was no longer fit to serve the interests of the 
British people, and that her supposedly patriotic defense of British freedom against the 
dominance of Brussels was in reality doing serious harm to the nation. This episode was 
followed on the very next day by Michael Heseltine’s announcement that he would challenge 
Thatcher for the Tory leadership. Nevertheless, although Thatcher was ultimately ousted from 
office as a result of this contest, she was replaced not by Heseltine, but by her own preferred 
successor, John Major.
6.2 The run-up to Maastricht: an impassioned discursive contest over the defense of 
Britain’s ‘national interest’
Early in his premiership, Major signalled an apparent break with his predecessor’s stance on 
Europe, by delivering a speech in an official visit to Bonn, during which he proclaimed:
My aims for Britain in the Community can be simply stated. I want us to be where we 
belong. At the very heart of Europe. Working with our partners in building the future. That 
is a challenge we can take up with enthusiasm. We want to arrive at solutions which enable 
us to move forward more united, not less.25
24 The Times, 14 November 1990.
25 The Times, 12 March 1991.
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This change of tone appeared to symbolize the beginning of a new era in Britain’s relations with 
Europe. Major declared that he spoke for a generation who grew up in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, for whom Europe was a cause of political inspiration:
We were barely adult when, in 1963, Britain’s Conservative government made our first 
application to join the Community... The Conservatives recognised that it was in Europe 
that Britain’s destiny lay; in Europe that we could best secure the welfare and prosperity of 
our people.
Major therefore seemed to be promoting a new national we-image of Britain as a cooperative, 
enthusiastic partner in the project of European integration. In this way, national pride could be 
derived by portraying the British as ‘good Europeans', and shaking off the stigma of narrow­
minded nationalism for which Thatcher had been severely criticised during her final years in 
power. Nevertheless, as the Maastricht summit approached, it became evident that there were 
considerable limits to the new Prime Minister's ‘Europeanism’.
During the parliamentary debates that took place on the 20th and 21sl of November on the 
treaty negotiations, Major outlined his government's position as follows. He wished Britain 
neither to abandon the Community nor to stay in grudgingly, but to play ‘a leading role’ in 
Europe.26 However, this did not mean that every idea that was marketed with a European label 
should be submissively accepted, but rather that Britain should try to build ‘the sort of Europe 
we believe in’. Hence, the Prime Minister proclaimed that he would not tolerate the imposition 
of a single European currency, which was a decision with tremendous implications that could 
only be taken in the future with the consent of the British Parliament. Neither would he accept 
the introduction of a social charter on the regulation of working conditions, which was viewed as 
a programme that would harm the competitiveness of British industry in world markets, and 
drive away inward investment from Japanese and American companies. Furthermore, Major was
26 The Times, 2 1  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 1 .
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not prepared to accept ‘the idea of a European Federation’, which would lead to the European
i
I Community having ‘an unacceptable dominance over our national life’. Hence, he assured that 
j he would not sign a treaty that described the Community as having ‘a federal vocation’ -  the
| words which were included in the initial working draft of the treaty. From Major’s perspective,
j therefore, Britain’s ‘national interest’ at Maastricht was defined primarily in terms of rejecting 
j the federalist conception of Europe, as well as maintaining the country’s right to opt out of both
j the project of monetary union and the social charter.
I The Labour leader Neil Kinnock, however, portrayed Major’s position as a ‘dreary,J demeaning, and ultimately self-defeating posture’.27 In an emotionally charged discursive effort
I to mobilize national sentiments against the Conservative government, he suggested that its
j policies would put the country ‘in the second division of the European Community’. If Britain
I stayed out of the single currency, the consequences could be potentially disastrous: ‘What would
i
l inward investors, who want and need access to to the markets of the whole community, really 
think about locating in this semi-detached country?* Kinnock, furthermore, considered it morally 
shameful that only Britain, as a result of the Conservative government’s attitudes, would refuse 
to guarantee its people ‘the same minimum rights as their fellow Europeans’ by rejecting the 
social chapter of the treaty. The Labour leader, therefore, tried to discredit Major’s supposedly 
patriotic defense of Britain’s ‘national interest*, by depicting the proposed opt-outs from the 
single currency and the social chapter as a recipe for national disaster that would severely harm 
Britain’s future prosperity, its political influence, and its moral reputation in Europe. ‘Opting 
out’, Kinnock declared, ‘would mean losing out.’ Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that one thing 
the Labour leader did not challenge was the Government’s rejection of the so-called ‘f-word’ of 
federalism, since on this point there appeared to be a consensus between the two main British 
parties.
27 The Times, 21 November 1991.
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It was Margaret Thatcher, however, who made the greatest headlines in the press by 
delivering an impassioned speech in which she warned his successor that the Maastricht Treaty
involved an ‘enormous’ and, in her view, ‘unacceptable transfer of responsibility’ of the House 
of Commons to EC institutions.28 29Using a vivid, fear-provoking image, she defined this process I
i
as ‘the conveyor belt to federalism’ and suggested that this dangerous mechanism would not be
stopped simply by removing the word ‘federal’ from the treaty. The project of the single i
i
currency implied that national governments would surrender their capacity to determine 
fundamental economic policies to ‘unaccountable’ European institutions. Hence, the ex-Prime 
Minister demanded a referendum to ‘let the people speak’ on an issue that went ‘to the heart of ( 
our democracy and our Parliament.’ She suggested to Major that in the same way she used to I
i
employ her handbag to fend off threats to Britain in European summits, Major should employ a 
cricket bat in defence of the nation.
On the second day of the Maastricht debates, the deep Conservative divisions on European 
matters were illustrated once again when Edward Heath intervened to depict his own version of 
the British ‘national interest’. As one would expect, the ex-Premier who had taken the country 
‘into Europe’ identified the maintenance of British influence and national pride with the need to 
wholeheartedly take part in the project of economic and monetary union. Being excluded from 
this project, warned Heath, could lead to a disgraceful reduction of British prosperity and status:
Can you imagine a situation where our partners have a single currency and our 
businessmen are left out? It is unthinkable. How would it be possible to make the City of 




Divisions were also visible within the Labour Party, however, as an intervention from the l 
veteran opponent of European integration, Peter Shore, demonstrated: !
i
28 The Times, 21 November 1991.
29 The TimeSy 22 November 1990.
152
We are promised a further assault upon what is left of our national independence. Let there 
be no shame at all about our commitment to not just our independence but also the 
democracy that we have, with all its imperfections, which is a damn sight better in this 
House of Commons than it is anywhere else in Europe.30
These words portrayed the British democratic tradition as a great source of national pride, since 
it was infinitely superior (‘a damn sight better’) than in any other European country. This was, 
therefore, something which had to be preserved at all costs against the rising tide of European 
federalism.
The day after the parliamentary debates ended, Margaret Thatcher continued her patriotic 
campaign against the Maastricht Treaty in a television interview that was also widely reported in 
the press, in which she insisted that it would be ‘arrogant’ and ‘wrong* not to allow the ‘voice of 
the people’ to be heard by holding a referendum on the issue of the single currency [reproduced 
on the following page].31 In her view, just because the other eleven member states wanted to 
carry out this project, the British people should not allow themselves to be ‘dragged along*. 
When the television interviewer suggested that this could potentially lead to the British pound 
becoming ‘a weak little currency on the edge*, Thatcher jumped up and proclaimed: ‘No. We 
most certainly will not. Have a little bit more faith in your own fellow countrymen!* Hence, the 
ex-Prime Minister continued to defend Britain’s capacity to maintain its ‘greatness’ without 
having to join a common European currency. Implicitly, she was accusing those who argued that 
Britain had ‘no other alternative’ of shameful defeatism, of ‘losing faith* in their countrymen’s 
ability to maintain British prosperity and prestige independently, without being forced to join the 
European monetary union. Citing the revered Churchill symbol for her own purposes, she 
proclaimed:
Whatever happened to the British lion of whom Winston said it was his privilege to give 
the roar? And Winston said in 1953: ‘We will be with Europe but not of it, and when they 
ask us why we take that view, we will say we dwell in our own land.’
30 The Times, 22 November 1990.
31 The Observer, 24 November 1991.
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From Thatcher’s perspective, therefore, Britain could still be a great power on its own, it could 
still defend its parliamentary powers and maintain its distinctive national pride without having to 
join the pooling of European sovereignty represented by the project of the single currency. This 
patriotic hostility against the Maastricht Treaty was also similarly voiced on television during 
this period by another leading Eurosceptic, Norman Tebbit, who proclaimed that the British 
people would never tolerate being governed by ‘foreign language speakers’.32
In the discursive conflicts that erupted in the British public sphere during the period that 
preceded the Maastricht summit, one can therefore observe a passionate symbolic contest over 
the ‘national interest’, and how it could best be served in this new critical juncture of European 
integration. On the one hand, John Major stressed the need to protect Britain from three 
fundamental threats emanating from the proposed treaty: the ‘federal vocation’ which could lead 
to an unacceptable dominance of European institutions over the nation’s life, the imposition of a 
single currency, and the introduction of a social charter which would harm the country’s 
economic interests by, as he put it, ‘clogging up the arteries of industry’.33 On the other, Neil 
Kinnock depicted this position as a way of leaving Britain isolated and shamefully excluded 
from a project of monetary union from which the nation could simply not afford to be left out, 
and from a social chapter that would protect the fundamental rights of British workers. In the 
meantime, Thatcher continued her anti-Brussels crusade by depicting the Maastricht Treaty as a 
dangerous threat to British freedoms and an unacceptable reduction of the nation’s grand stature, 
while Heath pursued his attempt to identify the maintenance of British prosperity and national 
pride with full-hearted participation in the project of European unity.
These rival representations of the British ‘national interest’ portrayed in the discourse of 
politicians were largely mirrored in the positions adopted by different newspapers. The Times
32 The Independent, 10 December 1991.
33 The Daily Telegraph, 8 December 1991.
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and the Telegraph, for instance, commended the Major government’s ‘sensible’ approach of 
waiting prudently, rather than rushing ahead to embrace the dangerous, idealistic projects 
promoted by European federalists:
The other 11 states remain determined to humour Jacques Delors and the federalists... 
Need Mr Major worry muchy about this? He is rightly proud of his refusal to commit a 
future parliament to something as fundamental as monetary union... Reserving Britain’s 
position on economic union is not a wilful refusal to take part in European co-operation. It 
is a gesture of sanity and caution. If other European states are more cynical, or more 
nervous, or simply more careless of the future, so be it. If Britain is to stand alone, it is 
right to do so.34 35
Britain’s stance has been important and not insular. If the mechanics of economic and 
political union are moving too fast, they are moving too fast for the good of the whole, they 
are too fast for all Europe, not just Britain... Too much power stripped from too many 
electorates and granted to too many international bodies will induce its own reaction: a 
nationalist upsurge which no amount of central policing will suppress, EMU and political 
union will collapse in bitterness and fascism... If the other partners to these treaties 
overreach themselves, Britain should be outspoken in crying stop.
Let us be frank: from the British standpoint, whatever comes out of this meeting will be 
damage limitation. We do not want closer political or monetary integration at present; we 
have enough to be going on with. This is by no means a negative or dishonorable stance; in 
taking it, we are not merely engaged in protecting our independence, but limiting the injury 
that could be suffered by others if the Europe of the philosophers runs so far ahead of itself 
down the federalist road that it falls over its own peoples... Plainly, if a reasonable 
agreement can be achieved that enables us to remain in the long negotiating game that lies 
ahead, to check the extremists and put the EC on a sane and realistic path for the future, 
then that will be the best outcome both for the Government and for this country.36
The discourse of these two newspapers therefore coincided in presenting a flattering self- 
portrayal of Britain as the only sane, cautious member state of the EC -  the only country in 
which the implications of a European monetary union had truly been thought out, and which had 
the courage to resist the rising tide of impassioned European federalism. Britain was thus 
depicted as the voice of sensible rationality, while ‘the eleven others’ were supposedly being 
carried away by emotive European idealism. This position, furthermore, was morally legitimated 
by the claim that it was not just a question of egoistically pursuing Britain’s self-interests, but of
34 The Times, 3 December 1991.
35 The Times, 9 December 1991.
36 The Daily Telegraph, 9 December 1991.
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generously protecting all Europeans from the ‘nationalist upsurge’ that could be provoked by an 
excessive transfer of power to supranational institutions.
In contrast to this standpoint, however, the editorial discourse of newspapers such as The 
Independent and The Guardian adopted a much more favourable view of European integration, 
and regretted Britain’s continued negativism towards this process:
There is something uplifting, even inspiring, about this last phase in the efforts of the 12 
member states of the EC to forge a new treaty on political, economic and monetary 
union... Much of the self-congratulation over the vigorousness of the debate in this 
country is misplaced. It has been more muted on the Continent largely because closer 
integration, in almost any form, is seen as an unalloyed gain. Only in Britain is the further 
whittling away of purely national decision-making viewed with such suspicion. Yet who 
can regret, for example, that tough, centrally agreed standards for the protection of the 
environment have been imposed on these islands? When Mr Major emerges from the fray, 
it is to the positive aspects of European integration, as well as to the fear of the 
consequences of being left on the sidelines, that he must appeal. The logic of history is on 
his side.37
The Government’s positioning is poor. It is not at the heart of anything, let alone Europe, 
because it has no stable allies among the Twelve... We can’t in truth, keep dragging along 
like this.38
From this perspective, European integration was identified with ‘the logic of history’, and British 
resistance to this process was depicted as an embarrassing, misguided, backward-looking 
attitude. A number of cartoons published in these two newspapers graphically illustrated this 
same critical standpoint. One of them depicted Margaret Thatcher as a Union Jack with a pearl 
necklace, who nostalgically sang ‘RULE BRITANNIA, BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES...’ 
Another showed Thatcher and her Euro-phobic Tory sidekick, Norman Tebbit, as the famous 
protagonists of Miguel de Cervantes’s classic novel Don Quixote, both of whom were getting 
ready to tilt at a windmill which had the word ‘MAASTRICHT’ written on it. A third cartoon 
depicted an extremely lean and hungry British Lion, who had been given a meatless bone
37 The Independent, 9 December 1991.
38 The Guardian, 21 November 1991.
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labelled ‘OPT-OUT* to calm his voracious appetite, but who clearly felt tempted by the pleasant 
odour emanating from the boiling cauldron of ‘MAASTRICHT*. Finally, a fourth cartoon 
showed John Major and his Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, on a minuscule boat which had 
been named ‘HMS OPT-OUT*, and was decorated with a reproduction of London’s Big Ben 
clock. The British leaders were semi-attached by a rope to a luxurious ocean liner called ‘EMU 
MAASTRICHT’, at the helm of which was Captain Jacques Delors, and where Helmut Kohl and 
Francois Mitterrand relaxed placidly on the upper deck, looking down at the two Englishmen 
with a paternalistic smile. John Major, however, stubbornly tried to tempt the ‘Europeans’ into 
his little British boat, assuring them that there was still Tots of room’ left for others to join their 
opt-out from the monetary union, while Foreign Minister Hurd attempted to do the same by 
diplomatically offering them the classic English cup of tea.
All of these ingenious cartoons, therefore, adopted the same symbolic strategy of ridiculing 
the government, in order to pour scorn on its supposedly patriotic approach to the upcoming 
European summit. This same weapon of sharp critical humour was also brilliantly employed in 
an advertisement with which The Guardian announced the publication of a special section that 
would analyze all the details of the Maastricht reunion, a few days before this ‘historic summit’ 
took place. It displayed a picture of John Major next to Francois Mitterrand, with a caption in 
which the British Prime Minister’s dithery approach to the European Union was illustrated with 
the following statement: ‘Yes Mr Mitterrand we absolutely, categorically, possibly, maybe, 
could be going into Europe’ [reproduced on the following page].
A critical, *pro-European’ representation of the British ‘national interest’ was also 
exemplified by an impassioned article written by the Labour MP Giles Radice, published by The 
Independent/9 This politician argued that for a long time, the nation’s leaders had been ‘seduced 
by an anachronistic idea of Britain’ that had led them to remain aloof from the process of 
European integration. In the current situation, although John Major had adopted a style that was
39 The Independent, 1 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 1 .
The Independent, November 22 1991
TH E INDEPENDENT Monday 18 November 1901
The Independent, November 18 1991
THE INDEPENDENT Mondav 2 December 1S91
The Independent, December 2 1991





special reports on  the events leading up to the Maast r icht  
summit.  Plus Kr it Li vs (j’uaul ian Kurnpe offers Opinions on 
the subject.from all of Ktirope's rnosr prnmineui  newspapers .
77;? G u a rd ia n
“Yes M r  Mitterrand
: - ^ w e  a b s o l u t e l y  
| categorically 
r possibly nia^be9 
| could be going
into 55□
The Observer, 1 December 1991
‘a welcome change from Mrs Thatcher’s strident English nationalism’, in his attitude to 
Maastricht he was also trying to portray himself as ‘a doughty defender of a Britain besieged by 
marauding continentals’. However, according to Radice, the time had come to stop devoting 
British energies to preventing the integration process from going ahead, and to make a positive 
contribution to Europe’s future. It was only by pooling sovereignty with the other member states 
of the EC that Britain could retain a respectable position of national strength: Tn today’s world, 
the most effective way a medium-sized nation can exert influence is by joining with others. That 
is the case for European integration John Major must make this week.’
Hence, one can see how the arrival of the Maastricht summit reignited once again the 
symbolico-emotional battle of rival patriotisms in the British political arena, between those who 
identified the nation’s interests and the maintenance of its pride with a wholehearted 
commitment to the project of European integration, and those who believed that the country 
needed to protect itself from the dangerous threats that this process represented. In the following 
two sections, I shall illustrate how this discursive conflict unfolded during the actual summit 
itself, by analyzing the way in which the agreements reached were alternatively presented as a 
great victory or a humiliating defeat for the people of Britain.
6.3 'Game, set, and match for Britain9: Maastricht as a national victory
On the eve of the Maastricht summit, Jacques Delors delivered a provocative speech at a rally of 
European federalists. Surrounded by banners that proclaimed ‘History will not stop for Europe’, 
and an enthusiastic crowd which shouted ‘Federal Union Now!’, Delors became the high priest 
of a political ritual in which the ideal of ‘European Union’ was the worshipped totem/0 The 
group included a number of young British federalists, who identified themselves in their T-shirts 
as a vanguard of enlightened individuals who were ‘a generation ahead’ of those who continued
40 The Independent, 9  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 1 .
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to stubbornly resist the development of European integration. In front of this congregation, the 
President of the European Commission confidently declared: ‘Federalism is the guiding 
principle. It’s a word you should speak out loud... it is not a pornographic expression*. 
Furthermore, in a direct allusion to the British government’s negative attitudes, he declared that 
the EC had been paying too much attention to the one country that kept saying ‘no, no, no*, and 
defended the social chapter of the treaty by stating that Europe should be ‘a Europe for workers 
and not only a Europe of business’. The Times described this address as ‘a determined assault 
against Britain’s position on European political union’, while The Sun stated that Delors had 
‘blasted Britain as “shame faced” in the battle over a European superstate.’ The impression given 
by these newspapers was that the Maastricht summit was a tough battlefield in which the Prime 
Minister had to fight coureageously in order to protect Britain from the federalist threat 
represented by Delors. Hence, from this perspective, the ultimate results of the negotiations were 
presented at the end of the summit as a great triumph for the nation for three fundamental 
reasons: the word ‘federal’ was deleted from the final version of the treaty and replaced by the 
more ambiguous, less controversial concept of an ‘ever closer union’; Britain retained the right 
to opt out of the European single currency, for which the target date of 1 January 1999 had been 
set; and Britain also excluded itself from the social charter, which was signed in a separate 
protocol by the other eleven member states.
On the day the agreements were reached, the British Prime Minister therefore depicted his 
accomplishments in a language that combined images of victory from sports and warfare:
It’s game, set, and match for Britain. We surrendered nothing. We lost nothing. I am
delighted. It is a good day for Britain and a good day for Europe.41
Major’s discourse was thus a perfect example of what I have called the politics of national 
sentiment -  i.e. the attempt to symbolically legitimate a particular decision or policy by
43 The Times, 11 N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 1 .
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mobilizing we-feelings of national pride or ‘group charisma’ in order to build up popular support 
for it. Britain had reasons to celebrate, Major suggested, because it had neither ‘surrendered’ nor 
‘lost* anything. At the same time, in order to deflect any possible accusations of narrow-minded 
‘nationalism’, a discursive attempt was also made to morally legitimate this position by claiming 
that all the member states had benefited from British wisdom: it was not only ‘a good day for 
Britain’, but also ‘a good day for Europe’. The triumphant imagery of a sporting victory was 
further elaborated by Major’s minister for EC affairs, Tristan Garel-Jones, who used the 
language of cricket to describe the Prime Minister’s triumph: ‘It is important to look at the 
number of singles he hit as well as the boundaries. By the end he was scoring pretty freely.’42 43
Furthermore, in the speech he delivered in Parliament on the day after the Maastricht summit 
ended, Major received loud cheers from his party when he reiterated that the new treaty was one 
‘which safeguards and advances our national interests’.45 The Prime Minister declared that he 
had curbed the ‘grandiose’ designs for a federal European Union, secured the right of a future 
UK to decide whether or not to join the single European currency, and blocked the ‘creeping 
extension of Community competence’ into the sphere of industrial relations.44 In this way, he 
predicted that Britain could become ‘a paradise’ for Japanese investment, since it would not be 
saddled with the EC’s employment regulations.45
This same rhetoric of victory was of course also employed in the newspapers which were 
sympathetic to the Conservative government’s perspective on the Maastricht summit. The main 
headline of The Times, for instance, proclaimed: ‘Major wins all he asks for at Maastricht’ 
[reproduced on the following page], and its editorial discourse stated:
For the Treaty of Rome now read the Fudge of Maastricht. Last night, Britain stuck to its 
principles and was isolated... John Major did not seek confrontation in Maastricht... But 
when others seek to run before they can walk, only a fool runs with them... Britain will be
42 The Daily Telegraphy 12 December 1991.
43 The Guardian, 12 December 1991.
44 The Independenty 12 December 1991.
45 The Independenty 12 December 1991.
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accused of sabotaging Maastricht. It has not done so. It has forced Maastricht to be 
sensible. Britain has helped the EC to be realistic about its immediate future.46
Once again, Britain was depicted as the ‘sensible’, ‘realistic’ partner that had put the brakes on 
the dangerous path of supranational integration favoured by the other member states, who were 
said to be acting like ‘fools’. Hence, it was suggested that there was no reason to feel shame 
about Britain’s isolation on the projects of the single currency and the social chapter. On the 
contrary, the British had every reason to feel proud about their accomplishments in Maastricht.
The Daily Telegraph, similarly, described Major’s performance as *a notable diplomatic 
success’ which had saved the nation from great ‘perils and disadvantages’. Britain had avoided 
‘immediate bondage in an unhealthy centralisation of monetary, social, defence, and foreign 
policy’, as well as ‘being dragged willy-nilly towards a single currency’. Furthermore, by opting- 
out of the social chapter, Major had achieved a ‘semi-detached position’ which far from harming 
the nation, ‘could make Britain seem notably attractive to foreign investors seeking moderate 
labour costs and settled labour relations’.47 48An article by a political commentator of this 
newspaper similarly suggested that although Maastricht had produced ‘a two speed Europe’, it 
was one in which ‘Britain is not lagging behind, but alone in the fast lane’.4*
Not surprisingly, the language of patriotic triumphalism was even more marked in the 
discourse employed by The Sun, which in its reports on Maastricht highlighted the Prime 
Minister’s ‘F-WORD VICTORY’, his ‘EURO WIN OVER UNIONS’, and the way in which he 
had ‘scored triumph’ and ‘scooped the Jackpot’ by playing ‘the winning hand in Europe’ 
[reproduced on the following page]. Its editorial heaped even more praise on Major’s successful 
performance in defense of the nation:
46 The Times, 11 December 1991.
47 The Daily Telegraph, 12 December 1991.
48 The Daily Telegraph, 12 December 1991.
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John Major, facing odds of eleven to one in Maastricht, showed he is made of steel. He 
gave no quarter as Britain secured a deal which, in the Prime Minister’s words, wins us 
game, set, and match.
Britain now has the right to decide what’s best for us. We can CHOOSE whether or not to 
join a single European currency.
We can CUT ourselves off from the worst aspects of empire-building by Eurocrats like 
Jacques Delors.
We can PICK the plums from the social charter on workers’ rights, ignoring Mr Delors’ 
sops to the all-powerful French and German trade unions.49
The British Prime Minister was thus depicted as a heroic patriot that demonstrated he was ‘made 
of steel’, by standing up for the nation’s interests in spite of being heavily outnumbered by the 
other eleven member states. Thanks to his courageous efforts, the ‘Eurocrats like Jacques Delors’ 
and their ambitions of ‘empire-building’ had been prevented from harming ‘us’. Hence, no 
foreigner would be able to impose anything on Britain, because the Prime Minister had secured 
the nation’s right to decide ‘what’s best for us’. This same discursive framework of a British 
‘we’ against a European ‘them’ was also employed in a section entitled ‘HOW BRITAIN 
SUCCEEDED AT MAASTRICHT’, which drew up a list of the main ‘victories’ that the 
national ‘we’ had ‘won’ against ‘the others’:
FEDERAL EUROPE
The word ‘federal’ is deleted from the treaty on European unity. Instead it talks of ‘ever 
closer union’ -  back to the wording used when the Common Market was founded in 1957. |
Result: WIN |
SINGLE CURRENCY |
Britain accepts the principle of a single currency by 1999. But Britain wins the right to j 
decided if, and when, we adopt it. i
Result: WIN. .
SOCIAL CHARTER 1
Europe will not be allowed to force us to accept their rules on working conditions, which 
would give power back to the unions. The other 11 countries go ahead without us.
Result: WIN (...)
49 The Sun, 12  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 1 .
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Nevertheless, The Sun suggested that some ‘defeats’ and ‘draws’ also had to be acknowledged in 
the battle against the growing powers of Brussels and the deepening of European integration:
COMMISSION POWERS
Britain conceded a stronger role for Brussels in environment, education, consumer 
protection, public health, and transport.
Result: LOSE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The Euro Parliament wins small concessions giving it some powers to veto EC legislation. 
But the sovereignty of Westminster remains.
Result: DRAW...
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Richer nations such as Britain and Germany must contribute to a regional fund so that 
poorer countries like Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece can catch up economically. 
Result: LOSE
The image depicted in the discourse of The Sun was thus that of a Britain still besieged by the 
threatening Other of European federalism, even if at Maastricht the Prime Minister had 
successfully managed to block the advance of this dangerous foreign enemy. An important battle 
had been won for the nation, but the war was not yet over.
6.4 ‘Britain in the second division of Europe*: Maastricht as a national defeat
In contrast and opposition to the triumphalist discourse employed by John Major and his 
supporters, the leading members of the Labour Party launched a patriotic counter-attack in which 
they tried to channel national we-feelings against the Prime Minister. As a result of the opt-outs 
from the single currency and the social chapter, Britain’s position after summit was described 
with an imagery of defeat, in order to provoke collective sentiments of national shame. The 
following quotations can serve to exemplify the symbolic representation of the Maastricht Treaty 
which was employed in the discourse of the opposition:
‘When it is obvious that the other 11 governments are prepared to accept the draft before 
them at Maastricht and this Government is not, this Government is confessing to a unique 
combination of political prejudice and economic weakness that marks it out from the rest 
of the Community and marks Britain down in that Community.’ (Neil Kinnock, cited in 
The Independent, 11 December 1991)
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‘It is the first step in a two-speed Europe. We are dead in the water alone, adrift from the 
rest of Europe.’ (Glynn Ford, Leader of UK Socialist MEPs, cited in The Independent, 12 
December 1991) .
‘What would two opt-outs mean for Britain? Out of the first division, into the slow lane, 
left behind in Europe.’ (George Robertson, Labour European Affairs spokesman, cited in 
The Guardian, 11 December 1991)
‘It means, effectively, isolation for Britain.’ (Tony Blair, Shadow Employment Secretary, 
cited in The Guardian, 11 December 1991)
‘This is a defeat for the British people. We have become more and more isolated as the 
negotiations have gone on. The double opt-out is bad for Britain as under this government 
we will be condemned to the second division in Europe.’ (John Cunningham, Labour 
campaigns coordinator, cited in The Daily Telegraph, 11 December 1991)
‘Pasty-faced Englishmen waving their Union Jacks and shouting “boo” at Johnny 
Foreigner are never an edifying sight, either on the football terraces or in an inter­
governmental conference.’ (George Galloway, Labour MP, cited in The Daily Telegraph, 
12 December 1991)
From this perspective, therefore, the outcome of the Maastricht summit was depicted in entirely 
negative terms which implied a humiliating loss of national status. Britain was variously 
described as ‘weak’, ‘marked out’, ‘marked down’, ‘dead in the water’, ‘adrift’, ‘in the slow 
lane’, ‘in the second division’ ‘isolated’, and ‘defeated’. In the last quotation I have cited, Major 
and his colleagues were even compared to xenophobic English hooligans at a football game, 
waving their national flags and shouting insults at foreigners, in an attempt to mock their 
supposedly patriotic defense of ‘the national interest’ against the European threat. It was 
therefore implied that the Conservatives were making Britain look rather ridiculous in front of its 
EC partners. The Maastricht summit, from this standpoint, could in no way be considered a 
source of national pride. On the contrary, Major’s performance was utterly disgraceful, and the 
British people were encouraged to feel ashamed about a Prime Minister that was making their 
country the laughing stock of the European Community.
Furthermore, in the Parliamentary debates that took place after the Maastricht summit. 
Labour’s leader continued to pursue this discursive strategy in order to symbolically discredit the 
Prime Minister and his government. In response to Major’s claim to have advanced and
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safeguarded Britain’s ‘national interest’, he proclaimed that the Prime Minister had abdicated 
from his responsibilities in Europe, adding that ‘our country’s interests cannot be served by 
isolation and opt-out’.50 According to the Labour leader, what the Prime Minister had 
accomplished in Maastricht was ‘a self-imposed exile from the mainstream in the Community’ 
which would ‘severely disadvantage the British people’. By opting out of the economic and 
monetary union, Britain would lose all influence over this process, and ultimately have to accept 
‘conditions determined by others’. Furthermore, Kinnock suggested that the Prime Minister had 
lowered Britain to a humiliating, ‘uncivilised’ level by rejecting the social chapter: ‘When is this 
government going to learn the lesson that civilised standards help efficiency and 
competitiveness, and exploitation and unjustice harm efficiency and competitiveness?’ Major 
was similarly attacked in this same debate by the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy 
Ashdown, who declared that instead of putting Britain at the heart of Europe, as he had initially 
promised, the Prime Minister was ‘condemning this country to be semi-detached from the 
process.’
In the press, this same image of Maastricht as a national defeat was exemplified by the 
discourse employed to describe the results of the European summit in The Guardian. Under the 
headline, ‘EC unites on historic treaty with Britain in the slow lane’ [reproduced on the 
following page], this newspaper’s report stated in its opening paragraph:
European leaders this morning unveiled a historic European Union treaty, but one that had
all the hallmarks of a two-speed Europe -  with Britain in the slow lane.51
The pro-European position of this newspaper was also illustrated in an editorial which was 
critical not only of Major’s patriotic triumphalism, but of the way in which the leaders of the 
other member states had done exactly the same thing:
50 The Daily Telegraph, 12 December 1991. All other citations in this paragraph are from this newspaper.
51 The Guardian, 11 December 1991.
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No leader amongst the Twelve went home humiliated or defeated yesterday; all were 
variously triumphant. Mr Kohl and Mr Mitterrand and Mr Andreotti and Mr González all 
proclaimed victory, though on greatly different grounds. The saga of battling John was a 
second feature elsewhere. Rampant federalists should note that phenomenon carefully. We 
are still light years away from any hint of a super-state. Summit warfare is waged in 
entirely national terms -  underpinned by the perception (for Mr Mitterrand just as much as 
for Mr Major) that trophies have to be brought back in pseudo-triumph. It is the voters -  
French, German, British -  who have to be put first... But is this, any longer, a serious way 
of conducting serious business? Increasingly, it is not.
In its own editorial discourse, The Independent referred to the Major government’s opt-out from 
the single currency *a classic British error’ which severely imperilled the country’s economic 
future and therefore damaged ‘the national interest’:
The outcome shows that Britain has committed the classic error of underestimating its 
partners’ determination to achieve an ambitious goal. Such misjudgements follow a 
reliable pattern. “We are pragmatists”, the British say. “It’s all wildly optimistic Euro- 
rhetoric. They don’t really mean what they say. We’ve pointed out the realities. It won’t 
happen”... So the British are dragged along in the wake of everyone else, having wasted 
much diplomatic effort on justifying their negative position and keeping an escape route 
open... If our major EC competitor’s form a currency union, there is no way Britain could 
afford not to be a part of it... Governments are elected to take tough decisions, not to 
postpone them when delay threatens to damage the national interest.52
Furthermore, in relation to the opt-out from the social chapter, the Sunday edition of this same 
newspaper depicted this decision as one which presented a humiliating image of Britain as 
Europe’s ‘discount store’ -  a ‘bargain basement’ in which Japanese investors could buy their 
labour cheaply:
Mr Major has sent a dismaying message, not just to our European partners, but to the world 
about how Britain sees its future. The message is that Britain is a low-cost, low-wage 
economy, offering a European version of the economies of the Far East... By his actions in 
Maastricht, Mr Major has told the British people that their future lies in a discount store on 
Europe’s fringes, where their labour will be piled high at bargain basement prices.53
52 The Independent, 11 December 1991.
53 The Independent on Sunday, 15 December 1991.
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The representation of the Maastricht summit as a source of national shame rather than pride was 
in fact stated explicitly in a letter sent to The Independent by Peter Luff, the director of the 
European Movement in Britain:
Although the Maastricht council lived up to its promise and delivered an agreement that 
has set a course for fill European union, if the British government believes that its role in 
the negotiations has placed it at the heart of Europe, it is deluding both itself and the 
British people. Instead of a sense of shame that we are unable to face the disciplines of 
monetary union and unwilling to commit ourselves to a set of principles outlining social 
justice for the Community, the Government appears to take pride in these failures... We 
are, yet again, on the periphery and not at the centre of translating a Community treaty into 
reality.54 5
The same vision of national humiliation was also defended in another letter sent by Norman 
Willis, the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, who argued that Major’s opt-outs 
could only ‘damage Britain in the eyes of the world’ and leave the country and its working 
people ‘on the margin of the European Community’.53
As a contrast to the patriotic triumphalism exemplified by The Sun, it is interesting to note 
the sensationalist depiction of Maastricht as a national disaster which was presented in the Daily 
Mirror, a tabloid sympathetic to the position of the Labour Party. With headlines such as 
‘BUNGLER MAJOR CAUGHT IN EURO AMBUSH’, ‘IT’S DIVISION TWO BRITAIN’, and 
‘EURO DEAL LEAVES US OUT IN THE COLD’, this newspaper employed the same imager)' 
of sports and warfare as in The Sun, but with a diametrically opposed view of the Maastricht 
battle’s results [reproduced on the following page]:
ISOLATED Britain was plunging towards second division status in Europe last night as 
John Major botched the EC summit negotiations. In a humiliating rout, EC partners 
ambushed the inexperienced Premier as they finally lost patience with Britain’s stalling on 
the single currency issue.
They decided there could be no turning back and swept aside Mr Major’s plea not to fix a 
timetable...
54 The Independent, 12 December 1991.
55 The Independent, 12 December 1991.
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Double opt out 
puts Britain in 
1 second diyision
Daily Mirror, December 10-12 1991
Now the treaty will be a disaster -  leaving Britain outside the mainstream of EC 
development and scaring off overseas investors.56
In relation to the opt-out from the social chapter, the Daily Mirror depicted this decision in its 
editorial discourse as a ‘BOTCHED JOB’ that reduced Britain to the shameful status of a 
developing third world country in which workers would be denied their basic rights:
John Major says he is not prepared to put British jobs on the line by signing the European 
Social Charter. What cant!...
He says that the Japanese and others would not build factories here if we adopted the 
Social Charter because their costs would go up. That is admitting that under the Tories 
Britain can compete in the world only by being turned into a sweat shop.57 58
The political cartoonist of the Mirror further ridiculed Major’s supposedly ‘patriotic’ defense of 
Britain’s legitimate right to be ‘different’ from ‘Europe’, by depicting the Prime Minister getting 
ready to have breakfast with his Foreign Minister at the ‘Summit Hoteel’ in Maastricht, and 
asking the Dutch waiter -  who uselessly offered a ‘Menu Continental’ -  to please bring them a 
‘pot of tea and full English breakfast for two’. This same symbolic representation of the 
Maastricht summit as a source of national embarrassment and humiliation was also perfectly 
encapsulated in another cartoon published by this newspaper, in which Helmut Kohl and 
François Mitterand, riding a shiny black limousine with European flags, overtook an old, broken 
down car driven by Major, with a tattered Union Jack and a hood design resembling Margaret 
Thatcher’s face [reproduced on the following page].55
At the same time, it is interesting to note that some members of the Conservative Party also 
saw Maastricht as a national failure, and publicly distanced themselves from the official 
triumphalism of the government. On the one hand, Eurosceptics such as Nicholas Ridley 
considered that in spite of Major’s claim to have ‘surrendered nothing’ and protected Britain
56 Daily Mirror, 10 December 1991.
57 Daily Mirror, 12 December 1991.
58 Daily Mirror, 12 December 1991.
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Daily Mirror, December 9 1991
Daily Mirror, December 12 1991
1
from the threat of European federalism, the reality was that this danger had in no way been 
eliminated. In an article published in The Times, entitled ‘Maastricht will reinforce the 
battlements of fortress Europe’, Ridley warned:
The whole thrust is towards a federal union, despite the omission of the offending F-word. 
The community will enter upon stages two and three of the Delors plan for economic and j 
monetary union with a single currency and an independent central bank. This inevitably j 
means the transfer of control of economic policies to the centre, and the end of the | 
sovereignty of national parliaments over interest rates, exchange rates, and budget deficits.
It reduces them to the status of rate-capped county councils with economic power wielded 
from the centre... My view is that the exemptions we have obtained are worth very little. 
The full pressure of the law and the community spirit will be upon us to conform on both 
counts and to conform soon.59
On the other hand, in a speech delivered in Parliament, Geoffrey Howe suggested that it was 
completely absurd to imagine that Britain could maintain its prosperity, influence, and prestige in 
the world if it excluded itself from the single European currency:
On the assumption that the conditions for EMU... are fulfilled, do we help to create an ecu, 
which will probably be the currency of the world’s largest trading block, likely to displace 
the dollar, or do we want to plough a lonely furrow on the outside, losing our practical 
influence in the name of a sovereignty which no longer exists, locked into a conveyor belt 
not of federation, but of economic outer space?60
The battle of rival patriotisms within the Conservative Party therefore continued, with some 
viewing Maastricht as a dangerous step forward in the construction of a federal Europe that 
would reduce the British Parliament to the shameful status of a ‘county council’, while others 
feared the humiliating isolation of a Britain which could end up in ‘economic outer space’ as a 
result of its opt-out from the single currency.
59 The Times, 12 December 1991.
60 The Times, 20 December 1991.
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6.5 Conclusion: Maastricht and the symbolic manipulation of the British pride-shame 
balance
In this chapter, I have attempted to analyze the Maastricht summit as a ‘political spectacle* 
(Edelman 1988) in which both the Major government and the Labour opposition attempted to 
mobilize the national we-feelings of the British people in order to legitimate their respective 
positions on the new European treaty. I have shown how the defense of ‘the national interest* 
became an object of political dispute, and rival discourses were employed to manipulate the 
British pride-shame balance both in favour and against the agreements that were ultimately 
reached. Using the language of Goffman and Bourdieu, one can understand the Maastricht 
summit as a kind of ‘interaction ritual’ on a macro level, in which the maintenance of the 
national ‘face* was at stake in this particular ‘game of international honour*. John Major, as the 
symbolic representative of the nation, was judged according to the success with which he had 
supposedly defended Britain’s interests and upheld the country’s prestige in this reunion. The 
discursive battle which erupted can thus be characterized as a contested symbolization of 
national status -  a symbolic struggle to depict the results of Maastricht as either a triumph or a 
humiliation.
The Prime Minister and his supporters in the media therefore employed a language of victory 
and national pride, proclaiming that the fundamental interests of the British people had been 
protected by eliminating the word ‘federal* from the treaty, and by opting out of the single 
currency and the social chapter of the treaty. In this way, it was proclaimed that Major had 
shown his mettle as a tough negotiator who could not be bossed around by the other member 
states, but was capable of protecting the interests of the British people in the European arena. A 
discursive attempt was also made to legitimate this standpoint from a moral perspective, by 
suggesting that Britain was not a ‘bad European*, but rather that it was trying to slow down the 
misguided federalist idealism of other member states. In fact, Britain was depicted as the only 
country that was not being carried away by emotive, quixotic supranationalism, but instead
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represented the voice of inter-governmental rationality and wisdom. This was depicted as the 
right road not just for Britain, but for Europe as a whole.
In contrast to this, the Labour opposition and its allies in the press employed a language of 
defeat and national shame in their own symbolic depiction of the Maastricht summit, suggesting 
that it would isolate Britain from the European mainstream, and relegate the nation to a ‘second 
division’ or ‘second-class status’. Rather than leading Britain to the heart of Europe, the Prime 
Minister excluded the nation from the two most important projects of the treaty: the single 
currency and the social chapter. In this way, the country’s future economic prosperity was 
imperilled, and the fundamental rights of workers would be ignored, placing Britain in the 
shameful status of Europe’s ‘sweat shop’ for Japanese and American companies. Britain thus 
continued to be the grudging, ‘bad European’, and Major was accused of damaging the country's 
reputation on the world stage, through his negative attitudes to Europe.
At the time of Maastricht, one could therefore conclude that in Britain, there continued to be 
a fundamental ambivalence towards the project of European integration. On the one hand, there 
was clearly a strong consensus on the need to be a part of the European Community in order to 
maintain the nation’s prosperity and influence, illustrated by Major’s promise to put the country 
‘at the heart of Europe’. At the same time, however, the fearful image of a ‘conveyor belt to 
federalism’ which would abolish the pound and severely reduce British Parliament’s powers was 
widely depicted as a shameful, demeaning option which had to be avoided at all costs. The fact 
that the rejection of the ‘f-word’ and the double-opt out from the Maastricht treaty could be 
triumphantly presented as a ‘victory’ in the British public sphere clearly illustrated a continuing 
strong clash between national sentiments and the process of European integration.
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III. Spain:





“Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is 
the means to satisfy it  It was clearly seen from 
the beginning that Spain was the problem 
and Europe the solution. ”
José Ortega y Gasset

7. Attempts to ‘enter Europe’: The humiliating exclusion of a ‘backwards 
nation’ during the Franco dictatorship
When the project of European integration began to take shape in the aftermath of World War II, 
the reins of the Spanish state were in the hands of Francisco Franco, a dictator who had risen to 
power with the support of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The incompatibility between the 
ideals of European unification and the principles defended by the Francoist regime are evident 
when one considers that the Generalísimo originally described his military uprising in 1936 as a 
‘holy crusade' to protect the Catholic ‘essence’ of la patria from what he defined as the 
‘bastardized, frenchified, Europeanizing’ doctrines of modem liberalism (Franco 1975: 116). 
Although Spain remained formally neutral throughout the Second World War, Franco did not 
conceal his moral identification with the kind of ‘European order’ envisioned by Adolf Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini. On the contrary, he enthusiastically demonstrated his support for the Axis 
powers not only by granting them logistical aid, but also through the rhetoric of his speeches, the 
quasi-fascist ceremonial of his regime, and the impassioned discourse of his controlled press.1 It 
seems evident that until the final stages of the World War, Franco was convinced that the 
Spanish nation’s ‘status honour’ would be bolstered through the establishment of a new empire 
in North Africa, after the expected triumph of the Nazis. Through this renewal of imperial 
prestige, he hoped that the national shame of 1898, the year when Spain lost its last overseas 
colonies, would finally be wiped out from the conscience of his countrymen. In this way, España 
would finally recuperate its status as a ‘great nation’, and the concept of being español would 
once again become an emotive source of collective pride on the world stage.
1 My understanding of Franco and Francoism has been guided fundamentally by the excellent historical studies of 
Carr and Fusi (1981), Payne (1987) and Preston (1993). With regard to the relations between the Franco regime and 
Europe, I have primarily relied on the studies of Armero (1978), Preston and Smyth (1984), Pollack and Hunter 
(1987), Pereira Castañares and Moreno Juste (1991a, 1991b), La Porte (1992), Bassols (1995), Moreno Juste 
(1998a), and Franzé (2000).
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However, the victory of the Allies radically changed Franco’s plans of conquest and glory for I
the Spanish patria. Instead, his regime’s evident collaboration with the defeated totalitarian |
powers led to a humiliating period of international ostracism, which included the exclusion of '
Spain from the United Nations, as well as the Marshall Plan for economic recovery. In the kind I
of Europe envisioned by Hitler, Franco’s Spain would presumably have been a respected, i
prestigious partner, but in the Europe that actually followed the Second World War, the country .
soon became a denigrated outsider. Nevertheless, as the tensions of the Cold War began to I
mount, Franco’s fervent anti-communism appealed to the United States, and in 1953 a treaty was |
signed between the Spanish state and the American government. This bilateral agreement |
provided desperately needed funds to Spain, in return for the establishment of American military i
bases on its territory. Following this crucial foreign policy ’success’ (from the Francoist 
perspective), diplomatic relations were re-established with the Western world, and in 1955 Spain 
was finally accepted into the United Nations. ‘The nation’ therefore ceased to be an international |
outcast, at least in part, and in this way the regime received a vital boost of prestige and moral j
legitimacy. i
Franco, however, was much less fortunate with regard to the process of European integration.
In this sphere of the international stage, Spain remained a humiliated outsider throughout his I 
dictatorship. Although the Generalísimo attempted to appease his continental neighbours by 
defining his regime as ‘the sentinel of the West*, and the Spanish state as a noble guardian that 
was committed to protecting ‘Europe’s Christian civilization* fom the onslaught of Moscow’s 
atheistic Communism, Spain was completely excluded from the negotiations which ultimately 
gave rise to the European Economic Community in 1957. Nevertheless, a request to enter the 
Common Market was officially put forward by the Spanish state in 1962, after Franco’s reluctant 
abandonment of ‘virile’, ‘self-sufficient’ Hispanic autarky, and his pragmatic decision to 
implement a new policy of capitalist development and international trade. However, due to the 
authoritarian nature of the Franco regime, and the morally repugnant stigma of its previous 
association with the Nazis and the Facists, Spain’s entry into ‘Europe’ remained an unfulfilled
ia a n n B iin ii i iiM iH w iiim « n n n n f i« — ■!■■■■■ ■■■ ■■ -  -  —
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aspiration until the end of his lifelong rule. Although a commercial trade agreement was signed 
between the Spanish state and the EEC in 1970, the desire to become ‘fully European* could not 
be satisfied as long as the old sidekick of Hitler and Mussolini continued to rule Spain. Hence, as 
the legitimacy of the Francoist dictatorship gradually eroded over the years, ‘Europeanism’ 
became increasingly identified by many of its political opponents with the desire for a genuine 
recuperation of Spain’s dignity on the world stage, through a complete modernization and 
democratization of the country. The aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to illustrate how in the 
case of Spain, a very different sociohistorical process from that which was experienced by the 
people of Britain ultimately led to a widespread symbolic and emotional association of Europa 
with the end of a shameful atraso, or ‘backwardness’, and hence with the recovery of national 
pride and self-respect.
7.1 The confrontation between liberal ‘Europeanizers’ and Catholic ‘traditionalists’ in 
early twentieth century Spain
The symbolic identification of ‘Europe’ with modernity, and hence the resistance to 
‘Europeanization’ by all those who fervently defended the maintenance of Spain’s traditional 
Catholic values, can be traced back to the intellectual and political debates which followed the 
so-called desastre (‘disaster’) of 1898. As mentioned above, this was the year when Spain lost its 
last overseas colonies, Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, in a short war with the United 
States. The tremendous impact of this event on Spain’s national self-esteem must be understood 
in the context of the times. This was ‘an age when the possession of colonies was seen as the 
hallmark of a vigorous nation’, a period when the fashionable ideas of social Darwinism ‘posited 
that in the forward march of civilisation, the weaker powers had to give way to the stronger’ 
(Balfour 1996: 107). This hierarchic prestige-ranking of countries according to their imperial 
power was illustrated by a humiliating speech delivered in 1898 by the British Prime Minister, 
Lord Salibury, in which Spain was described as a ‘dying nation’ (Balfour 1996: 107). Hence, 
after a period in which a mass call-up of over 200,000 soldiers had been justified through the
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invocation of el honor nacional (‘national honour')» and Spaniards had been glorified in the | 
press as a valiant ‘race' of warriors who were innately superior to the ‘plebeian' American j 
people, the total defeat suffered at the hands of the United States was a major blow to Spanish j 
collective pride. |
Spain’s loss of imperial status also provoked an intellectual outpouring of books on the | 
shameful downfall of la patria, the loss of its historic greatness, and hence the disappearance of J 
its prestige in the world. Hence, many of the writers in the so-called ‘Generation of 98' 
attempted to find the underlying roots of Spain’s infirmity, as well as to suggest possible 
remedies. What is interesting in relation to the topic of this dissertation is that throughout this 
period, the ‘Europeanization’ of Spain was already being proposed during as the ideal solution 
for the nation’s shameful backwardness. The most fervent and influential defender of this idea 
was undoubtedly Joaquin Costa (1981 [1900]), an impassioned intellectual who was convinced 
that Spain would only be saved from its deteriorating condition if it fully assimilated ‘Europe’s 
rational mentality’ and purged itself from all ‘African’ influences. What was absolutely 
indispensable, he proclaimed, was the ‘deafricanization and Europeanization of Spain’, and the 
‘remaking of the Spaniard in the European mould’ (cited in Beneyto 1999: 23). ‘Europe’, in 
Costa’s mind, was essentially the land of science, education, technology, and progress. In his I 
view, this was the only medicine that would allow Spain to survive in the fierce global struggle | 
of national ‘races’, where only ‘the fittest’ could possibly survive. Other important figures, such j 
as the renowned Spanish neurologist, Ramón y Cajal, similarly believed that ‘the sickness of ¡ 
Spain is none other than its remoteness from Europe; in other words, from science’ (cited in 
Serrano 1998: 190).
Not all intellectuals, however, agreed with this symbolic invocation of ‘European modernity’ 
as the ideal solution for Spanish decadence, since many saw the adoption of ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ 
ideas as a dangerous threat to the unique traditions, and above all the Catholic spirituality, of the 
‘national soul’. This was also a time when German Romantic theories of nationhood had spread 
to Spain, and began to inspire a number of literary attempts to define the ‘essence’ of the Spanish
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people through idealized depictions of the barren Castillian landscape and the pious stoicism of 
the rural peasantry (Abellán 1988: 37-8). The diplomat and essayist Angel Ganivet (1990 
[1897]), for instance, was repelled by the irreligious, egoistic materialism of ‘European 
modernity’. In his view, ‘European civilization* was characterized by ‘anti-human*, ‘anti­
natural’, and ‘pitiless mercantilism’, while Spain was a morally superior land of Catholic 
spirituality, generosity, and idealism (cited in Beneyto 1999: 83). Hence, according to Ganivet, 
the resurrection of Spain could only come from the inside, by looking for the truth and the 
strength that lay hidden in the depths of the national soul. In his view, Spain should fully resist 
the misleading temptation of European modernity, because with time it would ultimately be 
them, the Europeans, who would ultimately beg us, the Spaniards, to teach them the moral truths 
and the spiritual strengths of what he called la España eterna, virgen y madre, ‘the eternal Spain, 
virgin and mother*.
One can see, therefore, the way in which during this difficult period of collective anxiety and 
uncertainty, ‘Europe’ was seen by some Spanish intellectuals as an ‘inspiring Other’, an ideal 
model which should be imitated to save the nation by modernizing it, while others viewed it as a 
‘threatening Other’, a terrible danger which should be avoided at all costs to preserve the purity 
of the nation’s Catholic soul.2 Indeed, this opposition between European modernization and 
Hispanic traditionalism (europeísmo y casticismo) led to a notorious public confrontation 
between the two most famous and influential philosophers of early twentieth century Spain, 
Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. Both of these thinkers were fully ‘Europeanized’ 
Spaniards, in the sense that they spoke several European languages and were very familiar with 
the intellectual currents of thought on the other side of the Pyrenées. However, while Unamuno 
ultimately developed a rather hostile attitude to the project of ‘Europeanization’, Ortega fully 
embraced it with passionate conviction. As Salvador de Madariaga pointed out, these two
2 The concept of inspiring and threatening Others has been coined by the Greek social psychologist Anna 
Triandafyllidou (2000).
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philosophers most clearly represent the two main patriotic responses which emerged amongst [ 
Spain’s intellectuals after the ‘disaster* of 1898: ‘one saw the salvation of Spain in its own |
substance; the other, in its renovation through the influence and example of Europe* (1989: 94). •
t
Unamuno’s fundamental philosophical concern was what he called el sentimiento trdgico de 
la vida (the tragic sentiment of life). By this he referred to the feeling of anxiety which uniquely 1 
arises in human beings, as a result of their awareness of death. Man, said Unamuno, is un animal 1 
enfermo (a sick animal), because he is the only creature who is conscious of his own mortality i 
(1988 [1912]: 22). This fundamental problem of the human condition was, in his view, the most | 
important issue which philosophy had to address. As a Catholic who had bitten from the fruit of i 
modem scientific reasoning, Unamuno himself was tom throughout his life between the need to 
believe in the immortality of his soul, and the rationalist denial of this longing for eternal life. In • 
fact, it was precisely this inner struggle between scientific reasoning and Catholic faith which I 
provoked his ambivalent stance toward the project of ‘Europeanization*. j
In some of his early writings, Unamuno had originally promoted the idea that the Spanish . 
people could only reawaken if they opened the windows of their patria to the influence of 
‘European winds* (1966 [1895]: 866). Eventually, however, he turned against the project of I 
‘Europeanization’, because he identified this notion with a dogmatic scientific mentality that , 
would completely wipe out the spirituality of the Spanish people, and the vital consolation 1 
offered by their religious belief in eternal life. In a famous essay he wrote against ‘European ( 
modernizers’, Unamuno wrote: .
I ask myself, alone with my conscience: Am I European? Am I modem? And my | 
conscience responds: no; you are not European, that which they call European, you are not j 
modem, that which they call modem... And if I do not feel European or modem, is that , 
because I am Spanish? Are we Spaniards ultimately incapable of yielding to 
Europeanization and modernization?... I must confess that, the more I meditate on it, the 
more I discover the intimate repugnance that my soul feels towards everything that is I 
supposed to represent the guiding principles of the modem European spirit, towards the I 
scientific orthodoxy of today, towards its methods, towards it tendencies.(1983 [1906]: | 
926) I
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Hence, in opposition to the ‘European’ obsession with scientific knowledge, and the widespread 
denigration of Spain’s so-called ‘Africanism’, Unamuno claimed that Spain had a valuable 
religious tradition with African roots, represented by ‘that great ancient African’ Saint 
Augustine. He viewed this legacy as a source of legitimate collective pride, a treasure of spiritual 
wisdom that should never be abandoned, but which Spain should spread throughout the world.
Furthermore, Unamuno proclaimed that the national religion of the Spanish people was 
represented by their great literary hero, Don Quixote, who stood for an undying, utopian faith in 
the immortality of the soul -  in opposition to all rationalistic, scientifically-minded 
‘Europeanizers’. Therefore, he concluded that a full-scale ‘Europeanization’ was simply 
incompatible with the spiritual needs of the quixotic Spanish people. Spain, in his view, was a 
land of mystics with un alma medieval (a medieval soul), and therefore it could never become a 
‘modem’ land of scientists, unless it completely allowed its true national spirit to be conquered 
and swallowed up by the rationalistic European Other. In opposition to those who had turned 
modem technology and machinery into new objects of collective worship, Unamuno proclaimed, 
“jQue inventen ellosV\ “Let them (in other words, the ‘Europeans’) invent!” (1988 [1912]: 289- 
90). Although he acknowledged that some degree of ‘European modernization* was undoubtedly 
a pragmatic necessity, Unamuno insisted that the Spanish people would completely betray their 
own national soul if they gave up their age-old religious spirituality, and above all their faith in 
personal salvation. Hence, even if the ‘Europeanization of Spain’ may admittedly have been 
necessary to some extent, Unamuno proclaimed that the ‘Hispanization of Europe’ was an 
equally important and noble task which Spaniards could proudly undertake. In this way, Spain 
would heroically save ‘modem Europeans* from their obsession with ‘scientific knowledge’, 
which Unamuno referred to as ‘investigations about the nature of life’, by revealing to them the 
fundamental importance of ‘spiritual wisdom’-, which he defined as ‘meditations concerning the 
problem of death’.
In contrast to Unamuno, however, Ortega fully took up Joaquin Costa’s proposals for 
national salvation through ‘European regeneration’. In his view, there were absolutely no doubts
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about what the Spanish raza moribunda (‘dying race’) needed in order to recover a respectable 
position on the world stage (1989 [1911]: 18). Only the adoption of Europe’s 'scientific 
rationality’ could rescue Spain from the calamitous, humiliating condition in which it found 
itself. In opposition to those who continued to idealize the supposed spiritual and cultural virtues 
of the nation, Ortega promoted what he called the el patriotismo del dolor ('the patriotism of 
pain’), which consisted in drawing attention to the miserable backwardness of Spain, in order to 
perceive, by contrast, the marvels of the magnífica posibilidad europea (‘magnificent European 
possibility’) (1989 [1911]: 18). As he put it in a public lecture in Bilbao, delivered in 1910:
Regeneration is inseparable from Europeanization; for this reason, from the moment in 
which the reconstructive emotion was felt -  the anguish, the shame, and the desire -  the 
idea of Europeanization was conceived. Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the 
means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem and 
Europe the solution^ 1983 [1910]: 521)
7i
Spain, in Ortega’s view, was an ‘invertebrate’ nation threatened by internal, egoistic 
particularisms and ignorant, indocile masses (1972 [1921]). It was, in short, a decadent country 
in danger of self-destruction, which could only be saved by the rise of a new, enlightened elite 
with a fully modem or ‘Europeanized’ mentality.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a bitter conflict of rival national ideals erupted during this period 
between Unamuno and Ortega over the controversial issue of ‘Europeanization’. One of its most 
famous episodes involved a heated exchange of insults in a series of letters published in the 
Madrid newspapers ABC and El Imparcial in September 1909. Unamuno initiated this 
intellectual duel by mocking the papanatas (gullible simpletons), who were dazzled by the 
supposed wonders of ‘European modernity’, and proclaimed that a nation which had produced 
the mystic poetry of Saint John of the Cross was preferable to one that had given birth to the cold 
rationalism of René Decartes. In response, Ortega called Unamuno el energúmeno español (the
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hotheaded Spaniard), and responded that in fact, ‘without Descartes, we would be left in the dark 
and see nothing’.3
The contrasting attitudes towards ‘Europeanization’ in the work of these two philosophers 
can be explained by considering their diveregent attitudes towards Catholicism and its promise 
of eternal salvation. Unamuno, as we have seen, was a man deeply tortured by the philosophical 
doubts that had largely eroded his own religious faith in the afterlife, and hence was terrified by 
the possibility that death signified the complete annihilation of the human person. Ortega, 
however, was an agnostic thinker who did not find the finitude of life particularly tragic, since in 
his view, the consciousness of mortality was precisely what made human life an exciting, urgent 
task, a dramatic adventure, a voyage full of risks in which one would should not waste a minute 
and always strive to do one’s best, knowing that time is limited by the inevitable arrival of death 
(1972 [1939]: 132). Indeed from this perspective, the urgent task that Ortega felt it was his 
patriotic duty to push forward as an intellectual was the political, economic, and cultural 
modernization of his country -  a national project which for him was encapsulated by the concept 
of ‘Europeanization’ (Gray 1989).
This impassioned discursive battle between Unamuno and Ortega was not, of course, a 
purely academic debate. On the contrary, these two intellectuals were very well-known public 
figures, and the issues they were debating with regard to the ‘problem of Spain’, and whether or 
not ‘Europe’ was the best solution to recuperate the nation’s honour and dignity in the world, 
were at the heart of the political conflicts of the time. It has been suggested that in fact, the 
debate over the desirability of adapting Spanish institutions to those of the rest of Europe ‘had 
been the stuff of national political controversy ever since the second half of the eighteenth 
century’, when the ideas of the European Enlightenment were alternatively seen by the country’s 
elites as a recipe for civilized progress, or as a dangerous foreign heresy (Preston and Smyth 
1984: 25). One important aspect of this confrontation is that at the time of the Napoleonic
3 The quotations from both letters are cited in Ortega y Gasset (1989: 36-7).
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invasion of Spain in 1807-8, many of the country’s liberal reformists supported the occupation
forces of post-revolutionary France. This apparent betrayal of ‘the nation’ in fact had a clear i
patriotic motivation, since the collaboration of these Spaniards with the French invaders was j
fundamentally based on the belief that a revolutionary modernization of Spain was exactly what J
the country needed in order to make progress. Nevertheless, by siding with the foreign occupiers. I
I
these liberal reformers placed a convenient symbolic weapon in the hands of their conservative | 
opponents, since from then on the project of European modernization could be denigrated as J 
‘alien’ or ‘anti-Spanish’: I
The ‘real’ Spain was defended by reactionaries as an immutable social hierarchy I 
dominated by the traditional triumvirate of crown, church, and aristocracy. Any attempt to | 
challenge the socio-economic status quo could be condemned as the sinister i 
manoueverings of national apostates and foreign agents: ‘Europeanizers’. (Preston and ■ 
Smyth 1984: 26). I
i
I
During the turbulent decades that preceded the ultimate rise to power of General Franco, this |
opposition between ‘European’ modernization and ‘national-Catholic’ traditionalism was in fact *
one of the fundamental cleavages that divided Spanish elites and contributed in a crucial manner |
to the outbreak of the Civil War (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 129). Some historians have I
I
illustrated this point by referring to the concept of the ‘two Spains’: ‘the notion of a contest i 
between the Spain of progress and free thought which looked to Europe and the inward-looking J 
Spain of traditionalist Catholic values’ (Carr 1980: 12). To a great extent, what one eyewitness i 
observer of the Civil War called ‘the Spanish cockpit’ (Borkenau 1974 [1937]) was indeed a j 
clash between two radically opposed projects of ‘national salvation’, in which the contested issue !
i
of religion played a key role (Gifford 1997). Both the right and the left claimed to be i
i
passionately concerned with the health of their patient (the ‘Spanish nation’ or ‘Spanish people’). (
However, while one side believed that the cure was to be found in the preservation of the [
(
nation’s Catholic ‘soul’, and the maintenance of its traditional socio-economic and political j 
structures, the other was convinced that the only possible remedy was ‘European’ secularization j 
and democratization -  or, in the case of its more extreme factions, the success of a Marxist
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revolution.4 General Franco’s triumph in 1939 meant that the symbolic paradigm of ‘national- 
Catholic’ traditionalism had successfully defeated, at least for the time being, the rival patriotic 
project of national salvation though ‘European modernization’.
7.2 Franco’s victory: the defeat of liberal ‘Europeanizers’, the rise of a new imperial 
ambition, and the defence of ‘Europe’s Christian Civilization’
As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, Franco defined his military uprising in 1936 against 
the Second Republic as a struggle of the ‘ideal Spain’ against what he called the ‘bastard, 
frenchified, and Europeanizing Spain of the liberals’ (Franco 1975: 116). From the Francoist 
perspective, the ‘ideal Spain’ was the Spain of the Catholic Kings, of Charles V, and of Philip II, 
the Spain of global prestige whose moral mission was ‘to defend and extend all over the world a 
universal and Catholic idea, a Christian Empire* (Franco 1975: 116). The principles of 
liberalism, which the new regime’s propaganda equated with ‘freemasonry’, as well as their 
application through the political system of democratic parliamentarism, were considered to be 
directly responsible for the national degeneration and shame of 1898, as well as the ‘anarchic 
chaos’ of the Second Republic (Carr and Fusi 1981: 16). Therefore, these ‘alien’ or ‘foreign’ 
concepts had to be permanently eradicated in order to rescue ‘the nation’ from its utterly * 
shameful, humiliating condition. Similarly, all tendencies towards peripheral autonomy and 
separatism had to be eliminated through a complete centralization of power, as well as a firm 
imposition of the Castilian language and culture throughout the Spanish territory. The liberalism 
of ‘Europeanizers’, according to Franco, was nothing but the first dangerous step towards a 
country’s collapse into Communism. Hence, in opposition to what he labelled the ‘inorganic 
democracy’ of other European countries, Franco promoted ‘organic democracy’, a ‘natural 
order’ based on traditional ‘Spanish institutions’ such as the Church, the family, and local 
municipalities.
4 This has been explored in detail by José Âlvarez-Junco (1997).
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After the Francoist forces emerged victorious in the Civil War, the regime's official
i
discourse therefore divided Spanish society into two camps: the vencedores (victors), who | 
represented the ‘true Spain’, and the vencidos (vanquished), who represented ‘anti-Spain’ (Can j 
and Fusi 1981: 18). Franco thus tried to rally support for himself by symbolically identifying his J
leadership with the very survival of ‘the nation’, while his opponents, including those he I
I
classified as liberal ‘Europeanizers’, were morally stigmatized as enemies of la patria. Until the | 
final years of his dictatorship, during which all the media institutions of symbolic power were j 
controlled by the regime, only this exclusive Francoist vision of the ‘Spanish nation’ and its I 
foreign-inspired ‘enemies’ could be officially promoted in the public sphere (thereby alienating J 
all opponents of the regime from the very concept of España). I
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that the discourse of Francoism was wholly ‘anti- j 
European’. In fact, what one can observe is that a particular symbolic representation of the ‘true | 
Europe’ was developed in order to coincide with the Francoist conception of the ‘true Spain’, j 
Essentially, the crusade of Catholic Spain represented by the forces of Francoism was placed | 
within the larger context of a continental struggle for the preservation of ‘Europe’s Christian j 
civilization’, threatened by the ‘evil forces’ of liberalism and communism. The following | 
examples from public speeches delivered by the Generalísimo during the Civil War can serve to j 
illustrate this point: |
I
This is a conflict for the defense o f Europe, and, once again, Spaniards have been entrusted I 
with the glory of carrying at the point of their bayonets the defense of civilization, the I 
maintenance of a Christian culture, the maintenance of a Catholic faith... (Burgos, 1 j 
October 1937, cited in Franco 1975: 49, my italics) I
i
Our struggle represents the salvation of Europe, and within it we aspire to live long days of 
peace, a peace compatible with the honour of our name and the dignity of our history. 
(Zaragoza, 1 April 1938, cited in Franco 1975: 50, my italics)
In such instances, one can see the ways in which Franco symbolically constructed and ritually 
manipulated a particular conception of ‘Europe’ and ‘European civilization’ which corresponded 
with his particular conception of the ‘Spanish nation’. Through this rhetoric, he attempted to 
legitimate his struggle from an ethical standpoint, by relating it to the preservation of moral
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values which were not only those of the ‘true Spain\ but also those of the ‘true Europe’. In 
statements made to foreign journalists, he employed the same discursive tactics:
By fighting against communism, we believe we are doing a service to Europe, since 
communism is a universal danger. (Interview with Journal de Geneve, December 1938, 
cited in Franco 1975: 51, my italics)
Hence, while it is undoubtedly true that Franco mobilized national we-feelings in opposition to 
those ‘bastard liberal Europeanizers’ who had been influenced by ‘anti-Spanish’ ideas, it is clear 
that he also did so by identifying his struggle for ‘Christian Spain’ with the salvation of 
‘European civilization’. The ‘real Spaniards’ could feel legitimately proud, according to Franco, 
for the heroic way in which they had successfully defended ‘Europe’s Christian civilization’ 
from the atheistic immorality of liberals and communists.
For much of the Second World War, it is clear that Franco linked his depiction of the Spanish 
national we-image with the kind of ‘European order’ which was envisioned by Adolf Hitler and 
Benito Mussolini. There were many occasions during the course of this conflict in which 
‘Europe’ was invoked by the Generalísimo as a way of identifying his national project with the 
continental ambitions of the Axis powers. For instance, on 17 July 1941, the fifth anniversary of 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Franco delivered a public address in which he presented 
the World War as an uninterrupted sequence of Axis triumphs, and spoke of:
these moments when the German armies lead the battle for which Europe and Christianity 
have for so many years longed, and in which the blood of our youth is to mingle with that 
of our comrades of the Axis as a living expression of our solidarity.(Cited in Preston 1993: 
441, my italics)
In fact, it seems evident that until the victory of the Allies became increasingly obvious in 1944, 
the Generalísimo attempted to gratify the collective self-love of Spaniards, by presenting himself 
as the leader who would wipe out the shame of 1898 and guide them to a new age of imperial 
splendour in which ‘the nation’ would finally recuperate its lost prestige in the world.
As Pollack and Hunter (1987: 7-9) have pointed out, the Spanish press and educational 
system reflected ‘a notorious pro-Axis bias throughout World War II, and in general, the various
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agencies of socialization were used to instil support for the Axis cause/ The discourse of the 
regime continuously invoked the supposed existence of an international conjura judeo-masónica • 
(conspiracy of Jews and freemasons), in order to justify calls for unidad nacional (national 
unity), and promoted the notion of Hispanidad -  a we-image of Spain as the Madre Patria 1
I
(mother country) of a pan-Iberian movement which included not only Latin America, but also an 1
I
as yet non-existent, reborn Imperio Español which would be built with the generous | 
collaboration of the Axis powers. ^
The best way to illustrate this initial Francoist attempt to rebuild Spanish national pride with 
dreams and fantasies of a new empire is by looking at the public ceremonial of the regime during 
the years in which the eventual triumph of the Axis powers was clearly expected (Preston 1993: 
328-330). The mass rituals which followed Franco’s victory in the Civil War are particularly 
illustrative of the obvious efforts to symbolically identify his regime with the nation’s past 
imperial greatness, and hence with a rebirth of this historic glory. After a series of spectacular 
parades in the major provincial capitals of Andalusia and Valencia which took place from mid- 
April to mid-May of 1939, the Generalísimo received a hero’s welcome in the capital, where the 
main streets had been draped in the red and yellow colours of the Nationalist forces. On May 20, 
a carefully staged ceremony took place at the basilica of Santa Barbara, in which Franco 
presented his ‘sword of victory’ to Cardinal Gomá, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of all 
Spain. Surrounded by the military relics of Spain’s ‘heroic crusades’ against los moros (the 
Moors), Franco was blessed by the Archbishop and offered the following public prayer to the 
Spanish nation:
Lord God, in whose hands is right and all power, lend me thy assistance to lead this people 
to the full glory of Empire, for thy glory and that of the Church. Lord: may all men know 
Jesus, who is Christ the son of the Living God. (Cited in Payne 1987: 208)
This emotionally charged political ritual, therefore, was designed to symbolically link Franco’s 
leadership with the authority and guidance of an omnipotent deity who would supposedly lead la 
patria once again to an honourable position of imperial power and global prestige.
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Franco's attempt to establish a symbolic association between his regime and the heroic 
splendour of the Spanish past is also evident if one considers the colossal monument which the 
Generalísimo commissioned in 1940 as a moral homage to those who had fallen in the name of 
the ‘true Spain’ during the Civil War. This gigantic mausoleum was to be built in order to evoke 
the greatness of Spain’s imperial age, and hence to link the Franco era with that of the Catholic 
Kings, Charles V, and Philip II. As Franco himself put it when he publically announced the 
creation of this national totem:
The dimension of our Crusade, the heroic sacrifices involved in the victory and the far- 
reaching significance which this epic has had for the future of Spain cannot be 
commemorated by the simple monuments by which the outstanding events of our history 
and the glorious deeds of Spain’s sons are normally remembered in towns and villages. 
The stones to be erected must have the grandeur of the monuments of old, which defy time 
and forgetfulness... (Cited in Preston 1993: 351)
A few months later, on July 17 1940, the fourth anniversary celebrations of Franco’s military 
uprising, the nation’s renewed imperial ambitions were once again proclaimed by its leader:
We have shed the blood of our dead to make a nation and to create an empire... We have a 
duty and a mission, the command of Gibraltar, African expansion, and the permanence of a 
policy of unity... (cited in Preston 1993: 370)
This pretension to recover of Spain’s past imperial status was clearly supposed to be achieved 
through a partnership with Hitler and Mussolini. Franco displayed his identification with the 
totalitarian powers and their own particular vision of Europe through the slogans, insignias, and 
rituals adopted during this period by his regime: the raised-arm Fascist salute, the blue shirt, the 
red and black flag, the slogans Arriba España (‘Upward Spain’) and Una Patria, Un Estado, Un 
Caudillo, evidently an imitation of Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer (Payne 1987: 171-2).
Spain, however, never formally entered the World War on the side of the Axis powers, and 
only provided them with logistical support (Halstead 1980: 62). This was mainly due to the fact 
that the country was in no condition to take part in another conflict after its own Civil War. 
Nevertheless, Franco was clearly eager to derive territorial benefits from the expected Axis 
triumph, and for this reason he contemplated entering the war in its final stages. Ultimately,
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however, he was disappointed by the fact that Hitler made only vague promises to him about the i 
amount of imperial booty he would receive after the war (Preston 1993: 398-400). In any case, ¡ 
what seems clear is that until the defeat of the Axis became increasingly evident in 1944 -  the j 
year when Franco made the symbolically significant gesture of removing the photographs of j 
Hitler and Mussolini which until then had been prominently displayed on his desk (Pollack and ! 
Hunter 1987: 13) the propaganda of his regime attempted to boost the collective self-love of | 
Spaniards through promises of imperial glory and the rebirth of national prestige within a new j 
‘European order’, which would be guided by the totalitarian triumvirate of Germany, Italy, and | 
Spain. The victory of the Allies, however, radically altered Franco's plans of renewed power and j 
grandeur for ‘the nation’. Instead, Spain soon found itself completely isolated and excluded from | 
the new post-war international order. J
7.3 Spain’s international isolation and the birth of the Franco regime’s ‘European j 
vocation’ during the post-war era |
j
During the initial years that followed the end of the World War, the Franco regime was |
punished, both in a material and a symbolic sense, for its evident collaboration with the defeated J
Axis powers. Instead of the mythical ‘path to empire’ which the Generalísimo had promised ‘the |
nation’, the Spanish regime quickly became an outcast in the new Europe. At the founding J
conference of the United Nations in June 1945, Spain was not allowed to become a member I
because of its association and identification with the totalitarian powers. This was ratified at |
Potsdam in August 1945 and again in March 1946, when a Tripartite Declaration of the US, j
Britain, and France announced that: !
I
as long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot [ 
anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by • 
common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the I 
present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned. I 
(Cited in Preston 1993: 554) !
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In April 1948, Spain was also excluded from the Marshall Plan and its Organization for 
Economic Cooperation in Europe, for the very same reasons (Bassols 1995: 14).
During this period of total international ostracism, it is interesting to observe the way in 
which Franco struggled to preserve his regime’s legitimacy by mobilising national we-feelings 
of collective indignation in mass rituals, as well as through his symbolic monopoly of all media 
institutions. He repeatedly declared that the hostility of other countries was a conspiracy of the 
fatherland’s foreign enemies, inspired above all by the most dangerous demons in the Francoist 
imagination: ‘freemasons’ and ‘reds*. It was even suggested that in fact, all of this was really due 
to the pitiful envy of those who could not bear Spain’s glorious rebirth in the world after the 
triumphant victory of his forces in the Civil War (Preston 1993: 535). Resisting international 
opposition to the regime was thus presented as a matter of national dignity, honour, and survival. 
As Armero (1978: 68) puts it:
(Franco) did everything he could to maintain his power, and he successfully stirred up the 
enthusiasm and patriotism of Spaniards in order to do so... Francoist propaganda 
constructed, for many years, the theory that the world despised us, that it persecuted us, 
and that it wanted to interfere in our sovereign decisions.
In December 1946, when the possibility of implementing sanctions against Spain was being 
discussed in the United Nations, the regime organised a series of massive ‘patriotic 
demonstrations of national irritation’, which culminated in a huge rally in the Plaza de Oriente 
of Madrid, where about 700,OCX) people assembled to hear their Generalísimo, chanting slogans 
against the Russians, the French, and foreigners in general. Franco, constantly interrupted by the 
defeaning applause of his supporters, denounced ‘those abroad who speculate with your loyalty 
and our domestic peace’ and suggested that ‘the proof of Spain’s resurgence is the fact that the 
rest of the world is dangling from out feet’ (cited in Preston 1993: 561). Four days later, in 
another public ceremony held in Zaragoza to commemorate the heroic resistance of Spanish 
patriots against the Napoleonic invasion, Franco affirmed the superiority of his political 
principles and claimed that, from both a moral and a social perspective, Spain was ‘ten years 
ahead of other nations’ (cited in Preston 1993: 562).
189
The point is that during these years of harsh international hostility, Franco constantly 
manipulated Spanish national we-feelings against ‘foreign enemies' in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of his rule, and it cannot be denied that to a considerable extent, he succeeded. 
According to Payne (1987: 357), ‘there is little doubt that much of moderate Spanish opinion 
rallied to the regime during its period of ostracism.* At the same time, this same rhetoric of 
national strength, sovereignty, and unity in the face of foreign hostility was also invoked to 
legitimate the regime's disastrous economic programme of national autarky. During these initial 
post-war years, a policy of centralised economic control, import substitution and economic 
protectionism through high tariff walls, was also presented as a heroic defence of national 
independence and autonomous patriotic regeneration, in the face of a hostile, envious external 
world. The ‘Spanish nation’, it was claimed, was ‘manly’ enough to make itself powerful and 
prosperous, without having to resort to foreigners and make itself dependent on anyone. 
According to Richards (1996: 149), ‘autarky, the state's strategy of economic self-sufficiency, 
can be explained by the particular conception of the nation which the regime sought to foster’ -  
in other words, a nation that could stand proudly on its own and become una, grande y libre 
(‘one, great, and free*) in isolation. However, by the early 1950*s, the undeniable truth was that 
autarky had in fact led the Spanish patria to total economic despair: ‘There simply were not 
enough raw materials, goods, and services produced within the country to maintain even a Third 
World level of existence’ (Arango 1995: 18). It was in this drastic situation of widespread 
penury and hunger that the United States provided Franco with a new vital source of money, 
national prestige, and moral legitimation, by making Spain an honourable partner in the Western 
world’s Cold War crusade against the the ‘threatening Other’ of Soviet Communism.
In September 1953, the American government and the Franco regime signed an agreement 
by which Spain would receive over one billion dollars of aid over a period of eight years, in 
return for allowing the establishment of US military bases on its territory. Two years later, Spain 
was admitted into the United Nations, and hence the days of total international ostracism came to 
an end. Franco’s moral authority and his claim to be ‘the nation’s* saviour thus received a crucial
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boost after the economic deal was struck with the Americans. This was typically proclaimed 
through a series of mass public ceremonies, while the official Francoist press claimed that the 
rest of the world was ‘speechless with admiration' (cited in Preston 1993: 625). All of this 
culminated in the ritual apotheosis of President Eisenhower's visit to Spain in December 1959, 
which included spectacular parades and warm public embraces with Franco (Preston 1993: 680- 
1, Payne 1987 458-9). The objective was evidently to depict the Generalísimo as the leader who 
had led Spain to an alliance with the world's greatest power, in order to cooperate in its noble 
moral mission against the ‘cancer' of Marxism. As I noted in my introduction to this chapter, it 
was this reincorporation of Spain into the ‘Western family' which gradually led to the regime’s 
definitive abandonment of autarky, and to the pragmatic adoption of a new programme of 
capitalist development and international trade.
After the agreement with the United States was signed, the Generalísimo began to 
marginalise the falangist wing of his ruling coalition, and increasingly placed economic affairs in 
the hands of a group of young technocrats, most of whom belonged to a lay Catholic 
organization known as the Opus Dei (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 133). After a government 
reshuffle in 1957, three members of Opus Dei -  Alberto Ullastres, Mariano Navarro Rubio, and 
Laureano López Rodó -  held key positions in economic affairs as Ministers of Commerce, 
Hacienda (taxation and budget), and Planning. Most of these men had been trained in the leading 
business schools of the USA, France, and Great Britain, and they all believed that Spain had to 
be modernized through the liberalization of the Spanish economy and its integration into the 
international market system. As Arango (1995: 71) has put it, the Opus Dei technocrats ‘shared 
philosophical convictions that reconciled modem capitalism with Catholicism.' In particular, 
they felt that entry into the European Economic Community was a vital necessity for Spanish 
interests, and hence it was within this new context that the regime’s so-called ‘European 
vocation’ was bom. General Franco, the defender of ‘autarkic national independence' and the 
opponent of ‘Europeanizing liberals', was about to make some pragmatic concessions to ideas 
which had previously been classified as ‘anti-Spanish'.
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It is crucial to stress, however, that the economic liberalization supported by the new ruling ' 
elite of technocrats was in no way supposed to imply any type of reform in the political sphere. J 
Initially, Franco was in fact quite reluctant about abandoning autarky and accepting the [ 
economic policies of his new ministers, since he feared that foreign investment and international | 
commerce could easily open the door to dangerous ‘alien’ influences from abroad. According to I
ii
Payne (1987: 470), the finance minister Rubio appealed to Franco’s sense of patriotism and | 
national pride in order to convince him of the need for economic change. After going through a j 
vast number of technical arguments and data, Rubio insisted that no other alternative existed in | 
order to save Spain from poverty and his government from bankruptcy. Franco thus eventually | 
agreed to allow this new economic phase in the evolution of his regime, as long as it did not 
imply any fundamental political changes.
The implementation of this technocratic development plan soon proved to be an enormous i
!
success from the economic perspective, with Spain accomplishing growth rates during the 
1960’s exceeded only by Japan (Carr and Fusi 1981: 49). This material prosperity provided the 
regime’s ideologues and propagandists with a new discourse of legitimation which now invoked 
the increasing living standards and consumer comforts of ‘the nation’. Within the framework of 
this new economic policy of liberalization and internationalization, Spain joined the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development between 1958 and 1959. However, in 
relation to the EEC, Franco was particularly worried about the possibility that an approximation 
towards the Common Market could be used by his opponents as an ideal opportunity to put 
international pressure on his regime and force him to implement political reforms. According to 
Preston (1993: 700), he regarded the EEC as *a fief of freemasons, liberals, and Christian- 
Democrats.’ In fact, until the early 1960’s Franco and his supporters had publically attacked 
‘Europeanism* (Payne 1987: 528), which in their minds clearly continued to have a symbolic 
association with the dangers of modem liberalism. One book written by a regime propagandist 
stated that ‘European integration is a work of anti-Spain to favour the masonic and capitalist
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I
i powers' (cited in Alvarez de Miranda 1985: 24). Another article published in the regime-
¡ controlled Journal o f Political Studies claimed that ‘the criteria of selection for European
i
, organizations is a consequence of a Marxist conspiracy which, to dominate Europe more
| effectively, aims to exclude Catholic parties’ (cited in Alvarez de Miranda 1985: 24). In the
I discourse of Francoism, as I have already suggested, the only concept of ‘Europe’ which so far
I
I had been officially acceptable was the idea of a community of Christian values which the regime
j  had always defended, by protecting it from the twin threats of liberalism and communism. As
| Franco put it in his ritualized ‘New Year’s Message the Nation’ of 1958: ‘If some day Europe
j  manages to recover its integrity, its soul, and its mission, it shall owe this first of all to the
[ Spanish crusade’ (Franco 1975:782).
j  Nevertheless, Franco’s new team of technocratic ministers was completely convinced that
I Spain’s incorporation into the European Common Market was a vital component of their scheme
j  for the country’s economic development. Hence, Franco ultimately authorized the Spanish
| foreign minister, Fernando Maria Castiella, to officially request entry into the EEC (Payne 1987:
I 529). He did so ‘with the greatest reluctance* (Preston 1993: 700), but it seems clear that he did
Í
I not really have much of a choice, considering the fact that his team of technocrats warned him
J that otherwise the consequences for the Spanish economy would be dire. Nevertheless, Franco
I had already made it clear that the regime’s approximation to ‘Europe’ would be limited to
J economics, and that this would in no way alter the political principles of his regime. What arose,
f  therefore, was the propagation of a new discourse on ‘Europe’: a ‘European vocation’ which
i
. focused exclusively on the economic interests of ‘the nation’ with regard to the ‘Common
' Market’. In a public address delivered in Burgos on 1 October 1961, which commemmorated the
i twenty-fifth anniversary of Franco’s proclamation as Head of State, the Generalísimo defined the
[
I extent of his ‘Europeanisin’ as follows:
[
1 The transcendental fact of the movements towards European economic integration are
' being taken into account for our development... Spain must progress at the same rhythm as
, Europe, it must adapt itself to the economic and social programmes of the world, but it
must also conserve, without intrusions or conditions, its political stability and its national 
independence. For this reason, any possibility of integration has to be analyzed taking into 




and always respecting the continuity of the political institutions to which Spain owes its 
current living standards, its growing reputation abroad, and its firm international position. 
(Cited in La Porte 1992: 292)
Hence, Franco showed his support for the project of European integration and Spain’s 
incorporation into the Common Market as long as ‘the nation* did not suffer any sort of I
r
economic harm. At the same time, since in his discourse the ‘good of the nation* was presented |
i
as totally inseparable from his own leadership and the supposedly incomparable guidance of his |
regime, ‘joining Europe* was acceptable only as long as it did not imply any political changes in I
i
Spain. As the quotation cited above suggests, according to Franco ‘the nation* owed to his | 
regime’s political institutions ‘its current living standards, its growing reputation abroad, and its
!
firm international position.’ Hence, from this official perspective, the Common Market was vital
i
to ‘the national interest’, but it would be absurd to suggest any political reforms in order to ‘join ¡
I
Europe*, since it was the Franco regime which had successfully boosted the collective influence, 
prosperity and prestige of ‘the nation’ in the first place. 1
I




On 9 February 1962, the Spanish state officially requested the possibility of associating itself | 
with the European Economic Community. A letter written by the Spanish Foreign Minister, 
Femando María Castiella, was presented to Maurice Couve de Murville, at that time president of 
the Council of Ministers of the EEC. It stated that
Spain’s European vocation, repeatedly confirmed throughout its history, has once again 
found an occasion to manifest itself at this moment when the path towards integration is 
transforming into reality the ideal of European solidarity. (Cited in La Porte 1992: 326-7)
The Spanish state requested ‘an association, susceptible to the possibility of eventually reaching 
a full integration’ into the EEC. Hence, the Franco regime publically presented the aim of 
‘entering Europe’ as an important aspiration for ‘the nation’, which in this way could continue
i
on its current path of economic growth and prosperity. In this official discourse, ‘Europe’ 
therefore stood for a crucial objective which would benefit the economic interests of ‘the nation*, 
and in this sense it became an important national goal which was fully sanctioned and supported 
by the Francoist propaganda. The regime clearly hoped that acceptance into the EEC club would 
add further moral legitimacy to it, after the boost that had already been provided by the 
American agreement and the entry into the United Nations.
The best way to illustrate this is by looking at the legitimating discourse with which the main 
national newspapers presented Spain’s request to ‘enter Europe*. Considering the fact that the 
press was controlled by strict official censorship until the final years of the dictatorship, one can 
thereby consider the ways in which the Franco regime attempted to promote its ‘Europeanism’ 
amongst the Spanish people through the symbolic channels of the media. It is first of all 
noteworthy that on the two days that followed the presentation of the request, the main 
newspapers gave prominent first-page treatment to this event. Dailies such as the falangist 
Arriba, the conservative-monarchist ABC, and the church-controlled Ya all presented the 
regime’s decision as a crucial decision for Spain’s future, a vital move for the country’s 
economic development and its further incorporation into the ‘Western family’. This was 
therefore a time in which ‘Europe’ and its ‘Common Market* became basic ingredients in the 
regime’s attempt to legitimate itself through a new symbolic framework which stressed Spain’s 
successful economic growth and improved international standing.
Arriba, for instance, entitled its main front-page story on 10 February ‘SPAIN REQUESTS 
ITS ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMON MARKET’ [reproduced on the following page], 
and published the entire text of the Spanish Foreign Minister's letter to the EEC’s Council of 
Ministers. In another article, entitled ‘FAVOURABLE RECEPTION IN EUROPE’, this 
newspaper’s Brussels correspondent called the event a ‘transcendental milestone for the future of 
Spain’ and noted the ‘satisfaction’ with which the letter had been received in the main EEC 
headquarters. He also referred to the enormously cordial way in which all the ‘serious’ Belgian 
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applauding the economic reforms which were bringing the country up to the levels enjoyed by 
the rest of Europe. This favourable response was supported by a report from the Bonn 
correspondent, who claimed that in Germany ‘the presence of Spain [in the EEC] had been 
missed.’ On the following day, this sense of international cordiality and favourable receptiveness 
to Spain’s new ‘European vocation’ continued on the front page of Arriba, which in massive 
print quoted a statemente from the French newspaper L ’Aurore: ‘THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
SPAIN IS VALUABLE’. A sub-title further quoted this newspaper as saying ‘Spain looks to the 
future with confidence and claims the position which rightfully belongs to it’, and another article 
beckoned the reader to read more on page 9 about the ‘EUROPEAN SATISFACTION’ which 
the correspondents from Brussels, Bonn, and Lisbon had witnessed and written about. That day, 
Arriba also included an explanatory text which described the history and nature of the EEC as an 
organization with ‘an economic potential which places it in the top position of the world, 
followed by the United States and the USSR.’ The newspaper’s writers further insisted in yet 
another article that the Spanish request was receiving ‘Commentaries of praise in the world’s 
press’. The objective of such discourse was clearly to ignite the Spanish people’s we-feelings of 
national vanity, and thereby to boost the popularity of the Franco regime, through the supposedly 
widespread signs of admiration and deference which Spain was receiving throughout Europe and 
the world.
A very similar discursive tone was evident in the representation of this ‘national event’ in 
other important newspapers. ABC also devoted its front page on February 10 and 11 to Spain’s 
official request to participate in the EEC. The first day’s headline was ‘SPAIN REQUESTS AN 
ASSOCIATION TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY’ [reproduced on the 
following page], which was followed on the next day by the claim that ‘SPAIN HAS TAKEN 
ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP IN ITS INCORPORATION TO THE WESTERN FAMILY’ 
[reproduced on the following page]. As in Arriba, numerous articles stressed the ‘favourable 
reception’ which Spain's intentions had received all over Europe, as well as in the United States, 
and published articles illustrated by figures that showed the ‘triumph of the Common Market’
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from an economic perspective. Other news headings stressed ideas such as the ‘EUROPEAN 
VOCATION OF SPAIN’, its ‘SPECTACULAR EVOLUTION’ in the economic sphere, and the 
‘HISTORIC DECISION’ which its government had taken. ABC also cited the full text of a 
statement given by the Minister of Commerce, Alberto Ullastres, to the main Spanish national 
radio station, in which the decision was described as ‘one more landmark in Spain’s trajectory of 
European and international integration.’
The very same discourse of national excitement was also visible in the coverage of Ya, which 
entitled its 10 February front-page headline ‘EXCELLENT RECEPTION TO THE POSSIBLE 
ASSOCIATION OF SPAIN TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET’. This newspaper 
cited numerous Spanish bankers and businessmen who stressed the enormous economic benefits 
which entry into the EEC would bring to Spain, and reiterated the cordial attitude of the 
European and American press. In an emotionally charged editorial entitled ‘Towards the 
Common Market’, Ya stated:
Not only history but also today’s reality illustrate to a great degree the European vocation 
of Spain. And, indeed, we can assure that, following the political imperatives of its own 
national policy, the Spanish state will be an ideal and vigorous collaborator in the great 
task of building a powerful Europe which will be capable of resisting the Soviet threat and 
emerge as a model of cohesion and economic and cultural splendour for the world.
On February 15, another editorial stressed the ‘great opportunity* for the nation’s economy which 
an association with the EEC represented, and assured that thanks to the regime’s decision to 
request the opening of negotiations with Brussels, ‘Spain has not failed to catch the bus.’
One can clearly sense, therefore, the sort of ‘emotional climate’ (Barbalet 1998) which was 
created by the Francoist media’s symbolic depiction of the official request to ‘enter Europe’ and 
of Spain’s new ‘European vocation.’ The Common Market was presented as a crucial national 
aspiration, a vital step forward in the consolidation of the country’s economic growth, and hence 
the resurgence of its international prestige. The days of imperial fantasy and heroic resistance in 
the face of external hostility were over. Following the agreement with the United States and the 
adoption of the technocratic programme for economic development, a new national we-image
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was developed by the Franco’s propagandists* which above all stressed the rise of livins !
f
standards and Spain’s proud reincorporation into the ‘Western family’. As Pereira Castañares | 
and Moreno Juste (1991a: 139) have put it, the regime elaborated ‘new legitimating myths to ■ 
replace the old postwar version’ of the national we-image, based on the idea of ‘efficacy’ and the . 
possibility of participating in the world’s most powerful and prestigious economic bloc. The new 1 
source of collective pride was to be the rise of Spain to ‘European’ levels of growth, comfort, ( 
and status. It is undoubtedly noteworthy, however, that the controlled press of the regime made j 
absolutely no references to the political gulf which separated the Spanish dictatorship from the | 
other member states of the EEC, and selectively concentrated only on the ‘favourable’ and J 
‘cordial’ responses which the request had elicited in some conservative European newspapers. | 
The situation depicted was one in which ‘the nation’, under the incomparable guidance of its J 
Generalísimo, was firmly on course to enter a ‘Europe’ which welcomed it with open arms. As ( 
La Porte (1992: 334) puts it, ‘the future was seen with great optimism... The issue was treated j 
from the purely economic perspective, avoiding all references to the political principles which ( 
had inspired the [EEC] organization.’ j
The Franco regime, however, would soon discover that ‘joining Europe’ would not be as | 
easy as receiving the warm embrace of Uncle Sam. Only a few days before the Spanish request J 
had been officially put forward, on 25 January 1962, the European Parliament approved a report | 
on the political conditions required for adhesion into the EEC, written by the German socialist J 
Willi Birkelbach, which asserted that ‘democratic forms of government’ were ‘a necessary I
I
condition’ for admission into the EEC. A few weeks later, in a session held on 19 February, [ 
Birkelbach himself proposed a motion against the Spanish request, due to the fact that the Franco J
regime lacked democratic legitimacy, and guaranteed neither basic political freedoms nor the (
I
protection of human rights. In a plenary session of the European Parliament held on 29 March, f 
the socialists once again protested against Spain’s petition, arguing that the adhesion of a j 
dictatorial regime to the EEC would betray the ideals of the Treaty of Rome and seriously ( 
diminish its prestige. As one might have expected, this opposition to the Franco regime’s j
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ambition to enter the EEC without implementing any political reforms was completely silenced 
in the Spanish national press (La Porte 1992: 342-356). The official response of the EEC’s 
Council of Ministers to the Spanish state’s petition was therefore a cold statement on 7 March, 
which simply acknowledged the reception of the letter in which the request had been made 
(Bassols 1995: 38). Although this was a time in which Charles De Gaulle’s concept of a Europe 
des patries favoured the possible acceptance of the Spanish regime, and in fact the French leader 
was attracted to the idea of gaining Franco’s cooperation in the construction of a merely inter­
governmental European alliance which would be independent from the United States (Armero 
1978: 87-88), the authoritarian character of the Spanish regime ultimately made it impossible for 
Spain to be accepted into the EEC.
During this same period, the Franco regime began to face a period of social unrest. A series 
of major strikes in Asturias, León, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa began to undermine its legitimacy, 
and the repressive measures with which the armed forces responded simply served to further 
weaken the Spanish state’s case for an association with the EEC (La Porte 1992: 381). Franco, 
nevertheless, was unwilling to budge on the political front, and continued to fight on with his 
constant invocations of the Spanish nation’s supposed superiority, and the righteousness of its 
moral mission in the Western world. On 27 May 1962, he delievered an emotive speech in 
Madrid in which he insisted:
We are the most important point of Western political resistance; we are the country in 
which, thanks to your efforts, Communism has been defeated for the first time... If we do 
not want to lose this glory, we must resign ourselves to become the target of its attacks. 
Liberalism is one of the principal doors through which Communism penetrates, and they 
will not forgive us for having closed that door and that path... Our apparent lack of 
adjustment with the rest of the world is only temporary. One day soon we will see how 
they all come towards us on the same road which we cleared. (Cited in La Porte 1992: 396)
The Generalísimo thus continued to defend a Spanish we-image whose great emotive source of 
collective pride was its morally worthy goal of leading the rest of the world to ‘see the light’: 
liberalism and communism were the worst possible evils which any country could suffer, and 
hence the Francoist political system was clearly at the vanguard of economic, social, and ethical
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progress. Why, then, should anyone want to change anything, why should anyone want to imitate 
other nations who had not yet converted to this virtuous cause? Nevertheless, in spite of the 
regime’s total monopoly of all the official media institutions of symbolic power, other rival we- 
images of Spain were beginning to develop and spread. In particular, many of those Spaniards 
who opposed Francoism, both within the country and in exile abroad, were increasingly 
beginning to unify under the symbolic banner of ‘Europeanism’ -  a ‘Europeanisin’ which in 
their minds was not limited purely to national economic interests, but which also stood for the 
overthrow of a ‘shameful, anachronistic dictatorship’ and hence for Spain’s recuperation of 
liberty, democracy, and moral self-esteem.
7.5 The Munich affair: ‘Europe* as a unifying symbol for the anti-Francoist opposition
From the moment the process of European integration began to take shape after the World War, 
many opponents of Franco’s authoritarian system immediately saw the development of a 
peaceful unification of the continent as an opportunity to put international pressure on the 
regime, in order to overthrow Franco and accomplish the democratization of Spain. The ‘new 
Europe’ of the victorious Allies was one which aimed to overcome the disastrous consequences 
of totalitarianism and nationalist aggression, through a gradual process of supranational 
integration. Hence, within the symbolic framework of this new project, Franco, the old partner of 
Hitler and Mussolini, was widely regarded as a shameful anachronism, as a frightening reminder 
of the frightening ‘Europe’ that could have been. Within Spain, as I have already noted, 
‘Europeanization’ had in any case already become a symbol of ‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’ 
during the years that followed the 1898 ‘disaster’. After Franco’s triumph in the Civil War, it 
seems evident this symbolic ideal of ‘Europe’ continued to play the same role amongst Spaniards 
who opposed the victorious forces of authoritarian conservatism represented by Francoism, and 
who wished to pursue their own patriotic vision of Spanish nationhood.
In May 1948, Spanish exiles participated in the international conference in The Hague where 
the ideals of a post-war European unification were put forward by Winston Churchill, who
2 0 0
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argued that non-democratic single party systems should be automatically excluded from the ‘new 
united Europe’. During the course of this reunion, the prestigious Spanish politician and 
intellectual Salvador de Madariaga -  who had played a prominent role in the Second Republic, 
as well as in the League of Nations -  delivered an impassioned address in which he envisioned 
the emergence of a future European patriotism that would devote itself above all to the 
preservation of Europe’s cultural treasures:
Above all we must love Europe; our Europe, sonorous with the roaring laughter of 
Rabelais, luminous with the smile of Erasmus, sparkling with the wit of Voltaire; in whose 
mental skies shine the fiery eyes of Dante, the clear eyes of Shakespeare, the serene eyes of 
Goethe, the tormented eyes of Dostoievski; this Europe to whom La Gioconda for ever 
smiles, where Moses and David spring to perennial life from Michelangelo’s marble, and 
Bach’s genius rises spontaneous to be caught in his intellectual geometry; where Hamlet 
seeks in thought the mystery of his inaction, and Faust seeks in action comfort for the void 
of his thought; where Don Juan seeks in women met the woman never found, and Don 
Quixote, spear in hand, gallops to force reality to rise above itself; this Europe where 
Newton and Leibniz measure the infinitesimal, and the Cathedrals, as Musset once wrote, 
pray on their knees in their robes of stone; where rivers, silver threads, link together strings 
of cities, jewels wrought in the crystal of space by the chisel of time... This Europe must be 
bom. And she will, when Spaniards say ‘our Chartres’, Englishmen ‘our Cracow’, Italians 
‘our Copenhagen’; when Germans say ‘our Bruges’, and step back horror-stricken at the 
idea of laying a murderous hand on it. Then Europe will live, for then it will be that the 
Spirit that leads history will have uttered the creative words: FIAT EUROPA! (Madariaga 
1952: 2-3, cited in Puntscher Riekmann 1997: 66)
Following this meeting, Madariaga and other anti-Francoist exiles founded the Federal Spanish 
Council of the European Movement (Tusell 1977: 385). This association, which included 
representatives from many different political tendencies, denounced the repressive nature of the 
Franco dictatorship in international forums. For instance, when in 1957 the possibility of Spain 
being accepted into NATO was discussed, it published the following manifesto:
We, Spanish citizens who have been deprived of the exercise of our citizenship by a 
military dictatorship, wish to warn NATO that the entrance of Franco’s Spain into this 
organization would demolish its moral authority.(Cited in Tusell 1977: 386).
Of course, the existence of such ‘Europeanist’ protest movements abroad was completely 
concealed from the Spanish population by the regime. Nevertheless, in spite of the total 
monopolization of all media institutions, even within Spain the Francoist propaganda could not
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prevent the development of symbolic challenges to its own official visions of ‘the nation’ and of 
‘Spanish patriotism’. In 1954, a society known as the Spanish Association of European 
Cooperation was founded by a group of moderate nonconformists, who timidly began to oppose 
the regime by reference to the democratic principles of ‘Europeanism’. Fernando Alvarez de 
Miranda (1985: 24), one of the men who participated in this movement from its earliest origins, 
writes that during this period, ‘European unification became an inevitable point of reference for 
all of those who supported democratic and liberal values’. The development of this protest 
movement led to the fact that in the language of the regime’s propagandists, the accusation of 
being a ‘Europeanise’ became practically synonymous with that of being a ‘Communist’ (1985: 
25). Hence, not only among exiled democrats, but also within some elite minority groups in 
Spain itself, the possibility of bringing Spain closer to a democratic Europe was seen as a way 
‘to escape the asphyxiating political gag of Francoism’ (1985: 26). As I have shown, the 
regime’s official ‘European vocation’ was limited to the economic benefits of taking part in the 
Common Market, while fervently rejecting the need for adopting the supposedly ‘dangerous’ and 
‘inferior’ political institutions of liberalism. In opposition to this discourse, however, a rival 
‘Europeanism’ arose which openly stood for the rejection of a ‘backwards’ regime and for the 
‘democratization’ of Spain. These rebel ‘Europeanists’ viewed the Franco regime as something 
that Spaniards should be ashamed of and attempt to overcome, in order to recover their collective 
pride through the recuperation of the basic freedoms and rights which had been denied to them.
In 1961, the Spanish Association of European Cooperation attempted to organize a 
‘Europeanist Week’, in association with the International Secretariat of the European Movement, 
presided by Robert Schuman, which was to take place during the month of September in Palma 
de Mallorca. Ultimately, however, the regime’s officials decided to suspend this reunion, fearing 
that it could receive dangerous publicity and harm Franco’s image (Tussell 1977: 394).
Nevertheless, the celebration of the IV Congress of the European movement, which took place in 
Munich from 5 to 8 June 1962, provided an ideal opportunity for moderate anti-Francoist 
opponents from both within the country and in exile abroad to unify under the symbolic banner
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of ‘Europeanism’ against the dictatorship and its official paradigm of Spanish national greatness. 
Monarchists, Christian democrats, repentant falangists, and others from inside Spain met exiled 
socialists, liberals, and Basque and Catalan nationalists in what was to become one of the most 
notable gestures of organized political opposition during the Franco years (Payne 1987: 500-01, 
Preston 1993: 702-3). The meeting took place only four months after the regime had officially 
requested to enter the EEC, and its aim was therefore to promote the idea that only democratic 
reforms would allow Spain to gain full recognition and acceptance by the European Community. 
Salvador de Madariaga, the veteran anti-Francoist opponent from the exiled group, addressed the 
assembled delegates as follows:
Europe is not only a Common Market and the price of coal and steel; it is also and above 
all a common faith and the price of Man and of liberty... Should not Europe consider it 
essential for public life to circulate with full freedom among all its members? And if 
madame de Sevigne could write to her daughter: ‘your stomach hurts me", cannot Europe 
say to Spain: ‘your dictatorship hurts me’? (Cited in Tussell 1977: 395)
José Maria Gil Robles, a Christian democrat leader who had come to the Munich meeting from 
within Spain, declared that, contrary to Franco's claim that the Spanish nation needed 
authoritarian discipline in order to avoid a descent into total anarchy and chaos:
The Spaniards who have come here are convinced that there is no incompatibility between 
the Spanish people and the ideals of democracy. We are convinced that we are capable of 
establishing and maintaining a political system based on the awareness and effective 
guarantee of essential liberties, from the freedom of expression to the freedom of labour 
unions, in accordance with the principle of political self-determination, which may again 
allow the Spanish people to be in control of their own destiny. (Cited in Tussell 1977: 395)
At the end of the reunion, the Spanish participants signed a joint manifesto which asserted that 
adhesion to the European Communities should necessarily compel every member state to 
establish genuinely representative and democratic institutions, to guarantee basic human rights, 
to recognize the distinct ‘cultural personality’ of the different ‘natural communities’ of Spain, to 
permit the free organization of labour unions, as well as their right to strike, and to permit the 
organization of political parties (Bassols 1995: 42).
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Hence, for the first time since the Civil War, Spaniards from across much of the political 
spectrum had joined forces to oppose the Franco dictatorship and demand democratic reforms 
under the common unifying symbol of ‘Europeanism’. Once again, it should be stressed that 
these Spanish ‘Europeanists’ were clearly as motivated by an emotive patriotic sensitivity 
towards ‘the nation’ as Francoists were with their own passionate adherence to Spain’s 
‘Christian mission’ in the world. As Alvarez de Miranda, who participated in the Munich 
meeting, has written: ‘we also insisted in our profound love for the patria... not for one moment 
did I doubt the sincerity of my posture, of its utility for Spain’ (1985: 38). Hence, these were 
men who wanted to recuperate national pride and self-esteem by pushing forward process of 
complete democratization in Spain. Without such a political transformation, in their view the 
desired entry into ‘Europe’ and the achievement of a ‘European* status would never be possible. 
In other words, what is observable here is the continuining confrontation between two rival, 
incompatible, emotionally charged we-images of ‘the nation’ and its role in ‘Europe’: the official 
one represented by the Franco regime and its ‘European/Christian’ crusade against liberalism 
and communism, in opposition to the rebellious one represented by the democratic 
‘Europeanizers’ and their attempt to recover national self-respect through the recovery of 
political liberty.
The regime, however, was perfectly aware of the dangers which this unity of the moderate 
opposition could represent for its survival, and hence it quickly reacted with severe repressive 
measures. Many of the delegates from the interior were arrested or sent into exile for their 
participation in the Munich meeting. One of the articles in the so-called Fuero de los Españoles, 
the regime’s cosmetic charter of rights, was immediately suspended. In this way, the Francoist 
state’s authorities were legally empowered to suspend the rights of residence of some of the 
participants, and to confine them in the remote island of Fuerteventura, in the Canary 
archipelago, as a form of exemplary punishment. Furthermore, the regime organized a massive 
propaganda campaign in the media, which mobilized collective sentiments of national outrage 
against these ‘filthy traitors’, who had ‘betrayed the fatherland’ and jeopardized its vitally
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important attempts to enter the European Economic Community. The discourse which was 
employed in the main national newspapers during the days which followed the Munich reunion 
is worth analysing in some detail, for it is highly charged with constant emotive invocations of la 
patria, and the despicable way in which it had been ‘insulted’, ‘sold out to foreign enemies’, and 
‘stabbed in the back’ by this group of ‘treacherous conspirators’.
On 9 June, Arriba, ABC, and Ya all published a report in their front pages which was 
disseminated by EFE, the state’s official press agency [reproduced on the following page]. It 
defined the Munich reunion as El Contubernio de la Traición (‘The Collusion of Treason’) and 
Una Maniobra Indigna Contra España (‘A Contemptible Stratagem Against Spain’). The men 
who had participated in the event were described as ‘protagonists of the circumstances which led 
Spain to the Civil War’, and their ‘theatrical reconciliation’ was defined as a ‘ridiculous 
conspiracy’ against ‘the nation’. They were accused of wanting to demonstrate that Spain was 
‘essentially anti-European’, and hence that the Common Market ‘should close the door in its 
face’. The report claimed that these ‘filthy conspirators’ had attempted to turn the Munich 
Congress into a ‘platform of attack against Spain’, but that in fact none of their claims had been 
taken seriously by those who were the nation’s ‘genuine friends’ in the European Movement.
For days, the main newspapers’ editorials chided and denigrated the men who had 
participated in the reunion. On 10 June, Arriba entitled its front page editorial *A 
RECONCILIATION OF TRAITORS’ [reproduced on the following page], and raved against the 
‘outdated liberal clichés’ of these ‘demagogues’ and ‘fools’, as well as their despicable defence 
of political parties, which ‘would soon lead the country into chaos.’ Another article denounced 
the way in which these men had ‘turned their backs against the needs of Spain, the anxiety of 
Spain, the propriety of Spain, the solitary and proud Spain.’ ABC also devoted an editorial to the 
Munich affair on 10 June, entitled ‘THE COMEDY OF PROMISCUITY’ [reproduced on the 
following page], in which the reunion was defined as a ‘shamelessly hostile episode against the 
present and future interests of Spain’, while the participants themselves were classified as the 
‘eternal enemies’ of the fatherland, men who were said to ‘represent nothing and no one.’ The
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tu i(!c;i (ir í:i u:::«Liu cviiiiníniaL Ho/s.
i’e e r n »  i-rr icg i.,  j-*- rm n ir  ín  *i: sen»  
iiCf*i*r.is r*i■:v ■'•«::••: ¡i[,■* .v i ¡nunilft poTitico 
¡" te r i i .i r ir u M l,  rr. n n ,  in c  d e  L e ó n
i ‘¡i;'»!. í V f . :«;»■■: i. t ’itv rrlúíl. Aiícii-tuvr. R»- 
l'rrt Sclie-P'ai! v. *C 1».U1 MiíHido CT1
I«1 ¡Mi •
v* en scéue” de uoal
n¡’,i r.iK>'.: reyitrieiiiüvíiin entre tas fncreat
ri! r] (-:. Ili.» y le; <• ícrñ.ilrs rCSuiiü itcS. m  
l i  IVu íu-.iiL i. !¡; i« nuu tiiió  n i  el ap re tón  
■ !■• ¡ir.ii'« ' ■ * R , . ■/ l.hijiii, ya  r r -
.tert»'-*. V  ■ ! -i"u¡¡.!.. U 'ir i. i ; ¡r;t y  l!a -  
¡i..e.¡t-liti: en ín il-c - ! ¡u  q ix - v i  í.'(!pg.'tS'* tir! 
M u v h i iu I i í "  K i ;;'(>;.r.» v  ¡or:t‘.i¡ y
»•■ Ivnuiemrntc a  ia snaeítitd o p n ñ c la  d e  
a.'nciaL'ió!! :ti M vrc.v i.i C.'niuúr.
¡■ 'uü ry lali«aiuvrt»  f.jp;¡ ¡,.tr.t el "g*> l;icr- 
;in“ i lf l  <-ji*1 ni c i’u^.'giúr. a ir.:v«:i  de su *  
ircnrxú ine* cnii el M .tv ín u rd i'i R o ro p co .  
^ñalvatio r «J; '.¡aditrin-.t e i <á e’. icr.o.iie
m ;
K s í r  o * r r r i :
'M is  *i*‘ fJ'H* **•<? L»
4*K iklM KfJttC» ¡lt'; (_•
i\:* A ¡ra '•’u i s t r r m n r  c í
iV\K M í> v i¡n ;c ti!c í T
\ lc
L n  n<fliiiÍ4>1ni:t h.ijRM di* (vu
ív  j i r > i  rÜ' .  í ’l 'H T1 n y.‘* c
ABC, June 10 1962
same discursive hostility was equally visible in the leading article published on the same day by I
I
Ya, entitled ‘WORSE THAN FOOLISHNESS’, which summed up the event as follows: )
I
(...) it is intolerable that Spaniards, for political ends, have begged for an international j 
action which, whether they like it or not, would be directed not only against the regime, but . 
also against the nation, and would be a lever which, by making the system fall apart, would ' 
bring damages, possibly lethal ones, to the country. j
I
After effectively whipping up national we-feelings in this way through the symbolic vehicles I 
of the media, the regime further strengthened its position by organizing a series of mass protests j 
against the Munich ‘traitors’. Thousands of pamphlets and leaflets distributed throughout the j 
country asserted: ‘Munich: the pact of treason. The people denounce the collusion of pseudo- | 
Catholics, pseudo-monarchists, and pseudo-democrats... Khrushchev applauds them all...’ (cited | 
in Tusell: 407). The culmination of these collective protest rituals took place on Saturday, j 
January 16, when the Generalísimo himself addressed the masses in Valencia to voice ‘Spain’s | 
outrage’ against the betrayal of these false ‘Europeanists’. Describing himself as the ‘captain of j 
the ship’, he stated that the reality of ‘our resurgence’ had disconcerted ‘our enemies’ and | 
provoked jealousy and anger all over the world. As a result of Spain’s transformation since the | 
end of the Civil War, the country had become a ‘motive of admiration’, which was denigrated | 
abroad by the ‘natural enemy of political parties’, as well as by the ‘Communist inflitration in 
Europe*. Constantly interrupted by the frenetic applause of his followers, who chanted ‘Those 
from Munich, to the gallows!’, Franco mocked the ‘liberal world which is still fashionable in i 
Europe’, and defended the unquestionable superiority of ‘our revolution.’ In its front page 
headline on the following day, Arriba highlighted a statement in which Franco proclaimed that | 
‘THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF SPAIN CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY A ¡ 
REGIME SUCH AS OURS’ [reproduced on the following page]. At the end of his speech, the * 
Generalísimo proudly concluded that, therefore, ‘in spite of the small clouds that may confront | 
us along our path, the sun has come out for Spain. I
The Francoist press typically inflated its discursive representation of these protests, speaking I 
of ‘the nation’s unanimous adhesion’, and showing pictures of the crowds which surrounded the |
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V a lle  d e  io s  C a íd o s
SE R V IC IO  DIARIO
Siüds: >̂ 9, ¡: j I] ftfrat -  RrsttW » Mtaflfl: ItJQ, !■ , X 
EKCUKSICS D1A CCariETO: ÍJC * -  tLfrtM. M n.
»5 pejem* IDA VUELTA -  CÜ'J ALMUERZO 
INCLUIDO, 120 ÍÉSETAS — Alüfnillcet »uloeirc»
l a r r e a , s . a .
SIAIWN 1>E LOS i ü :r u i , I — ín t lM » !  W B »  » í í l  I « *
í^wim >u roa josa a s t o m u  rn» ig  p k  « ivenA^ow iA so  c e  f i n n *  uv u » ' > o r> * — u i ;k.v  n  v.m j .m i-j  tu .'itm  s s a a - u w  i.> « >i iw*.
“ LA TRANSFORM ACION SOCIAL DE ESPAÑA SOLO 
PUEDE HACERLA UN REGIMEN COMO EL NUESTRO”
FRANCO, CDN IOS 
TRABAJADORES
VALENCIA. í f í f  teifiíer.O. Da 
r& a ifo  4roet*r. S á b ix j  A t a w  
í'ufyo >-* loa t'UuUrée »0»* fc 
la Vittori* 7 vrtnLtcia a Aja Ira* 
c! rvnócnra 4 t l i  C ru tad , Frai» 
eo aljut teni«nd« |»  i«lw-T»eUn 7 
t i  uriti* i r  9« «L'ttt» (¿»nao c; 
P«»irr itta. VjIío^h  ' - ü  i*tr.n«iic
trarulq »nrlL-Tr*nU e» cMV* mu* 
tw n iw  tj | a*iri»m¡M tan m a  
u w n r ’í f t t  u*la*i O? te* « » k *  
eívrot (*a u  « «1 Laudilo.
Ki •  ju v*>'a ;*or i*s ta tu i tic la 
fiuti«ü, í » ¡oí dt*i»eiua tftiuan y  
tit penti cu da a que vj*iiu, en c n ’a 
tvew*ri«rn fl«r liem  v-n  traba- 
;uJores, y»r  ¡M i« lu r ift  *«**(* ̂  
P»m , «1 (ihdri:« 1'ranea couttla
ya «trtfirfcr» rn io iiivna . ca  aia«
mof J< la m »I!i!u ¡, qwc fco »alMa 
rVncutir »a »ambre a la* vaiare* 
ir.át U: |* P*irU
(ice ronlij fti rnoin curanti!* tíí l 
mrjor fvrurti Je Ki«paña.
Su £':<;tueía ?¡ ¿i fe tiri K*utl? 
tu lenito ri líamir¡^ i**t ¿o-narf« 
iíilciiti * ale« (»oías fiar»; irí*¿ifi Jai 
«brw *ifl 4 -o ; i e  ili aTuorciuu, In- 
au£u*i> n^e*a* edifici«! pr crine! v  
3«  7 rari« ;ru£<">i fie i'icirriJis* 
f« dtc:r. rLue ítA qWfMn * tf testi*
S* prrcrucili fie la ft&fnr.dJi Iran** 
fornaci*:) fr’irraJj en Valrnri*, * 
faj* aj numJUn, ecttiii *r»Um> 
rio Irre-'wUbEt Je usa paKttcs fit 
rcaJIficdr:*. Vrirl.tr lis aAo* líe p*t 
bao bseíio pasible el n*;!i(¡r* ee 
■4 r<eoM»trBreián Je KApafia, que 
*!i«f* marcha <on fita* *r£i;io b,j* 
e'a »uev ŝ forma* i¡<* .tufaraelún, 
hada nurtlnf Inalila* de «ilfIqii* 
t * .  aa rtprr'.-neHladc* t«dnia  
pat A»A>tm> *Ka U naturai n o  
jueinn—fi:j» frane* m  la ioaara* 
xack*> tizi mitr* ho\i*tJ**'» ta» 
puf-tilo« «iminan hacía futrn** 
nue*a\ 7 en rilas, ;bcl* Ib rs* 
lerba aJ bl*r. % t* «firstja,
proffes» econiniir*. ■ Jt inali' 
da 7 a Uc t*tiiU*Ci*nitá 
•er i rrrhjcjda, 7, m  csmUia, lo*
*» lm «m icj 4ti;, r ik u  7 m i '  
In ilif«  <rrs ««rpUdn*
M U > n a d i  M  Jnn»ifS[ft reel*
Ib tiXUfiiiM en jMViarMlciwi 7, si 
niM A  tiempo, ilc c iiM d cra  pop 
el rroijo ú* «otc«?»t!tto i^vf t¡ jiuc» 
Wa nlrtwiifl« LtíkJí  4 so  Cimtl* 
1!«, M «le ayer, r s  14 ItiatUw.*** 
Vféeol* fVrrvrv; »4* 
fluirli «na d ls iin iiia  ir ilm sJ s  
¿ o ít íii,  imMAaVe, podría As» 
( ir n  que «na preesdeaten.
U  i*?*oe«iasrí«n 4# la Veles**' 
eíón Nsclona) alt silatfcaiev por ' 
uíU  - y  •**’ *aíii4eíón rru fíca ln  y  
(Ccf«.*ji¡t r» le f ¿finé f  jJ ‘4|%
N a d ie  puede estar más interesado que el obrero en la 
• fortaleza de las estructuras de sus Empresas
CUANDO LA'HUELGA REPRESENTA.PARA LOS PUEBLOS LA RUINA Y LA ESCASEZ, NO PUEDE PERMITIRSE
DE NINGUNA FORMA
Tnu<m(*!ii>t diteorta.del Ctudtllo en  un gr*ndioso «cío de nfírm itión  »ind7c¿!;iii
EN LA  MISMA NAVE
PzsuUcrd tntty pwCC’iOíC rc?í^flr tú ' iTcrfrOf rfetuosfrúrat que tu *  jens<tc¡&:fi  ̂
tiisieris nrítVf«̂  » poütice de francisco nrctded no cfit su¡ititntt oinrrsr f!
Frattct*. ¿Scldatio de irtti&ú csirctte? q|Pp/í* ■ cspeiWtt *ñ p3*A hnce* temblar :s
jico ff/orfiutórfc? So¿r4 tímbes citvunsitin* mena jimiisitixt de Frfí*tc^w Fruteo» 
c/ti¿ he habido txuJfirud do especulaciones Pero bajo U> tuí?*?n Apuren* de te 
A Ft fíne teco r renco 44 te íiate por a** hom- iiceciáit, ríe ln ftíeuittid o t dcredjtif* J<* 
bre df j?rrr;i En una ieyenda tic eotor dt :crca coitjmu no kti coetlo. Ct¡*t Etpaita 
rosa fue no resitte fin ri%utoso 4»t<ríiiii. que aaipa wto ríe *fí»< pdtycríf* puestos 
Fmusite o F renco —o refutónos t¡ciibtrQtt*u en et escatafcrt mtttididi dei lyritiua. qtu 
n:c.'irc CHntqnict incidencia en ia teoría dei enuahrtenti 45 vt4¿tcdam recorrida, husytes» 
provitiiiticiaiisuio— es scticiUattiettrc ia Sin* da por mncíiós m¡U&tes í?c axirenieros. 
i&t\< de un coojuuto de virfjiri« iwnartas recite tttt trato oprobios*} en la wa}’or par, 
qnt í í  poseen di vrrffjrf-rfe «« raro prf* ic de los rttccan'ftnos itifo*tnnt:irost qnft 
vilano. Franca et, cama se dice *húrttA tía ante la prisa y H pereza característicos ríe 
mfu ins de seric\ Los r/reiwijífl# dei exterior nuestro tttinpo* Sp*- los verdaderos crey, 
le iistt sometido a infinided de yriteítas, dores de tas corrientes de opinión. $e íii- 
¿Íó ¡tcbUmaj ya de Citando era acosado 4 fotfir turbar la calma de España, ignorar 
jtoücitaciones por ta máquina rtiUiíOr mdf ‘ sus virtudes, tsíigntastspr odiosamente su 
poderosa de Europa, allá en tos años cu*, ^sistema político y exagerar sut defectos y 
.renta. En el comedio de esta década fue sus inevitables foílút. Se trata, en sume, 
¡uzpado y  condenado por la cantorilia.de de conturbar su ánimo» de mterfcrtr ios 
ios orcjtoicnics vencedores, cerca Jo. ese» relacioneser.irc el pueblo y ti Estallo y At 
duzda y  pttesfo al margen de lo ley ínter, . minar la serenidad de Q.neii rige tos destt» 
nadorusl. A España y a Franco se le nct+ ntf* det pele. / Vano empeño! 
ron ciuqkccs derechos Trámenos elementa. " Somos lot propios españoles tos que
tes ene les hombres nú están eúierizedos ' muchas m es, ante t t  incalificable cspec. 
’4 rtéger. Se. negó a nuestro pcls ct */m » fácula del ataque, deseortos ver e :m Tro*. 
comcrcii4, «¡ derecho ú comprar aumentos - pa-túnense, desmelenado».ardiendo en ira 
y primeros materias pare su fadiisiriet ¿m ^  •' "/ ‘ ‘ icofitin̂ b ¿s U páct» í  >
> iír^ í «: tc:4 Út tn»iiSKncaA(i 
de la aK va  ío tfn x& n  S í^ c a J  
Cr romocJdtl Prftífíieftit *San VI* 
ffíilc rerrr:*. íe  V atún tu ,  c! C*u- 
fililo j itm n c u  el »ijiiienie trwr 
Ceftfier^sí & •» reo:
SVfnríao*« 7 tra bajad otre 400 
me caradiJtt:
!« iosMs*ra*M*i «ffaial 4* vita 
liiaUlncmt SJmlical *Sifl VnmiO 
rnrrtí", dr JF(*nnac4ái\ rreífiip- 
nal, me affeer la «ciiUótk 4e 
rnpnenirn 7 fir poder Hocrrai pAr* 
iidpt*« 4« mi p n ru n im io  *«Uro 
rl futuro «oral «tr mtrrrtr* fatria, 
flm* a* afrria tan «tipoeiwnentc- 
1̂ # e*n»*ote* pon»»* i* !ü ir í i i  
«  ri Orili»*, na podcmiaa 1»»nar*
n«i 4 lo* dktaetov 4r la «M cn líi  
7 4* la balería; o felpe 4e f>rt* 
tt  feria nurmre na rionali* 
dad, ,>iorho anlr* que <nr*i pop* 
b:*o, l>paAa re m  nactnn, 7 mí
!cmpla**< iTurair* ( i i i n r r  en fco 
iw*há frriniM ficrv* 4* rmrotn in* 
frpeatiencii 7  p ^ n t i n m  e n  
Ira srrJa por ti ptend». haala pu* 
la Iftviftian de, itoeirtim* n i  rafia* 
ac^hfi «nnufiMlaA»« m  la 4r««4en* 
t i l ,  El affitto paro armiamo* O 
Tmperno* Fue MWiptt el oainnoj
fl diTtdlmee \rnttimrmcntr', ail
perdi ma a fot mejono afino en <joo 
*1 mttnd» »0 iranafofmfi, eo«t o* 
eitlo 4e «oartanira l«fh ia  in te»  
Unas, fi quelli llapafia qiH ni i  
O non ni a olma n*a fn*t*ba, *M  
(Rpiijé a U  AevoIiKtfin. K*U ria l 
. SCpsüaúfi r» la páeím 4.1 %
Arriba, June 19 1962
I
I
Generalísimo, with headlines such as: ‘ALL OF SPAIN REITERATES ITS ADHESION TO 
THE CAUDILLO’ and ‘THIS IS SPAIN’ [reproduced on the following pages]. Nevertheless, in 
spite of such an absurdly hyperbolic exaggeration, it seems undeniable that to a considerable 
extent, the regime accomplished its fundamental objective: the ‘Europeanism’ of the democrats 
who had raised their voices in the Munich reunion was symbolically and emotionally 
delegitimated, by being stigmatized as an anti-patriotic, anti-Spanish ‘betrayal of the nation’. As 
Tusell (1977: 422) puts it, ‘the arousal of ardent feelings of nationalism... demonstrated the 
support which [the regime] continued to enjoy in broad sectors of the country.’
Hence, in opposition to the silenced discourse of the democrats, the regime continued to 
defend the superiority of its own ‘European vocation’. In another speech delivered in Valencia 
on 18 June, Franco spelled out very clearly the only kind of ‘Europeanism’ which was morally 
acceptable in the symbolic universe promoted by his regime:
In any case, our will towards Europe is firm and sincere; we feel European, but this does 
not mean that we are willing to exchange either our interior health or our internal peace in 
order to please foreigners.(Cited in Franco 1975: 792)
In his 1962 New Year’s Eve address to ‘the nation’, the Generalísimo reiterated the same point 
once again:
In relation to Europe, of which we are a part, our feelings are clear and formally defined. 
As a part [of Europe], we have a definitive European vocation, and as Europeans, we 
defend a consideration of equality which implicates us as long as it respects our 
personality.(Cited in Franco 1975:796) . |
As usual, ‘our personality’, in other words the ‘national personality of Spaniards’, was J 
symbolically equated in this discourse with the political institutions of the regime. Franco. I
I
furthermore, noted in this same speech that what interested Spain was not ‘sharing European | 
egoism’, but instead ‘incorporating a human and social significance to foreign policy, a Christian j 
conscience of justice among peoples...’ (Cited in Franco 1975: 796-7). Hence, at least for the | 
time being, the rival patriotic we-image of the opposition -  the idea that Spain could only regain 
its collective self-esteem in the world and become ‘European’ through democratic reforms -
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IHFCIMACICN KACtQNAt*'. •' ■ ‘ '  .  • 48JUBA.—Juffvtt 1< ¿ t  jvnio d» W 3
TODA ESPAÑA TESTIMONI! SU ADHESION Al CAUDILLO
Eri Uri<U
UPtflM.-IS O o tm je  Pratir/eiai 
ed  «ortoknW U  «ufiad-» d  fo  
U  Cd E»Uti un wl«RrvnA, to  ri 
u  1« eypem uni ftrvteu? • 
ÌnqdebfMUH» ati.eattn, ad corno 
« io« Pf ttc.ptte fendameiiMlti cM 
Kuv:raienta a in et* te repudi» 
cvinttcìtnieme la nusUp *tr i 4 t I d » 
suh&ìoM* *• lo» menugod do Ef» 
pdU «uniti» nck^inaeiiitf «  
¿ftnich.
i l  cnrifl di et« soìrtrttfc» tu* 
Vi Bidu «tidado u  ma icuni» 
p?«R(rit C e ra ia  Pr6+lficid dei 
i.*rvirru*ntc. za 7«*us«ftiis 
4 * GoSora*.tir CMì, S e r ra n e  
¿tattUro, ca «1 «urto de tt 
e* Bvìeyoae PrwLTclal de A«et*- 
¿caca. ta  n^.Vrt de ioti* lai 
m to t is  .« ‘J'rrUia*, y •»?««*> 
m » u  en ?( ds tt H e m a n t id  de 
et Ct*nO »**»(«!*, «a Cauti«« y 
ranllljim i t  CaTto«, àlz» ««* 
KTipuiiM i»r.ft'2ic raduno* cendtse* 
tona* de !« qu* enll«!e6  do «c?^ 
W-te* lainett do Jduoici».
A£«d!d qt>» tea all) r im it i*  end 
rrpfeteoua » nati ni * nadie. et 
no ta a au p?cpi* imbietta y e 
un Viete rceucrCo h: «talco*.
Z i Aicaltt« t i  ta duciad» %t Pro- 
attinte do la 0:p*JtaddA. lo* fr >  
eurjdorvs cn Corte* j  tee Aie*!- 
te i i* *lMnrwi a la aetUud til  
Concio, qya ambito tranamstii * 
•m tetterà»?* al Scemitelo Otno* 
ro* aK Us^iaiiintt 
Por »  p ire , ta Ortaeizectta 
invocai, «a wa t tunttn da. ta 
«unta rtt Xttw&r», a ttu ti» ei g fr  
w  tu rrtiina reputai e tt* ma-
CVtnatittfe» T manrjoa pCÌl'.L Ĵ 
mttftUeoi «n liuNcii por un pò» 
turile trjp» t i  imeasadca t trai« 
i w ,  j  <t» n t^ìo  lue cur* 
udo c» ttiecrama a i» Cau Ctrtl 
d**! «eie del Eatada (dita.)
Ce U y X *
SEVSLLA. *-£; Conscie Pfirfi’1* 
dal dei MpiLmlcaLQ te he munto 
ron nràcttr *Tl«en*icario. A J» 
*c*l(Vn MtìAi-ftoe, dtffnttA de lo* 
miombrw dei rviertdo Genera toj 
Msr..fei 4M V t m e  do Aiventudea.
denti de MqmtftOad** y 
AMXlstionci, Ittamuraa. t i  l t  C f 
¡¡irJurl&n Itoditil, Prea: Scale* y  
tie»iia?io* a* io* Stancato« Pro- 
virt:Uttt f  w* jefs  da diverse* 
tiitvd:** t i  Ja eipjtal.
ai termino de , i  reitAttn'ae Atte 
pù'J.tta un» nciU «sa la que. emre 
(i-rm »taf, ir ètte:
>j U Stiate ta pforlnrial# n t*  
t1 rndi et tiov*  jbla &92te*i6n t i  
;w ìi  io* eE&vites, *!eu;a m  pe> 
ì ; n  en toe jigtirnici Uidinoe;
Frema a o^wnea ‘LnUntca pe» 
lardar ta poa iOc*»U rri«Cn£icacnet 
Ta b eo t i;»  t i  la |uu ic i* * j e ! i i  tt* 
por Fatinft dead« tv  
d» acctire fiondo AiaCìlci- 
lo r j» i a  M taUiiMj m  VA!» 
[*rer<4ii» por unti y odteda por 
iil re*.- »
Frante ■ ifilem  lai&ntea pen 
la pt« poìftie* mflstrsmoi 
jAiCitra. iirmi adhisven'ai jde  del 
K*t*d9 y ti;«  rracfosat d d  ISorP 
m:r/Aio noni ondo ua* vta mi* 
fucAìra Sa Jnooebranttbtt a tos 
dd II de Htìio, C4>* 
dican*! e.’Teratfv* Inibq.da ter l;* 
a la- prletjti prtcltammte 
a ra  i l  X a c w  poìSlico se quiinoi 
ai^rt pretende* resudtti «a u*  
t?jt iTtfbo de t c :  «iottiUt-
r —.e rep^aiiflo por al Etfrcue r
d Psi'Uio tr. ■ mas,
Cn Hvobra
Jt5ii3 I/*A.—En rcuniOn ecttpr» 
<*» por el Cttiacp» I*ravcidai tii 
i-i-ii-.ffrtmtc. ci CoVmaddff Ci«il 
> Jtf« F»ytn<!at, M ra  OttUttt, 
prcr-jr«:* $*n ìjcìì: »  de clevud^o 
p^tiSàtieoe, pentendo t i  
i»vC*c»tt Ita tnaaleiuae dttarf^
SOjN YA INXOMAìLES LOi LLL(i;iA\tAS Y CAaiA* 
RECIBIDAS EN LOS GOBlrRNuS C.YittS LO.nDLNANj O 
Y DbPREOANOO LA RcUMON DE MDM1.11
Sea ya ìneoiicable» loe st.unctt«i<a e< * ¡'»s til y «m
Irquebnntebto t 4.V*l«o s| t i l  ^ri *t lun in n ^ »  «u c i.«  d ui por j««rh>t» 7 ì m -
dedci'de EspjfU. Ha t u  r^trienwi d 'ila  k  reeiLpM ceniipwtar.'tr;« irkcrani»« de le« p«eM<« m  ti 
fu-eròci», de tt.v Contela« ?r«vinci»tt» j  J^n»k* d:l ik V * * i « *  7 flit-iurmte»,
de !■» Hermandad« d« o  Cembiiĵ iLies n  CJulIvo*. r>l*lfc:«* *ìi-  ̂ Fecale t i  Iw K ilc i, ncir <̂ i 
FeineAlti, nillstJM« del l̂«vtAtef*te, SiedleMP* ? ti eívmei f  lo*
dai Su d ttfttb ti icleerineoe t x . * n  raateb.ti« or !•« m J . it » *  i - i n x * * *  t i  te l̂iad a Trinr« j  r<.» 
putu do U arsatà» de Htiutfc,
Hi pepslar ci Un* de «¿neU**’1** pc*c » *cic<a pne c u  ri'r^ìi «r;i>i-4 titee«  ««*!.■ rV ip«pc»r- 
ioneia 0 m  enn*itirtn de ielceca r* 4¡v«:t»f'«n. <« Si pL*ìi »■* i* p-tm:* t i  ramo tt mg* p w  t i  
Eqifa h» ittatìteidi ante 1» r?en*v#i d« Vuw;)i t *tucn<« ■ ella tat.»wm w
Uatis «a bSuotth per eiemeMa» 
•SCctpitett».
wTê et-ìp* Di«: to­
nane* la  ta  CLTenes nten 10» dtt» 
‘Jsc» de k  rovi»; tenerne* ti en 
ix fltii C*ud::io y itnemoi »« co 
la «ennttnieetttv y en el adettn- 
io de ;* tacita y no permiitreif^a 
j tx u  que punirà %'irrpflt. con* 
teyuidi ■  trueqitt t i Slr.ua u- 
ciiacitB, de unu* viti* y  inni«̂
* martire*,, ptida »costi arri^sv 
d» per quinte» fti I» «Ida «xp»* 
atroci cvac* un »pie« para n*  ̂
.‘orti ja» cttatioti de aa&ttr* p*. 
i t t i »  ^
Oetputi te  tic ptitbru ti? 
boinidor. d  CBAMjo aeord» p-f 
actimtcoA bacar iow tr «a t :  .\ 
xu ni» ferrante y. ini idpejsrn 
tt tit i  dal f ix u tt avi timo pi*. 
Ptlesttr sa atta n f 'is tj  «pv;*» 
por tta iftcw ltibo  rraniobr** 
y «I daprecio absdWlo a &coano 
pueatD d* tiUem co la reumon t i  
Mvnlett.
£n al Cebienw G*it t t  ste&ri 
trii^ ipui n  tal lenito di Cor* 
pancione«, coltoti* y 
Loatu de to protlncli, u t &x t a  
ta  fliiKhot pajtleutarct, (Gira.)
Cn Tarra^on*
TAftlUCOlfA. — eccitata recv- 
bjarxttce en el Colti mo Cirll cren 
ctrLtlsd te ùtìtxreiwm t i  Anm- 
tanieoro* f  Cv^ d̂ h Ueata d̂  
;* previneii, w lu  e ti 1« rx»r> 
ecm su tUTrrtttn y et Osseo de qufi 
te, fiero a Su Eaecttmtt et Jti»- 
dei £»talo h  foquetewabfe vo» 
luntad t i  la prtiinfsa de pams- 
n an s  Ce) a U» datene* de! Coi* 
dillo Franti ante tt manlohm de
Msnic* y del eittfrìreunientt t i  
ha mjtct eanractm ««Vf tt* ti=- 
«19̂ )0 polltlee* yje aiti (u«:eftn
hijtr I» pttad» «fetta*. Por n  
parta. I» Cu* CZ«n de Su Eicatt.v 
et» et Jrfe d«l Etivtt ha euraadt 
aendti tettsrami* a: Cobemador 
GvH. J tta in i Pr-trlnettl dei t:ov‘> 
mie»:» f  GiputaeidP. asridesten­
t i ,  cn flornbti del Caudino, ¿a» 
martiri»» do tt*:i*d f  (errar p^ 
trvdito dtmoalrultt p̂ r tt ?:> 
tlot! a t>rfasnnm«i " «nrt OMSSftt 
ti!  l'UtittflOilltl tiio ectthrido 
«1 ei t/bftù de Cttr»ii:at iCilm ?
En C»»telt6n
WSTfiLtQPf WS :.* l't-AWA.« 
Cuc^ttmcrii c*tt cl^vt 0» 
mpeuafto t i  tu ‘  + --
n t X n  mir la« tuaran til EJdrSia 
KaciOMl, Con tti noe!« ac ha* 
orc^nai? diterti» ifìci el pr>» 
mem t i  tt» euatta w dbttbtt ay?r 
U rti ea t t  SeUtata Pror^cìe: e t. 
?̂ oviJT!jfitó>, pm ldtti por e) &t> 
txrae&os CirtJ, SWJfÌt Prorl^SiS. 
Attorti y  e tm  janrqitlM, t  ai 
qcc aaiditt »mn aborro de 3Can*
tira i y pdPSco, qua ittrtabid >.*i 
eocoottm •> *016» y tta eatAtt-ta
l ;  Driefftdn Prtisnett* da O^a-. 
fcìzAclooei del Uortascott 7 Ĉ*i- 
tiK o KadeaaC n ta»  prommett
<&àt pxtòai, f  a lza  n  *co t. 
C;«m3ii: e«  or. trr-;so. q»t
ccr «rmorfCii. es Co o k !? 
Pro^jva« Cct srith.-J
una r<Kr»s, «0 ì» esc, d4-»pû> 
CO ;^ a r  direxu Kee:'xn d  
tr.'.crt» ioext j  p»«3<KitL «cn«-̂  
per urttftimi’'jpid reiterai 1 Sa D'
et'^-11 ei j;ì< Cri Liado 1* tt-
hetlAn de >% r<*fin»e »lUlìi-rrr* 
i  «andrn«r Li ritriiobr» 4»  Vj* 
nlch. iSemUi a ci:a P*>? I>i tr> 
Ole sennet e*«mLstt de Etpv^a
En ViBjtioliJ
VAi^ADOf .̂-fii Co-.wid r.-> 
onesti de! hi
» fc» EvffSeiVtt tí Ĵ f« t f l  Fa vie  
cl *:j-.;Ser> taSesrtic«;
-u  Fitto,;« ti Va:^;*. VJ« 
dricndtt Qit b : le» >»:=
Sido* de “jr» :»  ÜüíiniPiift en 
,U» leim t Xittt lucore»
Ìj* iwcĉ VjO. tnnvrita, tfu t u  
«»i. ir mi» u  ;»:i Vi
ti n«l y Ci4 -l!ii 6  tt-
hett^n ;w wOni.viVe a;«nts;-cift- 
po rrp-Tdtt ríen tralcwn fnv>;- 
isiffa F-î iAi cl-rdu
n'xoci y Como «.snv
rt;«, diî uw.iTi a ts:iity;ir ori«- 
/.rrifcj »* Q rti.o
r:s*l:i*/il dcS iionlxJemo.*
E-* Vi lori*
VlTQT.rA.- Zz n-iniin Odi-Vii- 
iik por ri C*'::fc> Pnn:.VJi* d> 1 
*¿jVLfrirnli. j rra rito ;w Cn- 
TStffliio: Co.' *c !«nd «l vw;-
Ite. h © i r  400 ¿«1 U?iÌA:-!C 
ti let »;v.-fv«, enewr u* 
<xvsty.*9 itx T̂i,T4 ti ^  jtSrar.- 
tipì:ir 'uftfvtt 1 Su Sxcckn.:» 
2i*t t i l  In  ¿oc. remili »,
rc*::i'~r*:o £,' y ijr '*
Ft'Se fttieme. a f in e  i:rm>«. tt
:.rr,s emSuAtt «j» Attv* tur* 
en f, prm** y ;« uro dr .» p» 
irti
C; ^r.irrSZr.tc. por fp parv.
tft tt 1**4.-. Í. jjrr »c;.r« trL.„ t 
tiro le-«:*«- * ¿  Ctwr.:^» er. ^  
mir.xo» iirrilvtf. <ULrxi
Fn Pamplona
-  c .  :=ie r,Tr.:0- 
iiaì de? Hi'artfsir o, f
C-i^ejrwk'r CM1-, erinm* itue:,», 
hn, dirlfio el Wm ! ni ro n.*.̂
Omm; 6! f.SiTli'mui, 
ci ilfiKnlr icSisrtiM
PhA.ne.el ¿fi M.v; 
«»miOsit t i  Srnifi ani e ;l.:̂ .-, 
ircrJflbni vittf.i3»-v>:i dir Siisi.-:: 
htet pubi*. * »Viìuio dctpTtCin » 
retmiidoc «pe lytisjnn»« tt r*-“0. 
ri* t i  t a  ccr.-ti^icmarMi Mm iu  
Om . dii'-llcv eo<t tt» euiJOb'*« y 
4g-4tfa <^fn»
Cn Soóao
Til UìAO, — Brindo m tediar 
rvl-iSf^^irl* ri T'Serui «
rCT y de tt*.Jtgysu S4?o tt ps,-t|. 
tirsi» dei Jeit Froruneial, tn*a 
tirar oc in ttotìriu -ìiVtXJCiê .
►e uiTundtoa es ititisoo ‘o? 'n 
te ha II ¿modo ;*tttv:entf 
"sn*.:-6rrn.a 11« liuiw*:“. n« *«iir 
¿itc rc.ttMr tt CiuA.i«e 3« L»p*- 
su 7ia enm ura y torri rou 
MAniti «!t V na* «r^nke ru»
p»itti ;L«l ^c-«niiMe «4petul^*> 
*** of recto 1 a -x ttof tt« 
awirtsd* t i i-ímerr. !{>,(■* 1
En Sin SibaeiÁin
SAX SílbrtíTíATí. — TtauiMe el 
CfMf.'o Proyineii1, Hej iSor.mttd* 
:a en «stón pson r̂ii, icsrrid ok< 
w  % Su Exeticrtea c  Jefe til 
Zu«4e, Gtnff-Jsima >'xnc<i no
$et:n,Tt de iuiiod r adi»e^e »
¡•-i pefTOM* r  I *u oí»ra, y t» mti 
^  iimid» r ^ '  i* pr-r «: o%Tipof> 
i w t o  t i .a* dvi
d-i*ttP«da tpittilo d« tftt-.to, 
:Cír»v
En P ita e  s
rAl¿VCs*-U IhtwtirSeA Pn- 
v¡r/ol M tomado el a rv to  de 
«rciir »a ie:«rr»m« a1 d?
¿ Cot^fniCtn para qu* ŝ cn ¿?e- 
**: » i m r«r-;tAtatt e; tifa til F-V 
l*íí  el tetí.mcntt i*r t i
tt Ca'pr'mel'ín ptteaurj r tt pro- 
twti n li frertie* eantf» tt na» 
m?W  tnUsipabfy'tt tr, ktiinieh. 
iCirra.)
Er Almorí*
A^lCrstA-** lA J-fjírf?* Pro 
*tfr'*i d^ hín'r.nuerAr w hj «- 
jnlda ti Fimo del Copftcjn, prM- 
di'ttf :>«r r; rttOrf^adv fii.li y 
:% lt P-riSnrtti dtt bo
3¿víS», 30r Rtttn-iMti. f>v»r
irfu-c» prpfmi* e^.t r» |a* Uir
ütji que V̂1 ;fn:do le-
•e: en María y ei>x,ierto l»m 
H*s mí htii» l*4 fWtttM
pr,;r.̂ n. &« s*art'.\ u^vettX (** 
srm r »i CivlS'fl l» in ^d ío iti!  
tó.'9 .4» di I'« h l t r »  kSiftati 
i- 'C.ííH
En Zorayoi*
7.*ftW/¡í,V — £m» emnrrou* 
:»« CntporKi«?}«* y mnci>c:nn:.| 
*t í  ft.n.e **rtrte? Mn rl«m- 
t i  1 Se Zttrettncta m ¿*fr -tet L> 
:e:Cf-'*-w 6e Lf̂ avlíitiniabie 
wjr.^-sn y 4« t»**itt* turir» tt 
cífijur* dr MuiiieU a*.*? Ui h,tl> 
r t r  e* t t  er-mlutlt-:;^ írttnií* 
n» t i  tt »-trn «e Ai^vicr*T. tt 
•ír.'irv.'tad Prmin: >5 t i  e i  C*m» 
i-”' 1 P «»i-,.« t i  1*
?x:r¿ t i  í :.T{u ,y -i {.,, i«:L-¡v- 
r a *  r r i i ín n  i* irr:u^*-rfí*M^ j  
;»n..e rflVttin o; c<í IttUii 
r <- err-t»t* yrr «1 ttuvuVtni? 
-!« ¿datieh í.'Vrr* »
Ef Siiinuiue
^ h «<i  r t>  
«itita tii bS:v:*n«r!  ̂ 14 ff.
 ̂ ti*ac*n nrlu
m je»to Peíais», j<;c Tr» 
«i-vt*s mmtmd 4* tTV, ii9  ^  
ea h  q-a« \ 9 ctt
m t ir «  t i w t iu s s ie  
tt, de dt'tiftief t^rttcattrf 
t* y  «00719 m  «>;ft tiiri7««»e» 
«1 acuenti d« toaorur ai X^n* 
man «saatof y pcdit n  «vr.u.> 
«Ma »  ri piati xm o m t poar-
btt- la Co«eio, «va« s-w-jv» d si
«m »em » r te o sto  «a t» cu4>q y
itfttU» m y
repuia» *a;c ta »rruv
don de «iti pupo jc :bctiiw»tt« 
ati'.ta :n» que al pareerr m iti 
Contratta alido Limatiti*, y 
■donstt per ittsnroaid el 1» 
"ti otir»r * tt Cv» Citi: t*  >j 
Kiteimcia ri ¿ef* de*. Z*:*Ut f  
ai SitA t;«o «feci«:«! s a
tlrriiiwr.ls 1« Turata; p:v*.rt a 
cocgrt v*kon > 1. aii^r.y 
tttftTio tt asib^.ti >tai t su*** 
>r»r.*.att!r dei Conte;» ?rometti 
7 de tt r».a^i U T i s r »  a lo 
per»?« «ci Cì j Ê Sj  t 1 Un Pr:-i- 
rpuu rundarteri ttla» 4*: 
a fu ;? f:r, (ur*un c-r 1 *  
cvrerpsrdfne* ’x l^ ir -a i  « . 
medtttamevtt dtipuet 4« * i m ,v 
¿atta tt rrunita (Gfm >
E* Partteedra
W tTJCVEir*/.—So fa  rtunpda 
«I Ctnaeta Provine,»! dei V«»,. 
ntinia m m i» a rk i» ;a  1« 
p^iidFTcli (H GtiL-ft» kp#i f.r-l 
7 Jcfr Pro îreinl ì*  et^rC*, ^4  
unvurmctid, dir .£tr ita i/KErime 
a Su Cxcrldifia et ticr eoi te- 
Udo i**t: meni irto:* 1* m *\ vr> 
nero» y  imi »4 hn!»n tur !» a n i 
Arnie rtytfiM  pti e poa/ure ***• 
IttOpaAu;» quo lLau p»Mdj> *i* ìi 
IWtatrtsMtt tn  »ji
del pntitino 7 dr tt or: 4c tt ko-
li*». rCt(r»,j
Cn Hm h *
ì!VESC.t,-i:. Cta.ecjc “r. T.I.-
Citi dei t t j-. in tt!» , r e u r j * , *  \ 
arito'l IflK pl «Aitar ,n
U!r;:»ira a  ai Ca*a l>|» 4/« >-j 
Dceeimea a  «Vie del 
Itrtoio ,.r»',.v-,i* *; vei«i»N* u 
erte T i r *  p re.tr s p j i «t ip’ ijrf  
COcilattCjr.tO 4c iti ftrypo «e irai, 
«urei » tt rv./n in ttur,ic;i. « «1 
UrUr.ior.ì; il Ca-dilk- z* t ip i ai 
to ni er.»» Un*« .rj.u-:, 
y utiftfl, !tt,& a r j  •lenon» ,rt-
i t e  a im  Prr/*ff*fai 4ri H u r r r t r * .  
t j  Nicla»;, cu/i JeC^rt» »- 
todcr» io» ropr^onefwr* in  JlfrifiT'.«
Mito» a ir.»,vener r;m e t ,  it
t i Jui.p
Orni ieic^mr:». r >,-Ja;io9i. --ri 
p»ftcidcs trnrtser a» i.j*  £ir  
«ad) ni i lr i i lr o  Y c n  i r e  (tiuc* 
t» ikl Mtiimsrtq. ( tu r o
£r Jjfit
JAHM.— CtoffEjfl-j; C ru  7 
-eie P:iw<ia: ti; Mc-timifr«» !»* 
attirato e! « Cu:,-*!« b » r ; i r i  »1 
•eie dq la C«u C.nt t i  ó-i V.«* 
celerai t i J*(r dei £»;vto,
«ftiirt» t  V, £, ‘.fcn iri ;» g p j  
rawv.«nca el W »  oc! T.i  m Ia  :> 
rr-Jcntr;
««Vate qci» ne oonocicrrr l \ e  
ilk* mrtoltru dr S4»*J£̂  w  r\* 
riti rmibLMe «i e»,c C u a 'e m  
Cin7 f  J c lu ttn  »tr F«tt.*,;e t . r *  
k n irn  do cartai. ie>etft-mi« 7 1?» 
»tu» £:r*wi!rs t i Co.*p5rocinrf* 
fiilititiit frprrSeiiiirKTr» y pai* 
lifuttrci Óè loda tt prvurj.i, lev- 
:<BUS;ando « rrrf.t ;ttt-Vi  y 
omivntfA ¡1 d ittw ^n ;k»i 
«¡mie cdfltabcrntt ani:« cjp.-w:tt 
I n t s u t o ,  J tiJ tn -i a tt pa-'i.i, 
S «'.tt irndkmaie* retmlsci mi* 
Mntoo^oir.tmuui txkenìa  »* 
¡r* apitqit* c n  usd-i rtlier tt ity 
tpae ttu::sr. Jru ti'.il'ts ta  ¿eia r»* 
Sii*. A! dai fi1» *  V £ un TU»
Trioiko re» =f . i rorui c i a  yvt*0 
Rota», tnwno perK'rii; jtpuiia. 
t'4t (tnv ieu  aC«»’>r, e !.v,in 
Pmr»;abie dteetpiina ti Ciuci;'0 
de ExyeiM i ; e r t u « v
mf«tu.^Gobrfn»*ar Ci-.,:.*
Arriba, June 14 1962
ESTA  ES 
E S P A Ñ A
A<*vi t t l i  m  primer* nt olí?
de licrt̂ ito fnjlófr poílfitfd. «ir «rtdvrf 
d i fcrno*. «n gtRlo de xrtW orn ici p 
mmiietmo, *n «ío »ovR&r«
** ¿.rpniirj' tn W 4 rn re Mirri
;  d< mor j-AUcO pora r i  p v t  rr> 
ha «do precito nt ti má« ¡«ve «**>;*- 
r-ic de r'D 7ÜJ* te llnm* rrtrmptídt 
et celomi« o «mpctíijocíOfi de itt opt'
r.:6;\ p iibiicct,’ ErpcAo e tíé  al n N  de 
[a caí!«. Y  M r « 0  le ha ta j t r d o  rtai 
nw* fwreaj («.*«rinomK> fe fa *rr> 
k . ' i r b d u  noi retai de 1« CEcfcspva* 
ite i r  Ica rtf'&pettrm de Munte*. p«*n 
cpreierBiie, en mi «jdajfeu« reffr«- 
d*«ì uponidR«*. 9  e ì t p i r  1* rundidn- 
ii>- S i de ilrwtón «e irete— re hj rftiho 
fij'Je ifi 4 ti misiaeo—eri« e* u c i i r o  
ecAdtdAlo. ¡S% (o «ebecmoi Me«. dea* 
r*é* de Feirjfcteeo eie» '
Pie fi a t  hecho. Se  he* níacdo  ì i w  
{rendere«, «  ha* etntodo inai ceue^ 
*ì s . te he priitdf* 0 tee píenlo* ile t>  
dee (bj ratti et «onbre «I«f C«àl«^ 
«f noma*« de Frene*, jr bípeda u  Kt 
p+etfo r i Marche Aipo «d « n «  il 
io* Mcrfiai li^qnjMlpi «1 tes 
e ro d iv i ,  te nde  te firn polca mi ma* 
sutura nel** «spirti nulo, te battere 
prp-rwncuiù atra *ci ri lesena ivpi* 
rt mirti« - «/ffft, lai pvrincki «a 
pk.'i Por tea cdUdtt.cnrl»« de »m 
primavera o  «axOn, de «»« prwncyra 
flve no ir «iicH if. a«« lm eUtc ■» 
rr.% crecer j  florecer tre* tarpa« fr»tf ‘ 
mcfcmc* de espejóte*. jRnwAn ,ic M  
itevedo hasta «m« ^ ^ « i  m.?yor«iT U«l* 
dot n  ua co le te i corro de ò ru o c  apre 
t=4oj, n  ir«  ptfé« de coraamej «ne 
iloj 7  d lip n u lo j. !e t eepeAnU* m  hen 
p recn tn i^o ; ¿<>111* fttje*  ¿Quid net #on
K¿o j* {fri*  ovIcttm? ¿C» nombre de 
t*l¿n hablan.* T ptrr «tot cominci. de 
««ai pinm i PMrpo.'c«* «reta« f  « i w » ,  
ha mrgido «1 pn ;«  «niium e, et e ia » m  
c ^ r i h o ,  ta eoacten cu*»«*, al « r -v  
(Tre mil h cci proclamado Ir! érùejo Ce- 
pjidv ti «ombre de fw c tx c  fracco
Jìo ha «trfo «/Imero de *»
CAsJitto d# /urfCi de «ritìnto* no ha 
«tgo la mcrtHeaeteN de uno» /dota« 
retorici i r  /aflori# £ r w
pee deiris de to fo  ceto >mp algo C*r 
Sspada no Civada. /Viréj tVl mearte 
diñarlo « ro  del /error populee, deità* 
de ici ccnetonri f  ¡et òofidcro«, t^fv- 
Urtncc *Aot de fiurone fe dan a Frpr. 
co ^  ruòo. /«ufo i  (aa far^oiudi de 
ìm  fniOne» de e«pado(o pue Je
man o l i  ri M«« «netniM  de ano 
I rp a M  dvd a i  mefor, la melodia in* 
■Tuo/atte de ta l /AOrieai. ri hr«*o ma** 
mallo de lai tórrenla de lo* en&ap< 
le*, ei ptro da lai fvrfrfnaj. le premo- 
cidn de bu em pietet cpficoU*. ef mo­
te «ubante de bi p a  de fipdia. «Lo 
habla a. «toldado le« pirjto  o«p«nicpd* 
fami, (e* crccv oi ganadre« de Icn
c ib ili hirM af7„t £1*01, draao; »►  
otroi, co.
devi eiid ffippda. Con ilio m Cn*. 
d ille ; cHe ctpd  mi* podere ^ - n a  co*» 
teitodo frane«—, ta «nion m*i «eie«* 
«A« con n t pueblen, die piitbfe V *1 
?«dd 1« «clami, t t  te p iu  ■ w  /a /*- 
rexlad le dl/o ««te octubre cea ít fro­
te rte «a poete cipadoí-*; «Aura odSm- 
tisro*,. gu*t flint vt t í  ni maao, pmt 
el roer f  el cíete a  « «  ^e^cloe.
Aoteeto tZQvJlKRDC 
(ToM PhdocJ
was tabooed in the official discourse of the Francoist state. Instead, the only ‘Europeanism’ 
which was officially permitted continued to be the idea that the Spain of the Generalísimo had 
more of a right to be classified as ‘European’ than anyone else, because it continued to defend 
the spiritual heritage of Christian civilization from the dangerous threatening Others of 
liberalism and communism. Hence, from the Francoist perspective, in order to enter the EEC 
there was absolutely no need to change the political institutions of a regime which, after all, 
fervently defended the true moral values of ‘Europe’. As an editorial published in Arriba put it:
Spain proclaims its European vocation with the highest merits. No one can deny that 
thanks to her, Europeity irradiated and irradiates its spiritual values all over the world, and 
neither can anyone deny that in the worst moments of crisis of our civilization, Spain 
placed herself at the vanguard of the defence of those values.5
Therefore, according to the regime’s official discourse, Spain’s ‘European vocation’ was in fact 
far more genuine than that of the EEC’s member states, since the latter’s democratic liberal 
institutions were seen as wicked threats to Christian ‘Europeity’. Communism was looked upon 
as the worst conceivable enemy of this metaphysical ‘European spirit’, and so it was argued that 
no one could possibly claim to have fought this lethal infection with greater zeal than Franco’s 
Spain.
7.6 The 1970 trade agreement with the EEC: a small and insufficient approximation to 
‘Europe’
The regime’s repressive measures against the rebel democrats who participated in the Munich 
reunion ‘severely damaged the Spanish case for entry into Europe’ (Preston 1993: 703). The 
following year, Franco’s decision to execute the Communist Julián Grimau provoked a wave of 
demonstrations against Franco in the major capitals of Europe, as well as in the United States, 
further distancing Spain from the aspiration to be admitted into the EEC. Nevertheless, the
5 Arriba, 20 June 1962.
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efforts of Spanish diplomats eventually bore some minor fruits. In 1964, the EEC announced that 
it would allow the opening of ‘exploratory talks* with the Spanish state, albeit at a purely 
economic level. For six long years, however, there were no palpable results which the regime 
could publicly present to the population as a step forward on the road to Europe, increasingly 
‘demonstrating to the Spanish that there was enormous resentment among the membership of the 
EEC at the continued existence within Spain of nondemocratic governmental institutions’ 
(Salisbury 1980: 75). On June 29 1970, however, the Franco regime finally accomplished a small 
victory in the European arena: a preferential trade agreement was signed between the Spanish 
state and the EEC, which involved a series of reciprocal tariff reductions on industrial products. 
During an initial stage of six years, the commercially weaker Spain would receive the larger 
reductions, 60 to 70%, versus 25-30% on the part of the Common Market. The second stage of 
the deal remained unspecified, although it was implicitly assumed that a gradual process of 
harmonization of policies would lead to Spain's effective inclusion in the Common Market, 
though only from the economic point of view (Salisbury 1980: 102). Eight years after the initial 
request to ‘enter Europe* had been officially put forward by the Spanish state, the regime ‘was 
only able to obtain some commercial advantages which, although beneficial, could hardly 
compensate for the failure of not having accomplished the objective of full integration’ (Pereira 
Castañares 1991b: 100). The official Francoist propaganda had always made the promise that the 
Generalísimo would lead ‘the nation* into ‘Europe*. Nevertheless, in the most fundamental 
sense, Spain remained an excluded outsider, and it was increasingly obvious that this was 
because ‘Europe* rejected its dictatorial regime.
It is interesting to observe, in any case, how this relatively insignificant ‘European success’ 
was presented in the Spanish press as a hugely important national triumph, made possible 
through the wise guidance of the Generalísimo. On 30 June, for instance, Arriba devoted the 
main story of its front page to the commercial deal with the EEC, with the massive headline 
‘AGREEMENT’, under which a sub-title cited the words of the Spanish Foreign Minister, López 
Bravo, who asserted that ‘our approximation to Europe is due to the perseverance of Franco’
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[reproduced on the following page]. The text on the front page highlighted the symbolic 
significance of the fact that the Spanish flag could be seen ‘waving among those of the “Six’” in 
Luxemburg, where the treaty was signed. This was seen as ‘a recognition which pays homage to 
the man who has directed Spanish politics with tenacity towards this new European alliance, the 
Spanish Head of State Francisco Franco/ In its internal pages, this newspaper called the event a 
‘historic date’, and printed the speech delivered by the foreign minister López Bravo before 
signing the agreement, which stressed that ‘Spain has decided to anchor itself more firmly in 
Europe’, and that ‘Our country feels present in the Europe which is uniting/ ABC also devoted 
its main front-page story to the signing of the EEC agreement, and similarly drew attention to the 
way in which at the site of the event, ‘the flags of the six countries of the Common Market could 
be seen waving, and at the geometric center was the Spanish flag’ [reproduced on the following 
page]. It was thus claimed that Spain, even if only partially and incompletely, was in no way a 
humiliated outsider: it had finally been ‘accepted into Europe*. In its editorial on that day, 
entitled rather optimistically ‘AT THE DOORS OF EUROPE*, this newspaper further asserted 
that the agreement would be ‘of great utility as an instrument for our approximation to Europe*.
It is clear, therefore, that the aspiration to ‘enter Europe’ continued to be a hugely important 
national objective promoted by the regime itself, and hence a relatively minor success such as 
this 1970 trade agreement was presented by Franco’s propagandists as proof that the 
Generalísimo could lead Spain to the widely desired ‘European’ status. However, only a few 
months after this deal had been signed, the regime’s decision to execute six alleged terrorists of 
ETA, the Basque terrorist group which had arisen to challenge the Francoist notion of ‘national 
unity’, provoked indignation throughout Europe and once again left Spain morally isolated. 
Hence, although Franco eventually bowed to the protests from abroad and commuted the death 
sentences, the situation of international hostility provoked yet another propaganda campaign 
against the ‘foreign enemies’ of Spain. The regime exhorted Spaniards to ‘unite against the 
world’ during a mass protest ceremony held on 16 December 1970, and Arriba railed against the 
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Ct»R*«Jn ■uâ uro». Flerr* * «j pt
Certuci'i«.
ProUioiüajt, ?«?**. de (a feneide fe myrr rn I 
jg, iLtp'á**». cv*> tunde*« eihteebrf f 
fcilr Me«**J*r>cfMe «quivel* » ro  
br< qi« he djr̂ .itte («mwHeu 1« i 
««te eiiWfMi eliaui* europea, eJ Jet« fei
FiabcIko rn*cA Alt lo t b  íwebo cnotter 
le ¡e i  Dmro, </.
■*•««*; «• «'*• >•«* *zi»lien *»:« ív*.-), , ,i .«„„.i,
—impía, /ten eyetere tts1 Jai ,»«MFiri*.>,, f t r t n  H trm tt  
: Bfiw. a» C¡ mente*!* et ;*
M t
■ ’ ' ■■ '  ■
f
V-  : :
' V  ■ - ■ v
E S P A S A . M E R C A D O  C O M l'N  E I . H O P E O
ACUERDO COMERCIAL PREFERENTE
'■ Fup firmado, a Ins 11.40 d t: ayer, por ■s'S^'i’Í~y_ 
López Bravo, Picrre ti arme! y .¡can Rnv \L^sjrPr¿
'1 0  IMPORTANTE ES COMENZAR T l’EUSm U AH*. 1)1,111 ' h - . S Z .1Z;
n  m i n i s t r o  e s p a ñ o l  d e  a s i m o s  e x t e r io r e s
‘ESPAÑA HA DECIDIDO ANCLARSE 
MAS FIRMEMENTE EN EUROPA'’
. ~ c,\ucstm país se siente préseme en la 
:■ Europa que «r une? Vr-:*
Discurso Je Lupes líruco en el acto :~P;j IV :
C fe»*-»
Arriba, June 30 1970
A B C .  MARTES JO
ABC
Dratero*: Tora.«!® LUCÍ», íe TENA. 
Dmxcr«* a w v j*t o : Pfdr® Je LORENZO 
Smmtcrnii Je « i REVUELTA IMAZ
R X B A C C r O N ,  ADMINISTRACION Y  
T A LL IR E I)  SERRANO, S I. M A D R I D ,  
APARTADO A3.
TE LE F S , 2251710 ■ 2759405 y 2255023 
H  dtíen PRENSA ESPAROIA. 5. A. |¿¡ J
A LAS PUERTAS DE 
EUROPA
Un largo y, en ocasiones, desesperante 
rroceso negociador e n t r o  España y  el 
Mercado Común ha fructificado formal­
mente ayer con la firma del Tratado co­
mercial preferencial en el Centro Europeo 
de Luxemburgo. El Acuerdo «  de im­
portancia práctica, concretamente p o r  
cuanto en él se sistematizan las relacio­
ne« económica» y comerciales entre los 
*Scis" y  nuestro país. Pero ei la más 
Inmediata virtud del documento de Lu­
xemburgo la de disciplinar, emplazándolo 
a unas convocatoria» de riguroso contras­
ta. el desarrollo y expansión de la econo­
mía española. Tiene el Acuerdo, por des­
gracia, algunas insuficiencias aunque en 
absoluto imputables a la eficacia nego­
ciadora de nuestra representación en los 
largo» y  difíciles debates, sino debidas a 
imitaciones propias al Mercado Común, 
escasamente evolucionado, por ejemplo, 
en lo gue se refiere a la unificación de 
>a política agrícola. Pero, pese a tales 
limitaciones, el Tratado preferencial es, 
económica y  comercialmente, de g r a n  
Utilidad como instrumento p2 ra nuestra 
aproximación a Europa.
ABC, June 30 1970 j
" s
Vffffif
in Preston and Smyth 1984: 27-8). Nevertheless, in spite of this renewed atmosphere of 
international isolation and ‘patriotic resistance to foreigners’, Franco boldly claimed in his 1970 
New Year’s address that the commercial agreement with the EEC was one of the ‘exemplary 
symptoms of the strength and maturity with which Spain confronts its mission in the 
international stage’ (Franco 1975: 823).
At this point, however, the regime’s official discourse was being rejected by broader and 
broader sectors of the Spanish population. It was becoming increasingly obvious to many 
Spaniards, even within the regime’s own power structure, that if Spain truly wanted to become 
‘European’, political democratization was a necessary condition for this ideal to become a 
reality. By the 1970’s, Spain had been transformed into an industrialized, mobile, better educated 
society by Franco’s own regime, and as many historians have illustrated, these changes gradually 
eroded its legitimacy and rendered it obsolete (Carr 1980, Carr and Fusi 1981, Gilmour 1985, 
Arango 1995). The great irony of Francoism is that a ‘crusade’ which was initially launched to | 
preserve the traditional Catholic values of la España eterna (‘the eternal Spain’) eventually led 
to the country’s economic and social modernization -  a process which eventually made its own 
discourse of legitimation sound completely anachronistic. The regime’s famous tourist slogan, 
‘Spain is different’, an image that sought to entice visitors to a spiritual land of ‘picture-book 
villages seemingly untouched by time, and austere cities where life seemed to be locked away [ 
behind stone walls and iron gates’ (Arango 1995: 1), was completely untenable by the late 60’$1 
and early ‘70’s. At this point, students, intellectuals, workers, Basque and Catalan nationalists, 
and even many representatives of the Catholic Church were publicly rejecting the official visions 
of ‘the nation’ and ‘Spanish patriotism’ promoted and defended by official regime discourse. 
The exposure to alternative lifestyles through the mass presence of tourists and the migration of 
Spanish workers abroad, as well as the influence of American films and television programmes, 
had an enormous cultural impact on the Spanish population. Many Spaniards, particularly in the 
younger generations, therefore began to feel increasingly alienated from the old-fashioned.
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repressive, paternalistic discourse of the regime, and longed to live in a land of ‘genuine liberty’, 
just like ‘the rest of Europe’, where a ‘free use of the body’ was tolerated.
The exclusion of Spain from the EEC only served to widen this increasing gap between the 
national we-image promoted by official Francoist discourse, and the rival patriotic paradigm of 
all of those who wanted to recuperate collective pride by living in a ‘modem* and ‘democratic’ 
society that could be fully accepted into ‘Europe’:
The official attitudes and actions of [European] Community institutions, made evident 
during the 1960s and 1970s, impressed upon Spaniards the fact that political 
democratization was a precondition of entry into the EEC, an ambition which became both 
cause of, and focus for, the burgeoning democratic $entiment.(Preston and Smyth 1984: 
30)
The regime was therefore increasingly losing the symbolic monopoly by which it defined the 
‘essence* of España and its 'European vocation’. Rival conceptions of ‘the nation* and 
‘Europeanisin’ were gaining ground, particularly those which linked complete democratization 
with the desired entry into the EEC. As the Socialist politician Femando Morán (1980: 289) has 
put it, for the increasing number of people in Spain who opposed the regime:
Europe was during the dictatorship a myth: something unattainable in the circumstances of 
the times, and precisely because of those prevailing deficiencies. Consequently, Europe 
was perceived as an idealized reality and the march towards it appeared as something 
which unequivocally represented the end of autocracy.
The Generalísimo himself, however, never showed any willingness whatsoever to revise his 
rigid, exclusionary symbolic classifications of those people who were ‘really Spanish’ and those 
who belonged to the treacherous, foreign-inspired ‘anti-Spain*. In his 1971 ‘New Year’s 
Message the Nation’, he insisted once again that:
The realities of Spain... are still not understood and are even rejected by the recalcitrant 
representatives of old liberal politics which are progressively and pathetically 
extinguishing themselves. (Cited in Franco 1975: 826).
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A year later, in spite of the evident impossibility of Spain being accepted into the EEC without a 
process of democratic reforms, Franco would still stubbornly continue to claim that:
Our fatherland is a part of Europe and aspires to occupy within it, economically and 
politically, the position which history offers us and which the qualities and merits of 
Spaniards deserve. (Cited in Franco 1975: 827).
The final days of his regime, however, made it patently clear once again that the aspiration to 
‘enter Europe’ would never be satisfed without a political transformation. On September 27 
1975, five Basque separatists were executed by a firing squad. A furious international 
condemnation of the regime followed, which included the EEC’s total suspension of its 
negotiations with Spain. ‘Europe’, once again, had rejected and denigrated Franco’s Spain 
because of its utter disregard for ‘the principles of justice and humanity’ (cited in Bassols 1995: 
121). The old Generalísimo and his remaining diehard propagandists, nevertheless, still managed 
to organize one last mass ritual of ‘national irritation’ against the ‘foreign enemies’ of la patria. 
On 1 October 1975, in front of an assembled crowd of those who still continued to worship their 
totemic national leader, Franco warned his countrymen that the envious forces of ‘anti-Spain’ 
were once again threatening the fatherland. All ‘true Spaniards’, he proclaimed, should feel 
proud about their adherence to the values of ‘real patriotism’, while all others were nothing but 
shameless traitors:
All of this is due to a masonic leftist conspiracy of the political class, in collusion with 
Communist-terrorist subversion in the social sphere, which honours us and denigrates 
them... Evidently to be Spanish has today once again become something important in the 
world. (Cited in Franco 1975: 869)
Franco, in what was to be his last public appearance, still clearly commanded a considerable 
degree of popular support, and during the following days, walls all over Madrid were covered 
with the slogan, ‘Say “no” to Europe’ (Preston and Smyth 1984: 28). However, the inflated 
Spanish we-image of the Francoist propaganda was no longer very convincing. On the contrary, 
the hostility of ‘Europe’ towards the Franco dictatorship was for an increasing number of 
Spaniards something to be ashamed of, not something to celebrate proudly because it proved that
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foreigners were supposedly jealous of ‘national greatness*. In many minds, Francoism had rather 
become a humiliating reminder of the fact that they could still not fully consider themselves 
‘Europeans’, because they still lived in a ‘backwards, undemocratic nation’.
7.7 Conclusion: ‘Europe’ as an unfulfilled aspiration
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the we-image of Spaniards was devastated by the loss 
of their nation’s imperial status after the 1898 ‘disaster’. During the decades of extreme 
instability which followed this humiliating blow to collective self-esteem, a symbolico-political 
struggle emerged between two rival, emotionally charged conceptions of the Spanish nation. On 
one side were those who defended the ‘Catholic essence’ of Spain and the continuation of its 
evangelical imperialistic mission in the world. On the other were those who wholeheartedly 
embraced the ideals of liberalism, secularism, modernization, and hence ‘Europeanization’ as the 
most effective remedies for Spain’s loss of interational prestige. This was one of the fundamental 
ideological divisions in Spanish society that ultimately erupted during the Spanish Civil War. 
Ultimately, however, the victory of General Franco’s forces signified the temporary triumph of 
Hispanic traditionalism, Catholicism, and imperialism over liberal ‘Europeanizers’, as well as 
Communists and peripheral nationalists. In opposition to the discourse of ‘European 
modernization’, which was stigmatized by the new regime as ‘anti-Spanish’, Franco defended a 
conception of ‘Europe’s Christian civilization’ which coincided with his vision of Spain’s 
religious crusade against the twin threatening Others of liberalism and Marxism.
During the initial years of his rule, the expected triumph of the Axis powers led Franco and 
his propagandists to build up a Spanish we-image based on the glories of imperial expansion 
which would supposedly resurrect national pride after the World War. However, the victory of 
the Allies led to a period of total international isolation, during which the regime effectively 
mobilized national we-feelings against the hostility of Spain’s ‘foreign enemies’. At the same 
time, the regime attempted to symbolically construct a Spanish self-image of ‘independence’ and 
‘self-sufficiency’, in harmony with its autarkic economic policies. By the early 1950’s, this
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situation had led to widespread poverty and hunger in Spain, but the regime was able to find a 
new source of wealth, prestige and moral authority through the 1953 agreement with the United 
States. Spain then became an honourable partner in the American struggle against Soviet 
Communism. At that point, Franco placed economic affairs in the hands of the Opus Dei 
technocrats, and the regime developed a new patriotic discourse of legitimacy based on the 
development and modernization of ‘the nation’.
Within the context of this new economic programme, the Francoist state requested entry into 
the European Economic Community, as a further source of both commercial benefits and 
international prestige. The concept of ‘Spain’s European vocation’ and its aspiration to ‘enter 
Europe’ developed during this time as part of the Francoist propaganda’s official discourse. This 
‘vocation’, however, was limited to the nation’s economic interest in joining the Common 
Market, as well as to the claim that Spain’s defence of Christian values entitled it to be classified 
as ‘European’ as much as anyone else. There was never any suggestion, however, that this 
‘Europeanism’ should imply political changes. On the contrary, Francoist propaganda continued 
to deride the liberal democracy of other European countries as an ‘inferior’ system and a 
‘dangerous’ step towards Communism. Nevertheless, the non-democratic character of Francoist 
Spain blocked the regime’s attempts to associate itself with the EEC, and increasingly revealed 
to Spaniards that political reforms would be necessary in order to be accepted as ‘Europeans’. 
Hence, those Spaniards who were opposed to the Francoist regime both within the country and in 
exile began to unify under the symbolic banner of ‘Europeanism’.
A rival, patriotic we-image of Spain which saw the renewal of the nation’s international 
status through its democratization and entry into ‘Europe’ therefore gradually developed and 
spread. Initially, this democratic challenge to the regime’s official conceptions of Spain and its 
‘European vocation’ were largely silenced and labelled as ‘anti-patriotic’ through the Francoist 
monopolization of all media institutions. However, by the time of Franco’s death, it had become 
increasingly evident to many Spaniards that their ‘European vocation’ would never be satisfied 
without the implementation of political reforms. The exclusion from the EEC thus became a
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symbol of Spain’s shameful ‘backwardness* in many minds. ‘Europe*, from this widely shared 
perspective, remained an unfulfilled aspiration, a necessary condition for the recovery of national 
pride and prestige, and hence it was widely recognized that such a recovery would only be 
possible through the country’s full democratization. This will be illustrated in the following 
chapter, where I shall analyze the powerful emergence of a new political discourse on ‘freedom’, 
‘modernity’, and ‘Europeanization*, which initially emerged during Spain’s transition to 
democracy, and which ultimately reached their symbolic peak in the 1985 signature ceremony in 
which ‘the nation’ finally entered ‘Europe*.
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8. ‘Going into Europe’: A triumph for ‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’
Mi Ji,
When Franco died, no European leaders attended the elaborate funeral ritual which was 
organized in Spain to honour the Generalísimo and his life of servicio a la patria (‘service to the 
fatherland’).1 In fact, the only significant head of state who came to pay his respects to the 
deceased Spanish leader was the Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet. During the last period of 
Franco’s life, ‘Europe’ had already made it perfectly clear that a non-democratic Spain would 
never be allowed to participate in the project of continental unification. As the last chapter 
indicated, only a few weeks before Franco’s death, the execution of five alleged terrorists was 
condemned by the EEC as an unacceptable violation of human rights, and all negotiations with 
Spain were therefore suspended. In the words of one Spanish author, the end of Franco’s life was 
characterized by ‘the clamours of the civilized world against the dictatorship’ (Armero 1989: 
20). The implication of such a statement is that according to this writer, Spain could certainly not 
consider itself a part of ‘the civilized world’ at this point. On the contrary, from an anti-Francoist 
perspective, Spain was still embarrassingly close to the ‘Third World levels’ of a ‘banana 
republic’, due to the ‘backwardness’ of its political system. Indeed, there was a joke at the time 
according to which Africa began ‘south of the Pyrenees’ (Arango 1995: 253).* 2 For Spaniards
I
who shared a pro-democratic standpoint, the absence of European dignitaries at Franco’s funeral j 
clearly illustrated once again his regime’s moral isolation and hence their country’s lack of 
international respectability.
The aspiration to ‘enter Europe’ had been repeatedly promoted by the Francoist authorities 
themselves since the early 1960’s, but in the end they had failed to make this collective 
aspiration a reality. Spain therefore remained an excluded outsider, and this humiliating situation 
catalyzed the desire for a process of democratization among broader and broader sectors of the
i
'Reported, for instance, in ABC, 21 November 1975.
■ The Spanish journalist Fernando Jâuregui (1983) has referred to this Spanish we-image of political, economic, and 
cultural backwardness vis-à-vis Europe as 'the Pyrénées mountain complex’.
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population. The ‘Europeanizing* discourse of the democratic opposition forces, whose voices 
had been silenced for many years and stigmatized as ‘anti-patriotic’ by the regime, were quickly 
gaining ground. In fact, due to this increasing popular pressure, even within the Francoist 
political apparatus there was a growing realization that fundamental changes would be necessary 
if Spain was ever to become accepted as a modem ‘European’ nation.
Nervertheless, there were still powerful factions, particularly in the circles of the armed 
forces, who radically opposed any violations of Francoist orthodoxy. Such men believed it was 
their moral duty to rise up in arms if, from their own particular standpoint, la patria became 
threatened after the death of their leader by the dangerous forces of ‘liberalism’, ‘anarchy’, or 
‘separatism’. It is interesting to note that when Franco’s death was publicly announced, many 
Spaniards celebrated with champagne, and people spontaneously danced in the streets of 
numerous Basque towns (Preston 1986: 76). At the same time, however, large crowds of people 
gathered in Madrid to silently file past his coffin and respectfully bow their heads with sincere 
affection (Share 1986: 74), and leading newspapers such as ABC proclaimed in their headlines 
that General Franco was still VIVO EN LA HISTORIA (‘ALIVE IN HISTORY’) [reproduced on 
the following page]. It was therefore far from clear whether a reconciliation between the ‘two 
Spains’ would be possible after the dictator’s death, and hence whether a transition to a 
‘European’ form of democracy could take place without bloodshed.
Within this context of political tension and uncertainty, King Juan Carlos I stepped in as the 
new symbolic figurehead of the Spanish people. As Franco’s appointed successor, he was 
educated under the dictator’s supervision, and had sworn loyaly to the principles of the regime’s 
single party, the Movimiento, in 1969. Hence, many expected him to follow in the political 
footsteps of the Generalísimo. Franco himself had famously insisted in his final years that 
everything was atado y bien atado, ‘tied down and well tied down’, in order to ensure the 
survival of an authoritarian power structure after his death. Nevertheless, in the end this proved 
to be the dictator’s greatest miscalculation, for King Juan Carlos clearly decided to legitimate his 
monarchy by promoting the tranformation of Spain into a modem liberal democracy. Instead of
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maintaining the symbolic division which Francoist discourse constmcted between the victorious 
‘Spain’ of Catholic authoritarianism and the vanquished ‘anti-Spain’ of liberalism and 
communism, the new monarch presented himself as a leader who stood for a much wider and 
more inclusive definition of ‘the nation’: a man who proclaimed his wish to be ‘King of all 
Spaniards’, independently of their political creed. Juan Carlos was conscious of the increasing 
demands for democratization amongst the country’s industrial, financial, and professional elites, 
who were fed up with Spain’s incapacity to be accepted into the EEC. Hence, with the full 
support of the new monarch and his advisers, a new we-image of ‘the nation’ was symbolically 
constructed and defended by a broad spectrum of moderate forces on both the right and the left: 
the vision of a Spain which aspired to ‘freedom’, ‘modernity’, and ‘democracy’. What is 
fascinating in relation to the topic of this dissertation is that all of these patriotic ideals became 
fully identified with the desire to achieve a ‘European* status. This chapter, therefore, will 
analyze the new public discourse on ‘the nation’ which emerged during Spain’s transition to 
democracy, and which reached an emotional peak of prestige and collective pride when the 
country’s accession to the European Economic Community was finally achieved in 1985.
8.1 The coronation rituals of a new totemic leader: King Juan Carlos calls for a ‘free*, 
‘modern’, and ‘European’ Spain
On November 22 1975, only two days after Franco’s death, King Juan Carlos addressed the 
Spanish people for the first time as their new leader.3 In the main chamber of the Spanish 
Parliament, dressed in an impeccable military uniform, the young monarch delivered his 
inaugural speech. The royal crown, as well as a large crucifix, were neatly placed by his side, 
next to the podium from which he spoke to el pueblo español [see photograph reproduced on the
3My analysis of this event is based entirely on the reports of ABC, 23 November 1975. The entire text of the King’s 
address was published on that day by this newspaper.
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ABC, 23 November 1975
following page]. Behind him sat his wife, Queen Sofia, and his three children, Felipe, Elena, and 
Cristina. In this emotionally charged, highly ritualized setting of power-transition and power- 
legitimation, the new King delivered an address which was a cautious mixture of sensitivity and 
respect towards those who genuinely felt saddened by Franco's death, as well as optimistic hope 
for those who desired a political transformation of the country.
Juan Carlos I began by acknowledging the importance of Franco as an ‘exceptional figure’ in 
Spanish history:
His memory will constitute for me an obligation of action and loyalty towards the 
functions which I now assume in the service of the fatherland... Spain will never be able to 
forget the man who as a soldier and a statesman has devoted his entire existence to serve it.
At the same time, the King gave numerous signs, albeit in an inevitably ambiguous language, of 
his plans for democratic reform in Spain. He spoke of the beginning of ‘a new epoch in Spanish 
history’ and a future which would be based on ‘a consensus of national harmony’. More 
specifically, he asserted with apparent democratic conviction that:
A free and modem society requires the participation of all in the forums of decision­
making, in the media, in the different spheres of education, and in the control of national 
wealth. To make this participation more real and effective should be a collective enterprise 
and the task of the government.
Finally, and most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, at the end of his address the King 
made a passionate appeal to ‘Europe’ and highlighted the rightful claim of Spain to be 
considered ‘European’:
The idea of Europe would be incomplete without a reference to the presence of the 
Spaniard, and without a consideration of the acts of many of my predecessors. Europe 
should reckon with Spain, for we Spaniards are European. It is a necessity of the moment 
that both sides should understand that this is so and draw the consequences that derive 
therefrom.
Hence, already in this initial speech, the new monarch timidly suggested that his aim was to lead 
Spain into ‘Europe’, via the achievement of ‘freedom’ and ‘modernity’. His language had to be
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cautious, given the fact that there was still a powerful Francoist 'bunker’ which radically 
opposed any deviations from the authoritarian path. The King, as Commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, necessarily had to show great sensitivity towards the figure of the Generalísimo, 
who was still highly revered in military circles. Nevertheless, with hindsight one can clearly 
perceive in this inaugural address the beginnings of the new patriotic discourse on ‘the nation’ 
which emerged during this period, and with which the new monarch aimed to legitimate his 
reign: the aspiration to install a ‘European’ form of democracy. It was a discourse which, in 
order to avoid the possibility of violent confrontation, had to strike an uneasy balance between 
cautious respect for the Francoist past, and enthusiastic hope for a ‘democratic’ and ‘European’ 
future.
A few days later, on 27 November, another elaborate ceremony took place which was again 
designed to symbolically mark and legitimate the changeover of power into the hands of King 
Juan Carlos.4 In this case, the context was that of a religious rite de passage: a coronation mass 
to celebrate the proclamation of the new monarch and the emotive hopes he represented for ‘the 
nation’.5 Huge crowds, waving the national flag and chanting ‘Spain with the king!’, lined the 
streets to salute Juan Carlos and his family, as they arrived at the church of San Jerónimo el Real 
in the center of Madrid. It is noteworthy that, in striking contrast to the absence of European 
leaders at Franco’s ceremony, the new King’s coronation mass was attended, among others, by 
the Presidents of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as by the Duke of 
Edinburgh. The presence of such figures provided an important symbolic boost to the authority 
of Juan Carlos, by portraying him as a new source of international status and respectability for 
Spain. The popular enthusiasm elicited by the arrival of such foreign leaders was illustrated by 
chants such as ‘Europe, Europe!’ and ‘Hooray for Europe!’ from the crowds which greeted them
4My analysis of this event is based on the reports of ABC, 28 November 75.
5 The term rite de passage was initially coined by the French anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep (1977 [1909]). It 
was subsequently developed by Victor Turner (1969), and has recently been applied to the study of the Spanish 
transition to democracy by Laura Desfor-Edles (1998).
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as they arrived to the church. After the national anthem was played and a spectacular military 
parade took place in honour of the new monarch, the coronation mass began.
During this religious service, the Archbishop of Madrid, Cardinal Vicente Enrique y 
Tarancon, delivered a homily which is worth considering in some detail, for it clearly illustrates 
the way in which Catholic Church authorities also played a role in the rejection of Francoist 
ideology, and the construction of a new public discourse on ‘the nation'. As the last chapter 
illustrated, for many years the Church had played a very important role in the legitimation of 
Francoism, and indeed religious icons were always key ingredients in the symbolic paraphernalia 
of the regime. One important aspect of this was that from the Francoist perspective, to be a ‘good 
Spaniard' necessarily implied being a ‘good Catholic’. However, after the Second Vatican 
Council and the emergence of a younger generation of priests, many liberal-minded members of 
the Catholic Church joined the anti-Francoist cause and rejected such narrow, exclusivist 
definitions of ‘Spanishness’ (Carr and Fusi 1981: 152-56). This was illustrated in the discourse 
of tolerance and openness employed by Cardinal Tarancon in the coronation mass of King Juan 
Carlos.
A few days before this ceremony, the Archbishop of Madrid had already published a letter to 
the faithful in which he asserted that ‘patriotism is compatible with all sincere and honest 
political forms which have as their objective the common good.’6 Now, in front of the newly 
crowned monarch, Tarancon asked Juan Carlos to become ‘King of all Spaniards’ and stated:
I pray that you may possess the wisdom and discretion to open paths for the future of the 
Fatherland, so that, in accordance with human nature and the will of God, the politico- 
juridical structures may offer all citizens the possibility of participating freely and actively 
in the life of the country.7
■ ,-f
After this remarkably pro-democratic homily, one of the prayers of petition voiced by the 
Archbishop invoked divine guidance for this same political cause:
P u b l i s h e d  b y  ABC, 2 3  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 5 , p . 1 5 .
1ABC , 2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 5 , p .  7 .
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For all of us here united, so that, without distinctions of religious creed, race, ideology, or 
condition, we may work for a more just, happy, and fraternal humanity, let us pray to the 
Lord.8
My point is that although for many years, Church authorities had identified themselves with 
Franco’s narrowly partisan project of ‘national Catholicism’, some of them were now positioning 
themselves on the side of those who did not necessarily identify ‘patriotism’ with a particular 
religious or ideological outlook. The discourse of the Archbishop of Madrid during the 
coronation ritual of Juan Carlos supported the construction of a Spain in which one could 
legitimately work for the common good of the patria, without going to church on Sundays or 
upholding all the moral commandments of Catholicism. Even powerful sectors of the Church, 
therefore, were openly in favour of ‘European’ democratization.
It is also worth drawing attention to the inevitable excitement which was generated in Spain 
on the day of the new monarch’s coronation, as a result of the declarations of support which 
were made by the French President, Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, in relation to the country’s 
‘European’ aspirations:
Spain is a part of Europe. I would even say that Spain, because of its history and its 
civilization, is one of the founders of Europe, and we wish, therefore, that Spain may be 
able to participate with us in the great task of our time, which is, precisely, the political 
unification of Europe.9
The Spanish press paid great attention to these words, and interpreted this atmosphere of 
supportive warmth from European dignitaries as a signal that the desired entry into ‘Europe’ was 
imminent, due to the new political situation in Spain after Franco’s death. On 29 November, 
ABC devoted its entire front page to two large photographs of the new monarch: one showed him 
chatting in a casual manner with the German President, Walter Scheel, and the other pictured 
him enjoying breakfast in the company of the French leader, Giscard D’Estaing [reproduced on
SABC, 2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 5 , p . 8 .
9ABC, 2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 5 , p .  1 3 .
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the following page]. The headline was ‘VISA FOR EUROPE’, and the sub-text claimed that 
these symbolic gestures of friendliness were ‘an undoubted clearing of the path for our 
immediate European policy’. This newspaper’s editorial on that day also focused its attention on 
these hopeful signs of Euro-respectability:
Don Juan Carlos expressed before Parliament, on the historic occasion of his proclamation 
as King, the European vocation of Spain... The response of Europe has been clear. This 
renovation of a European openness by King Juan Carlos has been immediately followed by 
the cordial openness of Europe towards Spain and its King... Spain is now closer to Europe 
because Europe recognizes itself more in the signs and the potential for change and 
participation incorporated by the Crown to our national reality.10
i
On the following day, the same newspaper published an article in which the journalist Luis 
Maria Anson called upon his fellow citizens to help the new monarch
organize moderation, so that all Spaniards, without exclusions or violence, may participate 
in political decisions within democratic pluralism; and so that as soon as possible, the 
youth of Spain may be offered their two great aspirations: liberty and Europe.
In all of this, one can sense an emotional atmosphere of collective hope for the renewal of 
Spain’s international respectability and self-esteem, through the changes which King Juan Carlos 
seemed to represent. Thanks to the new monarch, it was claimed that Spain was closer than ever 
to ‘liberty’ and ‘Europe’. Nevertheless, there was still much tension and uncertainty in the air. 
Juan Carlos still had to prove his democratic credentials to a very skeptical opposition, and in 
fact the clandestine left-wing press proclaimed in its own headlines: ‘No to an imposed King!’ 
and ‘No to the Francoist King!’ (Cited in Preston 1986: 78). The fundamental point for the 
purposes of this thesis, in any case, is to highlight the initial, timid emergence of a new official 
discourse on ‘the nation’ which aimed to overcome the old distinction between the ‘patriotism’ 
of Francoists and the ‘anti-patriotic conspiracies’ of the regime’s opponents, through a new,
l0ABC, 29 November 1975, p. 3.
11 ABC, 30 November 1975, p. 3.
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ABC , 29 November 1975
!
j more inclusive we-image: a Spain that could only become ‘European’ by recovering
j ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’. King Juan Carlos, inevitably stigmatized in many circles because
| he was seen as ‘Franco’s boy’, needed to find new sources of legitimacy in order for the
I
| monarchy to find mass support. From the very beginning of his reign, it is clear that the pledge to
j make Spain ‘European’ was one of the key ideals which were repeatedly invoked by the King
and his supporters for this purpose.
8.2 The identification of ‘democracy’ with ‘Europe’ during the transition period
The relatively peaceful process which transformed the Spanish political system from an 
authoritarian Catholic regime to a liberal pluralist democracy has been extensively analyzed by
f
i many authors.12 It is not my purpose here to give a detailed account of this complex
f metamorphosis, but rather to focus above all on the way in which ‘Europe’ and the idealized
f
j concept of becoming ‘European’ were symbolically identified during these years with the
! ‘modernization’ and ‘democratization’ of Spain. The aspiration to ‘enter Europe’ was one of the
i
fundamental issues on which there was a broad consensus in Spain amongst a wide spectrum of 
* moderate forces on both the right and the left. Hence, this collective aspiration was undoubtedly
J
one of the key points of coincidence which made the negotiated transition to democracy possible.
' As the socialist politician Fernando Moran (1980: 289) has put it:
i
i
, At the time of the transition from dictatorship to democracy [Spain’s Europeanism] attained
almost a metapolitical worth and constituted one of the facts on which the unanimity which 
permitted change was established.
i
! ‘Europe’, for many Spaniards, was not merely a question of economic benefits and commercial
I
i advantages. It was also clearly a matter of recovering national prestige and self-respect, of
i *I :
J
12 My own understanding of the transition has been guided by the excellent studies of Carr and Fusi (1981), Gilmour 
(1985), Preston (1986), Share (1986), Perez-Diaz (1993), Aguilar (1996), and Desfor-Edles (1998).
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overcoming the ‘anachronistic’ political structures and cultural ‘backwardness* of the past for | 
good.13 j
When Franco died, EEC authorities officially expressed their hope that democracy would j 
soon be reestablished in Spain, and made it clear that only such a political transformation would | 
permit the country’s participation in the project of European union (Armero 1989: 32-33). 
Nevertheless, the first government appointed by King Juan Carlos inevitably disappointed those 
who hoped for immediate change, since the new monarch initially maintained Franco’s last | 
Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro, in his position. With hindsight, it seems probable that this 1 
decision was taken due to the necessity of implementing change slowly and cautiously, in order j  
to avoid the possibility of a military backlash. In any case, whatever the reasons, the re- j 
appointment of Arias deflated the hopes for democratic renewal of many Spaniards, for this man j 
was still clearly committed to the Francoist conception of Spain, and hence he continued to think J 
of parliamentary democracy as something alien and dangerous. His emotional attachment to the | 
Generalísimo was made very visible when he wept profusely as he read Franco’s testament to j
the Spanish people in a television broadcast, aired on the day after the dictator’s death [see I
'1
photograph reproduced on the following page]. It was also symbolically illustrated by the fact | 
that his office was decorated with an enormous portrait of Franco, in contrast to a diminutive J 
photograph of King Juan Carlos (Preston 1986: 80). J
Of course, in his inaugural speech as Prime Minister of the Monarchy’s first government, | 
Arias did not fail to make a reference to the nation’s ‘European aspirations’ and he promised to ] 
put all his efforts behind this desired objective:
13 In January 1976, the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center for Sociological Investigations) 
carried out a poll which suggested that amongst the general population, 73% of Spaniards were in favour of their 
country’s entry into the EEC, and 65% supported the ‘necessary political reforms’ which had to be carried out in 
order to accomplish this objective. It is also worth noting that both age and levels of education were the two crucial 
variables which determined the degrees of ‘Europeanism’ of Spanish citizens. For instance, in the age range of 15- 
24 and 25-44, 84% and 79% of those polled were ‘in favour of Europe’, while amongst those who were 65 or older, 
support for the EEC fell to 51%. Similarly, amongst university students, ‘Europeanism’ was popular amongst 87%, 
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The government, recognizing that the process of European integration constitutes a i 
fundamental fact, will search firmly and progressively for mutual and acceptable solutions 
which will facilitate the integration of Spain in that reality.(Cited in Armero 1989:22-3) I
I
However, this was still very much the Francoist version of Spain’s ‘European vocation’, for I 
Arias was clearly not willing to initiate a genuine process of democratization and give up what j 
he saw as unique Spanish ‘traditions’ in order to join the EEC. As he declared to an American ( 
journalist: j
I
We wish to join European institutions with full rights. And that means we are willing to I 
construct a democracy with Spanish characteristics which will allow us to move towards j 
the political currents of the free Europe without having to give up our traditions.(Cited in 
Armero 1989: 21)
When Arias spoke in this way of ‘a democracy with Spanish characteristics’, he was essentially 
demonstrating his allegiance to all the basic tenets of Francoism and its particular version of ‘the j 
nation’. In other words, the democratic institutions of other European countries were viewed as !
I
something which could never work in Spain, given the ‘national character’ of its people. Hence, | 
in his public speeches he repeatedly praised the achievements of the deceased dictator and j 
continued to vilify much of the democratic opposition for acting in an ‘anti-patriotic’ manner j
(Share 1986: 76). The left’s minimum demands of full amnesty for all political prisoners, the '
Í
legalization of all political parties, free trade unions, and free elections, were simply not j 
negotiable with Arias (Preston 1986: 80-1). J
The EEC, however, had already made it clear that entry into ‘Europe’ would never be f
t
allowed without a genuine process of full democratization. The more liberal-minded members of f 
the Arias cabinet, such as the Foreign Minister José María de Areilza, were perfectly aware of J 
this, and hence they pressured the Prime Minister to initiate genuine reforms in the democratic i 
direction. In fact, during the first few months of 1976, Areilza visited the capitals of the member j 
states of the EEC, guaranteeing them that a process of genuine democratization would soon be 
initiated in Spain (Bassols 1995: 154-5). Prime Minister Arias, however, remained a hostage of > 
the Francoist ‘bunker’ and of his own passionate attachment to the legacy of the Generalísimo. ¡
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At the most, he was willing to put forward a watered down version of democratic reforms, but 
this was totally unacceptable to the increasingly confident and unified opposition forces. 
Meanwhile, Basque terrorism continued to rise, large-scale industrial strikes began to spread, and 
mass demonstrations in favour of amnesty for political prisoners took place throughout Spain. 
Such an increase in popular militancy and violence was quickly threatening to erode the 
legitimacy of the new King and the promise of democratic change he supposedly represented. He 
was therefore advised by his liberal-minded councillors to distance himself from the Francoist 
Arias, and in April he declared to the American magazine Newsweek that the Prime Minister was 
‘an absolute disaster’. This statement was widely publicized in the Spanish press, and the King’s 
office made no denial of its validity (Share 1986:78).
Two months later, in June 1976, Juan Carlos made an official state visit to the United States, 
in which he received the backing of the American government for a programme of ‘modem 
democratization’. Speaking before the U.S. Senate, the Spanish King promised to oversee a 
transition to democracy in his country, employing a discourse that clearly represented a 
repudiation of his Prime Minister's Francoist intransigence:
The monarchy will uphold the principles of democracy, social peace, and political stability 
while at the same time assuring the orderly access to power by the different governmental 
alternatives, according to the freely expressed wishes of the people.(Cited in Share: 81)
A few weeks later, on 1 July, Juan Carlos asked for and received Arias’s resignation. The stage 
was then finally set for the successful process of ‘democratization* and ‘Europeanization’ under 
the new Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez.
Initially, the choice of Suarez delighted the Francoist continuistas, and horrified the 
democratic opposition, for he was also a man who had held very high posts in the authoritarian 
regime’s power structure. Under Franco, Suárez had directed the public radio and television 
networks, which were obviously key instruments of regime propaganda, and he had more 
recently served as secretary general of the Movimiento. Nevertheless, Suárez clearly understood 
the popular urge for democratic change, as well as the King’s desire to legitimize his monarchy
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I
through Spain’s political transformation and the recovery of its international respectability. |
Hence, in less than a year, he successfully implemented a process of reform from above, in I
I
continuous dialogue with the forces of the opposition, which made possible the construction of a | 
bicameral system based on universal suffrage, the amnesty of over 400 political prisoners, the j 
legalization of all political parties, the re-establishment of free trade unions, and the celebration ( 
of the first free elections in June 1977. j
Of all the reforms initiated by Suárez, the most daring and controversial was the legalization 
of the Communist Party in April of that year, for it granted legitimacy to a collectivity which 1 
from the Francoist perspective represented the ultimate incarnation of la anti-España (‘anti*;
i
Spain’). The eradication of Marxism was, after all, one of the fundamental causes for which the ] 
Civil War crusade to save ‘the nation* had been fought back in the 1930’s. This decision j 
therefore provoked enormous indignation in military circles, in spite of the fact that in return for J 
its legalization, the Communist Party accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy and its national j 
flag. By granting official legitimation to the Communists, a crucial step was taken in the' 
symbolic construction of a new, much more inclusive concept of ‘the nation* in which any 
political creed could put forth its views and take part in political life without being officially 
stigmatized as ‘anti-patriotic’. Clearly, the celebration of elections without the participation of' 
the Communists would not have been taken seriously by other European states, and hence the'
i
legalization of this party was a fundamental step for the achievement of a fully democratic,, 
‘European’ status. Hence, even for many Spaniards who despised the Communist ideology, the 
legalization of los rojos (‘the reds’) was a vital decision which was necessary for Spain to be 
accepted as a ‘normal European democracy’.
The same applies to the measures adopted by Suárez in relation to the demands of Basque 
and Catalan nationalists. The Prime Minister similarly ignited the rage of the Francoist ‘bunker 
by stomping on another sacred tenet of their own particular version of España: its centralized 
indivisible unity. By the time of the June elections, Basque and Catalan symbols, ceremonies of 
nationhood, and political organizations had also been fully legalized. Once again, such moves
229
were vital for Spain’s achievement of a democratic status which would be acceptable to 
‘Europe’. In the minds of the reformists, it was thus absolutely crucial for the Spanish ‘national 
interest’ to take these political steps towards genuine democratization. But from the perspective 
of orthodox Francoists, these measures represented the worst conceivable treachery of ‘the 
nation’, and hence military barracks were flooded during this period with propaganda which 
railed against the government for the way in which it had deteriorated ‘patriotic values’ (Preston 
1986: 89). However, because King Juan Carlos was Franco’s appointed successor, his 
endorsement of these democratic reforms made possible the fact that many military men 
accepted them in the name of ‘patriotic’ obedience and duty to their commander-in-chief. 
Nevertheless, there were widespread rumours of military conspiracies and the possibility of a 
coup d ’état during much of this period.
All of this therefore illustrates the continuation of an ongoing symbolico-political division 
between different conflicting views of ‘Spain’ and ‘the good of the nation’. On the one hand, 
there was now the consensus of a broad majority of moderate forces, crucially supported by the 
King and Suárez, who fully accepted Spain’s need to become a ‘modem European democracy’ in 
order to ensure political stability, improve the country’s status, and recover its international 
respectability. On the other, there remained the ideals of nostalgic Francoists, with their 
unshakable emotive affiliation to the Generalísimo and their patriotic dogmas on ‘the eternal 
enemies of Spain’. This division eventually reached a dramatic climax in the attempted military 
coup of Februrary 1981, which will be considered later on in this chapter.
In any case, what is crucial for the purposes of this dissertation is to note how in the 
discourse of Suárez and his team of reformist ministers, the success of the democratization 
process was repeatedly linked to the possibility of ‘entering Europe’ during this delicate 
transition period. In its initial programmatic statement as the new government of the Monarchy, 
the Suarez cabinet officially manifested its ‘will towards integration in the European 
Communities’ (cited in Bassols 1995: 161). In itself, such an announcement would not have 
necessarily demonstrated a shift from Francoist discourse, since from the 1960’s the regime had
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always insisted on its own particular ‘European vocation’. However, it soon became evident that | 
for the first time, the need to fully democratize and transform the political structures of Spain j 
was explicitly acknowledged in official governmental discourse as an indispensable condition for I 
the accomplishment of the ‘European’ objective. This was particularly evident in the language j 
employed in relation to the EEC by Suarez’s Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja, in his J 
statements to the media. As Armero (1989: 45-53) has shown, from the moment of his initial [ 
appointment to the celebration of the first democratic elections in June 1977, Oreja repeatedly j 
explained to the Spanish people that ‘Europe’ was impossible without the successful installation | 
of a democratic system: !
For historical and geopolitical reasons, Western Europe constitutes the immediate focus of 
our attention, and within it, the Europe integrated in the Common Market. We cannot 
remain outside the Community, not only for political but also for economic reasons, and so J 
Spanish foreign policy must be directed towards finding the conditions under which we [ 
may be able to participate in the complex edifice which is housed in Brussels.14 I
‘Europe’ was therefore seen as vital for the interests of ‘the nation’, and the ‘conditions’ which j 
were required for the accomplishment of this objective were now stated openly and clearly: j
Spain is in the process of a transformation of its structures and its institutions. The j 
government which Prime Minister Suarez presides has clearly declared its recognition of r 
the fact that sovereignty resides in the people and that the people will determine through . 
universal suffrage the composition of the future Chambers... Undoubtedly, the result of this 
will be that our political system will be on an equal par with that of Western society. This ! 
will clearly facilitate our penetration into into the three economic, political and defensive I 
institutions which are the Common Market, NATO, and the Council of Europe.15 j
Therefore, during the very same period in which the Suarez government was implementing its [ 
full-scale programme of democratic reform, the necessity of this change was linked with Spain’s J 
aspirations to ‘enter Europe’, and its desire to be ‘on an equal par’ with ‘Western society’. After ( 
four decades, the Francoist symbolic monopoly of ‘Spain’ and its own particular brand of f
14 Cambio 16, 16 August 1976 (cited in Armero 1989:47).
15 ABC, 26 September 1976 (cited in Armero 1989:49).
patriotic ‘Europeanisin’ had been defeated, and the discourse of the anti-regime democratizes 
who had united against the dictator in the 1962 Munich reunion now became the officially 
sanctioned language of the Spanish government. It was now openly acknowledged that to 
‘Europeanize’, the nation necessarily had to ‘democratize’, and so the Spanish Foreign Minister 
repeatedly insisted that a new request for adhesion to the EEC could only be possible after the 
celebration of free elections:
When Spain complies with the necessary political and economic conditions, the request for 
entry into the Community will be put forward, but this will not be possible before the 
general elections. (Cited in Armero 1989: 51)
When these first elections finally took place in June, the extent to which the Francoist 
conception of España had been defeated was clearly illustrated by the results. The majority of 
Spaniards clearly opted for the aspiration to ‘liberty’, ‘democracy’, and ‘Europe’. As Carr and 
Fusi (1981: 227) have put it, ‘the elections were a triumph for moderation and change’. The 
Spanish population clearly rewarded the reformist efforts of Suarez, whose centrist coalition 
Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático - UCD) won 34.8% of the vote 
and 165 seats in the 350-member Congress. The other main victor was the moderate left, 
represented by Felipe González’s Spanish Socialist Workers Party {Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español - PSOE), who won 28.5% of the vote and 118 seats. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
highly significant that in their campaign slogans, both of these parties promised to satisfy the 
Spanish people’s aspiration to become ‘European’: ‘Vote center. The ideologies that make 
possible a democratic Europe. The people that will make possible a democratic Spain’; ‘The key 
to Europe is in your hands. Vote PSOE’ (cited in Desfor-Edles 1998: 57).
At the same time, it is equally noteworthy that the extreme right, represented by the 18 July 
National Alliance, gained no seats in these first elections, and even the relatively moderate right- 
wing Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular - AP), led by the former Francoist minister Manuel 
Fraga and other prominent figures from the old regime, only managed to win 16 seats. On the 
other side of the spectrum, the Communists {Partido Comunista de España -  PCE) were also
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relatively unsuccessful, gaining merely 20 seats. The radical antagonisms of the past had thus | 
largely been overcome, and so in opinion polls, four out of five Spaniards now defined J 
themselves as belonging to the area between right and left of centre (Preston 1986: 122). j
If, as Paloma Aguilar (1996) has shown, the Civil War was widely viewed in Spain as the j 
tragic collective memory of the past that had to be avoided at all costs during the transition to 
democracy, one could say that ‘Europe* became the mythical aspiration for the future which the 
majority of Spaniards desired to reach during this delicate period. The dominant we-image was 
now that of a nation which desired to overcome the polarized divisions of the past through 
‘European’ forms of democracy and the successful maintenance of a peaceful, ‘civilized’ co­
existence. As Arango has put it:
Most profound was the popular opinion that Spain must never again repeat the horrors of 
the Civil War. This historical memory shaped the Spaniards’ view of the future, and the 
most exhilarating consensus in this area was the wish to be like other Western Europeans, 
all of whom, in 1977, were democratic^1995: 114)
Similarly, the Spanish sociologist Víctor Pérez-Díaz (1993: 21) has referred to the transition as a  
period during which ‘a new invented tradition and a new identity’ emerged in this country’s j 
public sphere: a ‘symbolic politics of coexistence’, in which the ideal of a new, democratic Spain j 
implied ‘connotations of modernity (“modem Spain” as opposed to “traditional Spain”, or J 
perhaps “backward Spain”) and of belonging to Europe ( a  “European Spain” as opposed to a  j 
“different Spain” or the “isolated Spain” of the past).’ This new politico-cultural idiom, as Pérez- | 
Diaz has shown, pervaded the symbolic universe of everyday politics, and it involved the J 
elaboration of new, emotionally charged totemic icons, such as the ‘sacred text’ of la J 
Constitución (the Constitution), the ‘exemplary institution’ of la monarquía parlamentaria (the 
Parliamentary Monarchy), and the collective national ritual of las elecciones (the democratic J  
elections). Hence, during this crucial period of Spanish history, one can observe that national we- j 
feelings were successfully channelled by a new elite of political leaders in the direction of f
I
‘European democratization’. For many Spaniards, the success of this process was at that time (as f
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it still remains today) a fundamental source of national pride, in the aftermath of General 
Franco’s death:
After decades of being told by Franco and his minions that they were incapable of ruling 
themselves democratically, the majority of Spaniards were justifiably proud of the way 
things were turning out. (Preston 1986: 122)
8.3 The 1977 request to ‘enter Europe’ and the prolonged efforts of the Spanish nation to 
be recognized as a ‘modern democracy’
As soon as democracy had been achieved and hence the political obstacles on the road to the
EEC had disappeared, the elected Suarez government wasted very little time in demonstrating its
determination to achieve the widely desired membership to ‘Europe*. A few days after his
victory, the Spanish Prime Minister -  now endowed with a new aura of democratic authority -
declared in front of a huge crowd of journalists:
Spain is Europe and forms a part of it. Europe receives with the contribution of democratic 
countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the contribution of peoples, and of geographic 
and political structures, which is evidently very important.(Cited in Bassols 1995: 187)
The phrase ‘Spain is Europe’ could now be uttered with a new national self-confidence. Given 
that the possibility of ‘entering Europe’ had become fully identified with the achievement of 
democracy, at this point there was no longer any reason to doubt Spain’s rightful claim to 
‘Europeity’. One can therefore observe in this sort of discourse how the concept of being 
‘European’ had in effect become so linked to EEC membership, that it was not something a 
country could simply be through mere geographical location, history, or cultural background, but 
rather a status-symbol which had to be achieved through the accomplishment of certain political 
and economic conditions. For many Spaniards, it was only through the successful 
accomplishment of this ‘European’ status that the stability of democracy could be secured and 




On 28 July 1977, only six weeks after its electoral victory, the young Spanish democracy 
officially presented its request to open negotiations with the EEC in order to gain full 
membership in this organization. Two days before, Marcelino Oreja, who was re-appointed as 
Foreign Minister in the new cabinet, had declared to the media:
.>* '
The decision adopted by the government of requesting the entry of Spain into the Common 
Market is authentically national. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 192)
Hence, one can clearly see the way in which the necessity of participating in the supranational 
community of ‘Europe’ was typically justified through the symbolic invocation of ‘the nation’: 
this was an ‘authentically national’ decision. In Spain, moreover, no political party challenged 
this official government discourse. The claim that ‘the nation’ clearly needed to ‘enter Europe’ 
was endorsed by all the parties represented in the Spanish Parliament, as well as by both business 
organizations and trade unions. (Bassols 1995: 192) The overwhelming support shown in the 
elections for a democratic political system was therefore mirrored by an identical enthusiasm for 
integration into Europe.
The Spanish government’s official petition to Brussels was marked by a brief political 
ceremony or ‘media performance’ during which Foreign Minister Oreja handed three letters 
from Prime Minister Suarez to the President of the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities, the Belgian Henri Simonet, requesting Spain’s adhesion into the EEC, the ECSC, 
and Euratom. This ‘historic event* was, of course, amply covered by the national press. The 
country’s two leading newspapers at that time, El Pais and ABC (the latter leaning towards the 
left, and the former towards the right)16 devoted their main front page stories to the political 
ritual of request, publishing photographs of the key moment in which the Spanish Foreign
16 El Pais was bom in 1976, one year after Franco’s death, and it quickly became el periódico de la transición, the 
leading newspaper of the transition period, a position which it has maintained up to the present day, with the 
conservative ABC remaining in second place since that time (Fuentes and Sebastián 1998). In the late 1970’s, El 
Pais had a daily average circulation of 183.000, while ABC  had approximately 130.000 readers. Figures cited in 
Anuario de El País, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.
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Minister handed the official petitions and enthusiastically shook hands with the EEC 
representative [reproduced on the following page]. The emotive discourse employed by the 
journalists covering this political ceremony once again illustrates the symbolic identification of 
‘democratization’ and ‘Europeanization’ in the collective consciousness of Spaniards:
In this historic hour... Spain has reached the end of a road which began on 9 February 1962 
and which was obstructed by a whole series of political problems that today the young 
Spanish democracy has been able to overcome.17
Europe, from today onwards, is something possible, attainable, and even close at hand for 
Spaniards. Having overcome the political obstacles which for many years impeded the 
Spanish request for adhesion to the European Communities, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Marcelino Oreja, has culminated the process which precedes the opening of 
negotiations... It has been the Spanish people who with their desire for democracy have 
carved the path towards a liberal society which makes possible the entry of Spain into the 
community club. Without the minimum requirements of parliamentary democracy, the trip 
of Mister Oreja would not have been possible. One cannot request entry into a club without 
guarantees of being admitted.18
One can see, therefore, how the mere fact of being welcomed in Brussels and having the chance 
of requesting Spain’s adhesion to the EEC as a fully fledged democracy in itself represented a 
crucial boost to national pride. Spain was no longer a denigrated ‘backward disctatorship’, it had 
managed to prove its ‘democratic credentials’, and so it now had every right to be recognized as 
a ‘normal European nation’.
Nevertheless, it soon became evident that entry into the EEC would certainly not be 
automatic, although at this point the difficulties had more to do with economic than with political 
circumstances. From the beginning, the new request met the opposition of France, because the 
agricultural sector in this country feared the threat represented by competition from Spanish 
products (Bassols 1995: 193). This became one of the main obstacles which prolonged the 
waiting period that Spaniards had to experience before they could definitively call themselves 
‘Europeans’. The Suarez government, in any case, made every effort to show the Spanish people 1
11 ABC, 29 July 1977, p. 8 
izElPafs, 28 July 1977, p. 3
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that it was doing everything possible to get them ‘into Europe’. Between August and September 
of 1977, the Prime Minister toured the capitals of the nine member states of the EEC, and 
assured Spaniards, through his declarations to the media, that in every country he had found 
enthusiastic support for the Spanish request (Bassols 1995: 200). In November, a partial 
penetration into the European sphere was achieved through Spain’s entry into the Council of 
Europe, another ‘historic occasion’ which once again was ritually marked by an emotive 
ceremony in which Foreign Minister Oreja reaffirmed the Spanish people’s full identification 
with the defence of ‘human rights* and ‘democratic pluralism’ (Armero 1989: 90). National 
pride was thus being slowly rebuilt in the sphere of morality and ethical respectability: after 
years of dictatorship and international opprobium, Spain was now being defined as equally 
‘democratic’ and as a nation which upheld ‘human rights’ as much as any other ‘European’ 
country.
In February 1978, the government further demonstrated its interest in satifying Spain’s 
European aspirations, by creating a cabinet-level position devoted exclusively to relations with 
the EEC. The new minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was quickly dubbed ‘Mr. Europe’ in the 
media (Salisbury 1980: 113). These concerted efforts finally bore fruit on 5 February 1979, when 
negotiations were officially opened in Brussels between the Spanish state and the European 
Communities. As usual, in a style which by now was entirely habitual in Spain, the political 
discourse which surrounded this new step on the road to ‘Europe* continued to emphasize the 
link between democratization and Europeanization. Before travelling to Brussels, Foreign 
Minister Oreja declared to journalists:
You must not forget that for us the entry of Spain into the EEC has not only an economic, 
but also a political content. Many issues which affect us would be better resolved within 
the Community. Furthermore, we feel identified with Europe in the defence of peace, 
political pluralism, and democracy.(Cited in Armero 1989: 81)
This was the new national ‘we’ which had powerfully emerged in post-Franco Spain: an 
officially sanctioned version of ‘the nation’ which fully identified with ‘the democratic values of 
Europe.’ The Francoist repudiation of ‘vile’ and ‘inferior’ liberal politics, generally condemned
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in the regime’s discourse as ‘judeo-masonic conspiracies’, had practically disappeared from the 
public sphere.
It is also undoubtedly significant that the President of the European Commission during this 
period, Roy Jenkins, welcomed Spain’s negotiating team with a speech that linked their presence 
in the EEC with the successful transition to democracy: d
This is a happy day for you and for us. Spain is a part of Europe, and Europe is incomplete 
without Spain... You come to this table with the immense authority provided by the total 
support of your people and of all political parties, through which Spanish public opinion 
expresses itself. I would like to express my admiration not only for your government, but 
also for your King, for the notable and peaceful way with which Spain has achieved a 
profound constitutional change in such a short time. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 221)
The Spanish people were thus finally receiving gestures of deference, respect, and admiration 
from ‘Europe’, after the long period of isolation and denigration that had been experienced 
during the Franco dictatorship. It is perhaps worth recalling here the insights of Charles Cooley 
on the ‘looking glass self, which I referred to in my introductory chapter. Cooley argued that the 
more human beings admire and respect those who honour them, the greater the feelings of pride 
which they experience in response to such gestures of deference. From this perspective, one 
could say that ‘Europe’ had clearly become an idealized ‘significant Other’ -  to use George 
Herbet Mead’s language -  in Spain, and hence that the warm way in which the Foreign Minister 
of la España democrática was received in Brussels was a potent source of national self-esteem.
In March 1979, the second general elections were held in Spain, three months after the 
referendum in which the Spanish people approved, by a wide majority, the new democratic 
constitution drawn up by representatives from all the main political parties. The UCD remained 
in power, and continued its full-scale ‘Europeanisf offensive. Shortly after the elections, a 
parliamentary debate took place on Spain’s request to join the European Communities. The 
discourse of the leading governmental figures continued to stress the crucial importance of 
accomplishing the ‘European’ objective for the consolidation of Spain’s young democracy. 
Calvo Sotelo, the minister for relations with the EEC, declared that, aside from the evident 
economic opportunities represented by the Common Market:
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Europe should also be for us the ultimate cause which should give meaning to this 
legislative term; it should be the great adventure abroad in which our new State may be 
strengthened and secured; it should be the place of coincidence, and I would even say, the 
place of consensus, for all the political forces represented here.(Cited in Armero 1989: 83)
Foreign Minister Oreja similarly continued to emphasize the link between Spain’s participation 
in ‘Europe’ and the moral commitment to human rights:
The Spanish government, which has made the defence of human rights one of the 
fundamental dimensions of its foreign policy, is in favour of a model of society based on 
the affirmation and defence of these rights... Spain will work with the European 
Communities and its institutions to defend the universal respect... for those rights, because 
we are convinced that the foundation of political order and social peace lies in the respect 
of the dignity of the human person.(Cited in Armero 1989: 86)
In the context of the new legislative term, the government's efforts to achieve Spain’s adhesion 
to the EEC retained the support of all the political parties represented in Parliament (Bassols 
1995: 224). Hence, above and beyond the commercial benefits of participating in the Common 
Market, the ‘Europe’ of ‘liberty’ and ‘human rights’ was presented as a model of ethical prestige 
for the Spanish nation, and as the best way to protect the fragile democratic structures that had 
been constructed during la transición. ‘Europe’, apart from everything else, was an opportunity 
to shake off the stigma of Francoist xenophobia and cruelty, of police tortures and executions by 
firing squad. An interesting parallel can perhaps be drawn here with the way in which the 
enthusiastic adoption of a European identity appears to have functioned in Germany, as a way of 
overcoming the collective guilt of the Nazi past (Forsythe 1989). In the discourse of Spain’s new 
leaders, ‘Europe’ also became a symbol of moral renewal after the collapse of an authoritarian 
dictatorship.
Nevertheless, in spite of the Suárez government’s efforts, the country’s ‘European’ 
aspirations were clearly not being fulfilled with the quickness which many had expected. 
Precisely because of the fact that in Spain the achievement of democracy had been linked to the 
possibility of ‘entering Europe’, people could simply not understand why at this point it was 
taking so long for the country to be accepted into the EEC (Share 1986: 214-5). This unfulfilled
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expectation, along with other major problems such as economic recession, unemployment, the 
continuing escalation of Basque terrorism, and the increasing rumours of military conspiracies 
against the government, led to an inevitable desencanto (disenchantment) with democracy. Many 
critical voices began to claim that in the end, democracy was simply not delivering the goods it 
had promised. Spain, after all, had hardly become a paradise after the death of Franco and the 
first free elections. As Raymond Carr (1980: 179) has put it: i
Spaniards expected the mere installation of democracy to solve every problem from I 
structural unemployment to pollution and access to education. To take a serious example: | 
since the undemocratic nature of the Francoist regime had effectively kept Spain out of the | 
European Community, then the coming of a democratic regime would ensure automatic 
and immediate entry. This hope was not realized. I
Unfortunately for Spaniards, in spite of their collective desire for ‘Europe’, there were still major j 
obstacles on this path. The opposition of the French agricultural sector to Spain’s entry remained | 
very strong, and hence politicians in this country preferred to secure electoral support by j 
promising to defend their own ‘national interests’ rather than to welcome the young Spanish I 
democracy with open arms. In June 1980, with general elections on the horizon in France, [ 
President Giscard D’Estaing declared that further European enlargement would have to be - 
indefinitely postponed until all the economic and institutional problems represented by this I 
expansion were fully resolved (Bassols 1995: 237-41). ‘Europe’, therefore, seemed to be in no | 
hurry to open its doors to Spain after all, even after the country’s political transformation. [ 
Relations with France were further strained by the fact that French territory was becoming the J 
sanctuary of ETA terrorists. This situation of European policy failures led to massive criticism of f 
Foreign Minister Oreja, who was accused of incompetence by the media and had to be removed J 
from his post in September 1980 (Armero 1989: 89). j
Furthermore, during this same period Suarez's governing UCD party coalition began to fall i 
apart, as the differences between its Christian Democrat, its Social Democrat, and its Liberal 
wings came to the surface over controversial issues such as the legalization of divorce. An 
artificial union of political families, which had been forged during the consensus period of the 
transition, was beginning to crumble (Arango 1995: 140-42). The Prime Minister himself was
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being intensely criticized for his incapacity to resolve Spain’s problems, and eventually he gave 
up and decided to resign on January 29, 1981. All of this inevitably contributed to a further 
increase in the intensity of the desencanto with democracy.
It was in this context of renewed tension and uncertainty that the military men who felt that 
la patria and its ‘true patriotic values’ had been betrayed after Franco’s death attempted to 
resurrect the ‘spirit of the national crusade’. The authoritarian ‘bunker’ apparently interpreted the 
atmosphere of desencanto as a sign that the Spanish people were fed up with democracy and 
longed for a return to Taw and order’ (Preston 1986: 160). As mentioned earlier, the legalization 
of the Communists and the devolution of regional autonomy to Basques and Catalans was seen 
as the ultimate treason to the Spanish nation in the minds of staunch Francoists. The continuing 
rise of ETA terrorism had confirmed, in their view, that democracy could only lead to separatism 
and chaos. Hence, on 23 February 1981, while the nomination of the new Prime Minister, 
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was being submitted to a parliamentary vote, a group of armed civil 
guards led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina stormed into the Spanish Congress, 
firing a round of warning shots in the air with their machine guns, and shouting Todos al suelo! 
(‘Everyone to the floor!’) Tejero then announced that sus señorías, the ‘right honourable 
members of parliament’, would be held hostage until further notice. Suddenly, the ‘European 
Spain’ of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ was being threatened by the terrifying ghost of the 
Generalísimo (although, from the perspective of the conspirators themselves, la patria was of 
course being saved from the forces of anarchy).
Nevertheless, in less than 24 hours, this attempt by nostalgic Francoists to resuscitate their 
version of ‘the nation’ failed, primarily because King Juan Carlos, as Commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, opposed the conspiracy and rallied the majority of Spain’s military leaders on his 
side. At 1 a.m. on 24 February, the monarch addressed the Spanish people in a television 
broadcast, reassuring them that the coup had failed and that ‘our democracy’ had been saved 
(Arango 1995: 143). This dramatic event clearly revealed the continuing fragility of Spain’s 
democratic structures. Nevertheless, in the end it also bolstered the public image of the King as
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‘guardian of the nation’s will* and revived the emotional climate of popular enthusiasm for 
political liberty which had characterized the transition period. On 27 February, three million 
people demonstrated in favour of democracy in Madrid and other cities, clearly illustrating the 
extent to which Juan Carlos had interpreted the wishes of the majority (Preston 1986: 201). For 
many Spaniards, the attempted coup was therefore a shameful reminder of the Spain that had 
been, while the intervention of their ‘democratic King’ became a renewed source of national 
pride, a symbol of the Spain that could be.
With regard to the main theme of this dissertation, it is interesting to observe the way in 
which the challenge to democracy represented by the so-called 23-F was inevitably seen as a 
fundamental threat to the nation’s ‘European’ aspirations. During the hours of uncertainty which 
followed the shocking sound of Tejero’s gun shots as he entered the parliamentary chamber, for 
many Spaniards it seemed as if everything that ‘the nation’ had achieved in the approximation to 
‘Europe’ was suddenly being lost. As the whole world watched, the Spanish democracy, ‘our 
democracy’, was being humilated.19 Furthermore, once the coup had failed, the official 
declarations of support which emanated from EEC authorities reaffirmed the symbolic link 
between the survival of democracy and the possibility of taking part in the project of European 
unification:
The Commission has always been convinced that the Spain of democracy had its place in 
the European Community... The Commission has always admired the quickness with 
which Spain has recuperated the democratic traditions of Europe, a quickness which was 
the expression of a great political maturity... The Commission trusts that the initiators of 
violence, which have wanted to provoke subversion, have in fact provoked a reaffirmation 
of the constitutional order. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 225)
All the usual points were therefore emphasized yet again: only ‘the Spain of democracy’ could 
find a place in the EC, only the recuperation of ‘the democratic traditions of Europe’ could allow 
Spain its rightful place in the process of supranational integration.
191 have often heard Spaniards describing the 1981 coup in such terms.
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A few weeks later, on March 13, the European Parliament approved a resolution which 
transmitted exactly the same message: the Spanish people and their King were congratulated for 
overcoming a threat to their young democracy. At the same time, they were also reminded that:
A system of pluralist parliamentary democracy and the respect of human rights constitute 
the necessary conditions for the accession and membership of any country to the European 
Community.(Cited inBassoIs 1995: 256)
Finally, on 16 March, the new Spanish Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez Llorca, travelled to 
Brussels and declared before his European colleagues that although the coup had threatened the 
liberty and democracy which the Spanish people had conquered in the previous five years, it had 
also provoked an important positive effect:
to reaffirm our conviction in the necessity of consolidating the construction of the 
democratic institutions of the State, whose firmness has been significantly demonstrated 
after this challenge, and of culminating the objective which is an inseparable corollary of 
that construction: our full integration into the European Community.(Cited in Bassols
1995: 259)
The official government discourse was therefore as determined as ever in its Euro-democratic 
convictions: if the coup had undoubtedly strengthened the Spanish people’s faith and enthusiasm 
in democracy, it had similarly strengthened their desires to join the European Community as a 
way of fortifying this collective achievement. Indeed, membership to ‘Europe* was once again 
presented here as the culmination, the ultimate goal of Spanish democracy. Hence, the Foreign 
Minister begged the EEC authorities to show generosity towards his country, because ‘what is 
really at stake is the will of that immense majority of Spaniards who has decided to live in 
liberty’ (Cited in Bassols 1995: 259).
The failed coup therefore did nothing but strengthen the belief of many Spaniards that ‘the 
nation’ desperately needed ‘Europe’ to secure it once and for all from the threat of 
‘backwardness’ and ‘opression*. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe how during their trial, 
the conspirators who organized the 1981 revolt were totally unwilling to give up their own 




motivated solely by ‘patriotism* and by their love for ‘national values’, in spite of the fact that 
for most Spaniards, the whole episode was a source of collective embarrassment and humiliation, 
a chilling return to Francoist backwardness (Preston 1986: 218). National self-esteem was now 
widely based on the achievement of a ‘European* form of democracy, and hence in many 
Spanish minds, nothing could have provoked greater shame than the triumph of the nostalgic 
Francoists.
This massive popular support for European ‘modernization’ and ‘democratization*, with its 
implicit rejection of everything the coup d ’état had stood for, was confirmed in the next general 
elections, which took place on 28 October 1982. The UCD, racked by internal divisions, suffered 
an enormous defeat, while Felipe Gonzalez’s Socialists won an absolute majority. Less than 
seven years after Franco’s death, Spaniards had voted for the largest party on the left (a very 
‘anti-Spanish’ or ‘anti-patriotic’ thing to do, from the perspective of the Generalísimo). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the discourse of the PSOE was not one of radical | 
socialist transformation. Since 1979, this party had abandoned the concept of Marxism and J 
moderated its proposals, until in the 1982 elections it successfully occupied the centrist position j 
previously represented by the UCD (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 143). In effect, the young and j 
dashing Felipe González became the spokesperson of ‘Europeanization’, the new charismatic j 
leader who promised to definitively consolidate the fragile Spanish democracy and lead ‘the j 
nation’ to the paradise of ‘modernity’.20 Hence, in the inaugural speech he delivered in the | 
Spanish Parliament as the nation’s new Prime Minister, González therefore assured Spaniards j 
that he would ‘work with tenacity to eliminate the obstacles which still stand in the way of our J 
full integration in the European Communities’ (cited in Bassols 1995: 280). Under the Socialists, I 
therefore, ‘Europe’ was still the great legitimating symbol, the national aspiration that remained j
20 As Holman has written, ‘once in power, an ideological offensive was carried though, aimed at presenting the 
comprehensive hegemonic project of the PSOE as the only possible one, the only way to realize what was seen as 
essential for the future of Spain: the country’s modernization and Europeanization* (1996: 79),
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unfulfilled, and hence the ideal of ‘catching up with Europe’ was constantly invoked by the new 
government (Holman 1996: 80).
It was finally on 29 March 1985, after a long, exasperating waiting period, that Felipe 
González officially announced in a special ‘media performance’ to ‘the nation’ -  a live broadcast 
on Spanish television -  that all obstacles had been overcome: the negotiations with Brussels had 
successfully concluded, and so Spain had at last been accepted ‘into Europe’. It is worth citing 
extensively from this emotionally charged political ritual, for it perfectly captures the dominant 
affective meaning of ‘Europe’ which was symbolically constructed in post-Franco Spain:
Today, with honour and satisfaction, I address all the citizens and peoples of Spain to 
transmit to them a message of hope in our future. Early this morning, a transcendental, 
irreversible step has been taken for our integration in the European Economic 
Community... For Spain, this is a deed of great significance. As a historic fact, it signifies 
the end of our age-old isolation. It signifies, as well, our participation in the common 
destiny of Western Europe. For democratic Spain, for the Spain which lives in freedom, it 
also signifies the culmination of a process of struggle of millions of Spaniards who have 
identified freedom and democracy with integration in Western Europe. For Spain as a 
social reality, as an economic reality, it undoubtedly signifies a challenge, the challenge of 
modernity and competition, a challenge to which I am certain that our workers, our 
businessmen, our scientists, our professionals, and society as a whole will rise up... I think 
we have the obligation to do so, and that we are going to comply with this obligation of 
leaving our children a Spain with a greater level of economic efficiency, a greater level of 
culture, and a greater capacity for solidarity. A Spain which, in Europe and with Europe, 
will play the role which is concordant with the history of Spain, of our own Spain, and 
which in Europe and with Europe, will play the role which our collective will as a people, 
as a nation, will be capable of forging.21
‘Entering Europe’ was therefore something which could be confidently announced in the 
Spanish public sphere ‘with honour and satisfaction*. It was ‘a deed of great significance’, 
because it signified the end of Spain’s ‘age-old isolation’, the culmination of the struggle for 
‘freedom and democracy’, and the opportunity to rise up to ‘the challenge of modernity’. In 
short, it was ‘in Europe and with Europe’ that Spain’s future generations would benefit from ‘a 
greater level of economic efficiency, a greater level of culture, and a greater capacity for 
solidarity’.
21 El Pais, 30 March 1985.
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This triumphalist discourse, furthermore, was widely echoed in the press. For instance, in an 
article entitled Aleluia por Europa (‘Alleluia for Europe’) [reproduced on the following page], 
the editor-in-chief of El Pais stated that the encounter with ‘Europe’ signified above all ‘the 
discovery of a mental and ideological space still new to us, in which the words invoked for so 
long by Spanish intellectuals -  tolerance, freedom, and rights -  are deeply rooted in a way which 
will inevitably and happily benefit us.’22 Similarly, ABC displayed on its cover an EEC door 
which opened widely to welcome Spaniards inside its terrain of prosperity and prestige 
[reproduced on the following page], while an editorial in this newspaper, entitled Un Día 
Histórico, ‘A Historic Day’ asserted that this achievement was:
a turning point which will anchor us, for a long time, in the orbit of the nations in which 
individual rights, free enterprise, and the freedom of ideas impose themselves upon any 
totalitarian temptation... a space which is still, in spite of everything, the geographic 
platform of reason and liberty.23
Another article in ABC also celebrated the way in which Spain had finally ceased to be ‘African’, 
by proclaiming that ‘from yesterday, Europe no longer ends at the Pyrenees’, and defining the 
accession into the EEC as a ‘genuine democratic baptism’ that had saved the dignity of the 
Spanish people.24 ‘Europe’ was thus presented in these emotionally charged discourses as the 
ideal antidote for all remaining traces of Francoist backwardness, and as the fundamental 
collective achievement that made possible the recovery of national self-respect by finally being 
recognized as a ‘modem democracy’.
8.4 The 1985 signature ceremony of accession into ‘Europe’: a ritual of national 
effervescence and collective self-veneration
22 El Pais, 31 Mardi 1985.
23 ABC, 29 Mardi 1985.
24 Manuel Blanco Tobio, *¿Daremos la talla?', ABC, 31 Mardi 1985.
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On 12 June 1985, a spectacular ceremony was organized by Spanish authorities to mark the 
nation’s accession into the EEC.25 The official entry of Spain into the Common Market would 
not take place until 1 January 1986, but the signing of the treaty on this day was transformed into 
a major ‘national event’ by the government. The ritual, which took place at the Royal Palace in 
Madrid, was attended by King Juan Carlos, Felipe González and his entire cabinet, the President 
of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and other leading EEC authorities, the leaders of 
all political parties, the heads of Spain’s regional governments, bankers, businessmen, trade 
union leaders, artists, writers, sportsmen, and many other national personalities. The famous 
Catalan painter, Salvador Dali, drew 17 special drawings to commemmorate the event, all of 
which depicted the mythical Greek story of Europe’s abduction by Zeus [see report on the 
following page]. They were given as a special present to each of the treaty’s signatories, with a 
caption written by the artist: ‘We are the bull that abducted Europe for ourselves.’26 The ‘we’, of 
course, was the proud national ‘we’of Spain, a ‘we’ which, like the Greek God of the ancient 
myth, had finally managed to seduce the irresistible Europa. The mayor of Madrid, Enrique 
Tierno Galván, also published a special proclamation in which he called Europe ‘the Reason of 
the universe that guides the rest of the world’s peoples with the light of intelligence and the 
health of its sentiments’.27 After declaring that on this day ‘we are more European than we have 
ever been’, he asked his fellow citizens, los madrileños, to show the world their exhuberant 
happiness on such a joyous occasion: ‘the discovery that we are a part of the Europe that has 
discovered itself. The enormous importance which Spanish authorities gave to the event was 
futher illustrated by the fact that the main public television channel broadcast the entire 
ceremony live from the grand hall of the Royal Palace, which had been decorated with the flags 
of all the EEC’s member states. In this way, the entire nation was invited to participate in this 
civil liturgy of collective self-veneration.
25My analysis of this event is based entirely on the reports published in ABC, El Pais, and Diario-16.
16El Pais, 12 June 1985.
27The entire text was published by Diario-16, 12 June 1985.
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Such an event can thus be analyzed as another fascinating illustration of political symbolism 
concerning ‘the nation’, within the context of European integration. It shows how national 
sentiments in Spain were ignited during this ‘historic occasion’, as the country’s leaders and 
citizens proudly assumed their new ‘European’ status. Following Emile Durkheim, one can 
define this emotionally charged ceremony as a ritual of ‘collective effervescence’: a mass 
adoration of la España democrática and its ‘European achievement’, as well as an affirmation of 
national pride to celebrate the fact that this old aspiration had finally been achieved. At the same 
time, following the emphasis on the political efficacy of ritual highlighted by authors such as 
Lukes and Kertzer, one can observe how such a ritual was employed to bolster the popularity and 
strengthen the legitimacy, or what Bourdieu would call the ‘symbolic capital’, of those power- 
holders who had guided ‘the nation’ towards its European goal: King Juan Carlos, Felipe 
González and his government, as well as more generally, all state authorities since the transition 
to democracy. In the Spanish case, entry into ‘Europe’ clearly symbolized the triumph of 
‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’, the culmination of a difficult process that had begun after 
Franco’s death. Hence, this elaborate rite de passage into the EEC can be viewed as an important 
symbolic effort to further legitimate the constitutional monarchy and its democratic institutions, 
and hence as one more step in the delegitimation of the previous authoritarian regime. Indeed, in 
a country where the very name of the nation, España, had almost become a taboo due to the 
symbolic monopolization of the term which was carried out by Franco and his propagandists, the 
idea of a ‘modem’, ‘democratic’, and hence ‘European’ Spain was employed to morally 
relegitimate the concept of Spanish nationhood.
The collective joy of the occasion was partly marred, however, by the fact that ETA terrorists 
assassinated four people on the very same day: an army colonel, his chauffeur, and a policeman 
in Madrid, as well as a Navy officer in the Basque city of Portugalete. The choice of this 
particular day was obviously no coincidence: a ritualized moment of ‘national celebration’ such 
as this one was chosen by this Basque separatist group in order to make clear that it had 
absolutely nothing to cheer about. On the contrary, for ETA and its supporters, España remained
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a symbol which stood for the oppression of what they saw as their own ‘nation’, Euzkadi, and 
hence on a day which was supposed to mark the ‘Spanish national success’ of ‘entering Europe’, 
the terrorists attempted to spoil the festivities by murdering four men who in their own minds 
were classified as ‘enemies of Basque freedom’. Nevertheless, in spite of this renewed attempt to 
destabilize the young Spanish democracy and delegitimize the central state’s definition of 
España, the spectacular Euro-celebrations went ahead as planned, aside from the last-minute 
cancellation of a fire-works display which had been originally scheduled on this special day’s 
agenda.
The presence of the head of the Basque regional government, José Antonio Ardanza, at the 
signature ceremony, and his declarations of support for Spanish entry into Europe, illustrates 
how in any case, the radical separatist posture of the ETA terrorists was not shared by the more 
moderate Basque Nationalist Party. Ardanza stated to journalists that the Basque people were 
ready to accept the challenge represented by Spain’s accession into the EEC, because ‘we want 
to be a modem and European country’.28 The same applies to the Catalan nationalist leader Jordi 
Pujol, who also attended the ceremony and declared that the accesión into Europe was a very 
positive move, because it represented the end of an isolation period which had harmed the whole 
of ‘Spanish society’ for a very long time.29 According to figures cited in Hutchinson (1994: 147), 
during the 1980’s some 40% of Basques claimed to be exclusively Basque, and only 15% of the 
population in Catalonia described themselves as solely Catalan. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that in the discourse of Basque and Catalan nationalists, Spain was (and is) usually referred to 
with the cold, bureaucratic concept of ‘the state’, but never with the warm, emotionally charged 
ideal of ‘the nation’ (which is reserved solely for the notions of Catalunya and Euzkadi).
In all the main speeches which were delivered during the signature ceremony, entry into the 
EEC was logically presented as the climax of the process which has been traced throughout this
2*ABC, 13 June 1985.
29ABC, 13 June 1985.
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chapter: the symbolic linkage between ‘democratization’, ‘m odernization’, and
‘Europeanization’. Hence, in the opening address, King Juan Carlos welcomed the 
representatives o f Europe in the following manner:
Spain is proud to receive the m ost illustrious dignitaries o f the European Communities and 
the nations w hich integrate them. You represent what the Spanish people understand by 
Europe: the principles o f  liberty, equality, pluralism, and justice, which also preside over 
the Spanish constitution. The Spanish people welcome you with satisfaction, and conscious 
of the great significance which this event implies.
Long gone were the days o f Franco’s ‘European vocation’: the ‘European Spain’ with a 
‘Christian m ission’ to preserve its ‘national soul’ from the dangerous forces o f  ‘liberalism ’, the 
‘judeo-m asonic conspiracy’ and ‘the reds*. This was now the ‘Europe* that had been conquered 
by the transition to democracy: the ‘Europe’ of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘pluralism ’, and ‘justice’ 
which ‘the nation’ had successfully reached. It was, indeed, the ‘Europe’ through w hich King 
Juan Carlos had found widespread popular support for a monarchy initially stigm atized due to its 
Francoist origins.
The King also stressed that Spain, in spite o f its centuries o f co-existence with Islamic and 
Hebrew cultures, as well as its expansion abroad to America, ‘had never lost its desire to be 
European.’ In any case, this multicultural heritage, according to Juan Carlos, in no way 
dim inished Spain’s ‘Europeanness’, because a closed, fortified ‘Europe’, disdainful o f other 
peoples, would not be true to itself:
This is w hy Spain, by m anifesting its ties to Hispanic-speaking peoples, and encouraging 
friendship w ith the African and Arab world, does not diminish its Europeity, but rather 
manifests it creatively.
In this way, the monarch’s discourse represented a repudiation o f Francoist Spain, its ‘Euro- 
Christian* religious purity, and its fear o f  ‘foreign contamination’. The new  we-im age of ‘the 
nation’ was one o f  tolerance and openness, and these were now  defined as the true values of 30
30 The entire text of the address was published by El Pais, 13 June 1985.
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‘Europeity’. Hence, in the nam e of his people, the K ing m anifested Spain’s will to contribute to I 
the construction o f a united Europe, an objective ‘w hich fills our future with hope’. This |
illustrates how although ‘nationalism ’ is often equated exclusively with its xenophobic J
manifestations, there are contexts in w hich national w e-feelings can conceivably be channelled | 
in the opposite direction: a nation m ay construct an im age o f  itself as ‘open’ and ‘to lerant’ of j 
‘others’, and m ay feel proud o f such a ‘m odem ’ ethical choice (even if  actual behaviour m ay not ( 
really be consistent with this self-claim). In the context o f th is signature ceremony, ‘Europe’ was | 
identified in Spanish political discourse with the achievem ent o f this moral renewal. 1
The address delivered by Felipe G onzález followed the very same discursive path.31 32 The 
Spanish Prime M inister called the treaty o f  accession a ‘historic occasion’, which was vital ‘to 
complete the unification of our old continent and to  overcom e the age-old isolation o f S pain’. He | 
recalled the country’s 1977 request to enter the EE C  after the recuperation o f dem ocracy, and j 
affirmed that the unanimity shown by all political groups in relation to this issue ‘reflected the | 
overwhelming desires o f the majority o f Spaniards, for w hom  the integration o f Spain in Europe 
was identified with participation in the ideals o f  liberty, progress, and dem ocracy.’ The symbolic I 
link between Europeanization and the struggle for democratization was further stressed in his | 
speech by a hom age to those Spaniards who ‘assum ed personal risks’ during the Franco regime 
by attending the European reunions o f The H ague in 1948 and Munich in 1962. Through • 
membership in the European Comm unity, G onzález solem nly declared, ‘it is an entire nation that | 
recuperates the sense o f its history. Furtherm ore, like K ing Juan Carlos, the Prim e M inister 
also stressed Spain’s cultural links with Latin A m erica and Africa, and suggested that because of 
them, ‘Spain understands the universality o f Europe’. Once again, the Spanish nation’s supposed
31 The entire text of this speech was published by El Pats, 13 June 1985.
32 Gonzalez’s reference to the anti-Francoist Munich reunion in 1962 demonstrates how, as Berta Âlvarez-Miranda 
(1996: 310) has argued, ‘Since 1957, the Community and the European Movement had offered a common terrain for 
the different sectors of the opposition to Franco’s regime and to the most modernizing and open-minded sectors 
within the authoritarian system itself. The tradition of delegitimization of Francoism, from the opposition, as a result 
of its international isolation and, in particular, its exclusion from the EC, had transfomed the latter into a symbol of 
democracy.’
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allegiance to the ‘European’ values of openness, tolerance, and respect for other cultures was 
reaffirmed with pride.
Aside from these ideals, the other m ajor symbol invoked by González in relation to ‘Europe’ 
was, o f course, ‘modernity’. For Spain, entry into the EEC represented ‘a challenge of modernity 
which requires a change of mentalities and of structures.’ Nevertheless, the Prime M inister 
emphasized that he was convinced that the Spanish people would succesfully rise up to  such a 
challenge, in order to ‘cross the threshold o f the next century w ith confidence and firm ness’. In 
the name o f his nation, González prom ised that Spain would be ‘neither a burden nor an 
obstacle’ to the progress of European unification, but that on the contrary, the Spanish people 
would collaborate ‘as much as our energies allow us’ in this goal. This ceremony, he concluded, 
was ‘an act o f faith in Europe... o f hope in a more just, more cohesive, and m ore unified Europe’. 
In a clear reference to the terrorists who on that very day had challenged the very concept o f ‘the 
Spanish nation’ with the language of gunfire, the Prime M inister ended his emotive address by 
stating that Spain would devote its energies to the construction o f ‘a Europe of peace and 
justice’, and that this was something that ‘no one, through coercion or violence’ would be  able to 
prevent. The imagery of Spanish political discourse on ‘Europe’ therefore reached its ultimate 
climax: ‘the nation’ had become ‘European’ through a democratic transformation, a  moral 
com mitment to tolerance and human rights, and a passionate desire to be ‘m odem ’. The project 
o f European unification was therefore fully equated with all the ideals which represented great 
sources o f collective pride for a nation that until very recently had suffered the painful stigm a of 
‘backwardness’.
A t the same time, the Spanish ego w as further flattered by the speeches of the main European 
figureheads which attended the signature ritual.33 At that tim e, the rotating Presidency o f the 
European Community was held by Italy, and hence both its Prim e M inister, Bettino Craxi, as
33Published by El País, 13 June 1985.
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well as its Foreign M inister, Giulio Andreotti, praised Spain for the democratic transformation 
which had made possible its acceptance into the European club. Craxi, for instance, stated:
Today your great country finalizes a process w hich demonstrates the wisdom, the tenacity, 
and the far-sightedness o f  its people and the Spanish government*.. W e have always 
considered your country an essential part o f  Europe, not only due to its geographical 
location, bu t also because o f the history, the culture, and the art of Spain have developed in 
parallel to those o f the other great European nations.
A ndreotti’s address similarly piled on even more ‘European’ deference on the Spanish nation:
For Spain, entry into the Com m unity constitutes a new occasion that will allow it to p lay  
the role w hich its traditions and its potentialities assign it in the community of European 
nations. W e find ourselves before a  country which, while preserving its own individuality, 
has always been a protagonist of European history... [In Spain] the European ideal assum es 
the symbolic value of a choice in favour o f dem ocracy and liberty.
Finally, it was perhaps the words o f the President o f the European Commission, Jacques D elors 
(the closest thing in the European Community that resembles a totemic, symbolic incarnation o f 
‘Europe’) which struck the m ost em otive chords o f Spanish nationhood:
Spain has finally joined us. I can say it very simply: we needed you... How can we not feel 
stronger and more ambitious w ith a Spain that has now reached the rank of a  w orld 
industrial power, a Spain that has found a way to reconquer liberty and democracy, a Spain 
that wants to conserve its essential values while at the same time firmly establishing itself 
within m odernity?
Just in case there had ever been any doubts, the ‘Europeanness’ of Spain was now affirmed 
plainly and clearly by ‘the Europeans’ w ho had the ‘symbolic power’ to acknowledge or deny 
this fact. From now  on, there would be no further ambiguities or insecurities w ith regard to this 
aspired status-ranking. Following the term inology o f Norbert Elias, one could say that the 
‘established’ Europeans had finally w elcom ed the Spanish ‘outsider’ into their bossom. Spain 
was no longer a  subordinate, humiliated, or denigrated ‘them-group’, it had now  succeeded in 
becom ing a p a r t  o f  the European ‘w e-group’. Francoist ‘backwardness’ had been defeated, and
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European ‘m odernity’ had triumphed. As the ex-foreign minister José María de Areilza put it in 
an article published on that day,34 Spain’s participation in Europe would finally allow the 
country to overcom e what he called el síndrome del Africanismo (the ‘syndrome o f A fricanism ’) 
-  in other words, its obsessive sense of cultural, scientific, and technological inferiority in 
relation to the rest o f  the Western world. The great collective ambition of el pueblo español had 
therefore been achieved: Spain was no longer ‘African’. On the contrary, as a popular saying 
stated, ya somos europeos - ‘w e’, the Spanish people, had finally become ‘European’.35 36
Among the m ajority of Spain’s citizens, the day’s events were undoubtedly experienced as a 
m ajor boost in national pride, judging from the kind of coverage presented in the three leading 
national new spapers.37 First of all, it is worth simply stating the obvious: the signature cerem ony 
was by far the m ajor story of the day, with pages and pages o f details and photographs on every 
aspect o f its proceedings. Hardly any attention was paid to the fact that Portugal had also 
‘entered Europe* on the very same day with a similar ritual: the major ‘European happening* of 
the day was of course the Spanish one (while the reverse was undoubtedly the case in  Portugal). 
If anything, the M adrid ceremony w as partly outshined in terms of press coverage by the terrorist 
acts of ETA. Indeed, it is interesting to observe how the discourse of the main national dailies 
depicted the Euro-ritual as a symbol of the new, proud Spain o f ‘liberty’, ‘m odernity’ and 
‘dem ocracy’, in direct contrast and opposition to the old, shameful Spain o f ‘violence’, 
‘barbarity’, and ‘intransigence’ represented by the assassinations of the Basque separatist group.
34ABC, 12 June 1985.
35Such discourse, of course, reveals a rather arrogant, derogatory vision of Africa which clashes with the vision of 
‘multicultural openness’ and ‘equal respect for other peoples’ that was noted earlier in the speeches of the King and 
Felipe Gonzalez.
36 Between 1985 and 1990, Eurobarometer opinion polls showed that between 60 and 67% of Spaniards considered 
their country’s membership in the EEC ‘a good thing’, while only between 4 and 7% described it as ‘a bad thing’. 
The rest considered it ‘neither a good thing or a bad thing’ (15-20%), or responded that they did not know or were 
not sure how to answer the question (11-17%). Figures cited in Álvarez-Miranda (1996: 308).
37 In 1985, the three leading national dailies, whose coverage of the signature ritual I have analyzed, were El Pais, 
whose daily average circulation was 348.364, ABC (218.739), and Diario-16 (130.461). Figures cited in Anuario de 
El País, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.
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El País, for instance, entitled its front-page headline ‘SPAIN JOINS THE PROJECT OF A
UNITED EUROPE WHILE ETA ATTEMPTS TO SPREA D  TERROR* [reproduced on the 1
I
following page], and in its editorial article, ‘Europe, against the enemies of liberty’, this | 
newspaper stated: J
I
Yesterday’s terrorist assassinations did not manage to overshadow the historic moment oí | 
Spain’s entry into Europe... The desperate attem pt to spread terror in an indiscriminate 
manner clashed with our society’s vocation o f m odernity.
‘Europe’ was therefore typically identified with the Spanish people’s ‘modem’ ethical 
aspirations, while ETA was defined as ‘a violent m inority  which tries to detain the clock of 
history’, and their actions were viewed as ‘a vain and desperate attempt to prevent the progress 
o f solidarity and freedom in this country.’ A  cartoon in El Pais encapsulated the emotional 
atmosphere o f the signature ritual by depicting Prime M inister González as the driver o f a  train 
called ‘EUROPE’, who cried out to King Juan Carlos, ‘Your M ajesty, Europe!’, to w hich the 
Spanish monarch responded: ‘Eureka!’ [reproduced on the  following page].
Interestingly, this newspaper claimed that the terrorists o f ETA who had attempted to spoil 
the day’s festivities were ‘barbarians who manipulate fallacious nationalist emotions’, and this 
was contrasted to ‘the project o f a European supranationality, based on popular sovereignty, 
respect for human rights, the guarantee of liberties, the struggle for peace, and the exercise of 
tolerance’. However, such claims typically obscure the fact that the political ritual of adhesion 
into the EEC also clearly involved the igniting of national sentiments (in this case, the sentiments 
o f  affiliation to ‘the Spanish nation’ represented by the central state). Hence, it could equally be 
said that such a  ceremony also manipulated the ‘nationalist em otions’ o f all those individuals 
who were loyal to the idea o f the Spanish nation. W hat one should recognize is that in the case of 
ETA and its supporters, national we-feelings w ere channelled towards violence (the 
representatives o f the Spanish state were killed in the nam e o f ‘Basque freedom ’), while in the 
case of m ost Spaniards, national sentiments were directed towards the proud acceptance o f  and 
allegiance to the idea o f a European supranationality. In this way, one can observe that the
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em otions o f affiliation to a nation cannot be classified a priori as necessarily xenophobic or 
destructive, for they can conceivably be mobilised to construct cooperation and unity  across 
national boundaries.
A nother leading national newspaper, Diario-16, significantly entitled its main front-page 
headline ‘DEM OCRACY INTEGRATED SPAIN INTO EUROPE’ [reproduced on the 
following page], an implicit allusion to the Franco regime’s incapacity to do so. Its second main 
story centered on the terrorist actions, and explicitly contrasted one event with the other: ‘ETA  
CLOUDED THE DAY WITH FOUR ASSASSINATIONS’. A cartoon published in the opinion 
section reflected the same dichotomy between the joy of Europe and the tragedy o f terrorism : a 
bottle o f champagne had been cracked open by four bullet holes [reproduced on the follow ing 
pages]. This was also very visible in the emotive discourse o f  the newspaper’s editorial article, 
‘ETA , against Europe’:
As on so many other occasions when the Spanish democratic system has taken successive 
steps towards its consolidation, the terrorist organization ETA, dramatically present in all 
the transcendental landmarks o f the Spanish pluralist process, decided to leave its 
despicable stamp of blood yesterday on the signature ceremony of the Spain’s Treaty of 
Adhesion to the European Communities... Indeed, the entry o f Spain into the European 
Community, which represents an explicit support for Spanish democracy, constitutes a 
serious setback for all o f those who still believe they can still defeat the State, ripping o ff a 
piece of its territory and constructing an impossible Albania.
ABC entitled its own front-page headline, ‘MADRID, CAPITAL OF EUROPE’ [reproduced on 
the following pages], and its own editorial called the accession into Europe ‘a C opem ican 
change and the beginning o f  a rationality indispensable for our country’. As in the other 
newspapers, one o f  its opinion columnists also wrote that the ETA terrorists:
have covered in blood our entrance into the market of liberties and the concert o f  progress, 
as if they wanted to demonstrate that a country in which savage and ferocious beasts w ith a 
human appearance still exist has managed to slip through the doors of Europe.
A n identical dichotomy thus characterized the discourse o f all the main national dailies, and 
indeed it was probably a dichotomy that existed in many Spanish minds: ‘Europe’ stood for
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D iario 16Aid X -Numero:,»«. - - - - - f .  Precio: 30pcsetis Madrid. jwv« 1J junio PííS ínforaizcíóo * P ic a n .  S. a .
El Rey Juan Carlos presidió la histórica firma de nuestra adhesión a la CEE en el Palacio Real de Madrid
La democracia integró a España en Europa ¡
M A D R ID .—T re s  d ías antes det 
octavo aniversario de ia s p ri­
m eria elecciones democráticas 
de 1977, que inauguraron un 
nuevo liste  tea p o lític o  en Espa­
rta , e l Gobierno firm ó  ayer el 
tratado de adhesión de nuestro 
pa ís al Mercado Común en una 
solemne sesión en el Palacio 
Rea l, presidida por Don Juan 
Cortos, y a la que a sistie ro n  se is 
je fe s de Gobierno y más de 
trescientos invita d o s.
T ra s  la firm a  del tratado, un 
texto de 63.000 fo lio s que con­
tiene la s condiciones de nuestra 
incorporación a Europa, el pre­
sidente del Gobierno español, 
Felipe G o n zá lez, pronunció un 
d iscurso en e l que destacó la 
im pon »c ria  h istó ric a  de! acto, 
«un jalón/andemental para su­
perar el <ñsto«í>n;r> secular de 
España*.
E l presidente dd Ejecutivo  se 
h ito  eco del «.temor* con el que 
algunos pa íses com unita rio s 
contemplan nuestra  integra­
c ión, «porque piensan que po­
dría alterar tíeftnttr,•ámeme tos 
delicados equilibrios puestos en 
pie por ¡os tratados fundacio­
nales*.
E u  este sentido quiso dejar 
claro que itrio  serem os Jti carga 
para la Comunidad ni obstácu•
a. i M M i M U e n
Memento ea que Felipe González estampa m  firm a ea el tratado en et acto de ayer en Lisboa.
Jo que entorpezca su marcha 
hada formas superiores de in­
tegración política y  económi­
ca*. y subrayó b  voluntad de­
cidida del Gobierno español
para «avanzar con los que quie­
ran a vanzar y  hasta ¿cuele se  
quiera avanzar».
E l solemne acto de la  firm a  
se in ic ió  con un d iscurso de
bienvenida pronunciado por Su  
Majestad D o s Juan Carícs I. 
E l Rey de Espada desmeó el 
significado de la  fecha: «C fii 
gran día — d ijo —  pera España
y  Portugal», pero también. «un 
gran tila pera Europa. Un die 
que debe tener significado po­
sitivo más allá de nuestros fron- 
renos».
Don Juan Carias puso é n lV  j 
s is  en subrayar esta dim ensión | 
/renseurqpeadelaCom unidad, - 
por cnanto «en su  ser asió «t \ 
tratar de ir más ailá de si ñus- j 
ma. Urut Europa cerrada, des­
deñosa de lo ajeno, sería menos 1 
Europa» ,
A l Monarca espado! le s i-  i 
guieron en el uso de la palabra : 
lo s ita lia nos Betlino Crexi. pro- ¡ 
lidem e del Conseja de M u tis- i 
tro s de b  C E E , y  Giuiio A »  ¡ 
dreotti, presidente dd Consejo i 
de la s Comunidades Europeas, 
y  el francés Jeequts D e io n, 
presídeme de la C om isión Co- : 
m unito ria .
E l acto fin a lizó  con una ce- ' 
na en el Palacio de O riente, i 
ofrecida por lo s Reyes de Espa- ¡ 
fia . i
L o s lideres p o lític o s españo­
le» expresaron, sin  reservas, *a 
satisfacción por la  incorpora­
ción de nuestro país a la E u ro ­
pa com unitaria, s : bien mani­
festaron su s c ritica s en aspectos 
puntuales.
W g s. 4 , 5 . 6  y 7 
E d ito ria l, póü- -
i !
Tenso debate entre 
Corcuera y Suárez por la 
reforma de pensiones
P ig . 19
El Senado dio luz verde a 
la elección por las Corles 
del gobierno de los jueces 
P ig . 1 «
El «pirata» Nazih vuela el 
avión de ALIA, mientras 
otro comando secuestra 
un aparato de MEA
P ig . 17
Tres de los implicados en 
el «affaire del 
"Christina”», procesados
Pag. 40
Karen Quinian, la jo v e n  
que vivió durante diez , 
años en coma, murió ayer 
por una neumonía
P ig . «
Checoslovaquia jugará 
coa España en  semifinales 
al derrotar a Yugoslavia 
en e l Eurobasket-85
Pag.«
Ua coronel, un chófer, un artificiero y un brigada muertos, en Madrid y Euskadi
ETA empañó la jomada con cuatro asesinatos
M A D R ID .— La  organización 
E TA  empañó ayer la  solemne 
jomada, de la  firm a de adhesión 
de España a la  Comunidad 
Económ ica Europea, perpe­
trando cuatro asesinatos en tre s 
lociones te rro rista s.
A la s d iez de la mañana, ho­
ras antes de que fuera firm ado 
en el Palacio Reai el tratado de 
adhesión, un comando de tre s 
te rro rista s de E T A , dos hom­
bres y  una m ujer, asesinaban a 
tiro s ec la  calle Genera! O ria , 
de M adrid , a l coronel aud itor 
Vicente Romero Gomdtez-Ca- 
latayud y  a se chófer, Juan 
Gantia Jiménez.
Lo s te ro rista s condujeron e! 
coche que les había servido pa­
ra perpe tra r esta acción hasta el 
aparca miento de la a vertida de 
Felipe I I ,  donde io  aparcaron 
tra s colocar tina sofisticad a 
trampa-bemba con 23 h ilo s de 
guma-2. A l intacta: desactivar 
el artefacto, a las 12.30 dei me­
diodía, se produjo una gran ex­
p losión que causó la muerte a l‘ 
a rtific ie ro  Esteban dei A m o  y 
heridas graves a otros se is po­
lic ía s ncoonala y aa policía 
m unicipal.
Paralelamente a esta acción, 
otro comando etarra asesinaba 
en Porntgaíeie al brigada de la 
Armada José ,V¡¡¡arengo.
P S p . g *  15 Q  irti lidero btriáo, *1 que hubo que amputarte un braza, conducido par m  campsáeros.
Diario-16, June 13 1985
Diario-16, June 13, 1985
ABC, June 13 1985
m r m %
progress, liberty, democracy, and modernity, while ETA was the chilling reminder o f an 
‘uncivilized" past in  which guns and bom bs, rather than words and ideas, were the m ain weapons 
em ployed in the political arena.
Once this elaborate signature ritual had taken place, a final waiting period o f several months
passed before the emotional atmosphere o f Euro-excitement and Euro-pride was once again
rekindled with the arrival o f the new year, when the entry into the Common Market became
official on 1 January 1986. It is undoubtedly noteworthy, for instance, that in his traditional
‘Christm as Eve M essage to the Nation",38 King Juan Carlos congratulated his countrymen for
achieving the desired integration ‘into Europe", a goal which was once again equated with ‘our
closer approximation towards modernity". The monarch therefore called upon Spaniards ‘to open
their arms, without fear and without fatigue, with confidence and security in ourselves, to a
com m unity essentially committed to the survival o f the West." The same clichéd message was
thus reiterated one more time: M odernity was Europe, Europe was the W est, and belonging to
such a space o f collective identity was presented as something unquestionably positive,
som ething ‘the nation’ had every right to be proud of. Hence, in their first editions o f 1986, the
m ain national newspapers did not fail to highlight the ‘WELCOME", ‘W ILLKOM EN’
‘BIENVENUE", or ‘BENVENUTO" w ith which España had now been warmly received into
‘Europe’ [reproduced on the following page], as well as the image o f the crucial ‘historic
m om ent’ when the Spanish flag was finally raised at the EEC’s headquarters in Brussels for the
first time, during the early hours o f N ew  Year’s Day, 1986 [reproduced on the following page].
Furtherm ore, their editorials similarly continued to harp on Spain’s admirable ‘European"
achievem ent, and the hopes represented by  the nation’s ‘European’ future. A s El Pais put it:
We shall finally end our interior isolation and participate fully in the construction of the 
modem world... The European road responds to the imperative of reason and history. To 
assume it consciously and deliberately signifies one more step in the path o f maturity. 
Good morning, Europe.
38The entire speech was published by ABC, 26 December 1985.
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El País, January 2 1986
actualidad
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¿.Las baáderasde Espaüa y Portagai, ante la CEE
r Desde oyer, las ,bcnd§ros española y pdrtugue&o ondean 
. Junto a las de tos otros peíses miembros onte la s e d e  en B n j -
*  setas ’de taiComumdod Económica Europeo. EJ .comisorio de 
ta C££. y actual vicepresidente de lo Comisión, Lorenzo No-
’ to li, ho m anifestad^que España.y Portugal «reequilibran
• no sólo geogrófic ornen te, sino también, poli t icomente lo Co- 
•' munkfqdr Segufamente, Espoño y Portugal trocrón un espíritu
que no ex sólo: mercantil, oportarán tln  empuje político.
ABC, January 2 1986
8.5 Concluding summary: ‘Europe’ as a confirmation of democratic maturity
‘For Spain, democracy was identified with Europe, and S pain ’s renewed democracy has been its 
passport to the continent’ (Arango 1995: 314). This chapter has illustrated how in Spain, the 
ideal o f ‘entering Europe’ became directly linked to the success o f the country’s modernization 
and democratization after General Franco’s death. King Juan  Carlos, initially stigmatized in the | 
circles o f the opposition due to the fact that he was the dictator’s appointed successor, soon J 
displayed his commitment to  a genuine process o f  dem ocratic change, with ‘Europe’ as the | 
ethical model and the ultimate objective. It was through such a commitment that his monarchy j 
received a w idespread popular support, by representing Spaniards independently o f  their political | 
affiliation. A fter a brief period of Francoist continuity under Carlos A rias Navarro, the reformist j 
team headed by Adolfo Suarez rapidly tranform ed Spain into a modem liberal democracy, 
through the legalization of all political parties and trade unions. W hat is vital for the purposes of j 
this study is that throughout this delicate transition period, the aspiration to ‘enter Europe’ was j 
linked directly to the success of the democratization process, and indeed was one o f the I
I
fundamental points of consensus amongst the m oderate political forces on both the left and the | 
right which ultim ately permitted its favourable outcome. I
After the first elections had taken place in 1977, the first Suarez government immediately j 
presented a new request to jo in  the European Com m unity, now with the confidence o f a fully J 
fledged democracy. In the official political discourse o f  post-Franco Spain, ‘Europe’ was ( 
depicted not only as a matter o f economic benefits, but also o f  moral com mitment to the ideals of J 
democratic pluralism  and human rights. From this perspective, it was believed that only through I 
‘Europe’ w ould Spain be able to secure the stability o f  its young democracy and recuperate its j
international respectability. Nevertheless, the waiting period was a long one, particularly due to I
I
the constant opposition o f the powerful French agricultural sector, and hence the continued | 
incapacity to  fulfill Spain’s ‘European’ aspiration becam e an important aspect o f the so-called [ 
desencanto w ith democracy which arose during these years. The 1981 coup d'etat, however, i 
dem onstrated the continuing fragility of the new dem ocratic structures, which were only saved I
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by the dramatic intervention o f the King. This event, however, renewed the popular spirit of 
consensus and enthusiastic commitment to the ideals of the transition, as well as further 
strengthening the belief in Spain’s need to secure its democracy through membership in the EEC. 
After the fall o f the divided UCD party in 1982, the Socialists of Felipe González fully 
maintained the symbolic identification o f ‘Europeanization’ with ‘democratization’ and 
‘modernization’, until in 1985 the achievement of Spain’s accession into the EEC was celebrated 
with a spectacular ceremony o f  national exhuberance and self-veneration. ‘Europe* therefore 
became a great source of national pride, as it signified the country’s successful achievement of 
the great collective aspirations which had been symbolically constructed by the leading political 
figures o f the transition, after the death o f  General Franco.
My fundamental point is that in Spain, ‘entering Europe’ w as generally viewed as a great 
promotion or a step up in the world’s hierarchic ladder of pow er and status. In other words, it 
provided Spaniards with a new, highly attractive and self-flattering we-image. This was true in 
various crucial spheres of international rivalry and prestige-ranking: the EEC represented a 
superior position in terms o f economic prosperity, political m uscle, and moral respectability. 
‘The nation’ received not only greater possibilities for m aterial well-being, but also a better 
opportunity for making its voice heard in the world, as well as the W est’s recognition o f its 
democratic credentials. ‘Europe’, in short, was widely perceived as a major improvement in the 
global ‘group charism a’ o f the Spanish people. It was by  gaining the status o f a  ‘free’, 
‘democratic*, and hence ‘European’ nation that many Spaniards recuperated pride in themselves 
as Spaniards. The years o f humiliating isolation were over, ‘backwardness’ had finally been 
overcome, ‘democracy’ had been conquered, and so, as one intellectual triumphantly put it:
The Common Market opens its doors to us -  and at the same time we open our own...
Modernity is here, and almost everything, in economics, culture, and politics, has changed
since 1898. (Racionero 1987: 12, m y italics)
Therefore, in the case o f Spain, adopting a  European supranationality and showing enthusiasm 
for the project o f  European integration hardly clashed with national sentiments. On the contrary, 
‘Europe’ was in many ways exactly what the national self had been thirsting for.
259
(
9. Maastricht: Contributing to the unity of Europe ‘with dignity and prestige’
a  - *!'  ■ -
On 24 December 1991, King Juan Carlos I appeared on Spanish television to deliver his 
traditional ‘Christmas Eve M essage to the N ation’. Two w eeks earlier, the country’s Prime | 
Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, had taken part in the negotiations o f the M aastricht Treaty, an event | 
which had been widely depicted in the m edia as a  ‘historic step forw ard’ that had put Europe on j 
the road towards economic and political unity.1 During his yearly summary of the nation’s | 
achievements on the world stage, the King referred to Spain’s participation in the Maastricht 
summit as follows:
W e find ourselves before the creation o f new political systems, o f different unions, of 
segregations which until very recently no one could suspect. W hile the disintegration o f the 
Soviet U nion is taking place, in Europe the opposite phenom enon is occuring, a process 
which links economic, monetary, political and security relations, in order to achieve unity.
An objective o f unity in which Spain participates directly, with dignity and prestige, with 
its own personality and clear criteria, w hich has been manifested in the reunion that has 
recently taken place in M aaastricht, and in which w e m ust all collaborate with our work, 
our efforts, and with a spirit o f  sacrifice which will undoubtedly bring forth its fruits in the | 
near future.1 2 |
The M aastricht Treaty was thus defined by the King as ‘an objective o f unity* to which Spain 
was contributing ‘with dignity and prestige’. It was a goal w hich all Spaniards were encouraged j 
to support with enthusiasm. Indeed, im m ediately after highlighting the im portance this national J 
accomplishment, Juan Carlos I went on to remind his countrymen of what this represented for a | 
country which for a long time had been excluded from the process of European integration: |
That is why we must be proud o f the civilized and harmonious way in which we have | 
accomplished the establishment o f our democracy, w hen so many believed that this was | 
practically impossible. ,
1 This point will be empirically illustrated throughout this chapter.
2 Diario-16, 26 December 1991.
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The discourse employed by the King in this televised political ritual therefore illustrates how, 
fifteen years after Franco’s death, the concept of ‘belonging to Europe’ was still being invoked 
in the Spanish public sphere as a symbol of Spain’s ‘civilized and harmonious’ transition to 
democracy, and therefore as a fundamental source o f  national pride. From this perspective, 
Spain’s participation in the ‘historic’ sum m it o f  M aastricht was viewed as a demonstration that 
the Spanish people had definitively consolidated their status as respected ‘Europeans’. As I shall 
illustrate in this chapter, the goal which em erged now was to make Spain a leading, influential 
m ember o f the newly baptised ‘European U nion’, and to  ensure that the country would never 
again be ‘left behind’ like in the past.
9.1 The run-up to Maastricht (I): Promoting Spain’s need to catch ‘the high speed 
European train’
In Spain, the arrival o f the Maastricht sum m it was marked by numerous emotive proclamations 
which, like the K ing’s Christmas speech, aimed to remind Spaniards o f the fundamental 
importance which belonging to ‘Europe’ represented for the prosperity and prestige of their 
nation. For instance, on the day this event began, the editor-in-chief of El Pals, Juan Luis 
Cebrian, wrote an article in which he stated:
W hatever reading one makes of Spain’s integration in the European Community, there is 
no doubt that the results are brilliant for our country. Isolated for centuries from the great 
continental tendencies, obsessed w ith the adventure of the Indies, and enclosed in the 
armed defense o f the Catholic faith, we Spaniards discovered our political maturity and the 
radiance of economic well-being through our reencounter w ith Europe. 3
3 El Pais, 9 November 1991. At this time, El Pals remained the leading national daily, with an average daily 
circulation of 394.686, followed by ABC (292.631), El Mundo (134.175), and Diario-16 (131.626). In this chapter, 
in order to maintain a continuity with the three newspapers I analyzed during the transition process and the entry 
into the EEC, I have looked at the coverage of Maastricht in El Pals, ABC, and Diario-16. Figures cited in Anuario 
de El Pais, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.
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Spain’s membership of the European Community was thus typically framed within a historical 
narrative of national progress and self-improvement, a successful ‘rags-to-riches’ story through 
which the country had gone from poverty, isolation, and backwardness to ‘political maturity’ and 
‘the radiance o f economic well-being’. The challenge now, according to this leading journalist, 
was for Spain to be at the forefront o f any future advances in the process o f European 
integration. In his view, it was likely that ‘a Europe of two velocities’ would soon be created, in 
which a reduced group of countries, led by France and Germany, would push forward the 
process o f econom ic and political union. At this point, therefore, the crucial question was 
whether Spain w ould be able to catch this ‘high speed European train’, in spite o f its still 
relatively low levels of economic, political, and cultural development. This was the fundamental 
challenge which had to be faced by the nation’s government: ‘whether Spain will belong to  the 
nucleus of [the European] galaxy, o r will remain, once again, on the periphery o f its history’, j 
After recovering national pride by successfully getting ‘into Europe’, the next objective would j 
therefore be to maintain this collective self-esteem by belonging to the vanguard of countries | 
which would lead the construction o f the European Union. j
Similarly, one o f the leading columnists of ABC, Darío Valcárcel, suggested during this same *1'
period that as a fully fledged m em ber o f the European Community, Spain was no longer una , 
nación acomplejada, ‘a nation w ith an inferiority com plex’.4 It was rather ‘a rich and j 
contradictory country’, w hich continued to be ham pered by ‘dark aspects’ such as public and | 
private corruption, but was increasingly growing thanks to a dynamic population of j 
‘professionals, professors, and businessm en capable o f creating, com peting, and selling’. I 
Although this w riter acknowledged that ‘after a long period o f isolation, Spain cannot aspire to a 
position of leadership in the construction of Europe’, he stressed that the best hopes for the 
national future could only be found ‘within the club w here the great European interests are 
decided’. From this perspective, the project of the European Monetary Union was defined as ‘a
4 ABC, 26 November 1991.
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life raft’ and ‘an injection of rationality’ for the national economy. ‘Europe’, in such journalistic 
discourses, was therefore depicted as an ongoing national aspiration, and a potential solution for 
the continuing deficiencies which Spain still suffered in com parison to the other, ‘more 
developed’ and ‘advanced’ European countries.
The symbolic portrayal o f ‘Europe’ as a platform for national progress, prosperity and 
influence w as also reflected in several newspaper articles written by  leading politicians during 
the period that immediately preceded the Maastricht summit. For example, the M inister of 
Foreign Affairs at that time, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, defined the European Community as 
‘a gigantic machinery of economic progress’ and ‘the great supporting lever o f all our 
international influence’.5 It was only through Europe, he argued, that it was possible for Spain to 
carry out ‘a serious policy towards the outside world’, and this ideal situation was contrasted to 
the tragic errors o f  the Spanish past: ‘we have to remember how often we have got ourselves into 
dead ends, missed opportunities, wasted chances, tribal d isputes’. ‘Europe’ was therefore 
typically presented as the way forward for Spain, the outward-looking project w hich would 
ensure that the shameful tragedies and the humiliations o f the past w ould be successfully 
avoided. In another article published during this period, Fernández Ordóñez wrote that at the 
M aastricht summit, Spain would be present ‘to defend its future, which is tied to the future of 
Europe’.6 From this perspective, there w as no conceivable clash between national pride and the 
concept o f ‘belonging to Europe’; on the contrary, a ‘European future’ was identified with the 
m ost promising national future.
Similarly, one o f Spain’s European Commissioners, the Socialist M anuel Marin, argued that:
Spain has a very clear option: to vigorously play the European card. A  country o f medium 
size and importance, with a level o f  development close bu t still inferior to the Community 
average, has an objective interest in consolidating the C om m unity’s mechanisms, instead 
of a  simple intergovernmental cooperation which would only  benefit the large countries... 
The worst thing that could happen to our country is to find itself isolated and marginal in a 
weak and disunited Community. Fortunately, our cultural vocation, our sense o f history,
5 Diario-i6, 8 December 1991.
6 ABC, 8 December 1991.
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and our short but positive experience as a member state o f the EC clearly encourage us to 
support a united Europe without any reticence.7
x
Using the language of gambling, this politician thus suggested that if Spain wanted to win in the 
future, it should confidently play ‘the European card ’. This was the only way that a country ‘of 
medium size and importance’, as w ell as a relatively ‘inferior’ level o f development, could 
strengthen its influence, prosperity, and prestige in the world. The alternative would be a return 
to the humiliating days o f national weakness and humiliation, o f being ‘isolated and marginal’.
According to  Marin, the Comm unity as a whole had only one possible alternative at 
Maastricht: either it managed ‘to consolidate its economic, monetary, and political integration, 
through a federal perspective’, or it w ould have to resign itse lf to ‘playing an insignificant role 
on an increasingly complex and com petitive world stage’. Spain’s other European 
Commissioner, Abel M atutes (a m em ber of the conservative Popular Party), made exactly the 
same point in another article published during this period:
The great dilemma which the European Comm unity faces ‘here and now’ is the following: 
If  at a time when the European Com m unity increases its pow er o f attraction and its 
authority over the rest o f  the world, and in which the Comm unity o f Nations is getting 
ready to renovate the institutions o f the post-w ar period, Europe does or does not decide to 
transform itself into a great, global political power, as one w ould expect of a leading 
commercial and financial power.8
In fact, this image o f M aastricht as a potentially great leap towards the creation of a ‘European 
superpower’, capable o f competing equally with the United States and Japan, was a recurrent one 
in the media coverage of this event. For instance, on the day the summit was scheduled to begin, 
a report in ABC stated that the new treaty could potentially transform the ideal of ‘the United 
States o f Europe’ into a reality, and give birth to ‘a new rivalry: that o f  the ecu against the dollar, 
and o f the W estern European Union (W EU, the virtual m ilitary arm o f the Community) against
7 ABC, 8 December 1991.
8 ABC, 8 December 1991.
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the Atlantic A lliance’.9 Similarly, Diario-16 published a photograph of the conference hall 
where the M aastricht summit would take place, with the headline ‘All is ready for the b irth  o f  a 
united Europe’ [reproduced on the following page] and a text which stated:
In this conference hall, still empty yesterday, the leaders of the twelve countries o f the 
European Community will try today and tomorrow to overcome their differences and agree 
upon a treaty, a common currency, and a common foreign policy, affirming their role as a 
global power, on a par with the United States and Japan. Europe aims to em erge at 
Maastricht as a new superpower which speaks with one voice.10 1
This idea was further illustrated with graphs which displayed the impressive economic m uscle o f 
‘Europe’, symbolized by its flag, in comparison to the United States and Japan. On the sam e day, 
this newspaper also published an article by Luis Ignacio Sanchez, a Professor of International 
Law, entitled ‘The United States of Europe?’, which recalled the days when Europe used  to  be 
the political, economic, and military center of the world, and suggested that the M aastricht 
reunion could be a crucial step towards the recuperation of this lost global importance:
A multitude o f various factors, amongst which the two great and cruel world w ars are 
particularly important, have reduced the importance of continental Europe to a group of 
countries that are large, medium, or small-sized powers, but which lack specific, decisive 
weight in the international context... The steps towards political, economic, and m onetary 
union constitute, in the end, mere instruments towards one final goal: the birth o f  a new 
political entity with substantive influence in the sphere of international relations, capable of 
intervening in the great planetary decisions.11
The im plicit message o f  these discourses was that through such a fusion o f continental strength, 
Spain could become a part o f this ‘new European superpower’ and benefit from its com m on 
pooling o f prosperity and prestige. Only in this way, it was suggested, could the country gain a 
truly significant degree o f influence and ‘status honour’ on the world stage.
Some voices, nevertheless, were extremely pessimistic about the capacities o f  Felipe 
G onzález’s Socialist government to lead the country to a respectable place in the European
9 ABC, 9 December 1991.
10 Diario-16,9  December 1991.
11 Diario-16, 9 December 1991.
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INTERNACIONAL
Los dirigentes de Jos doce países de la Comunidad Europea 
se reúnen boy y mañana en la localidad holandesa de Maas* 
trícht en la que se considera la «cumbre» más importante 
de la historia. Las «doce» intentarán llegar a un acuerdo 
sobre la adopción de un tratado de anión que dote a
la CE de una moneda común y de un esbozo de política 
exterior conjunta antes de acabar el siglo. Hay diferencias 
sobre la. toma de decisiones en política exterior, la defensa 
común europea, la referencia al objetivo federalista de la 
construcción europea y la cohesión entre ricos y pobres.
Europa busca su unidad en ÍVlaastiicht
Contactos de Felipe González antes del inicio de la «cumbre» para buscar apoyos
BtSTA ?EaW SSS2 ffWTHESS)
E l perímtemo o  d  protagonista 
de te «cumbre» europea que 
cóm ica» bey. te más impórtame 
de tas celebrad» hasta ahora, 
pero e l pesim sroo do quero 
decir que haya dedamo. Lo s 
expertos en política europea y 
« i las negoááóotws internas de 
te Comunidad Europea retraer, 
dan que en te JtiKoria de Esa  
se han cncoatrado sotudones 
milagrosas en el últim o minuta, 
ctt e l últim o segundo, que han 
salvado situ a d ««« que parecían 
insalvables.
Pero te sataaaóa general izada 
es que oo habrá consenso ja n  
e l documento de M aastriehi 
sobre U n id » Política, y  que en 
todo caso se tratará de «sabor 
te ctm » poniendo te Sim a  bajo 
ur. testo muy que no rrc o  
gera k »  puntos concreto» que 
tratan de defender (o* «doce». 
Por ejemplo, se oee que Felipe 
González w  va i  conseguir que 
x  tenga en cuente te cuhesaóe 
social, que io s pa íses ríe o s 
paguen más que kte pobres, y 
que deberá darse por satisfecho 
con fe «elación dé oomproeaiso 
que ya se ha acordado*, que lo s 
tondas estructurales financien d  
a no jcnts por dentó de lo s pla­
nes de desarrollo de tes ropones 
menos tavcrocid.'ts.
Felipe Gom óla, ríe  embargo, 
uo da su  brazo a torcer, ¿legó 
i  M sastricht arces de lo  provisto, 
pues ha querido cntrevistenc 
coa varios de ios «grandes» antes 
de que se tricara formalmente 
el trebato de te «cumbre», hoy 
hiñes. González se reunió, por 
separado, con el presidente de 
te Com isión, J seques Detexs. qce 
ha amcreundo coa ronundar s i 
en Maastricfct no se ooórígue el 
consenso necesario pora poner 
a¡ m arc h a  te nueva Europa coa 
su Unido Política y M oceará;
«  p rim e r m in istro  holandés $  
Ruad Lubbcrs, a s f i trid o  de '  
M a utric h i. y que u  quien reabra f  
más enfuera» (EpkwÁálieos para 8  
conseguir e l acuerdo que peró iiía  “  
que Maastricíst sea un coto; y 5 
coo Hchnut Kahi, e l presidente g
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OTROS BLOQUES ECONOMICOS ;
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Todo listo poro 
que nazca la 
Europa umda




lideres de los doce 
países de te 
Comunidad 
Europea tratarán 




acuerdo sobre un 
tratado, una 
moneda única y 
una política 
exterior común, 
afinnaodo su papel 
como potencia 
mundial, al lado de 
Estados Unidos y 





® »teoría que oori una sola 
voz. Tras el 
derrusibacúcuto 
de la Unión 
Soviética, cuya 
dcfcncióosc' 
cerificó roer, la 
Europa Unida 





alemán que, pox .su propia peí» 
somlsba, y porque representa a
una Alemana muda, a  ahora 
el peso pesado de la CE, el hom­
bre de voz más fuerte y pro­
bablemente mis nnhñrana. poc 
su trayectoria política comuruia* 
ría y porque representa a un pai 
que lenteza un enorme «fueran 
intenso de cohesúo y solida­
ridad
V hoy, antes de que se miden 
1» sesiones de trabajo, González 
se verá oon el primer ouncOro 
italiano Giulio AodrcoA buen 
amigo, y qt» fué quien d¡ó trace 
años d mas nnportante empujón 
final pan que Papara pudiera 
salvar los últimos escolios de la ndherióo.
En Maaarioht deben 
se los tratados de Unida 
y Unión Económica y Monetaria 
por unanimidad, y r» habrá esa 
unanimidad, según te delegación 
espadóla, si no se tenca en 
atesta los nrueler de desarrollo 
<fc oda uno de los paites miero- 
bros. La postura de González la 
respaldan Groes* y Portugal y la 
entienden alemanes, franceses e 
¡tabaiUM, pero luy en trod» has­
ta conseguir te mayoría necesa­
ria. Por otra parte existen dis- 
enrpanria» importantes entre los 
Doce respecto a la Unión Polí­
tica. sobre todo desde el pumo 
de vista de Política Exterior y 
de Segundad y Deten». España, 
Franca y Alemania quieren una 
defensa europea aitkúbda a tra­
vés de 1a UEO, mientras que 
Gran Bretaña, coi d apoyo de 
Italia, Portugal y Holanda, pre­
tenden potcmar b  OTAN. Y 
criste aun un pareo id* de dis­
cordancia en el que no hay acer­
camiento previo; el federalismo. 
Ahí es Jobs Majar quien se opo­
ne con más vigor al texto dd 
borrador que se ha presentado. 
y se teme que el premio- bri­
tánico, muy {sesionado pr su 
partido y porte opinión pública 
de su pan, pueda Herir a esta 
dudad car. te misar» cáporirióo 
de ánimo, y de ionamigenría, 
con que b  hada su antecesora 
Mareares Ttmcber ca anieñtns 
cumbres en tes que demostró 
que le iba como un guante d 
apodo de «Dama de
'LA SEMA3ÍA RíTERNACIQNAL /  HACIA ÍA  EUROPA RICA UmbA
sNÍSOUE CLEMENTE Los «doce» celebran hoy y 
mañana te c u  más 
impostante de a  historia, ya 
que deben decidir sí Europa se compromete 
o no en e! camino de constituir una anidad 
federal. El viejo nieto de una Europa unida 
con una moneda, una política exterior yon 
Ejército comunes está aún lejos, quizá se realice 
antes de que acabe e( siglo, pero en Maastricbt’
deben ponerse los medios para que sea posible. 
La pérdida de soberanía nactosal, sin embargo, 
molesta a tos británicos. Pero alemanes y 
franceses, máximos defensores de dar mayor 
peso a tes instituciones comunitarias, consideran 
que se debe trasladar el evidente poder 
económico de esta Europa rica el piano político, 
para acrecentar su peso ea el corváerto 
internacional y para que el papel de comparsa
de te CE en ta guerra dd Golfo no se repita.
La cohesión entre países ricos y pobres que 
defiende España ha convenido a González en 
protagonista de te «cumbre». Hay diferencias, 
pero también voluntad de superarías..
Esta semana también habrá que estar atentos 
al diálogo árabe-teraeü que comienza el stertes 
en Washington y no perder'de vista el 
progresivo deterioro de la situación en h  URSS.
Diario-16, December 9 1991
arena. Another colum nist o f ABC, Lorenzo Contreras, suggested that although the Spanish Prime 
M inister liked to portray him self as ‘a  builder o f  the great united Europe’, his position was that 
o f ‘a brick-layer’ rather than ‘an architect or a promoter’.12 13The reality, according to this writer, 
was that Spain’s role in the process of European integration was modestísimo, and that it was 
‘arrogant to the point of stupidity’ to dem and ‘a place in the Europe of high speed, after our 
econom y has demonstrated serious insufficiencies in the race for productivity’. Yet by attacking 
G onzález’s Socialist government for its supposed incapacity to put the country ‘in the Europe of 
high speed’, this critique simply reiterated the same widespread desire: that Spain would become 
a leading, prestigious member o f the European Community. From  this perspective, i f  Spain’s 
role in Europe still remained modestísimo, this was viewed as a  m ajor source o f national shame.
Another important theme in the journalistic portrayal o f the M aastricht summit was the 
representation o f the European project as a  moral quest for peace and a struggle against the evils 
o f nationalism. For instance, in  a special supplement on this event published by El Pais, 
illustrated with pictures o f the celebrations which followed the Allied victory in World W ar II, 
the ‘new Europe o f M aastricht’ was referred to as ‘a historic landmark for a Europe which less 
than half a century ago was reemerging after the destruction caused by the Second W orld War, 
and which today is advancing in many fields towards its unity* [reproduced on the following 
page]. One of the commentators who wrote an article in this supplement wrote that the progress 
o f European integration had not been ‘an easy road’, but that ‘the amazing thing is that it has 
taken place in half a century, after 2000 years of wars, passions, rival nationalisms, hegemonic 
games, and, in this century, tw o horrific conflagrations*.14 Similarly, the Secretary o f State for 
the European Communities, Carlos W estendorp, stated in his own contribution to this special 
supplement on M aastricht that the challenge which had emerged out o f the ashes of the Second 
W orld W ar was ‘to end, if  possible forever, the European divisions which had degenerated into
12 ABC, 30 November 1991.
13 El Pats, 5 December 1991.
14 El Pats, 5 December 1991.
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histórico para'una Europa 
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El País, December 5 1991
two fratricidal conflicts in the first half o f the century’.15 In a country such as Spain, w hich until 
relatively recently been governed by an old ally of Hitler and M ussolini, the project of European 
unity was thus portrayed once again at the time of Maastricht not only as an opportunity to gain 
political influence and economic prosperity, but also as a source of moral regeneration and 
ethical pride.
9.2 The run-up to Maastricht (II): Fighting for Spain’s ‘national interests’ in the ‘battle for 
cohesion’
At the same time, however, the period that preceded the M aastricht summit in Spain was also 
dominated by a pragmatic concern with what came to be known as ‘the battle for cohesion’. This 
referred to the Spanish government’s dem and that the M aastricht Treaty had to guarantee the 
establishment of policies which would aid the development o f the E C ’s poorer countries, so that 
they would be able to reach the convergence requirements o f the future monetary union. It was 
argued, firstly, that each member state’s contribution to  the Com m unity budget had to be based 
on their relative levels of prosperity -  a demand that was frequently summed up in the press as 
‘those who have more should pay more’. This was a particularly important issue for Spain, since 
w ithout a reform of the EC’s system o f funding, it was destined to become a net contributor of 
the budget in 1993. Given that the level of income per capita in  Spain was still 22% below the 
European Community average, this was considered to be a totally unacceptable situation (Barbé 
1999: 46-7). Secondly, the Spanish government demanded that it was necessary to set up a 
‘Cohesion Fund’ to help finance projects for the development of transport infrastructures, 
education, scientific research, and healthcare in the least prosperous member states. These 
demands for the ‘solidarity of the rich North with the poor South’ were presented by the Spanish 
government as fundamental ‘national interests’ which had to be defended at all costs -  including, 
if  necessary, the threat of vetoing the entire Maastricht Treaty.
15 El Pais, 5 December 1991.
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In the period that preceded the European summit, the press focused much of its attention on 
this sensitive economic issue. For instance, Diario-16 devoted a full-page story to what it called 
La Hora de la Cohesion (T h e  Hour o f  Cohesion’), and ABC  stated in one of its headlines that 
Sin cohesion, Europa le va a costar muy cara a España (‘W ithout cohesion, Maastricht is going 
to cost Spain a lo t’) [reproduced on the following pages]. Furthermore, all the three main 
newspapers devoted widespread coverage o f Felipe G onzález’s reunion with the Dutch Prime 
Minister, Ruud Lubbers, during which the Spanish Prime M inister attempted to gain the support 
o f this leader -  w ho at that time held the rotating presidency of the EC -  in the ‘battle for 
cohesion’. Lubbers, however, declared to  the Spanish press that the requests for solidarity would 
probably not be accepted by the m ajority o f the m em ber states.16 17On the same day, the Spanish 
Secretary of State for the Econom y, Pedro Pérez, proclaim ed that the current draft o f the 
Maastricht Treaty was ‘unacceptable’ to  the government, and that Spain would reserve its right
1T
to veto the proposed document if  this w as necessary.
A tense em otional climate was therefore created in Spain as the European summit 
approached, and it appeared that the dem ands for cohesion w ere being ignored by the leading 
member states o f  the EU. In the discourse of the press, it w as therefore proclaimed that crucial 
‘national interests’ were at stake in M aastricht, and that these could simply not be sacrificed on 
the altar of European unity. The following are some illustrations o f this outlook from the main 
national newspapers:
Spain and the other less developed countries should receive from the Community’s 
finances a treatment w hich takes into account its current level of development. If  Spain had 
to pay into the EC more than it receives from  it, this w ould be absolutely unacceptable to 
public opinion, which w ould not understand the advantages of the system ... Until now, the 
main Spanish proposals have no t been taken seriously at the Community negotiating table. 
However, underlying these proposals there is a principle which is consubstantial with 
Spain’s presence in the EC. T hese are not capricious demands which can easily be given 
up .18
16 El Pais, 21 November 1991.
17 El Pais, 21 November 1991.
18 El Pais, 17 November 1991.
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ESPAÑA
l-a próxima reunión dei (.inscio 
Europeo en Maasiriuht (Holanda), 
donde habrán de firmasse los Tra­
tados de Unión Política (UP) y da 
Unión Económica v Monetaria
{UEM), ya tiene un nombre para «cumbre» tienen pocas posibiikíadcs 
España: será «la cumbre de la a>he- de ser aceptadas en su totalidad, 
sión». Sin embargo, las peticiones Incluso se cree que los países con 
de igualdad económica y social que - el mismo desarrollo que Esparta 
el Gobierno español hará en esta «aspiran a quedarse como están».
Maastricht: la hora de la cohesión
España propone ¡a igualdad económica, aunque es poco probable que se  acepte
E l G ol'kyr.o d i M .idrid lie  pect- 
10 durante lo.v últimos mese* 
tuda la cune en el asador para
que sus tx'.cc codos sorauniLIrievs 
aprueben su posición en c) tena 
de txK íse p iir use ñerehádn eco- 
oósticn v sccvi de ¡as países más 
pobres de i  C E con io s más 
lia s .
La Remera de Esectio seña 
instaurando un sistema progre­
sivo d>' ia itria iD , oran que ceda 
flu í, cálice x L i común
.XKXuru-.sc.a ce acuerdo cor. su 
pctctió-. ecúnórr.íca real, y  modi- 
tk.nr.eo bs proporciones de tx jfi 
Randacrót un ¿incida tíu  esa 
m istn ii pesentá«, de io rrn i «se  
a ing j;! E s lttlo  se vea obiqpído 
3 incremento: sa g*so público 
por el hecho d= que m w  fondos 
Citen tKttícric» cápcniStes para 
determinado provecto.
Pena, además. Evpnñr. «c c . 
momo expün el secretario de 
Estaco -ara ia C E  Carlos W cs. 
tendón. c;.e es un.-: »nocesalail 
que la cohesión figure como un 
objetiva del Trotado y no ro ñ e  
ana mero poiúia.«» a sry .u i:.
£n decir, para Maími es ¡teco- 
sarío cuc i  1« países ««nos 
JcsarroldUv» de ia Comunicad 
Oí- £*, cueste dinero, que sale 
de sus picsufrjciiM generalas. su 
psrtunuiitj;' i., misma y trac 
eso tiucntr reflejado como prat* 
arpio "en un artículo (iei Tratado, 
ix> cn unfi rcLixnsrj3au.iii; i o 
declara c.óri artesa ai mismo.
Ea t i d ife fíu i de coa nece­
sidad, íisp.sña contó & creyó con­
tar car. el apuro d-a los que 
ser tac sus «Airados nttrjratas« 
dentro de ia Cié Crecía, i ’ar­
ruga! c Irlanda, los países COR 
los que comparte la etiqueta de 
i-irc no s desarrollados-.
Pero c :i la reunión rR Ír.iít erial 
de Noordw ljk (Holanda), el 
Gobierno de M a d iiil — represen­
tado par Curios Wcocndurp a 
tatusa du la m icrnioti/id dei titu ­
lar d i Eviene ¡es, Francisco Fe r­
nández O rriü á « -  Se quedó 
prúeticamcr.ta solo.
A  Farorgnl le úttsrcia, más 
que la cohesión, la tr.otiifiliación 
óc ion ingreses, eunan fuentes 
diplomad em cspnrcsav
-Pe n i es que Greca e Irlanda 
están ofcrerrienifo ya mucha 
cohesión-., enitm dicrrio por lat 
tus cer.nioucionas iinanaems de 
la CE.
En c! caso de! país heleno Ce­
jan ai 5 por ICC1 de m Producto
E l préndense del Gebierao, Felipe C o rn il«, en La Moactoa,1
litlc ne ií Bruto (H B ), t t ís  m il 
m illones de ecus (125.0CC m ¡lo ­
na  de pesetas) de «suda a la 
baiamo de pn$rs.
En el de la república irlandesa, 
«lo  que bene >0 es imponente», 
seguii W csttjvfcip, ptses sapera 
a Grecia y  recibe oúnirífcotxmej 
euroimrtanas que llegan al 6 par 
¡OO tic w P IB .
Tanto Grasa como Manda y 
Portugal aspiran íimpfcmcate o  
quedase como están* enei tema 
de la cohesión, «que ya «  
mucho, y por eso no van a d » 
ninguna ba ra li ai rassetto, ma­
que Ics irro ra rs i al ir s i» ,  opina 
un dipiomíbca español
En  el extremo opuesto de 
Espada «sta ri c: Remo Grido, 
que «r©  quiera ñ  o ir ¡rabiar» 
de nada que alee* al tema 1 
social, en el que mantienen que
le í ha ido muy bien su tradición 
«paitieubu&a» o «aislacíonisra», 
« n o  la califican ocra*.
Pero no róio en cae, sino cam­
b ia l sopeando el coqueto de 
loa w »  lenus clave de los Tra ­
tados de U P y UEM  —¡xxlcras 
para el Parlamento Europea 
codcdsbn poíinca. pollbca exte­
rio r y de seguridad anián. etcé­
tera— se observa que España y 
el Reino Unido están cada uno 
en on exorno de U  soga.
De todas formas, Wcstcndorp 
opina que <sc pueden encootrar 
su s de wtrproénu en cas toda 
vaho en lea temas sedales«, en 
b s que d Reino Unido «a a 
moeRane espedabnente duro 
frente a toda nepnaóóft.
E l problema, visto desde 
Madrid, es que. aunque Maas­
tricht no lea b «última optra-
E 3 G 2 S 2 S 3 2 3 E D -
1 : hipo, 1 gaoj ! gitili
- Rvtvas gseeras 
! rooimSaRes acra ttutib i 
¡w cia l»
tunidad» pera la calidad, es que 
•dsspaes se va a complicar todo 
mochísimo«, dice Westendorp al 
¡referirse, splícnaraente. a la drv- 
íribuejún de fovios oomaniunuct. 
a las solicitudex de ampliación 
de la CE que «vero muy prtnc- 
esa* a ser admitidas —léase los 
casos de Suetra y  A ta ría — y 
• las difati ltadcs  que roa a pon­
tear ro  direcra e indudiblmwiue 
la lániudór. de tas crivn ca a 
ex U R SS y en b Yugoslavia que 
KdesRcmbra.
Los x x a s pttncpcbs, junuv 
con ct de ta ooheura. cae han 
de quedar, supuestamente, 
(muelles en ¡os I  niuidM  que se 
(¡ra ra is en Maastnchi son les 
poderes del Parlamento fiuropcu 
de Estrasburgo, la íonna de 
adoptar decisiones en temas cc 
política exterior y, loare todo, de 
segundad común.
e l Parlam ento Europeo, 
obviamente. q j.era ver aumen­
tado su poder dccisoRO en la 
Comunidad. Y  por eso desde 
Esttasbuipo. donde está SU Sede, 
ic  registran dodarador.es carta 
vez m is «¿gratara al re le e rá  
como la» dd pando .Tjcraoic\ 
que buhaban de -vhtoraa n-.t- 
uaicionat» y de »ravviauEcnó 
oigar.izadt** rcErtendcic a b 
mesia pnr.'.fa . en loe rrovvcto» 
kalandescs de I ra tadov de dexá- 
síones adoptadas pul enanimt- 
tlxd y pur niayona cualificada. 
Pero, p-aeitói a hablar de 
g íiS L S ü fíü -c i caquaufreniaSL ííla  es iota) en 
F s i2 Í2 ¿ t¿ 3   ̂ 10 "trIraente al papel futuro de 
3  b CE en temas de defensa. Cn- 
a¡ 00 paisas —Difamaren. Holán- 
i  da, Ita lia. Portugal y el Reino 
Unido— Oplan claramente por 
que 1* Kguncad europea epx 
teniendo cano pilar funíameraal 
1 b O TAN.
Otros cuten — Bélgica. Espa­
ña, Francia. Greca y Uuembur- 
fo— k  han ríe finido por o! 
tclcraamicnto de llw r.sdo «pilar 
europeo*, es crcr, per que J  
Union Europea Ooridcnra; asu­
ma respoxvihrüdadcs de defenst 
dd ecnuacntc.
Una Irlanda, se mantiene ec 
s i postura de «no sabe, no con- 
testa«, aeogiéndcei; a su exutn» 
de país neutral. Y  el duodócur.o, 
Alemania. manticRt una puu- 
bo.t para unos ambigua, pan 
otros eooíusa. ü  propugnxilo 
uxfo a la vcc rsaRten.iuer.!r> del 
papel de la AJunza -valiniíca. 
reionanúento da b UEO  y rata- 
cOn del crabniut de «Erér6n> 
ecropeo» potenciando te ¡meada
conjunta ¿emano-francesa.
So  es e s o ,  
señor Coronerà
ANTONIO HEROE
EL  rRruorc dd In te ­rio r. Jsuñ Lu á  C ar- O ta  expiieo e l vvef- 
;>ea, a los «convencido*» 
rrproxer—vntcv rosobaciona- 
lev Ce tu paiLdo un Vizcaya, 
el proyecte tic Ley de Segu­
ndad Ciudadana, vu famosa 
ley Precedía al acto interno 
socratixu una rueda de Pron­
ta que d señor C orc urr» 
coufandió cor. un ¿debate?, 
quizá una ¿-xrrolia? o. quién 
Sabe, con un oraroón?
Creyente en $1 texto que 
defiende, e l altanero nun is- 
tro  identificó a io s perplejos 
re n o -la ta s cen m ue le s. 
í*ero. ademix. y en insoieorc 
aprcc.aeión, sospechosos 
algunos de pcr.enencia a 
1 le í Bauisima «  a na entor­
no. Pues m ire, so . No es eso. 
seño; Carenen. E s algo u n  
elemental oxeo acudir a una 
Hamaca, a una convocRtoáa 
de su partido en Vizcaya y 
preguntar y tepre ju n ta r, que 
es la ¿ruca consimui de la 
Cae entiende ur. penodisra.
S i usted desea un ín te r- 
Ciucbio de opiniones — pre­
tensión deducíate de su  coe- 
tinv-o roto y en-piaz-imientO 
a kxs presentes—, quedamos 
a tomar usos «o liu lo s« en 
Porrocalctt o a n x rc r cn 
Aramia de Duero. Po r ejem­
plo. A lt: empezaría r.uestro  
debute Perú esa seria otra 
historia  y- cc le cu« nos reu­
nió a m ic il. al seerctario 
genera.’ <fc lus socialistas viz- 
CJi.va. Kntunda Te re m ». y 
a una v tin te rji de pcrioósv- 
tas. cor. el rchernader c iv il 
da Vizcaya, Daniel Vega, en 
calidad ¿e xmabie observa- 
ilo r para sor. bs ¡u íabras de 
su je l:.
E s un jucjp: sim ple esta­
blecido y con unas regias 
rgualroea,*: sim ples, donde al 
interpelada le cube siempre 
n um ita Une con libertad. 
D i s .i inteligente habilidad 
dapeodc no irrita rse  ante 
euestioees que le degustan 
t>. xirr.p l sraer.Ti. txs le  agra­
dan. E s una cuestión ce tróe- 
nos modos, cn fundo y 
turma.
Yo  acepto vu fanática 
pasión per el proyecto de 
Ley de Segundad Ciudada­
na. Admita, por favor, que 
le pregunten los deacrclócs. 
Y no v ilo  de e*a cuestión, 
sino de otros muchos asun­
to» que habitan cn el inmue­
ble de su tenebrosa M in is­
terio. Desde esa falta de fe 
tendrá usted también, señor 
m iniarlo, que soportamos.
r Piden la libertad de 
les insumisos ante 
!a prisión de Alcalá
Caas in v ie rta s personas 
procedentes de. M a d rid , 
Va le nc ia ,  K a r a  goza y 
Navarra ve manifestaron ayer 
frente a ta privióa ro Sita r de 
Aicala-Meeu pura pedir la 
libertad óe io« troce insum í- 
sus spresados en d istintas 
szTcc.es españolas, tra ry
Diario-16> November 25 1991
UUMUNUUMfPANJMmi!!
*  J u  Jr  a  o m b r e  t ie  W t CI MBRE DE MAASTRICHT ABOV
Sin cohesión, Europa le va a costar muy cara a. España
De no prosperar las demandas españolas, en 
1993 seremos contribuyentes netos de la CE
Cohesión m  la palabra clava. La aceptación por parte Pe lo» 
Ooca Pe «»te término a »batracio p a ra n  mayoría Pa lo s e sp a to  
les, con que el Gobierno denomine so concepto Pe Justicia d istri­
butiva dentro Pe la Comunidad, Va a re su lta r decisiva para el tu* 
turo desarrollo de Capeja dentro de la CE y para el saldo positivo
S i no hay eonevon. reconocen 
anofe responsables de ta Seoe- 
»n a  de EsiáOo para la CE. E s­
paña sera ef gran oerdedor de 
ese proceso de integración eu­
ropea ai Que se pretende, dar H 
■mpui» de*mrtivo en Maastncht.
&  Fe<>pe González no logra ven* 
ccr tas resistencias de ios países 
neos y la pasividad de los de* 
mas. para qoo se imponga el en* 
teño ce • solidaridad entra los 
Doce*, nuesiro país se hatera 
ante el dilema de pasar a la Mis­
iona come ta nación que veto la 
unidad europea o aceptar finan­
ciar. con sus contribuciones, el 
desarrollo de países como Fran­
cia o G- Bretarta, en un mo­
mento en ie ia patronal, CEOE. 
presagia tiempos de profunda 
c ris is  oara nuestra economía.
Pero t cué significa cofíeston? Según e(
Cofremc. tm principio general que debe ins­
pirar todas tas ponteas económicas y socia­
les en el seno de la CE. con objeto de acer­
car a sus miembros, corregir d iferenciar y  
'propioar un desarrollo armónico tendente a 
reducir dtstanetas.
. Felipe González pedirá que pague más 
quien, más tenga y cobren más los ,más pobres
Madnd. Isabel-,San SebastUn 
o negativo que obtengamos de nuestra condición de socios. Y as 
que. de no remedís rsa en M asstrlcht la actual situación, pudiera . 
ser que a partir o« 1993 al «europetsmo» de nuestro Gobierno y 
de nuestra sociedad sn general comenzaré • pesar de forma cre­
ciente y abrumadora en él bo lsillo  del espartotltCM l« t  pié.
sos de este último. Esta medida. 
Que nq impbca un mayor desem­
bolso pata la CE smo eventual- 
- m ente.una reducción'.«!« tos 
•''proyectos, podría: sin embargo, 
provocar tensiones con las co­
munidades autónomas, cada una 
da las cuates presenta puntual- 
. - mente sus demandas partícula- 
res, que el Ejecutivo.- hasta tale- - 
cha. procura trasladar -equriatí- 
- vamente» a B ru se la s, con la 
consiguiente dispersión Que efto 
genera.
Entre tanto, de no mediar solu­
ciones en Mástrlcht, ja  situacton 
tiende a agravarse puesto quo el 
fuerte consumo intemo y el.ele­
vado número de turistas qué nos 
visitan incrementan cada arto la . 
suma que en concepto de IVA 
recaudamos para la CE. míen- - 
tras regiones oomo Asturias o Valencia alcan­
zan el 75 por tOO.de renta per cápita res­
pecto a la media comunitaria, y pierden con ' 
ello el derecho a recibir ayudas con carácter' 
prioritario. ¡
de castos..cus se  cree un Fotos dé „ ' 'trumonfo máximo-de presión, habrá quo'apja
irisación Inter estatal fembnón de un fií- ^ _ _ ___. .íf^  „ ,F“_ ■_ .- i .  j'TV, ■._____ ”  zar tiáStá eflíróxlmo debáis TJTBSÚtTOíí Star»
Redistribuir la riqueza
En términos prácticos, supone reflejar a es­
cala comunitaria la máxima tributaria según ta 
cual caga mas quien más tiene y reo be más 
qurap más to‘ necesita. Es decir; en el capí-; 
tuto] de gastos, que se modifiquen tos actua­
les sistemas de recaudación para-.que'cada 
miembro contribuya en mayor o menor'me* 
dida ai presupuesto de la CE en función dé 
su prosperidad relativa (renta fo t  habitante .̂ 
En el g , ,'qu § ndo  
Compens q ( ri u­
turo tonco federal) que abandone la dimerv ■ 
ston regional que impera actualmente en ta 
Comurvdadd -.donde paradójicamente pagan 
los Estados y  cobran las regiones- y sirva 
de instrumento de redistribución de la riqueza 
entre tos Doce t *
¿Por qué «enturbiar** el ambiente previo a 
esa reumón clave para ef futuro europeo con 
ago tan prosaico, como et dinero? Porque en, 
ta actuáitoíti nuestro país *se. encuentra en 
una meómoda situación intermedia (muy simi­
lar a la que a escala índividbaJ padecen las 
sufridas -otases medias*, demasiado ricas 
oara acogerse a tas ayudas destinadas a les 
más pebres y demasiado pobres para benefi­
ciarse oe tas ventajas que disfrutan los más 
neos! que amenaza con convertirle de aquí a 
un año en contribuyente neto de la Comuni­
dad. es decir, en país que paga mas de lo 
que recibe. ' * %
Flagrante ¡tynsticia * . *
Pese a las tarantes patacas de Felipe 
González ente ¡a Cámara, donde reciente-
1986 fc.1987 í J9S8  
- — — c—  4
 ̂mente ¿égó esta posibilidad y aseguró que la 
; ComuDfda.d no permitiría que s e -diera tal 
caso ¿é-Sagrante injusticia, ¡o-cierto es que. 
de no corregirse los achuales mecanismos de 
recaudación y redistribución de los fondos co­
munitarios -calificados por él Gobierno do - 
irracionales e  injustos y tan obsoletos cuc so­
bre ei papel sótopKigan a pagar a tos 6 paí­
ses fundadores fff la CE- España podría 1 perder 'muy prontqjas ventajas financieras 
, que le há proporcionado hasta ahora su per- 
- tenencia a esta «socedad*. que en tos últi­
mos años ha arrojado un.toalance favorable 
en m is de 600.0000 milloneé de peseas:
. Y efló, porque nuestro paulatino desarrollo. ¿ 
propiciado en buena medida por nuestra ad­
hesión a la CE. nos ha .situado a medio ca­
mino entre tos páses más ricos -beneficia- . - rr¡m. ^
‘ríos de tos íondói comuriliarios estructurales*, aáiez ram-noa al derecho.dé veto como ms
' Apuesta arriesgada * \;y*
El 'Gobierno ha hecho hasta ahora una . 
apuesta por la negociación discreta y se Ma 
comprometido al mismo tiempo ante el Paria- 
mentó a pt> firmar "documento alguno_que- . 
vaya en contra de los intereses, españoles. 
Pero si la mención a ta -cohestori queda ex* 
cluídá o reducida 'a una. vaga .declaración-de - 
«¡endones en. el Tratado sobré Unión PoS- * 
tica y. ccmo todo parece, indiciar. Fetipe-Gorv^
un 50 por 100 de financiación ¿el país'recep­
tor y a los. que a menudo no podemos acce­
der por falta de recurses para hacer frente a 
nuestra pare de la inversión- y tos países 
más pobres -que. como Grecia olrtanda. re­
ciben el equivalente.al 6 por 100 de su P¡5 
en ayudas comunitarias (treme al 0.2 por 100 
de Esparta) o, como Portugal, aportan tan 
sóío ef 0.8 poc 100 del pesupuesto de la Co­
munidad (Irenté al 6 por «00 español)- y nos 
ha dejado prácticamente sotos en nuestra de­
manda de cohesión, sin más apoyo que el de 
, ta Comisión Europea, tardío e-incapaz.’ hasta - 
ahora, de suscitar adhesiones de tos restan­
tes socios.
- Ayudas dispeî as
Ante este desafio, ¡unto a tas tíos peticio-.
. nes antes reseñadas. Esparta solicitará en 
■ Maastricht que se liexibificcri los mecanismos 
de ayuda de la Comunidad de modo que los 
proyectos no deban ^er financiados neocsa- 
- ñámente en un 50 por ICO de su coste por e l . 
pais receptor. sno que fas tasas de qofinan- 
bacton puedan variar en functor* de tos recur-
záníasta ef'jíróximo debats'prssulHieííano. 
previsto para 1992, ta discusión pun&al sobra 
aportaciones y retornos de las arcas comuni­
tarias. y liarse de'la «buena voluntad* de 
.nuestros ínteriocutores.
Unidad de acción ..
t ' 4
‘ Porque para entontes, tras la firma del Tra­
tado sobra ta Unión Económica: y Monetaria, r . ' 
España se  habrá comprometido a- ajustar su * 
economía a la de lo? Doce, habrá reducido -- 
'su margen* de maniobra respecto*»! graso- 
puesto'nacional, al haberse jmpoesto un to­
rreo con'rol sobre el déficit y lá ¡nltacton, ha- 
' bré cedido soberanía en poética monetaria y - . 
habtá coartado con etto decisivamente ta ea* ¡ \  
paetdad del Gobierno de acometer sip el con- .;  
curso de los Doce'las'; tareas de ajusté y 
creación'de infraestructuras que necesita 
nuestro país para equipararse a tos miembros 
más desarrollados de-la CE. tras haber 
'abierto nuestras fronteras \y .nuestyia merca­
dos a sus empresas más competitivas.-
A B C , December 8 1991
Amongst us, the emotions of rom antic Europeanism have also given way to a cold 
calculation o f the costs and benefits o f political, economic, and monetary union. In the 
days before M aastricht, Parliament and Government have declared their firm conviction 
that Spain will not become a  net contributor to the Comm unity budget, in other words, the 
victim o f an unjust and regressive fiscal treatment.19
Cohesion is the key word. The acceptance by the Twelve o f  this abstract-sounding concept, 
which the government employs to designate its idea o f distributive justice within the 
Community, is going to be decisive for the future development o f Spain within the EC and 
for the positive or negative benefits w e will obtain as partners in this enterprise. The fact is 
that, if the current situation is not remedied, from 1993 the ‘Europeanism’ of our 
government and o f our society in general could begin to w eigh increasingly and heavily on 
the pockets o f  the average Spaniard. If  there is no cohesion... Spain will be the great loser 
o f the process o f  European integration which it is hoped w ill receive its definitive impulse 
at Maastricht.20
If Felipe González returned from M adrid on December 10, after the European Council of 
Maastricht, w ithout having broken the inertia of the current financing system o f the EC, 
which tends to tranform us into net contributors, eventhough Spain is a country w ell below 
the Community average, it would be plausible to speak o f an important failure in the 
Europeanist adventure which began on 1 January 1986.21
Hence, if the governm ent’s demands for cohesion were not met, it was argued that Spain would 
becom e a ‘victim’ o r a  ‘loser’, that public opinion would find this ‘totally unacceptable’, and that 
the country’s ‘European adventure’ would ultimately turn out to be a ‘failure’. In this sense, it is 
clear that the traditional Euro-enthusiasm o f Spanish political and media discourses was partly 
replaced during this period by a tough-m inded concern with the defense o f ‘the national interest’.
A t the same time, however, it should be noted that the ‘battle for cohesion’ was 
simultaneously depicted as something that was entirely consistent with Spain’s moral 
commitment to ‘European unity’. It was often proclaimed that Spain was not merely acting out 
o f egoistic, narrow-minded self-interests, but defending policies that were absolutely vital for the 
construction of a  unified ‘com mon European home’. In this way, an attempt was repeatedly 
made in political and media discourses to legitimate the governm ent’s demands for cohesion on 
‘Europeanist’ grounds, and to present them  as a positive, m orally honourable contribution of 
Spain to the process of European integration. Hence, although the Spanish Prime M inister and
19 El País, 7 December 1991.
20 ABC, 8 December 1991.
21 Diario-16, 30 November 1991.
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his negotiating team  warned that they w ere prepared to go as far as vetoing a treaty that did not 
respect their exigencies, this was depicted as an action w orthy o f ‘good Europeans’. The point . 
was not to obstruct the construction o f  European unity, but, on the contrary, to ensure that this ' 
objective would be successfully reached in a  m anner that avoided the creation o f wide gaps , 
between rich and poor countries. I
i
For instance, in a speech he delivered in the Spanish Parliament a few days before the i 
M aastricht summit took place, Felipe González declared that he was not willing to accept an ' 
‘insufficient agreem ent’ w hich did not guarantee the establishment of cohesion policies. [ 
However, he also emphasized that these mechanisms o f  collective solidarity were absolutely I 
vital to ensure the harmonious developm ent of the European Community: j
W e interpret the national interest in terms o f cohesion, but I want to stress that social and ! 




The Spanish Prim e M inister argued that a unified Europe could only become a reality if  efficient |
instruments were created to ensure that the poorer countries could bridge the gap which I
[
separated them from the ‘more prosperous and advanced’ ones. On the day the negotiations j 
began in M aastricht, he made this point once again: , 1
W e cannot go towards the econom ic and monetary union if at the same tim e there do not J 
exist the necessary means which will permit the least prosperous countries to dim inish the > 
differences which separate them from  the more developed ones.23 I
I
I
Hence, in G onzález’s legitimating discourse, the concept o f  ‘cohesion’ was depicted as a general | 
principle o f solidarity that w as necessary to create a European Union governed by a spirit of 
generosity and cooperation. In this sense, the Spanish demand was not merely a question of i 
econom ic pragm atism  and national self-interest. It was, according to the Prime Minister, a 1
22 Cited in Diario-16, 8 December 1991.
23 Cited in El Pais, 10 December 1991.
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valuable contribution of Spain to the construction of a truly united Europe, and therefore a 
source of national pride in the sphere of moral respectability.
The same position was also reflected in an interview published in El Pais with Carlos 
Westendorp, the Secretary of State for the European Communities. After declaring that ‘without 
sufficient cohesion there will be no treaty’, he linked this demand to Spain’s defense of a 
European political union:
Our attitude is a logical corollary of our integrationist position. You cannot conceive of a 
union if at the same time there is no cooperation. In truth, whoever opposes economic and 
social cohesion is opposing political union.24
This self-flattering portrayal of Spain’s position as that of a noble-minded ‘good European’ was 
further elaborated by contrasting it to what were denigrated as the ‘nationalistic’ attitudes of 
Britain. As I showed in chapter 6, the British government was also threatening to veto the 
Maastricht treaty if its own demands were not satisfied, i.e. the elimination of federalism, as well 
as the right to opt out of the monetary union and the social chapter. However, Westendorp 
stressed that the Spanish position on Maastricht was exactly the opposite, and went on to ridicule 
Britain’s old-fashioned ‘anti-Europeanism’:
The United Kingdom has been an Empire until very recently. It is also an old nation, with 
one of the most efficient democratic systems in the entire Western world. All of this, united 
to their insular character and the Thatcher legacy, is what leads them to block the process 
[of European integration]. We should not forget that the British led EFTA and created the 
OECD with the the idea of weakening the Community. Afterwards, they applied the 
pragmatic maxim that ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. Their attitude to the EC is that 
they do not get off the bus, but they put their foot on the brakes and on top of that, they 
criticise the way you drive.
By distancing the attitudes of Spain from those of Britain, Westendorp was therefore reaffirming 
that the Spanish defense of cohesion was fully consistent with the morally worthy project of 
constructing a supranational, European political union. In another statement cited in ABC, he
24 El Pais, 8 December 1991.
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insisted that this issue was ‘not a specifically Spanish problem’, because it would determine ' 
whether or not ‘the EC can function in the future as something harmonious’ -25 26 j
One can see, therefore, how the Spanish government presented its firm demands on social I 
and economic cohesion as a legitimate, positive contribution to the process of European | 
integration. Spain was portrayed as the ‘leader of the poor countries’, the spokesman of the ' 
disadvantaged nations of the South who were justifiably demanding solidarity from the rich j 
Northerners. This attitude was also widely reflected in the press. One commentator, for instance, j 
wrote in El Pais that without effective policies of cohesion, the ‘perverse effect’ would be that 
‘the winnings of the North would be strictly equivalent to the symmetrical losses of the South’. If I 
such regional inequalities were not corrected, ‘the Europe of two velocities would increase even J 
more the existing gap between the rich and poor countries of the Community’." In Diario-16, | 
another columnist warned that at Maastricht: j
Europe will continue to be a Europe of merchants if someone does not remedy it. It is very j 
clear that the rich countries of the Community are not willing to allow the poor, even if I 
they are partners, to approximate their levels of prosperity at their expense.27 I
I
According to this newspaper’s editorial discourse, the purpose of cohesion was to establish |
effective mechanisms so that ‘the Europe of the North will accede to remedy the backwardness I
of that of the South, so that the development of the “Twelve” will be accomplished (
harmoniously’.28 Similarly, ABC defended the moral legitimacy of the Spanish government’s |
demands as follows: |
I
Spain has a right to raise its demands without fear, because reason is on our side... Spain I 
has indisputable moral reasons to demand general solidarity before it is obliged to bear the | 
sacrifices imposed by the discipline of the projected Economic and Monetary Union... i 
Spain does not simply intend to remedy the injustice it would suffer by becoming a net 
contributor of the future European Union, and it does intend, on the contrary, to establish
25 ABC, 28 November 1991.
26 El Pais, 8 December 1991.
27 Diario-16,9  December 1991.
28 Diario-16, 8 December 1991.
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in the future Treaty of European Political Union the principle of solidarity as the moral 
foundation of Europe.29
The Spanish government’s struggle for cohesion was therefore depicted in these media 
discourses as a legitimate pursuit of national self-interests which was fully consistent with the 
moral goal of contributing to the harmonious unification of Europe.
The importance that was given to the issue of cohesion was also reflected in the attitude of 
the leading opposition party at that time, the PP (Popular Party), towards this issue. In an official 
document released to the press as the Maastricht summit approached, the PP declared its full 
support ‘for European unity and the process of integration’, but it made clear that:
Both things cannot be carried out at any price, at the expense of the least developed 
countries of the Community, and above all, without a negotiation which will effectively 
defend the interests of Spaniards.30
The PP, furthermore, pressured Felipe González to clearly explain to the nation’s citizens how he 
planned to achieve this crucial objective at Maastricht. The Prime Minister was heavily criticised 
by the opposition because he initially did not plan to present his negotiating position in the 
Spanish Parliament, unlike most other European leaders. For instance, the parliamentary 
spokesman of the PP, Rodrigo Rato, protested that: ‘Felipe González is the only head of 
government who is going to go to Maastricht without explaining to public opinion, through 
Parliament, what he thinks of the texts that are going to be discussed in Holland’.31 Similarly, the 
PP’s spokeswoman for European Affairs, Isabel Tocino, declared that no other European leader 
was ignoring his own Parliament like González, and that this secretism was totally unacceptable 
on an issue as important for Spain’s future as the Maastricht Treaty.32 The same criticism was
29 ABC, 10 December 1991.
30 El Pais, 19 November 1991.
31 Diario-16, 23 November 1991.
32 ABC, 23-11-91.
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also made in the press. El Pais, for instance, contrasted the democratic procedures employed in 
Britain to the backwards attitude of the Spanish government:
The methods utilized by the United Kingdom and Spain in the preparation of their 
negotiating positions in the European summit of Maastricht are radically different. In 
London, the issue is discussed in the House of Commons, under the scrutiny of public 
opinion, and Prime Minister Major ends up travelling to the Community reunion with the 
trust of Parliament. That gives his position in Maastricht considerable strength. In Madrid, 
on the contrary, Prime Minister González has just declined to negotiate with Parliament 
any terms of reference; in this way, when he returns from the summit, he will report on 
what he has achieved without having previously explained what he aimed to accomplish... 
The objetive of solidarity -  which in very simple terms means that the rich help the poor 
not merely as a Community declaration, but as an articulated rule in the treaties of 
Maastricht, is an essential point. If it is not accomplished, and we know that it is difficult, 
Felipe González will have the escape route of not having broken any promises with 
Parliament. But the error is much older: confident of its own strength, the Government has 
failed to mobilize its public opinion and the other political forces on this front of 
Community solidarity.33
An editorial in ABC similarly attacked the Spanish leader’s decision not to present his case in 
Parliament, in the manner which was customary in other member states of the EC:
In all Community countries, with rare and counted exceptions, the governments have 
appeared before their parliaments in order to refine their respective national positions... At 
the moment, nobody, neither members of parliament nor citizens, knows in Spain what 
destiny awaits the our legitimate request of ensuring the establishment of Social and 
Economic Cohesion... The logical thing would have been that instead of forgetting the 
representatives of the people, Gonzalez would have asked all of them to defend, even if it 
is lost beforehand, the legitimate Spanish request.34
These discursive media attacks illustrate how the issue of cohesion had become an emotionally 
charged concern in the Spanish public sphere as the Maastricht summit approached. At the same 
time, they also reflect the fact that in Spain, there was still a lingering self-image of political 
backwardness and inferiority, in comparison to the democratic practices of ’other Europeans’. 
The objective of these criticisms was to shame the Spanish Prime Minister for not abiding by the 
basic rules of the democratic game which were respected in the other member states of the EC.
33 El Pais, 25 November 1991.
34 ABC, 24 November 1991.
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Hence, when González ultimately bowed to this pressure and appeared in Parliament to explain 
his position before the Maastricht summit, this was applauded as a new, significant advance in 
Spain’s ‘Europeanization’. In other words, by adopting the parliamentary practices of the other 
EC member states, Spain had come closer to properly ‘European’ standards of democracy. As an 
editorial in ABC put it:
Felipe González finally appeared yesterday before Parliament, compelled by the pressure 
of the political parties and the press, to take part in a debate before the Maastricht summit. 
It seems just to consider that the change in the Prime Minister has largely been motivated 
by the Popular Party’s demands that Spain should adopt the parliamentary habits that are 
practised in other European countries. In this sense, yesterday’s proceedings can be 
considered an important advance in the progress of institutional relations.35
One can therefore observe in such discourses a continuing symbolic depiction of ‘other 
Europeans’ as the admired political models which should be emulated in order to fully overcome 
the remaining shameful traces of Francoism.
When the parliamentary debate on Maastricht ultimately took place, Felipe González 
promised that he would not come back with a treaty that was ‘contrary to the interests of Spain’, 
and that he would ‘fight this battle to the end’ [see report on the following page].36 At the same 
time, however, he insisted that the success of Spain in the struggle for cohesion was something 
which would be necessary ‘for the proper functioning of the Community in the future* and that 
he would go to Maastricht with the spirit of ‘constructing Europe*. The imagery of a ‘battle’ that 
had to be ‘won’ against foreign rivals was also invoked by the spokeswoman of the PP on 
European Affairs, Isabel Tocino, who expressed her hope that Felipe González would return 
from Maastricht after achieving una pica en Mastrique -  in other words, a proud ‘victory’ like 
the one Philip II had won for Spain on the very same territory in the sixteenth century, by 
successfully defending the country’s ‘national interests’.
35 ABC, 29 November 1991.







FeJipe González aseguró ayer e» d  Congreso que el Gobicr- para que sean satisfactorios: Si no lo son, España puede 
no negociará duramente sus posiciones sobre los Tratados abstenerse en la votación, impidiendo así su aprobación 
. de Unión Política (UP) y de Unión Económica y Monetaria puesto que los acuerdos en las «cumbres» de la CE se 
(UEM), que han de ser aprobados en el Consejo Europeo tom an po r unanimidad. EJ dictamen parlamentario fue apre­
cie Maastricht (Holanda) los próximos 9 y  10 de diciembre, bado. ai final, por consenso salvo en el tema de la cohesión.
□  presídelo* dd Gobierno, Felipe G onzikz, en su escaño <M banco m ui, tytr durante la celebración del debate en 1* C isu ra  Baja-
| González asegura que negoáaiá con dureza en 
¡ Maastricht y no descarta un . yeto del Tratado
I  El Gobierno consigue e l respaldo matizado de ia oposición en el Congreso
____ vg>¿iccr____
| «asa»¡
i  E l presidente del Gobierno.
| Fe lip e  González, d ijo , durante 
j su  comparecencia de ayer tir-re 
| b  Cámara Baja para debatir e l 
¡ dictamen de la Com isión M ixta 
j Congreso-Senado sobre b  pro- 
¡ puesta española en Maastndu. 
que e l posible acuerdo que se 
alcance en Holanda »tiene que 
se r satisfactorio desde e i p e o » 
i  de vista  de nuestra concepción 
) de Europa y  de lo s i r  tenues 
racionales que defendemos».
S i eso no es a si. «no hablaré 
cunes de veto, pero s i llega el 
momento de no votar una reso­
lución, no b  votaré», declaró 
González. Esa  actitud. s i se pro­
duce, equivaldrá en ¡¿ prócera 
a un veto por e l reqvusito de 
unanimidad' para que Cualquier 
acuerdo sea adoptado en una 
«cumbre» eomunitaria.
E l documento de b  Com isión 
M ixta que Sja  b  postura espa- 
Aob ante ia «cumbre» fue fina l­
mente aprobado por b  totalidad
í de grupos parlaré cntarios, ira s
í  e l debate. salvo la  pane referida 
j a ls cohesión económica y  social 
j —ra b illo  de bara Ha en b  sesión 
de ayer entre PP y PSO E—  en
la que el Grupo conservador se 
abstuvo tra s so lic ita r su  p o ra - 
vez. Rodrigo Rato, b  votación 
separada de la s enmiendes.
E l presidente de) P P , José 
M aría A za zr, in s istió  en su 
intervención en que en b  pro­
puesta holandesa de cara a 
M aastricht — hecha en tanto 
que presidente de tum o de la 
C E— «no han sido recogidas 
n i la s posicones n i be m ie ra s« 
de España», por lo  oue «n o  es
González re ite ró  ia decisión 
de su Gobierno de dar la batalla 
de la cohesión «hasta e l fin a l». 
«N o» gustaría darla acompaña­
dos», d ijo  refiriéndose *  b  sole­
dad de España en b  defensa 
a ultranza de que quede refle­
jado en et Tratado la necesidad 
de una política de cohesión eco­
nómica, «peta no nos da ningún 
catracho hacerlo so to », aña­
dió;
Y  reiteró e tc  « s i no llegamos 
a un acuerda satisfactorio, no
aceptaremos el Tratado. Pero 
como eso no te puede d efin ir 
en un quantum-, precisó, «e l 
riesgo ra evaluar e) grado de 
»ü sfa a iá tt que nos parezca 
sufic iente» en Maastricht.
González enumeró como to  
tre s objetivas de España en el 
présten? Consejo Europeo tos 
de conseguir «mayor detuocra- 
tizacióo» de-b C E, «m ayor efi­
cacia» y  «mayor solidaridad».
E l poniere Correspondí:ría a 
profundizar el grado de codc-
c isó o  del Ftifa m a iia  europeo.
a U  creación del Comité de 
Regiones y  a la am plúóóii dd 
concepto de ciudadanía euro­
pea.
E l segando se conseguirá, 
según González, «oo e l otorga­
m iento de nuevas competencias 
a la C E en materias económi­
cas, culturales y  sóbales. «La 
mayoría cualificada coreo forma 
de decisión se va a ir  eonvir- 
tiendo en b  regla».
La  solidaridad será mayor s i 
se acepta la prepuesta de cohe­
sión  econóreoca y social. «A s­
piram os a un Tratado que in tro ­
duzca la  progresividad en polí­
tica de gasto y que bayn un fon­
do nuevo, se llame como se lla ­
m e», d ijo  González.
aceptable».
Fe lip e , e l deseado
Can expresiones y exclamaciones de fingida wrpicsi aco­
gieren ayer to  diputados de le s gntpot de oposición b  
entrada del presidente del Gobierno en e l hemiciclo del 
Congreso para participar en e l debate sobre b  propuesta 
española en M aastricht. Luego, en e l uso de! turno de pala­
bra, va rios de to  oradores, empezando por el presidente 
del Partido Popular. José M aría Am ar, se congratularon 
irónicamente de b  presencia del jefe del Ejecutivo en el 
foto parlament-uio donde, pan c ito , se hace demasiado 
cato de ver.
A zaar. como dirigente del principal grupo de oposición, 
fue e l m is  data a i respecto: «Deseo que « te  tipo de com­
parecencia se contiena en norma». So  compañera Isabel 
To c ino  loe más aCá en !a iro nía : «fe lic ito  a l presidente 
de) Gobierno que, en cumplimiento do sus funciones, ha 
accedido a ve n ir» a l Congreso, d ijo  la diputada popular.
m
El clarín del 
patriotismo
ISMAEL FUENTE
TR A S  dudas y «jtobeas, tras jugar con el «tempo» comunitario y ganar todo el tiempo posi­
ble, Felipe González tocó el 
cUrir» deí patriotismo y. a su 
sonido, formaren uso tras 
otro — algunos, como el PP. 
con reservas— liasfa dar ai 
presidente todas b s «roías 
posibles para voiver a Flan- 
des. no en nombre del colo­
nialismo. sino en el de la 
cohesión económica y soda!.
Los populares d : José 
M aría Aznar, que habían 
mantenido su m ío  alterna­
tivo. tuvieren oatura política 
pan  variz: ei sentido de se 
voto a  última hora y no caer 
en tentaciones propias de to  
tiempos de Mauuél Fraga V 
del referéndum de la O TA Ñ  
de I9S6, de defender una 
postura anri-nanira notamen­
te por dar u.ia bofetada 
«graos» al Gobierno y a su 
presidente. "
Seguramente, gano.» no le 
quedaron, porque ayer se 
tuvo b  demostración palma­
rá  de que el je.e Gcí Eje­
cutivo acude aí Parlamente! 
cuando quiere y cuando te 
-conviene. Acude para pedir, 
cuando lo necevii- Y  no 
para dar. aunque sea única­
mente oxplireco ncs. Pero, 
mientras se So eocsienta la 
oposición, bueno le será, 
supongo. Y  González está te 
suficientemente resabiado 
como para saber cuando eo 
se le puede negar ei apoyo.
A s i que d  presidente se 
poso — ante d  i V arae ato—  
L  vende antes que le herida 
y. como si se trotare de rei­
vindicar Gibraitar o  de 
defender Ceuta y  Meliila. 
prometió negooar coa fir­
meza «hasta donde se pue­
da». Feto aún con el respal­
do del Congreso, rechazó 
utilizar el mecanismo comu­
nitario d d  veto, cuya efec­
tividad ya está m i  que pues­
ta en entredicho.
Poique Felipe G o m ó la  se 
juega una parte de tu pres­
tigio personal si regresa 
•derrotado» de Macscrictt. 
13 ciudadano de a pie. que 
e» ta mayoría del voto, re 
preguntaré coa alguna lógi­
ca, aunque la política no re 
bascprcáseocnte en L» lógi­
ca: ¿Todos es ros años de 
vendernos Europa. inré-sn 
por encima de carreteras, 
hospitales, escuelas, seguri­
dad ciudadana, ere. no han 
servido para que, a la hora 
de la verdad, te nos haga 









D iario-16, November 29 1991
The so-called ‘battle for cohesion’ therefore became a symbolic rallying cry in the Spanish 
public sphere for what was seen as a legitimate defense of the nation’s interests in the European 
arena. The outcome of this crucial struggle was presented as the key issue that would determine 
whether Maastricht could be considered a national ‘victory’ or ‘defeat’. Without cohesion, it was 
feared that Spain would not be able to ‘catch up’ with the more prosperous European countries, 
and hence that the old Europeanist dreams of the past could turn out to be an illusion. As one 
columnist put it in Diario-16:
If [Felipe González] returns defeated, and this cannot be discarded, how will he explain to 
the country’s citizens that Europe has slammed the door in his face?... If he returns from 
Maastricht without the key of economic and social cohesion, many are likely to ask: So, 
what was all that for?37
It is interesting to note that, in any case, the vigorous defense of ‘national interests’ was clearly 
perceived in some minds as the most effective way of boosting Spain’s collective dignity and 
pride in the European arena. For instance, another journalist suggested in Diario-16 that by 
fighting for the establishment of social and economic cohesion, the Spanish Prime Minister 
could show that he was a truly respected ‘European’ leader:
At Maastricht, González needs to demonstrate that he is a leader with European stature and 
prestige. He needs to demonstrate that when he goes abroad he defends the interests of us 
all... That social cohesion deserves to be fought for with cape and sword, and that he does 
not accept watered down documents.38
If, in the past, the achievement of ‘European stature and prestige’ had been identified with 
Spain’s successful democratization, it was now increasingly linked to building up the nation’s 
weight and reputation within the European Community. From this perspective, Prime Minister 
González was pressured by the press to show his mettle as a tough negotiator who could make 
his voice heard in the European arena, and push forward Spain’s just demands for social 
cohesion. A cartoon in Diario-16 encapsulated this image of the Spanish Prime Minister as a
37 Diario-16, 9 December 1991.
38 Diario-16, 10 December 1991.
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courageous, virile defender of ‘the nation’, by portraying him as a courageous picador, preparing 
to confront ‘European bulls’ such as Kohl and Mitterrand in the corrida of Maastricht, by 
proclaiming with confident bravura: Me van a oirl (‘This time they’re really going to hear me!’) 
[reproduced on the following page].
9,3 The aftermath of Maastricht: A ‘giant leap towards European unity’ and a victory for 
‘the poor South’
When the Maastricht summit ultimately took place, the discourse which emerged in the Spanish 
public sphere was dominated by two fundamental messages: firstly, that a crucial, ‘historic’ step 
had been taken in the construction of a unified, European ‘superpower’; and secondly, that Spain 
had managed to win the ‘battle for cohesion’, by convincing its partners of the crucial 
importance of establishing mechanisms of ‘European solidarity’ between the rich North and the 
poor South. For both of these reasons, the Maastricht agreement was widely depicted as a source 
of great national satisfaction and pride. As a member of the new ‘European Union’, Spain could 
look ahead to becoming part of the future economic powerhouse which would be created with 
the birth of a common currency in 1999. At the same time, the two main demands of the Spanish 
government concerning the issue of cohesion had largely been satisifed. On the one hand, a 
legally binding protocol was signed by the Twelve in which it was agreed that the relative 
prosperity of each member state should be taken into account in order to determine their 
respective contributions to the Community budget. On the other, a new Cohesion Fund was 
established to aid the development of environmental policies and transport infrastructures 
(though not education, research, and healthcare, which had also been demanded by the Spanish 
government), in the so-called ‘poor four’ of the EU: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.
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This was more than enough to allow Felipe González to triumphantly present the outcome of | 
the Maastricht summit as a ‘victory for Spain’, which had been based on the ‘impecable and | 
implacable logic’ of ‘our arguments for cohesion’.39 In the discursive media performance he | 
delivered at a press conference after the summit concluded [see the report of El Pais on the | 
following page], the Spanish Prime Minister declared that the European Community had taken J 
‘the most transcendental step since its birth’, and that the most important thing now would be for | 
Spain to achieve the economic requirements necessary to belong to the future common currency, j 
In his view, Spain was ‘not in a position of grave risk’, since it already found itself among the i
i
seven leading countries who had the greatest possibilities of reaching this cherished objective.
¡
The socialist leader thereby suggested that Spain had an excellent chance of catching the so- | 
called ‘train of European history’ this time, and that it would not find itself again in the shameful
i
position of a humiliated outsider. j
This tone of proud national triumphalism was widely echoed in the press. El Pais, for 1 
instance, celebrated the great economic and political potential of the new ‘European Union’, as ; 
well as the triumph of Spain in the ‘battle for cohesion’. In its front page report on the day after 
the summit ended [reproduced on the following page], this top-selling newspaper proclaimed:
The European Union, the most important reform since the creation of the EC, was bom in 
the early hours of yesterday at Maastricht. The British veto forced a sacrifice of social 
policy, but the Twelve approved a treaty on political and monetary union which will allow 
them to speak with one voice in the international arena, work towards the objective of a 
common defense, and have at their disposal, from 1999, a common currency, which will 
strengthen their economic weight. Spain was the country which emerged victorious, t 
because it managed to impose the principle of solidarity so that the poor countries of the , 
Community will pay less and receive more money from the EC.40
Maastricht was thus presented as a cause for national celebration, because it signified a crucial 
step in the strengthening of Europe’s weight, as well as a Spanish victory in the struggle for 
solidarity. Spain had shown its capacity to make its voice heard at the European negotiating table
39 El PaiSy 12 December 1991. All other citations in this paragraph are from this newspaper.
40 El Pats, 12 December 1991, my italics.
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Felipe González se muestra “razonableiricnte satisfecho" de lo logrado en ManstricM
Moneda única y voz común en el exterior
V
definen el nacimiento de la Unión Europea
Francia detiene 
a 21 activistas 
de ETA en una
gran operación 
contra Pakito
F. V  Oí-TFIR a . t: S v DO ISPI-CT A L  Al a -.Ktr icM 
1.1  Unión F limpia. b  retoma m is importati­
ti desde la orcari'ji: Je tu CE, riaei» en ti nn- 
dniCalla de ayeren M aistrieM. E) ve tu brili- 
Fie» obligó i  sacrifica; ta política sociat, perú
loe Doti; aprobaron un iralüdn de unión pqli- 
tíea y monetaria rjitr k-c permítitá hablar con 
una aula v<u rn la (arma loirrnacional, plan­
tearse como obprtiiu una defensa común y 
disponer, a partir Je ¡990, de «ni moneda
única, qtte reformd su peso económica. Es* ; 
paña fue ti país que salió neto rióse, porque j 
ínjcrv imponer el principio de solíduridad para J 
que los países pobres de la Comunidad pa- j 
|¡uen meoos y reciban más dinero de la CE. |
Ai menos Ï !  iiclivtst.is y ce. 
labora dores tic ¡ÍTA. rru- 
yeria ¿z elles ir.;res-se,, fue. 
ren arrestados ayer por la P -- 
leerá tí;! país '.rcir.i, en a*;
Felipe Caerá lea se »»estro “ra-
mnablemenic Satisfecho” cotí e* 
resudado t?c la cumbre. Maas- 
tr eft, una pequeña ciudad hola«- 
«lesa de íólo 1:0.30C tiabitantüv, 
que Bi.priti letrios sitios en gue­
rra* eitrope.Kriel pavtrio. ha pa­
sado a convertirse altor.» en la 
cuita d i  la Unión Europea.
l-a unión monetaria s!yrriFcu
-oRstrtiu-iói: te una ceo«-»- 
tiiia federal para lo» Doce. En !a 
unión política. el acuerdo que­
dó bajo mintraci. pero la tsolíit- 
cs esterior y de »egeiid.'-d í  j - 
mún. así couto las nuevas «x-rn- 
pctc.ieia* s!; i:= Cutosráiiati ‘-ti­
ro pea. constituyen un primer 
pavo pura una píofatuii.'neión 
ya emplazada para }'}')/>,
"L o  más importante. h  irre- 
ver-iibiliiiiHl da) proce«', está
¡tara o ti «¡da", destacó ei canci­
ller alemán. licirmit Koltl.
La re acción de a Comisión y 
del Pariumert!» ti a r opeo, los 
des jira:«!« críticos de b  mer­
ma de antbic¡omcs de los Doce, 
demuestra que la integración 
europea t i  elt -: u •: rL- Je lo ¡Mil. 
ble. Para el presidente de ¡a C o ­
misión Europea. Jñeques Do­
lo rs, el Tratado " o  globalmcn- 
te favorable”.
Enrique Barón, presidente 
de la Eurocámara. considera 
que "se iraia Je un paso impor­
tante, aunque «o es lo que que­
ríamos nosotros’'. Lo s eurodi­
putados celebrarán hoy un pri­
mer debate en Estrasburgo so­
bre c! contenido del Tratado de 
la Un ión  Europea y, aunque 
ilovctzr. las criticas, el dicla­
men no será de recharo. La pro­
puesta de la comisión íme: insti­
tucional se pronuncia por el »
£1 a-ner ir-ratí-o bniírien, Jes.» Valar ;ítn,-e'-aj. t-ny - t ; srer-inia iet Fa-e-ge CTite. Dceqlas Hard senso), 
bas ta cerneré de Va-v.Trtcm. A ̂  «• eane.le* del éaetieeaer, Merman Laca oes
a! acuerdo ríe Vfaasrrchr. aun­
que b  votación dcñnntva >e cele­
brará en febrero.
La propia Con/s-deraeión Eu ­
ropea de Sindicáis** iC liS l emi­
tió ayer un com is cado en c! itn; 
”se felicita que i paires hayan 
superado una bttu'-b fundamen ­
ta! para ei futuro Je Europa”.
Peradónearneaic. la poliuea 
social, ei ch ina  vesr'po Je ur.it 
Europa dividida por culpa del 
veto de! primer mtimtco británi­
co. joba Matar, es iveurde a lo»
c:-.a;.-r-,.idnre< arrlaeonará a los 
la banca v  Major mantuvo «Orno 
una mea s¡. negativa a inefutr en 
vi Ttatatii: la m i- mínima men­
ción 9 lev derechos de los ¡raba- 
jadi.rts, y lo« otri» l ! paires no 
fueron capaces de convencerle. O  
ite Itiihia politimi social o r.o ha­
bía Tratado Je Mnjttrich:.
F .•.‘».rímenle. la* : I dieron su 
braco .i torcer. La política social 
t,o et :t-.a< que ni- simple proto­
colo en el qct todo*, menos el 
Rema lime!*', se comprometen a
desarrolla r bi Carta Social aprt>- 
bada en 1989. cuyo campo de ac­
ción es muy redecido.
La posición británica de dur 
menos poderes a ¡a Comunidad 
tuve éxito relativo en varios pun­
to* (leí Tratado, pero ísc com­
pleto al ccrsejTuir que lote 11 se 
trun obligado* a llevar a cabo su 
política social fuera de! mareo le­
gal de la CE.
Ibis a U págui* 3' Mis ¡itlb«Eje<én m t» póftas * * * 
EJiltltitt en ti prjtin S
a m p ia  .*pen:ct>*n ilctarra;:::- 
da en h-'Crer. Iviti.'is. Aa- 
j e n y  Biartiu, q*;e Vs-Ss «do 
nómada pata deten:' 1’ tefe
ve Fr.>n. ->- ','lc.v-
ta Oartuer.dh. /‘. í .m  l n;rr 
'os arrv*;s!!«r( e't.i - c  Lett* 
Erip lan Ca d:i. 
que figura en el ■ i-.-ar.-r renta 
de ¡a cüpitie tr litar Je 5:T A  y 
está jcc'itdo per!« l¿i es- 
patiol.i ÍL* haber iti'.-rvenHtn 
Ca l í  asesirtc:-’* T.tntS én fue 
Jetcriúti L’.iiV.cr. T lilu ’. le.c>- 
posa dei i¡¡rii-jr:e eittrtr. S-.n- 
lia só  Arto*pu lí fíiiras.il.t. 
.V-rclí #,4iir,*( Lite c- lo terre­
ra vee que el ¡le
E T A  e^ipo u urt.t epe-.j
v.nüor.
_ SÜi«5J«0.......
17 I-ladrada caiíc I ÍC.ÍHX) 
iriüicrcs ¿i d;d:!.i 
n  su per.” liar: subasa
w Y-1̂ 1'icrio J í  Hí;,if,n;;| ‘i;;
a:::r*a: * !r>\ «v?:*!*
ta je n ;« 7. rcgalvirar m  vi:*íj * 
cor. fiWi!. C i:'..iL¡-vi \.c lili > 
re evrcrztiJz r  -*!?, 
es tcO^N:: hajs ccn:\.::.t¿
\Vi <ío? *- cc
Ue «  Jti T+wc í -  v
i t i  púhiíCO* peu» C' «c^v 
vjpcr i o í 5 Lh  e^.iv '-.r\
<!¿i  devit ;ü¡::> pif»ncîo* c«e n*1hïhwn nï[K?'iiîo 2? - r*:-
¡lo iw .
12 interior nunca la
e ~ u R Ó r¿ :h
ÍTr¡iírr.tcs
Acuerdo entre Gorbachov y 
Yeltsin tras sus encuentros con 
mandos del Ejército soviético
Desconvocada la huelga 
de repartidores de prensa en 
la Comunidad de Madrid
Ei prevalen:* de Ir. l-ederseiÓB 
Huía. Herí* Vcítjin. eousiguió 
syvr. ira. en cncuer.trixttn mjn. 
do* dei lite rolo voviét ¡ca. que 
Mijoil Gprbíífcov sta virara >u 
inicial oposición ¡i la Comunidad 
de Estad.'* In Jcpcn Jientcv (C E 11, 
forjuda w  Minsk entre la* repú­
blica'. de Rusia, Ucrania y Uwla- 
rruiii. La entrevista de Yeüvn 
con mpoTijabics de ia> Fucrm  
Armadas seguías la uucct marte* 
sostuvo Gorbacitov. Un porta­
s-oí dd Ministerio de Defensa se­
ñaló que ki. c«n\pr<nni'Ov atlqui-
ridot e.vn ambos dirtecntes en 
torno 3 ü  csia>:l::l.tJ Je <:■ sitali • 
cñ'n dei —i: «- sen co;n.-:Jr?:|es,
Anùfçj Cr-iCh^)\  rK*ft;iva/  '̂e
M ij:i :l G ü rh j¿ î ., 3r<?:i
qtis f l J iiií.'í HCrt-îçi:m“* n»* W Í̂ IÚ
pkfiiíA m it» ’:i;,’hft ^ r ti ?W**
fot. " t il problema SÜ ;N ::.;c SKjU
« i i ;t i;C D íív r,í? i::r L»
Un «ir* $c;vìc*k^. >itu> N»vtu r fjt is
b  tniiisición H una lnitit-i- 
oôft Je îïcraJo st*>.-:nr,ci e rucie* 
pendiente se haca de una n-aner.i 
dctaoenítica y eiv:l¡¡T_.l.i”, di;o
Gniebc-v. * I ‘-e. - ' *
VatirL! raíl:pera hoy ía ñor- 
. .i:: ;r Í.t. Jictribnctón Je 
t’rv'tva, ya irire a! filo Je ¡a* 
r ,arve ¡ - - el -ir Je la ncvlte Je 
¡’ye- l-*i -í.rr-r y !,ts e rp rro i 
¡t-s*-ibujnr.-s lltjariir, el 
.-.-•i.'C.'du ce rennutínr L.v nejo, 
-.■ tacit-nes p r . u n  eoRvenio sovMivo cu ,a ConriiniJ.-.J 
un tortoniti t muir ¡leña. Este 
paetb ha p;rn>i:.Jo la deveon- 
soja torta Je ‘a huelga que 
nnrriouiiits los repartidores
lii-vle el pasudM lime*.
Los rrprctcfitf.ntef Je ía 
. pnt'onal se compróme: :eron 
a no atlcptar va neiottec contra 
¡o* «ere detenido* durante ía ! 
rtítrirupiu!« anterior por tttüi. | 
ear mciíiov virulentos. Todos f 
ellos fueron pauto* en líber- í 
taJ nrtles de suscribirse este | 
¡leqífdp. . ;
. Dur.tnie ¡a jomada .icaycr, 
tres peri jgicotk i-.L PAÍS, í)u - \ 
rin /ó y Orion I Km  ¡opreron j 
dístrihuir ve* ediciones Je -I 
Madrid. l'ieau te 'A
¡ !7 WIÍíti Kennedy, 
í dtrk.TfO ir.ATFle -j;:
! d-:Ü:a ó; viô der____
| ; 13 Les ppicsiwalcs
¿cIiicíR'î ciir.ir. h‘T.' 
iciî rros c;i uípiij
nditora! eri h  pá.r A-¡ S
27 E paro annego
¡'}.;S 2  X T O rji,
la x :: ¿ ’t  ixc¡
Tomas
¿ti» o lixehes irjíccs1
El País, December 12 1991
•I / INTERNACIONAL . PAÍS, iuevcs 12 de diciembre de 1991
jW*asrmcHr£ ŝajSfeg3fc^^
i**«;
V. p^íenlí»  Ge: E;C«;írvt5 « p a to  arafijj c*» tía jsir:^ t  v i ta d o s  Ge la í:¿r:yf
El Gobierno presentará este tr.es al Congreso un pian tic crr'.vorgor.eia cconómic:*.
González cree que España será capaz de aprobar 
en 1999 la reválida de la moneda única
!Cx,u*H> CS'VflKÍ Kt;, MaastrlcM 
El pttsiJcaJt rt*t f »f>Wmo, EcLf* Con ¿i le?, 
ahan^vfló Ayer por b  in ab m  lii ciudué w ie 
d* \% cürtibrr cvtopca ¿Kputvt* a preparar a 
tApJttet pava t|«c pave con éxito vi &t
mfttf/iJií tf*r Je pc:pi¡fi::i f \ ; j r  m  tvs *:i??* 
£mf?ci» d<* K^i;id«si!(>U Cc*MCtt[;í,til rnr«;*v;i 
que. cwtn tarde. c«'rilará n p:,*,iir de' pi ÍT*T?n 
¿c enere dv 1^>o irrn ’mu'?, vi
o;» (mtiíiIj J  de cuenta europeo*, \tilt* ti« lí-
"Kvr>atíct p.u csti -r* m’.v jerón é i  
iiriivc ricijitf4 de q^c-caf'« s!cr-» 
err b  Ú’titfta i'lísS de 1:: 
«imw inv-i’CtiiTia, recalcó Ou:u 
/![!?.% r :3 tíiu '.¿rr¿ Ci>Rteríce?!. 
<íc prens.t <íue en ¡a sn^lrsjii. 
í !j  sis C;<r a! término tic! C 
jo  Suropftí de M;A»«r>di!. d6>  
de mí trucdú a dortruren 1y norhe 
del itw-í«  a] mi creóle* Cjonri:* 
le/ i níe>fT?M i á a 1C $rc*u i c ¡x< i ¡ - 
fip'iOiile b  prunimu serrmní, 
” líi')* vrt d¡a España c*ú ya 
entre To* ticte pü?*«* qiit tienen 
mayor rtiuIo de cvnixrpettcb". 
!c*-’.iv> ci jefe del Hjcctiúvo. 
“ Ser;*, per ir.it&o. muy dítkil, cr^i 
inwrtcthib'e*'* tifudió* que no 
e*tc en c e  mismo grupo en 
fruande k  haga un pritncr intcn* 
lo, por mayoría cuJÜ(ka(l.v para 
desermínaf quienes ¿tafreUfár» 
tic ¡a fRoneda común.
Gon/úíc* h i/o  ;n lcnm  une 
i s*orac<¿n $»oba1 de !a cumbre,
al a te r r a r  c,t:e "Ma CE no ha
dudo desde tu  fundación en pavo 
más importante qitccue. s pcvtr 
d= que e! rexnhudo  ilnaJ reíTcj.t 
eomradicc;onc.V‘, LatluMÓti ¡t\ 
d p *n o  hecho entre t i  Citados 
para permitir ni Reino Unido 
munttnersc uí margen de Ijí poli* 
lisa tocia! era evidente y **no *£* 
rufita que el Reino Uníd*> h,;ysi 
litio <1 perdedor de b  reumón1*, 
í\l?a qve los indicadora eco  
r.óír.ico* de Espsr* arroje?. en* 
lance* fewliwdo* similar;* a los 
de los socios de b  CE con un s. 
rtoncmi'a n á s  saneudá, lo* í>oec 
)¡dera cófr'uíiiiarios reunid?! en 
Maaxincht dieron, en gr,m medí* 
*!a» CGiif.tcctón 4 la principal re­
vi ndíocióít espaAoú, la cohe* 
sK>n o solidaridad fsnancicra de 
lo* En3d01 má* próiperc»! de \*¿ 
ClVcon lov rumo« daarrull^dsH.
Conniví evitó. >in embarco. 
ew*h,tria> campano* al vuc'y. Re* 
conoció q‘.ie 4 ¿o* cspaftoiet "ni*!
han íu*.;<i'o í4rLT:il'r*K S!v  V ft ?« 
le* <v*sas. pern r»o me
ifcCer »m eifuewodc viût'íTi:: s 
d« Cnnvcriícr.wij, prr-jvc ” ;;vvN'. 
tros pr<&t*iuu> n\v s; v;¡n a tcü 1' 
ver *01« por «tídse-d-v.1. c» sión".
A chacó cl prcsidvrc.e **U vie* 
■orb en b  ’» a í j i a '1 de L  c o h e ­
sion n ,%b  Sódica 'ic.j'-iL'ilu en 
rln n tm m icruo  e^paf.oí que hi- tido iñiprcuKc e impj.ic-ible", 
hasi.i cj p u m o  ¿ ¿  , : s jb 4ir pi*r 
convencer 4 HcJmrt KnSl. c! 
canciller d e  una A la r in i.:  ouc 
«  el prrricip;il cun!r»'puyeriu- ;*. bs ffrcax comunitaria», y de h:i- 
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and to impose a vision of Europe which protected its national interests. This same attitude was 
also reflected in an editorial entitled Europe advances, in which El Pais stated that after the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957, the Maastricht Treaty could be considered ‘the second success of 
contemporary Europe’.41 By the end of the century, it would create an entity that would have 
much more than ‘a mere vocation’. It would have common economic, political, and legal 
institutions ‘at the service of a European citizenry’. Another article published in this newspaper, 
significantly entitled Un competidor peligroso para EEUU ( ‘A dangerous competitor for the 
USA’), emphasized once again the tremendous power potential of a united Europe:
The European Union which has just been bom in Maastricht marks the definitive 
consolidation of Europe as an economic and political superpower. In other words, as a 
serious competitor of the mighty powers which emanate from the two shores of the 
Pacific.42
The author of this article, who was the correspondent of El Pais in Washington, compared the 
Maastricht summit to the historic reunion which took place in Maryland on 15 November 1977, 
when the representatives of the thirteen original North American colonies met with the objective 
of creating ‘a great and united nation’. That meeting had turned out to be ‘the embryo of the 
most powerful country on the earth’, in the same way that the Maastricht summit could 
potentially become the crucial step towards a ‘United States of Europe’. Hence, this journalist 
suggested that the Americans, ‘accustomed to a century of clear global predominance’, were 
beginning to worry about ‘the emergence of a new economic and political power’ in Europe. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe was ‘reclaiming its own path’, and the Maastricht 
summit was, for the United States, *a clear message that the days of North American presence on 
the European continent are coming to an end.’
This same image of Maastricht as a crucial advance towards the construction of a ‘European 
superpower’, as well as a Spanish victory in the struggle for cohesion, was also clearly reflected
41 El Pais, 12 December 1991.
42 El Pais, 13 December 1991.
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in the coverage of ABC. In its front page headline on the day after the summit concluded, this 
newspaper proclaimed that Europe had taken 4A GIANT LEAP TOWARDS UNION’ 
[reproduced on the following page].43 The agreements reached could be considered ‘a first step 
on the road towards the “Europe of one voice”, capable of situating itself on an equal 
commercial and political plane with the United States and Japan.’ It was also stressed, however, 
that Maastricht had consecrated ‘the Europe of two velocities’, since in 1999 only those 
countries who fulfilled the required contitions of economic convergence would be able to join 
the common European currency. Hence, the crucial question now was ‘whether our country will 
be prepared to be in the leading group’ of the monetary union.
At the same time, this newspaper also celebrated in huge bold print that at Maastricht, ‘Spain 
won the battle for social cohesion’ [reproduced on the following page]. In this way, Europe had 
been reminded that ‘the South also exists’, and that for the project of European integration to 
succeed, it was vital to close the gap between the rich and the poor countries. The Spanish 
‘victory’ in the ‘battle for cohesion’ was thus depicted as an extremely valuable contribution to 
the project of European unification. It was not merely a question of ‘demanding money for 
Spain, Greece, or Portugal at a given moment’, but of defending ‘the establishment of a general 
principle for the redistribution of wealth’ which would ultimately become vital for the 
progressive assimilation of the impoverished countries of Eastern Europe in the EU. In an 
editorial entitled ‘The Success of Felipe González’, the Spanish Prime Minister was therefore 
congratulated for maintaining ‘a difficult balance between the energetic defense of Spain’s 
legitimate interests and the obligation of serving the European cause.’ His ‘good tact’ had led 
him to reject the temptation of vetoing the Maastricht Treaty, which would have been ‘a false 
demagogic success’, while at the same time he had avoided ‘a servile capitulation to European 
egoism’. In this way, he had obtained ‘an acceptable formula for our interests without losing the 
European perspective.’ The cohesion victory was thus depicted as a success not only because it
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España ganó la batalla de la cohesión social
El compromiso para la redistribución de riqueza González: «Las cosas han salido razonablemente 
entre países pobres y ricos será vinculante bien, aunque quedan algunas incertidmnbres» ;■
Espato consiguió ly w  que la CE acaptara sus pretensiones en ma­
teria da cohesión económica y social, que ha sido su principal ca­
bello de batato en la «cumbre» comunitaria. Felipe González 
afirmó al término de la reunión, esta madrugada, qu« en su opi­
nión. »las cosas han salido razonablemente! bien, aunque con al- 
En la cuestión de la cohesión.
<a Presidencia hoteoesa xitrodujo 
un párrafo, en el Artículo l30.d, 
según el cual, e1 Consejo Eu­
ropeo se eoqyromete a implan­
tar antes del 31 do dtiembra de 
1993 un foado de Cohesión 
para financiar proyectos en el 
campo doi modo ambiente y de 
las grandes redes transeuropeas 
de transporte.
Sólo trn punto
S>n embargo, sólo este punto 
aparecía incluido en el Tratado. 
Para el resto da las peticiones 
espartólas, lo que la Presidencia 
pirada era una declaración 
anexa sobre cohesión econO- 
mea y social, cuyo contenido to 
consideraba Madrid como satis­
factorio, pero que no aceptaba 
porque una declaración no bene 
carácter vinculante y podía fácü- 
meme Quedar en agua do borra­
jas.
•Todo estaría resuelto si en 
lugar de una declaración fuera 
un protocolo, porque eso ya for­
maría parto del Trenado y com­
prometería a todos los países 
miembros», dijo por la m a tona 
una fuente autorizada espartóla.
A lo largo da la jomada, las 
posiciones de los países más 
■cacos a introducir medidas que 
íes obligarían a aumentar su 
contrbubdn a tas arcas oomum-
taras fueron'rebíanaeoendoias 
Según González -en realidad 
nadie se opuso a ta cohesión so­
cial. aunque a muchos no íes 
guste tener que ace pía; la que 
es de una lógica implacable»
Protocolo del Tratado
Después dol almuerzo, los ne­
gociadores espartóles pudieron 
respirar tranquilos, porque lo que 
era una simóle declaración pase 
a ser un proiocolo del tratado 
a>go óon un carácter juntíx» r.n- 
cútante.
En cualquier caso. España, 
que había temido quo ol paso de 
la declaración ai protocolo fuera 
ecompatoda do una rebaja en la 
oferta dé ta presidencia, vio lí- 
naJmente recogidas sus preten­
siones. tanto, en cuanto a que la 
cohesión económica y social 
quede en el Tratado como un 
objetivo de la Unión Europea y 
algo que debe' estar presen« $r 
las políticas que emprenda la 
•Ccxnurtdad, como en lo que so 
refiere a les gastos y a los ingre­
sos. ‘eapituio'Mte último que era 
ei que presentaba mas proble­
mas.
Capítulo de gastos
En ol capítulo de gastos, los 
espartóles pedían un Fondo de 
Convergencia y han ccnseguteo 
un Fondo que lleva el nombre de
Maasthcht. LuIrAylldn. enviado especial 
gurí elemento de incertttumbtp», en referencia a la solución adop; 
toda en política social. Espato tuvo que convencer al fisto de ios 
socios comunitarios, y sobre todo a Alemania, de ta necesidad de 
ado p tar compromisos vinculantes para que loa espartóles no nos 
convirtamos en poco tiempo, en contribuyentes netos \¡e la CE. 
cohesión, pero cuyo objetivo ea al objeto da prevenir incrementos
el mismo, y que se aplicará so­
bre todo a medio ambiente y a 
las grandes redes del transporte,, 
que son los' campos en los que 
Esparta tendría que hacer un 
mayor esfuerzo inversor para si­
tuarse a la altura que exige !a 
Comunidad.
Además del articulo citado, 
dentro del tratado, en el Proto­
colo anexo so dice textuatmonte: 
-El Fohdo de Cohesión que de­
berá ser creado antes del 31 de 
diciembre de 1993 aportará con-
excesivos en los gastos presu­
puestarios en los ..Estados miem­
bros mohos prósperos-: 
Finalmente, en el capítulo de 
ingresos, el hueso más duro de 
roer, los Doce -declaran su in­
tención de tener más en cuenta 
la capacidad contributiva de k» 
distintos Estados miembros en el 
sistema de recursos propios,' así 
como de estudiar medios con et 
fin de corregir, pora los Estados 
miembros monos prósperos, ele­
mentos regresivos que áxlsian 
en et sistema actual do recursos¡ribuciones financieras comimita 
rías o proyectos en tes ámbito«, .propios», 
dei medio ambienta y do las rm
des do infraestructura del trar*** £1 quinto rCCnrSO 
porte en los Estados miembros * 
que tengan un Producto Interior 
Bruto per Capto Interior al 90 por 
too de la media comunitaria de' 
los que tengan programas de 
convergencia económica". .
Ingresos
- La otra demanda espartóla en 
cuanto a los gastos trataba de 
aumentar ¡a tasa de cofi rancia* 
c»on comunitaria. En «I texto al 
Que todos han dado su visto 
bueno so establece la disposi­
ción del Consejo Europeo a 
•modular tes niveles de. partid-, 
pación de iípomurudad arfeI 
contexto de programas y proyec­
tos M los Fondo^BstnjctuWes.
Es decir, que se tenga én 
cuenta, el principio de prosperi- 
, dad relativa con un carácter pro­
gresivo para'que paguen más 
> los más jicos y no sólo, como
* sucede ahora, los que más con­
sumen. entra-ellos Esparta, ai
' estar rri sistema de aportación en 
Tuncídn del IVA. Esparta ha ga­
ma do ta batalla de Maastricht
• .pero Ja guerra continúa y una
nueva contienda se  abrirá-el 
- próximo arto.cuandó se aborden 
las*perspectivas financieras para 
el periodo 1993-97, y se pueda 
aplicar lo que se ha dado en lla­
mar -el quinto recurso» para au­
mentar la contribución de los 
países más prósperos.
Una pica en -Mastriqiie
' Maastrichfe L k . e.e.
Feape González he tenido que*' 
proveerse de sus mejores armas 
y vestidos de guerra para salir 
vencedor de este nuevo asalto a 
Maastnctit como lo h¡oera Ale­
jandro Faroes« en nombra do su 
hermanastro Felipe H
En. vísperas del Consejo Eu­
ropeo. la contienda no se pre­
sentaba nada cara, a pesar de 
aue había conseguido que ta 
Presidencia holandesa compren­
diera su obstinación en que el 
Tratado consagrara la cohesión ' 
económica y social« No contaba 
González con la inestimable 
ayuda de uno de sus más Toles 
lugartenientes. Francisco Fer-- 
nández Ordórtez. mordiéndose 
sm duda las utos- por no poder 
estar presente en una batalla tan 
decisiva, a cuya preparación
tanto ha contribuido. En su 1ugar. 
Caries Westendorp. el.secretano 
de Estado para las Comunidades 
Europeas, puso en juego toda su 
experiencia comunitaria para 
apoyar las gestiones políticas del 
presidente idei Gobierno ya en la 
tocalkfad holandesa.
Claves para eso or oc esc fue­
ron tas escaramuzas nocturnas- 
del domingo con Jacques Oetorsi 
ñutid Lubbers y Helmut Kphl. 
Delors. el presidente de la Co mu 
Sten, aseguraba estar dei lado 
esparten. El presidente del Con­
sejo. Lubbera. ,$e comprometía a 
presentar nuevas propuestas 
pera Tratar de satisfacer a'Es­
pato. KoW. por fin. que habrá de 
rascarse-más que nadie-et Polsi­
no a causa de.la cohesión, no 
podía negarle a* Felipe González 
sus peticiones, recordando las
0 _ . . . . *iveces que cgnló con (as huestes« 
espartólas >n diferentes campos - 
de batalla. * 1
Cuando se desencadenó la 
guerra, las incursiones en (os pa- 
s¡3os y la guerra psicológicajm 
las mesas de los almuerzos y. 
cenas, permitieron a ©xiZáfez ir ■ 
acabando con las Tesistencias 
que aún quedaban en KoW o. in­
cluso. en Major. Mitterrand no* 
era. al parecer un problema. Na 
hablaba cuando se suscítala e t  
asumo de la cohesión, lo qué 
González interpretaba como algo . 
positivo, sabedor también de que _ 
los franceses no iban a desear- ' 
gar su artillería contra el Ejército ■ 
esparto). González sacrificó algu­
nas de sus piezas.&'á&que. es- 
peciafmeme ente que se refiera 
a la petición de unanimidad para 
deodif cuesáones de media em-
fciente y Cooperación, y. at final, 
él estandarte de ta cohesión 
atravesó tas murallas de Maas­
tricht. -t
Será difícil que Jord¡*Sole Tura • ' 
o Ludoiío *Paramio escriban una 
comedia-como Lope de vega 
hizo con. el primer asalto de . 
Métrique, pero, sin duda. Gon- . 
záíez podrá contar entra sus tro­
feo® de guerra este protocolo por 
el que tortpjia baiatodo.
ABC y December 11 1991
safeguarded Spain’s economic interests, but also because it did so without in any way neglecting 
the values and ideals of European unity. Spaniards were thus encouraged to feel proud of the 
way their country’s leaders were both protecting national well-being, as well as making 
important, positive contributions to the project of European integration. The political cartoonist 
of ABC thus portrayed a proud, cigar-smoking González as one of the three ‘protagonists’ of the 
Maastricht summit, aside from Major and Kohl, as a result of his Victoria en la cohesion 
(Victory in cohesion).
Similarly, in the discourse of Diario-16, the ‘birth of a new Europe’, as well as the Spanish 
triumph in the ‘battle for cohesion’, was also celebrated as a gratifying boost for the collective 
self-love of the nation [reproduced on the following page]. In its editorial on the day after the 
summit ended, this newspaper stated that ‘the city of Maastricht will be inscribed in history as 
the passing of the Rubicon of the new Europe’.44 Even if the new treaty could not exactly be 
considered ‘the dream of the European founding fathers’, largely due to ‘the intransigence of the 
British’, the common currency projected for 1999 and the European central bank, were 
‘important steps’ on the road to unity, and the agreement reached maintained ‘the hope of 
continuing to fill the gaps of Maastricht’ in the future. The denigrating depiction of Britain as a 
pathetically stubborn, ‘bad European’ was also evident in a cartoon in which an ‘ecu’ was tossed 
in the air by Jacques Delors at the Maastricht summit. While the leaders of the eleven member 
states that had signed up for the common currency shouted ‘Heads!’, John Major, all alone in the 
opt-out comer, passionately shouted ‘Tails!’ [reproduced on the following page].45 At the same 
time, on the emotionally charged issue of cohesion, the editorial discourse of this newspaper 
suggested that Spaniards ‘should congratulate themselves’ for the morally worthy inclusion of a 
legally binding protocol which would ensure ‘the solidarity of the richest with the poorest’. The
44 Diario-16, 12 December 1991.
45 Diario- J6, 13 December 1991.
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CUMBRE DE MAASTRICHT
¡ | E* Primer ministro británico John Major 
;• ha mantenido a to largo de la cumbre 
, una lucha titánica para defender sus 
i posturas «aislacionistas» frente al resto 
■¡ de los p a ís e s  comunitarios. Con la 
jj Dama de Hierro y sus partidarios *eu* 
íj roescépticos» velando armas en Gran 
¡i Bretaña por si fuera necesario salir en 
defensa ce la soberanía nacional. Major 
: acudía a Maastricht con un apoyo muy 
condicionado dentro de su propio partido 
jj y con un margen de maniobra muy es* 
ji trecho ame posibles concesiones. De 
|j ahí que la postura británica haya sido 
j uno de los principales escollos en las 
j negociaciones de los países comunita* 
j ños en la ciudad holandesa.
Los Protagonistas
El presidente del Gobierno español. 
Felipe González. obtiene de esta cum­
bre de Maastricht un triunfo y un resul­
tado satisfactorio, después de un duro 
forcejeo con sus contendientes comuni­
tarios que* incluyó el amago de veto. 
Una primera aproximación de la Presi­
dencia holandesa para incluir el lema de 
la cohesión social en una declaración 
anexa al Tratado, fue rechazado por 
González. Posteriormente la inclusión en 
el Tratado de un protocolo, pero vincu­
lante, colmó las aspiraciones espartólas. 
Con ello la cuestión del equilibrio econó­
mico en cuanto a contribuciones entre 
países ricos y pobres obtuvb el pleno 
consenso comunitario.
El poder en la sombra
El canciller Helmut Kohl ha sido y es 
el auténtico peso pesado en la sombra 
de la unión europea. Su potencié! eco­
nómica le da una fuerza que el propio 
Gobierno de Bonn rvó quiere ejercer de 
forma «descarada» ante los lem ores 
que suscita el recuerdo de una Gran 
Alemania. En cualquier caso, su postura 
ha sido cas determinante para ios avan­
ces y decisiones salidos de Maastricht. 
Para el futuro que se abre para Europa, 
no hay duda de que la locomotora -ale­
mana está destinada a desempeñar un 
papel crucial.Ka pesar del Castre que en 
un primer momento está suponiendo1̂  
unificación y el hacerse cargo política y 





ABC, December 11 1991
Miteeies U ò t
! I P r INTERNACIONAL
España consiguió ayer en Ja «cumbre» de Maastreht que satisfacción por este logro en una reunión que parecía avan- 
su propuesta de cohesión económica y social, un mecanismo zar lentamente hada la Unión Europea, pero ba;o ¡a « true­
que facilite el equilibrio entre Jos países más ricos ce la tura de «crxc países mis uno» ante la cantidad de cláusulas 
CE y Jos más pebres, figurara en un Protocolo que tiene de excepción que se estaban introduciendo para conseguir 
carácter vinculante. La delegación española manifestó su que Gran Bretaña acepte sirios puntos.
España gana la batalla de la cohesión
González logra que el equifibrio entre países ricos y pobres figure en un Protocolo vinculante
vrâccY___
favijiiM o>p*dji j Kjiwnumt
Los doce poács a ia n b n s  de la 
GxouRkfeit Europea aceptaros 
ayer tu  o :  geodas apañólas de 
que I» coheaión eomómica y  
tocia] figme en un Pnxocojou 
que tieñs rafácírr vinetaaKe.
B oa  dceúióc te consideraba 
es tu «curctxe- de b  C E  un 
indudable éxito para Felipe - 
Gonñha ya que b  redistribu­
ción de h  riqueza en el interior 
de la Comunidad era una de las 
prindpaks dificultades que ios 
•doce» tenían que ramver ea Msoaaidu.,
La acrptaddn de que b  cote ' 
sión ecotanruea £ surtía en un 
Prccocob vineulaere y no ea asa  
dixiaradúu anexa, asmo propu­
so HUanda por la mañana, fue 
adoptada en la reunión de los 
primeros minorres con los deu- 
lares de Economía y Finanzas.
t España e;u> satisfecha», 
declaró un «dDtttc Migue! Gil, 
portavoz oSeál de b  dclegadón 
epátala c-.i rueda de prensa. K o  
cía paro menos. Paro España, 
esa docitón era poner la guinda 
al pajSci desde un punto ce vista 
particular W» «ras once «0 6 0 a 
aocpietan «n el Protocolo piiic- 
ñcameure iodo, o al menos lo 
más tir.poit.vae, de tax propo­
siciones que Madrid había traído 
a Marioneta.
El apoyo del candil« ajenan,
I  Ielrnut ÉobL para conseguir ese ■ 
objetivo ha eittó dctcrmiuuue. E l 
poctavos español reconocía, 
nada m is ccmunumr ja conver­
sión de !a declaración anexa ea 
Protocolo, que b  acritud de Kohl 
«ha rcspooibdo a Ja que tuto 
ca la primeas eatxvista ctm Feli­
pe Ge «áte» ca MaadlñdU. el 
pasado domingo
Tros esa reunión, b  actitud de 
Kohi fue olí lirada de «recep­
tiva» ■ e incluso «sólida! ia». 
«Tambán hay que dectr». aña­
dió el portavoz español por la 
tiuxie »que el primer roiEisrnt 
británico ha colaborado» ca b  
consecución de este Piotcoolo 
viaotíarue.
I=l¡e b  primen vez, desde que 
contenió ia <urnbre». que desde 
la dde fañx  eqañola se mos­
traba. un cierto agradedmieiHO 
bacía la británica.
El primer niinKUo británico. 
John Major, también dio mues­
tro* do un cierto talante nego­
ciador al aceptar un «acuerdo 
politiocr» sobre la unión ocorcó- 
raxa y uionctaiM fU E M ) ya que 
levantó el último obscóeuio al 
aceptai que Gran Bretaña sea 
obytto de un iñgunen de caccp- 
oóa especifico.
Castos Wnieodocp y Felipe Gamite, fctegraSstta al laici» dt I» «tamla junad* de la «mata«» cnamitaria «  Maastricht.
—condicione* da trabajo, sejuGian B incula, qoe a  d  ùnico 
pars que te oponc i  h  ima» 
ducerai de una monadi ¿cica 
europea corno muy arde ea 
1999, taibicm deseado que el 
aerando (tubiera esablecidc una 
dìucub generai de ettepción. 
peto al rotai se la  co ciurmarlo 
oca scr objcto de un rògintcn 
espcfiTco de ezoepaón.
Gas «su siQaaóii, h  Come- 
nidad Europei pancia avanzar
hacia d  otre tito liwt de U 
Unión Europea, pero tajo b  
cstrucun tic noce olii uno, et 
dcor once países unidos en todos 
tos aspéese* y vao, Groa lito- 
niña. que gozara dt numerosas 
«cepooacs
Fero ea lo que no se habb 
legrado ningún áraxc. *1 menos 
hasta U hora del «se« de esta 
edraòn. en en d  lema de la 
publica social comunitaria
lidad social etc— donde b  mu­
íala del Reino Uiudocr» ¡nllcú- bk.
Lu dtsruuones sobre ene 
lema »taimaron ua grado ds 
»ruínela que cari taces afinar 
los infelio* en las salas doode 
bs oortavoora infonnriMn par 
separada de be ncgoraaoooei
Jean Muriteli, jportavat dd 
proidaue fnneés Fanptró Me-
Bn busca de la  cohesión podida
España ha CKisegtzdo iniroduár cr ks acuarios 
de Maa&ricbt el «principio» de b  eobcsióa eco­
nómica y  troal, eco d  cumpromiw añadido 
de Hiorumcntaí vencida* auioptatb» destini- 
dos a b e n c o li.
, Por eohctáón. segsit b  propucxia, cabe imen- 
preiM b  apbcacioñ de uno* mecaneenr» ene- 
CMios que balicen ei equüibno económiro y 
•acial entre ios poses m »  nex» je b  CE y 
los más potata, de tama que Is* ddcrenciiu 
entre rnms y otros sa n  cada vez mena«*.
En el origen de b  propoesa puede que se 
fflcucntx el ooavendnwrnta de que. de m iv  
tenerte la actual politica de tondo* csuununùes 
de b  CE  (el F á X iA  y cl PEDER). España 
podía llegar a uu  siuacióa de oonrh-jyerre
ne» a i* Cbmuridad: o  b  que «  lo uòmo, 
■pie pagaia aita da lo que nette, eoelribuycndo 
*m  taàròamenie ri desumilo de potai imera- 
bus de 3U>or taci de itola.
La propuesta opohrin oanba de doa {wuet 
biéaoov Lo prtrer rugar, dd brio de kx ir.jrat». 
Cada mtari apciror ca el futuro t»x> ei 
pricris» de b  «pneperobil reritro»: a mamr 
uvei <c pena a b  aponacaón acgici ma Ut- 
mub progiroiv».
En segunio lupi.', dd Irido de fc* grido». Se 
modificarla a  csruouni do fmarnanón de tas 
taniot ashuctunle* abnndonando e) principio 
ddóCKc. Adenti«, se crear» un Fendo de Carie- 
sita. destando • aceiesar b  eonwigenoa de 
lu» Jsios eoooónmo»
terar.d. dijo sin »pujo* que 
Lonoits criaba btoqueaiido b  
negociación state la untdad de 
la politica locai, a pesce de que 
et último texto de la presidencia 
de meno hobodca LÓuuIa roía 
cubnión social al tntajo mnual
Ì1 poro más, tic referirse co abso­rto • lui inaas corei* o ,«  como d de U  Luntaanon y estrursuraoóii de la segundad
1 0 3 *1.
Mustlcdi llegó s Crii ilice! de 
•Ir-Lirudri» b  acbtiid de Major 
y amenazó con un veto francés 
ti no cambaba de opinión. 
Según la opimo« de km france­
ses, este escollo esalta bioquearv 
do lodo el proceso y podía dar 
al traste con el resultado final 
La pmaidencb holandesa olle- 
rió nera cliusida de caccepoón. 
•opt-oui» en la sct̂ s  crvrrijniia- 
U  qw  Pie oecocznda i iu c p  
cable por el sesto, «pcucu: pone 
cn cai.-c<Lcbo sodo el proyecto 
q.-c te està Ibvandc 3  cabo», 
scñslC el portasen eqaóoL El 
buona de que « a  mejor tra buen 
acuttao • once que uno malo 
a doce», repetido en las últinui 
semana, roosbrò aver su actua­
lidad.
Diario-16, December 11 1991
Diario-16, December 12 1991
Spanish Prime Minister had been rewarded for his ‘impassioned Europeanism’ by the other 
member states, and Spain had successfully taken *a load off its back*.46
Nevertheless, in spite of the overwhelming predominance of this discursive triumphalism, 
some voices attempted to channel national sentiments against Felipe González and his 
government, by suggesting that the supposed ‘victory* in the ‘battle of cohesion* was nothing but 
a blatant piece of false propaganda. For instance, Federico Jiménez Losamos, a conservative 
columnist of ABC, defined the declaration on cohesion as ‘words and nothing more than words, 
without specifying how much and in what way, in other words, everything* and went on to 
suggest that:
We are told by the instruments of official intoxication that we are a great political power: 
Felipe González has supposedly achieved the miraculous feat of making Socialist Spain the 
great political force of the united Europe, in spite of being economically little, militarily 
nothing, diplomatically hardly anything, and culturally a folkloric memory. The worst 
thing is not that they fool us, but that they do it with our own money.47
Yet once again, it is important to note that this discursive attack continued to reflect the same 
recurrent aspiration of recovering prestige and national pride in the European arena. By 
attempting to pour scorn on the Spanish leader for supposedly keeping Spain at humiliating, 
shameful levels of economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural ‘nothingness’, this journalist was 
suggesting that the widespread desire to reach a respectable European status would never be 
properly satisfied under the leadership of the Socialists.
In fact, this strategy of discursive hostility was predictably adopted by the conservative 
Leader of the Opposition, José Maria Aznar, who was not willing to allow the Socialist leader an 
easy victory over Maastricht. In a statement published in the press the day after the summit 
ended, Aznar suggested that in reality, España sólo ha salvado los muebles (literally, ‘Spain has 
only saved the furniture’), an expression meaning that the country had just barely managed to
46 Diario-] 6, 12 December 1991.
47 ABC, 12 December 1991.
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save its bare necessities, but could hardly consider Maastricht a national victory and hence a 
source of collective pride.48 Similarly, during the parliamentary debate that took place to assess 
the results of Maastricht, the leader of the PP declared that the Prime Minister had not really 
achieved ‘guarantees for the development of policies of solidarity’ within the European 
Community.49 Furthermore, he mocked González’s negotiating position at Maastricht by stating 
that ‘we would prefer not to feel like supplicants’, and that ‘the real problem of Spain’ was that 
its income per capita remained 25% below the European Community average. Aznar thus 
suggested that as a result of the Socialist’s government’s incompetence in financial affairs, Spain 
had still not liberated itself from the shameful stigma of economic inferiority and backwardness. 
For this reason, it remained country which had no choice but to place itself in the humiliating 
role of a beggar, pleading for a few crumbs of charity from the prosperous rich countries of 
Europe. In this way, the conservative Leader of the Opposition attempted to symbolically 
associate the policies of the Socialist government with a lingering sense of national inferiority 
and shame, a feeling that to be a Spaniard was still rather embarrassing in the face of the much 
more ‘prosperous’, ‘advanced’, and ‘developed’ Europa de la primera velocidad (‘first-speed 
Europe’).
Indeed, the parliamentary debate that took place in the Cortes of Madrid after the Maastricht 
summit can largely be seen as a symbolico-emotive struggle in which both the Prime Minister 
and the Leader of the Opposition attempted to depict themselves as the men who could best lead 
the country to a proud and prestigious status in the new European Union, by joining the leading 
group of countries that would launch the single European currency. Hence, Felipe Gonzalez 
proclaimed that ‘the construction of Europe’ had become ‘an irreversible process’, and that 
Spain was contributing to it ‘in a constructive and active manner’.50 The results of the Maastricht 
summit were ‘very satisfactory for Spain’, since the new treaty has established ‘the instruments
™ El Pais, 12 December 1991.
49 El País, 18 December 1991.
50 El País, 18 December 1991.
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which are necessary for the solidarity of the countries which belong to the European 
Community’. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that for Spain ‘the challenge of the 
future’ would be to reach the convergence requirements which would make it possible to be at 
the vanguard of the countries which would belong to the future European currency. This was a 
great aspiration ‘not only for the government, but for the whole of Spanish society.’ The Leader 
of the Opposition, however, doubted that Spain would be able to achieve this widely cherished 
goal, because the government had ‘wasted its time since our entry into the EC’. In his view, 
although the Maastricht Treaty was a satisfactory step forward for the construction of European 
unity, it was far from clear whether Spain would be able to reach the necessary requirements for 
the Monetary Union under the ‘disgraceful’ leadership of the Socialists. This emotionally 
charged political debate therefore illustrates that there was a fundamental consensus in the 
Spanish public sphere on the importance of placing Spain in the leading group of countries that 
would inaugurate the European common currency, instead of ‘falling behind’ like in the past. For 
this very reason, the leaders of the country’s two main parties clashed over who could best 
satisfy this desire for ‘European’ prosperity and prestige.
9.4 Conclusion: Proud to be making ‘European history’
In Spain, the dominant discourses which emerged at the time of the Maastricht summit reflected 
a clear symbolic and emotional continuity with the triumphalism that surrounded the succesful 
‘entry into Europe’ after the country’s successful transition to democracy. There was much talk 
of a ‘historic summit’ and a ‘historic treaty’ in which Spain was now a respected, active 
participant. In other words, ‘European history’ was being made at Maastricht, but now, 
fortunately, Spain was contributing to the making of this history. It was no longer ‘on the 
sidelines’ or ‘in the periphery’, but at the center stage of ‘Europe’. Spaniards, in short, were no 
longer humiliated outsiders, but proudly established members of what promised to become ‘the 
great European superpower’ of the future, on a par with the two other economic giants on the
284
world stage, the United States and Japan. Being a part of this ‘Europe’, furthermore, signified j 
overcoming the horrific tragedies caused by the kind of xenophobic nationalism of which el I 
Generalísimo, along with Hitler and Mussolini, had been a notorious exponent, and therefore | 
contributing to the definitive consolidation of a ‘European peace’. As one author has put it, ‘the ( 
ghost of Franco was finally exorcised at Maastricht and with it, all questions of Spanish moral J 
worth and national expiation’ (Arango 1995: 257-8). The concept of a ‘modem, democratic, and ( 
European Spain’, a respected partner in the project of European unification, therefore remained a j 
fundamental, practically uncontested source of national pride in the political, economic, and | 
moral spheres. From this perspective, the national we-feelings of Spaniards were still j 
harmoniously fused with the concept of being ‘European’. j
Indeed, even the so-called ‘battle for cohesion’, on which much of the media’s attention I
I
became focused at the time of the Maastricht summit, was also framed within this symbolico- j 
emotive outlook. In the first place, it was argued that only with the aid of ‘cohesion policies’ I 
could Spain continue to ‘catch up’ with the ‘more developed Europeans’ and aspire to reach the ( 
convergence requirements of the future common currency. In other words, only through j 
‘cohesion’ could the ideal of ‘Europe’ as the road to Spanish modernization fully become a [ 
reality. Furthermore, although the achievement of ‘cohesion’ was viewed as a fundamental ( 
‘national interest’ which had to be defended at all costs, it was simultaneously depicted as a j  
valuable, morally worthy contribution to the harmonious development of the European Union. In (
Í
the discourse employed both by the country’s leading politicians, as well as by much of the j
i
press, the idea of Spain as ‘leader of the poor South’ became a new we-image that was employed j 
to describe the country’s special role in the process European integration. The idea was that 1 
Spain, as the spokesman of the least prosperous countries in Europe, had to convince the ‘bigger’ ¡
I
and ‘more advanced powers’ of the need for solidarity between ‘the North’ and ‘the South’. This 
was a flattering self-depiction, since the concept of being a ‘leader of the South’ implied that the 
country was assuming important responsibilities within the European arena. Even if, in 
comparison to Germany, France, or Britain, Spain was seen as a relatively powerless member
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state, at the very least it could be portrayed as ‘leader’ of the Portuguese, the Greek, and the Irish 
(in other words, from this perspective, there were still some ‘others’ who could be viewed as 
even weaker and more backwards than ‘ourselves’). By vigorously defending ‘the welfare of the 
poor’ against ‘the egoism of the rich’, it was suggested that Spain, represented by its Prime 
Minister, could show its weight as a country that was prepared to go as far as vetoing the entire 
Maastricht Treaty in the name of ‘European solidarity’. In this way, Spain would further increase 
its ‘European stature and prestige’ by standing up for its legitimate national interests, without 
losing sight of the wider ethical goals of European unity.
Hence, the ultimate results of the Maastricht summit released a new surge of discursive Euro­
enthusiasm in the Spanish public sphere, with much talk of a ‘future European superpower’ that 
would be a platform for national prosperity and prestige, as well as of a proud Spanish ‘victory’ 
in the ‘battle for cohesion’. Spain, it was proclaimed, had effectively imposed its demands for 
solidarity on the more prosperous member states, and in this way had shown its weight as an 
influential player in the European arena. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the target date 
which was set for the future common currency was symbolically framed as a new ‘challenge’ 
that had to be faced by all Spaniards if they wanted to stay on ‘the high speed train’ of European 
modernity. The past aspiration to ‘enter Europe’, in order to overcome the shameful stigma of 
Francoism, was therefore replaced at this stage by the collective aspiration of maintaining 
national self-esteem by not ‘falling behind’ ever again within the new European Union. Hence, 
the objective of gaining a place amongst the leading countries that would join the common 
European currency clearly became a crucial issue of national ‘status honour’ in the discourse of 
the country’s leading politicians. It was a fundamental goal that necessarily had to be reached in 
order to maintain the country’s hard-won ‘European prestige’, and to avoid the collective shame 





“ The difficulties in the way o f European union 
will remain inaccessible to analysis, particularly 
scientific analysis, as long as the we-ideal and 
the we-identity in individual feeling and 
behaviour is misunderstood. ”
Norbert Elias

10. National pride in the emergent European ‘patrie5
I began this thesis by citing Ernest Renan’s prophetic claims about a future Europe in which 
nations would ultimately ‘come to an end’ and be ‘replaced’ by a ‘European confederation’. 
Fifteen years later, Emile Durkheim similarly observed in a public debate on pacifism and 
patriotism that ‘over and above the patrie there is yet another which is in the process of being 
formed, and which envelops our national patrie. This is the European patrie’ (1973 [1907]: 101). 
Today, the very existence of the European Union demonstrates that to a considerable extent, a 
European patrie has indeed been bom since the days of Renan and Durkheim, even if admittedly 
it remains a rather immature creature which is still clearly ‘in the process of being formed’. The 
evidence of this thesis, however, demonstrates that the undeniable progress which has been made 
towards the goal of European unification during the course of the past century has in no way 
eliminated the ideals and sentiments of nationhood. On the contrary, as the cases of Britain and 
Spain clearly show, national we-images and we-feelings should rather be seen as the 
fundamental factors which have conditioned the emergence of different symbolic representations 
and affective meanings of ‘Europe’ in the member states of the EU. Indeed, although 
‘nationalism’ and ‘Europeanism’ are typically seen as rival, conflicting ideologies, what one can 
actually observe in different countries is a more or less harmonious interplay of national 
sentiments with the idea of belonging to ‘Europe’ and contributing to the project of ‘European 
unity’. In this sense, it is evident that the emergence of the European Union has in no way eroded 
or suppressed the collective emotions of national self-love or ‘status honour’. Rather, the concept 
of becoming ‘European’ has been portrayed more or less favourably in the public sphere of each 
member state, depending on its perceived impact on the pride-shame balance of different 
national communities.
The striking contrast between Britain and Spain makes this particularly clear, because it 
illustrates how national we-feelings can produce two very different outcomes: a largely 
lukewarm, reluctant, insecure attitude to ‘Europe’ in Britain, and a generally enthusiastic, eager,
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self-confident ‘Europeanism’ in the Spanish case. My analysis of these two case-studies suggests 
that this can be linked to the relative compatibility or incompatibility of ‘Europe’ with the 
maintenance of national self-esteem. In the British case, the idea of ‘belonging to Europe’ has 
largely clashed with national pride, and therefore a greater emotional resistance has arisen. In the 
Spanish case, however, the objective of ‘becoming European’ has strongly appealed to the 
national ‘face’, and hence this idea has been embraced with relatively little opposition. One 
could say that Spain’s particular historical trajectory made it possible to frame EC/EU 
membership within a triumphalist narrative of national progress and self-improvement, while in 
the British case, a very different background of collective memory made it rather difficult to 
perceive ‘entering Europe’ in an emotionally appealing way. In both countries, I have shown 
how political leaders appealed to national we-feelings in order to build up support for EC/EU 
membership, but while in Britain this process turned out to be a highly contested, difficult, 
unresolved struggle which met much resistance, in Spain it was embraced with very little 
opposition. As I have argued, this can be linked to the fact that while in Britain, the European 
road became associated with a loss of status-ranking in the world’s hierarchic ladder of 
international prestige, in Spain exactly the opposite was true.
Using Norbert Elias’s terms, one could say that Britain’s we-image as an established ‘world 
power’ made ‘going into Europe’ seem like a humiliating loss of ‘group charisma’, while Spain’s 
we-image as a denigrated outsider during the Franco dictatorship made it seem like a gratifying 
liberation from ‘group disgrace’. As I noted in my introductory chapter, Elias pointed out that 
national pride can become a painful ‘sore spot’ in people’s personality structure, particularly in 
countries ‘which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the 
pyramid of states’ (1996: 17). In fact, he specifically referred to Britain as a vivid empirical 
illustration of this phenomenon in the latter half of the twentieth century:
Up till now in the course of human history, it is a proven fact that the members of states 
and other social units which have lost their claim to a position of highest rank in the 
elimination struggles of their day often require a long time, even centuries, to come to 
terms with this changed situation and the consequent lowering of their self-esteem. And
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perhaps they never manage it. Britain in the recent past is a moving example of the 
difficulties a great power of the first rank has had in adjusting to its sinking to being a 
second- or third-class power.(1996: 4)
From this perspective, one can understand why in the British context, ‘going into Europe’ 
appeared to be a rather meagre subtitute for the ‘greatness’ of the past -  a kind of consolation 
prize which may have been necessary to maintain as much political and economic strength as 
possible in a situation of decline, but which in many minds could hardly compare with the glory 
days of ‘Rule Britannia’. It was thus a relatively weak source of national pride, if not a source of 
national shame. This collective historical experience has been perfectly encapsulated by the 
British writer Hugo Young:
For Britain... the entry into Europe was a defeat: a fate she had resisted, a necessity 
reluctantly accepted, the last resort of a once great power, never for one moment a 
climactic or triumphant engagement with the construction of Europe. This has been 
integral to the national psyche, perhaps only half articulated since 1973.(1998: 2-3)
Hence, for over fifty years, as this author puts it, Britain ‘struggled to reconcile the past she 
could not forget with the future she could not avoid’ (1998: 1).
In Spain, on the contrary, gaining acceptance into ‘Europe’ could be widely experienced as a 
great leap from a lower to a higher position in what Elias called the world’s ‘pyramid of states’ -  
as the grand victory of ‘democracy’ over ‘authoritarianism’, ‘modernity’ over ‘backwardness’, 
and hence of ‘Europeanization’ over so-called ‘Africanism’. It was thus a potent source of 
national pride, and in no way a source of national shame. Borrowing Pierre Bourdieu’s 
terminology, one could say that for Spaniards, the acquisition of a ‘European’ status became a 
self-flattering sign of political, economic, and moral ‘distinction’ on the world stage, in a way 
which could hardly have been the case in Britain. This process has been eloquently summarized 
by the Spanish sociologist Victor Perez-Dfaz:
I belong to a generation of Spaniards who first assumed professional and political 
responsibilities in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in the belief that the institutional 
framework of Francoism was both inimical to us and an impediment to solving Spain’s 
problems in a spirit of freedom, justice, and creativity. We believed then that, for all its 
limitations and internal tensions, and with all the reservations that our own youthful
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maximalism advised, western Europe and the western world as a whole provided us with 
keys to a better understanding of our situation and a better future for our country... Usually, 
the dreams of one generation are fulfilled only in the lifetime of the next, if at all. 
Therefore, it has been our great privilege as a generation not only to have harboured 
visions of change but to have been witnesses to, and protagonists in, the changes we 
desired, to the extent that institutions which were a fundamental part of European life a few 
decades ago have come to be an accepted part of Spanish life as well... In fact this 
European reference, and the construction of a European identity for Spain, has been one of 
the crucial mechanisms at work throughout the entire process of transition to and 
consolidation of democracy.(1993:1-2, 5)
In short, echoing Ortega y Gasset, one could say that the ‘backward’ Spain of Francoism was the
i
problem, and the Europe of ‘modernity’ and ‘democracy’ became the solution.
If we apply the title of Alan Milward’s famous book The European Rescue o f the Nation-  ̂
state to the emotional dimension of nationhood, it could therefore be argued that in the case of j 
Spain, ‘Europe’ effectively rescued the national pride of Spaniards, by welcoming them into the | 
bosom of the EC after the shameful stigma of Francoism had been thrown off during the quasi- J 
mythical period of la transición. In the British case, however, although it is clear that discursive I
i
attempts were made by figures such as Macmillan, Wilson, and Heath to portray ‘Europe’ as a | 
kind of supporting platform which could successfully rescue the national pride of a declining J 
Britain, it seems evident that these symbolic efforts were largely unsuccessful. i
In the remainder of this final chapter, I shall firstly review how this historically conditioned, j 
symbolic and emotional contrast between Britain and Spain has been reflected during the three
f
critical time-periods I have analyzed in each of these two case-studies. Secondly, on the basis of j 
these empirical results, I shall outline what I consider to be the main theoretical and j 
methodological implications of my findings, and also offer some suggestions for further research 
in this field. Finally, I shall end the thesis with some concluding reflections on the future of 
national we-feelings within the developing European patrie.
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10.1 ‘Europe’ as a symbol of national decline versus ‘Europe’ as a symbol of national 
resurgence: comparing and contrasting the cases of Britain and Spain
In order to make the comparative exposition of Britain and Spain as clear as possible to the 
reader, I have divided this section into three further sub-sections, each of which presents a 
summary of the different time-periods that I have analyzed in my two case-studies.
(i) Attempts to *enter Europe *: adapting to the loss of ‘world power* versus suffering the 
exclusion o f a ‘backwards dictatorship*
In Britain, I have shown how the initial decisions to apply for EEC membership, both under 
Macmillan in 1961 and under Wilson in 1967, took place in a context of national decline which 
involved having to recognize a painful reality of diminished status. At the end of the Second 
World War, the initial dominant stance in Britain towards the project of European integration 
had been that of a warm but detached supporter. As one of the world’s so-called ‘Big Three’, 
with a place at the ‘Top Table’ of international diplomacy, Britain was portrayed as a ‘world 
power’ with global aspirations and responsibilities. From this perspective, the idea of 
constructing a European federation was viewed as something which may have been entirely 
appropriate for the devastated continental countries, but not for a Britain which could still allow 
itself much greater aspirations, due to its ‘special relationship’ with the United States and the 
leadership of its Empire/Commonwealth. However, over the course of time it became clear that 
Britain could no longer be considered a significant player in the ‘world power’ league, which 
became a prestigious privilege reserved exclusively to the two undisputed global giants, the USA 
and the USSR, and hence the dominant national we-image of British global preeminence 
increasingly began to lose its plausibility.
From the British perspective, the turn towards ‘Europe’ was therefore symbolically linked 
with a weakening of national power and status. When other, more prestigious alternatives had
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failed, British leaders turned to the EEC as the only conceivable option which remained in order i 
to avoid the possibility of further political and economic decline. In this sense, the decision to I 
apply for EEC membership inevitably seemed to imply a loss of ‘face’ or ‘group charisma’, |
since it signified the definitive collapse of Britain’s initially greater ambitions on the world stage. I 
Of course, in their discursive efforts to legitimate the EEC application, and to build up popular | 
support for this decision, I have shown how both Macmillan and Wilson did their utmost to I 
depict this decision as an emotionally appealing option for the national pride-shame balance, by J 
invoking visions of a new ‘greatness’ for Britain which would supposedly be achieved through i 
its participation in the project of European integration. However, the impassioned discursive j 
controversies which surrounded the EEC applications in the British public sphere demonstrate j
that the need to ‘go into Europe’ inevitably provoked a sense of national failure and defeatism in I
I
many minds. This was undoubtedly best illustrated by the cries of ‘Shame!’ which were yelled in j
the House of Commons when Macmillan first announced the decision to apply for EEC ^
i
membership, as well as by Hugh Gaitskell’s ominous warning that entering the Common Market ( 
would imply ‘the end of one thousand years of history’ and the reduction of Britain’s status to ‘a J
Texas or a California in the United States of Europe’. Given Britain’s particular historical I
I
trajectory of recent ‘Great Power’ status, applying for the EEC was inevitably perceived more as \ 
a pragmatic necessity provoked by adverse circumstances, rather than as cherished aspiration.
In Spain, by contrast, a very different set of historical circumstances ultimately tranformed
f
the goal of ‘entering Europe’ into a widespread hope for national resurgence and improvement, 
after centuries of decadence and internal strife. As I have shown, the ideal of ‘European 1 
modernization’ was one which Spanish intellectuals such as Joaquin Costa and José Ortega y 
Gasset had already put forward in the aftermath of the humiliating 1898 ‘disaster’, when Spain 
definitively lost the last remnants of its Imperio. However, the authoritarian forces of General 
Franco which ultimately emerged victorious in the Spanish Civil War rejected the outlook of all 
such modernizing ‘Europeanizers’, and put forward the alternative vision of a ‘Christian Europe’
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that had to be defended by a resurrected España nacional-Católica against the grave dangers of 
liberalism and communism.
The initial Spanish application for EEC membership took place in the context of the Franco 
regime’s desperate attempts to improve its international image and strengthen its legitimacy by 
portraying Spain as a respected member of the ‘Western family of nations’. After the unexpected 
Allied victory in the Second World War, Franco’s collaboration with the defeated totalitarian 
powers initially led to a harsh period of international ostracism and economic penury. Spain was 
excluded from the United Nations, as well as from the Marshall plan for post-war recovery. 
Nevertheless, after this difficult period, Franco ultimately found a renewed source of wealth, 
prestige, and legitimacy through its Cold War Alliance with the United States in 1953. The 
regime’s official discourse now constructed a we-image of Spain as ‘the sentinel of Occident’, an 
honourable partner in the Western world’s struggle against Soviet Communism. Within this 
symbolic framework, the Francoist state applied for membership of the EEC in 1962, 
proclaiming Spain’s ‘European vocation’ and its aspiration to take part in the great collective 
project of the Common Market. However, the authoritarian nature of the regime made this a 
futile pretension, and Spain's accession into the EEC was therefore never allowed as long as el 
Generalísimo held the reins of power.
Hence, although the regime’s own propaganda had depicted the idea of ‘entering Europe’ as 
an important collective aspiration, the most it ever accomplished was a commercial trade 
agreement with the EEC in 1970. Full membership, however, always remained out of the 
question, and Spain therefore remained a denigrated outsider in this sphere of the international 
stage throughout Franco's lifelong rule. For this very reason, however, as the legitimacy of the 
dictatorship eroded over the years, ‘Europeanization’ gradually became a fundamental 
component of the national project defended and promoted by Spaniards who opposed the regime 
and demanded political change. From their perspective, Spain desperately needed to overcome 
its humiliating atraso, or backwardness, and to recover respectability in the world through a
process of modernisation and democratisation. As I have shown, the Francoist press branded 
these rebels as ‘filthy conspirators' who wanted to stab la patria in the back, and made it 
extremely difficult to make their voices heard. However, over the course of time, Spain’s 
exclusion from the EEC became an emotionally charged symbol of the country’s pariah status on 
the international stage, and the idea of ‘going into Europe’ increasingly became identified with 
the objective of recovering national self-respect by overcoming the shameful stigma of 
Francoism. Hence, unlike in the British context, the particular historical trajectory of Spaniards 
eventually transformed the goal of entering the EEC into a widely shared hope for status- 
promotion. *
(ii) 'Going into Europereluctantly accepting a diminished national status versus triumphantly 
celebrating the nation’s passage to ’modernity’ and *democracy’
At the time of the UK’s successful ‘entry into Europe’ in 1973, I have shown how Edward 
Heath’s Conservative government launched a massive discursive campaign to link the goal of 
‘going into Europe’ with a revival of national pride in a post-imperial Britain. The Prime 
Minister repeatedly attempted to depict the prospect of EEC membership as a new source of 
potential British ‘greatness’, by proclaiming that it would contribute in a fundamental way to a 
resurgence of the country’s economic prosperity, political influence, and moral prestige at this 
difficult juncture of the country’s history. It is clear, however, that in the particular British 
context of national we-images and we-feelings, the necessity of ‘going into Europe’ inevitably 
continued to involve a painful recognition of reduced power and status. As Heath himself put it 
in his ritualized media performance to the nation, when he attempted to legitimate his 
government’s reasons for taking the country into the EEC by offering ‘premiums of national 
vanity’ to his audience, the British people had to Took at the facts’ and realize that ‘today we 
don’t occupy the place in the world we once did’. ‘Europe’ was thus portrayed in Heath’s 
patriotic discourse as the best, most realistic hope for a diminished Britain, and in this sense it
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necessarily involved having to give up the older national we-image of global grandeur. Not 
surprisingly, the Prime Minister’s discursive attempts to transform ‘Europe’ into a new source of 
national pride were rather unsuccessful.
In the first place, as I have shown, Heath was challenged by the Labour leader of the 
opposition, Harold Wilson, who accused the British leader of failing to protect the ‘national 
interest’ in the negotiations with the EEC, and of displaying a shameful, defeatist attitude by 
suggesting that Britain had ‘no future’ outside the Common Market. At the same time, the Prime 
Minister’s attempts to depict ‘Europe’ as a new source of national pride were challenged within 
his own party by Enoch Powell and his supporters, who depicted the entry into the EEC as a 
humiliating surrender of Britain’s historic status and its sovereignty. Within this atmosphere of 
passionate contestation, opinion polls suggested that the British public remained largely 
unenthusiastic about ‘going into Europe’ when membership became official. As the front-page 
headline of The Guardian put it, ‘WE’RE IN -  BUT WITHOUT THE FIREWORKS!’
Nevertheless, when the British people were granted the opportunity to vote on the issue of 
EEC membership in 1975, they supported a ‘Yes to Europe’ by a ratio of two to one. This 
demonstrates that to a considerable extent, the British population now accepted that the EEC 
represented the best conceivable future for ‘the nation’. Indeed, as I have shown, the referendum 
was preceded by a massive propaganda campaign which depicted EEC membership as the most 
sensible and effective strategy for maintaining as much British prosperity and prestige as 
possible in a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, given the 
particular historical background of British ‘greatness’, it seems evident that for the most part, the 
‘Yes to Europe’ was primarily motivated not so much by a passionate enthusiasm for EEC 
membership, but rather by a resigned acceptance that, as the ‘pro-marketeers’ frequently 




In Spain, on the contrary, the ultimate ‘entry into Europe’ in 1986 could be triumphantly 
celebrated as the historic culmination of the country’s successful passage to ‘modernity’ and 
‘democracy’. As I have shown, throughout the delicate period of the transition, the objective of 
getting accepted into the EEC was directly linked in the dominant political and media discourses 
to the success of the democratization process which was launched in the aftermath of General 
Franco’s death. King Juan Carlos I, who had been initially stigmatized amongst the circles of the 
anti-Francoist opposition because he was the dictator’s appointed successor, soon demonstrated 
his commitment to Spain’s democratization, and invoked ‘Europe’ as the objective which he 
wished his country to reach. It was in this way that the new monarch managed to find 
widespread legitimacy amongst a population that was now overwhelmingly demanding political 
change. Similarly, in the discourse of the first democratically elected government, led by UCD’s 
Adolfo Suárez, the objective of entering the European Community was portrayed not only as a 
way of improving Spain’s prosperity and strengthening its political influence in the world, but 
also as a way of demonstrating the country’s commitment to the values of democratic pluralism 
and the defense of human rights. In this way, ‘Europe’ was depicted as a fundamental source of 
national pride in the economic, political, and moral spheres of global status-ranking. 
Furthermore, the military coup d ’etat which took place in 1981 dramatically revealed the 
continuing fragility of the new democratic structures, and further strengthened the belief in 
Spain’s need to secure its political freedoms through membership of the EEC.
After the defeat of the UCD in the general elections of 1982, the victorious socialists of 
Felipe González continued to maintain the symbolic identification of ‘Europeanization’ with 
‘modernization’ and ‘democratization’. Entering the EEC still remained the great unfulfilled 
aspiration of the young Spanish democracy, and the ideal of ‘catching up with Europe’ was 
frequently invoked in the dominant discourses of the Spanish public sphere. Hence, in 1985, the 
accession of Spain into the EEC was depicted as the successful culmination of la transición, as 
the definitive rite de passage in which ‘the nation’ acquired a ‘modem’ and ‘democratic’ status.
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This event, therefore, was celebrated with a spectacular signature ceremony in which el pueblo 
espanol was venerated for its achievement of all the great aspirations which had been 
symbolically constructed by a new elite of political leaders after Franco’s death. As the front­
page headline of Diario-16 proclaimed, ‘DEMOCRACY INTEGRATED SPAIN IN EUROPE’. 
Hence, in contrast to Britain, entering the EEC could be perceived as a major promotion of 
Spain’s status in the global hierarchy of international prestige, and therefore as a greast boost of 
national self-esteem.
(Hi) The Maastricht summit: Avoiding ‘the conveyor belt to federalism* versus contributing to 
the unity o f Europe ‘with dignity and prestige ’
At the time of the Maastricht summit, I have shown how in Britain, ‘Europe’ continued to be a 
source of passionate discursive conflicts between those who viewed the country’s full 
participation in the process of European integration as the best possible strategy to maintain 
national prosperity and influence, and those who viewed this prospect as a humiliating, defeatist 
surrender of national sovereignty and status. If in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the debate had been 
about whether or not Britain should ‘go into Europe’, in the late 1980’s and 1990’s it became a 
discursive struggle over how the nation should deal with the growing tide of supranationalism in 
the European Community. At the end of the treaty negotiations, Prime Minister John Major and 
his supporters in the media utilized a discourse of victory and national pride to celebrate the fact 
that the word ‘federal’ had been eliminated from the treaty, and that Britain had successfully 
acquired the right to opt out of the single currency and the social chapter. In this way, it was 
proclaimed that the British leader had protected ‘the nation’ from the shameful reduction of self- 
governing powers which would be implied by what Margaret Thatcher ominously called ‘the 
conveyor belt to federalism’. This was presented as a way of remaining ‘in Europe’ in order to 
maintain a respectable level of prosperity and influence in the world, without accepting the 
humiliating reduction of ‘the nation’ to the status of a ‘region’ in a future European superstate.
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From the perspective of Thatcher and her supporters, accepting the disappearance of the pound 
would be to completely lose faith in the capacity of ‘the British lion* to maintain its strength in 
the world on its own.
In contrast to this, however, the Labour opposition and its supporters in the press employed a 
language of defeat and national shame in their portrayal of the Maastricht summit, by 
proclaiming that the opt-outs achieved by Major from the single currency and the social chapter 
would leave Britain isolated in ‘the second division of Europe’. As a result of this, according to 
Labour’s discourse, the nation’s future economic prosperity was gravely endangered, and the 
fundamental rights of workers would fail to be respected, placing Britain in the humiliating 
position of Europe’s ‘sweat shop’ for American and Japanese companies.
This discursive battle shows that in the British context, ‘Europe’ remained a highly polemic 
issue characterized by emotional ambivalence and contestation. The very fact that the rejection 
of the ‘f-word’ and the opts-outs from the Maastricht treaty could be presented as a great 
‘victory’ in the British public sphere clearly reflected a continuing strong clash between national 
we-feelings and the process of European integration. Even if there was a strong consensus on the 
necessity of remaining a part of the EU, as epitomised by Major’s widely applauded pledge to 
place Britain ‘at the heart of Europe’, there was also a strong emotional resistance to what was 
viewed as an unacceptable reduction of the nation’s independent status on the world stage, 
through the replacement of the pound by a single European currency and the further ‘surrender’ 
of parliamentary powers to ‘foreign’ European authorities.
In Spain, by contrast, the dominant discourses which emerged at the time of the Maastricht 
Treaty continued to reflect a largely triumphalistic attitude towards the country’s participation in 
the project of European integration. The fact that Spain was no longer a ‘backwards’, humiliated 
outsider, but rather a respected, active member of the newly baptised ‘European Union’ was 
presented as a crucial factor for the maintenance of the nation’s prosperity and influence in the 
international arena, and hence as a fundamental source of national pride. The signing of the
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Maastricht Treaty was viewed as a great step forward on the road towards the unification of 
Europe, and it was proclaimed that fortunately, Spain was no longer excluded from this 
‘historic’, ethically prestigious process. Rather, as the emotionally charged discourse of King 
Juan Carlos I put it, the country could celebrate the fact that it was now contributing to the 
cherished objective of European integration ‘with dignity and prestige’. In contrast to the 
decades of international opprobrium that had been suffered under Franco, Spain could now look 
forward to becoming a member of what was defined as a future ‘European superpower’.
Unlike in Britain, the importance of participating in the future common currency was in no 
way a controversial issue in the Spanish public sphere. On the contrary, this objective was 
depicted as a fundamental ‘challenge’ that had to be faced by the whole nation in order to remain 
in the center the ‘European galaxy’, and to avoid the shameful isolation of the past. It was within 
this symbolico-emotive outlook that the Spanish demands in the so-called ‘battle for cohesion’ 
were framed: only if the ‘rich Northerners’ committed themselves to policies of solidarity with 
the ‘poor South’ would Spain be able to catch up with the ‘more developed Europeans’ and to 
reach the convergence requirements of the single currency. In other words, it was only by 
achieving the demands for ‘cohesion’ that the ideal of Spain’s ‘European modernization’ could 
fully become a reality. This was therefore portrayed as a fundamental ‘national interest’ that had 
to be defended at all costs, including, if necessary, the threat of vetoing the entire Maastricht 
Treaty. At the same time, however, it was stressed that by standing up for ‘cohesion’ and 
avoiding the creation of wide gaps between the more and less prosperous member states, Spain 
was doing a great service to the harmonious unification of Europe. In this way, when the final 
agreement was reached, the dominant political and media discourses constructed a self-flattering 
we-image of Spain as a respected, tough player in the European arena that could stand up for its 
legitimate ‘national interests’, while fully respecting the morally worthy goals of European unity. 
Furthermore, given that the need to reach the requirements of the common currency was widely 
viewed as a fundamental national aspiration, the leaders of two leading parties portrayed
299
themselves as the men who could best lead the nation to this cherished goal, in order to avoid the 
possibility of ‘falling behind" in Europe and returning to the shameful days of Spanish 
‘backwardness’.
The same symbolic and emotional contrast with the UK was thus reflected once again at the 
time of Maastricht: while in Britain the debate was characterised by passionate warnings, fears 
and tensions concerning the potential threats arising from ‘Europe’ to the maintenance of the 
nation’s independent status and self-respect in the world, in Spain it continued to illustrate a 
general enthusiasm for the country’s participation in the European project, and an ongoing 
aspiration to continue building up national prosperity and prestige through the platform provided 
by EU membership, for the benefit of the collective pride-shame balance.1
10.2 Final summary of empirical findings, theoretical and methodological implications of 
these results, and suggestions for further research
This thesis, therefore, has shown how the particular historical trajectories, and hence the 
collective emotional experiences, of the two countries I have studied allowed a relatively
i
harmonious fusion of national pride with the notion of belonging to ‘Europe’ in the Spanish case, , 
and an uneasy, ambivalent, contested relation between national self-love and the European I
i
Union in the British case. In fact, as I shall now briefly illustrate, these same tendencies can still | 
be observed today, within the public spheres of these two member states of the EU. j
It is unoubtedly noteworthy, for instance, that the British have voluntarily kept themselves out I
I
of the euro currency union, and that the whole ‘Europe question’ remains a highly controversial |
1 According to a Eurobarometer survey which was carried out amongst 1.000 individuals over the age of 18 in each | 
member state of the European Union at the time of the Maastricht summit, in Britain 57% of those polled thought . 
that their country’s membership of the EU was ‘a good thing’, while 15% thought it was ‘bad’, while in Spain 73& * 
were in favour of their country’s EU membership, while 7% were against it. Figures cited in Diario-16, 18 I 
December 1991. I
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issue of debate in this country’s political arena.2 On the one hand, the current Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, has clearly been attempting to channel national we-feelings in favour of ‘Europe’, by 
defending what he calls an ‘enlightened form of patriotism* -  a project through which the British 
people will derive prosperity, prestige, and collective pride from their country’s full-hearted 
commitment to the ideals of European integration.3 For instance, at a widely publicised speech 
on EU enlargement, which he delivered in Warsaw on 6 October 2000, Blair declared that ‘for 
Britain, being at the centre of Europe is an indispensable part of its influence, strength, and 
power in the world.’4 Similarly, on 13 November 2000, at his annual foreign policy speech in the 
City of London, the Labour leader stated that:
If we want to stand up for Britain then we have to be in Europe, active, constructive, 
involved all the time... It is patriotism, it is national self-interest, to argue for Britain’s full 
engagement as a leading partner in Europe. It is a betrayal of our nation and of our future 
constantly to obstruct every fresh opportunity for cooperation in Europe.5
At the same time, however, the leading figures of the Conservative Party have continuously been 
challenging Blair’s symbolic identification of ‘Europe’ with the maintenance of British national 
pride, by adopting an increasingly hostile attitude to what they view as the dangerously 
supranational character of the European project, and the growing threat it represents for one of 
the most emotionally charged symbols of Britain’s distinctive, historic ‘greatness’: the pound.
Following in the footsteps of the ‘Iron Lady’, the current Tory leader, William Hague, has 
therefore seized every possible opportunity to portray the Labour government’s position on 
Europe as a defeatist, unpalatable, humiliating source of national shame, by accusing Blair and
2 According to a report in The Guardian which was published on 25 July 2000, public support for the EU has 
plunged to its lowest level in 20 years, with just a quarter of the British population convinced that it is ‘a good 
thing’. This poll showed that Britain is currently the most Eurosceptic country in the whole of the EU. According to 
another survey published in the same newspaper on 8 November 2000, as many as 71% of Britons would vote No in 
a referendum on whether or not Britain should joing the euro currency.
3 The Guardian, 14 October 2000.
4 The Guardian, 7 October 2000.
5 The Guardian, 14 November 2000.
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his collaborators of ‘using every trick in the spin doctor’s book to try and pretend that they are 
not willing participants in the creation of a European superstate’.6 In fact, during the 
Conservative Party Conference of 1999, Hague even went as far as comparing the current British 
Prime Minister to Napoleon Bonaparte, because of his purported attempt ‘to submerge Britain in 
a single European superstate’, and due to the fact that he ‘obviously wants to abolish the pound’. 
Furthermore, at the end of this impassioned address, the Conservative leader tried to ignite the 
national sentiments of his audience against the Labour government’s humiliating ‘sell-out to 
Europe’ with the following words: ‘If you believe that our country is unique in the world but is 
in danger of losing its identity... if you believe in an independent Britain. Then come with me, 
and I will give you back your country.’7
One week later, however, Prime Minister Blair reiterated his ‘patriotic cause’ in favour of 
‘Europe’, when he officially inaugurated the cross-party ‘Britain in Europe’ campaign which has 
been created to defend the UK’s future entry into the euro currency in an upcoming referendum 
on this highly controversial issue:
Once in each generation, the case for Britain in Europe needs to be remade, from first 
principles. The time for this generation is now... And we make this case, not because we 
are pro-Europe -  though I believe in the ideal of European partnership. We make it 
because we are pro-Britain. To be part of Europe is in the British national interest. So far 
from submerging our identity as a nation in some Eurosceptic parody of a Federal super­
state, we believe that by being part of Europe, we advance our own self-interest as the 
British nation. This is a patriotic cause... The Britain of the 21st Century should surely be 
the Britain I grew up in: not narrow-minded, chauvinistic or isolationist; but a country open 
in its attitudes, engaged in the outside world, adventurous in taking on the future’s 
challenges, and having the confidence to know that working with others is a sign of 
strength, not weakness... The real denial o f our history would be to retreat into isolation 
from the continent of Europe of which we are part and whose history we have so intimately 
shaped.8
6 The Guardian, 14 November 2000.
7 The Guardian, 8 October 1999.
8 The Guardian, 15 October 1999.
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Only few hours later, the Conservative leader immediately responded to Blair, by launching a 
discursive counter-attack against the supposedly ‘patriotic* European project defended by the 
Prime Minister and his fellow ‘Britain in Europe* campaigners, by promising that he would lead 
a ‘full-blooded battle of the pound* amongst the towns and villages of Britain. In his view, this 
was an absolutely crucial, historic fight which would decide ‘what kind of land we give our 
children’ and ‘the fate our nation and of its soul’.9
The fact that Tony Blair has recently won the last general elections in June 2001 by a very 
wide margin suggests that his pro-European brand of ‘enlightened patriotism* has appealed to the 
British people more than the staunch defense of 'British independence* offered by his 
Conservative rival in order to ‘save the pound’. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen whether 
Blair will ultimately be able to capitalize on this electoral victory by persuading the majority of 
the British people about the virtues of joining the euro currency, when he decides to hold the 
promised referendum on this highly contested, emotionally charged issue.
In Spain, by contrast, the country’s successful entry into the euro currency in May 1998 has 
been completely unquestioned in the public sphere, and the idea that ‘Europe’ is something 
‘good for the nation* remains a rather obvious, taken-for-granted aspect of national life. Hence, 
as one would expect, this accomplishment has been enthusiastically celebrated in political and 
media discourses as a demonstration of the fact that the country has definitively achieved niveles 
altos de bienestar ('high levels of well-being*), by entering la primera velocidad de la Union 
Europea (‘the first speed of the European Union’) and catching el tren de la historia (‘the train 
of history*).10 As José Maria Aznar, the current conservative Prime Minister, wrote in an article
9 The Guardian, 15 October 1999, my italics. The fact that Tony Blair has won the last general elections by a wide 
margin suggests that his brand of pro-European ‘enlightened patriotism’ is more appealing to the British people 
more than the staunch defense of ‘British independence’ offered by his Conservative rival. However, it remains to 
be seen whether Blair will be able to capitalize on his victory, by persuading the British people to join the Euro 
currency, when he decides to hold the referendum on the single currency which he has promised.
10 These were the words employed by the Spanish leader José Maria Aznar at the end of the European Council 
meeting in which Spain’s entry into the euro was officially announced in May 1998. It is also noteworthy that in the
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entitled La Hora de Europa, La Hora de España (‘The Hour of Europe, the Hour of Spain’), 
which was published just one month before he won the last general elections by an 
overwhelming absolute majority:
Only three years ago, there were many in our country who were resigned to finding 
themselves permanently in the second division, and who did not believe that Spain would 
be able to make the effort of incorporating herself to the rest of the great European nations. 
I never listened to those voices: I always believed in the capacity of democratic Spain to 
rise up by its own merits to the position to which her history entitles her. Today the euro 
has become a reality. And Spain has regained its place, its weight, and if I may be allowed 
a term with an Orteguian eco, its level within this great European project.11
Even more significantly, on 20 November 2000, the 25th anniversary of Franco’s death, an 
editorial in the national newspaper El Mundo, which has become the country’s second leading 
daily, proclaimed that:
A quarter of a century later, there are reasons to feel proud... The bloody conflict of 1936 is 
today a page of history, the constitutional monarchy has obtained the consensus of the 
immense majority of Spaniards, Spain has found its identity in Europe, the economy has 
modernized, and most importantly, the mentality its citizens has changed profoundly. The 
Pyrénées have ceased to be a spiritual and topographical barrier.* 12
Finally, it is also worth mentioning a speech recently delivered by the celebrated Spanish writer, 
Francisco Umbra], when he received the Premio Cervantes (Cervantes Prize), the most 
prestigious literary award in Spain, in an emotive ceremony presided by King Juan Carlos I. 
After proclaiming that the figure of Don Quixote ‘is a metaphor of Spain’, Umbral declared:
Spain invents passions to survive itself.... The passion of America, the passion of Empire. 
the passion of Europe, the passion of the world move Spain and place us at the head of the 
century of centuries.13
preceding months, between April and May 1998,72% of Spaniards were in favour of their country’s acceptance into 
‘Euroland’ (Barbé 1999: 169-70).
11 El Mundo, 5 February 2000.
13 El Mundo, 20 November 2000.
13 El Pais, 24 April 2001.
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To a great extent, therefore, the historically conditioned relationship between British and Spanish 
we-feelings of collective pride, and the affective meanings of ‘Europe’ which have emerged in 
each of these two countries, can still clearly be perceived in the present day.
During the course of the past few years, this symbolico-emotive contrast has also been 
vividly reflected in the diverse collective representations of the European flag which have 
emerged in Britain and Spain. In the latter case, this totemic European icon has remained a 
prestige-symbol which is frequently seen waving from official buildings, and is even employed 
as an advertising hook by leading companies. In the British case, however, this seems rather 
inconceivable, since ‘Europe’ hardly has the same widespread emotional appeal amongst the 
general public, and hence cannot possibly be considered an effective symbolic tactic for the 
purposes of commercial marketing. This was made patently clear, for instance, on May 9 1996 
(otherwise known as ‘Europe Day’), when the British Daily Express tabloid published an 
‘alternative flag’ which it asked its readers to paste on the windows of their homes, as a sign of 
‘patriotic protest against Euro-rot’ [reproduced on the following page]. This image depicted 
Saint George, one of the classic symbolic representations of British nationhood, tearing down the 
twelve-starred European flag with his mighty sword, in order to uncover a shiny Union Jack 
which lay in the background.14 By contrast, only a few months later, in December of the same 
year, Spain’s El Mundo published a massive two-page advertisement in which Caja de Madrid, 
one of the most important banks in this country, utilised the European flag to promote the fact 
that it was supposedly more ‘modem’ and ‘advanced’ than any of its competitors [reproduced on 
the following page]. ‘The common project of Europe,’ its advertising rhetoric proclaimed,
14 This British hostility to European symbols was also illustrated in a series of recent reports on the web page of the 
BBC, which showed how leading members of the Conservative Party have mounted a campaign to promote the use 
of national symbols on passports, driving licenses, and car number plates, in opposition to what they see as the 
Labour government’s attempt to ‘erase all traces of Britishness’ and ‘force us into a Europe or regions by stealth’ 
(See ‘MPs demonstrate passport patriotism’ [July 7 1988] and ‘Tories flag up national identity’ [22 April 2001], 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng1ish/uk noli tic s/L
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'compels us to work harder. To win, day by day, the trust of our customers.’ Hence, such 
diametrically opposed depictions of the European flag encapsulate the diverse affective 
meanings of ‘Europe’ which have emerged over the course of time in the British and Spanish 
contexts of collective memory and sentiment.
These empirical findings, however, are not the only contribution which I wish to make with 
this thesis. As I stated in my introductory chapter, on a more general level, I also hope to have 
illustrated the fruitfulness of the innovative theoretical approach to the study of national 
identities which was pioneered by Norbert Elias, and has more recently been developed in the 
‘sociology of emotions’ proposed by Thomas Scheff. Such an approach, which I have proposed | 
to call Elias’s sociohistorical psychology of national pride, focuses on the we-images of relative I 
superiority or inferiority, as well as on the we-feelings of ‘group charisma’ and ‘group disgrace’, 
or collective pride and shame, which are experienced by individuals as members of rival national 
communities, embroiled in ongoing competitive struggles for power and status. As I argued in 
the introduction, this is partly a distinctively modem phenomenon, which has developed during 
the course of a long-term sociohistorical process of state-formation and nation-building. As 
networks of human contact and interdependence have expanded, people’s emotional 
identification with each other has spread throughout increasingly wider territorial spaces, with 
societies growing in scale from small-scale tribes to industrialized nation-states, and today, as 
well, to the globally interconnected, planetary community of humankind as a whole. However, 
national we-images and we-feelings should also be seen as contemporary variations of a 
universal anthropological theme', the general tendency of human ‘survival units’ to bond 
together symbolically and emotionally through collective ideals and sentiments about 
themselves, which are always formed in contrast and opposition to other human communities on 
the same level of integration (cities vis-à-vis other cities, regions vis-à-vis other regions, nations 
vis-à-vis other nations, and so on). Furthermore, following the leading exponents of the 
multidisciplinary research programme I have referred to as ‘political symbolism and ritual’, these
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collective self-concepts and self-feelings must necessarily be studied as conflicting paradigms of 
national greatness. In other words, from this perspective, national ideals and sentiments can be 
seen the key symbolic weapons that are employed in the ongoing discursive duels of the rival 
political groups which struggle for power and authority in the public spheres of contemporary 
nation-state societies.
At the same time, the crucial methodological point which I hope this thesis has managed to 
convey is that the collective emotions of nationhood have a history, and hence that in order to 
study them effectively, the sociologist must necessarily delve into a country’s past and analyze 
its vicissitudes on the world stage -  in other words, the triumphs and defeats which have been 
collectively experienced over the course of time in the various ‘games of international honour* 
which nations constantly play with each other, such as those of political power, economic 
prosperity, moral respectability, cultural prestige, and so on. In this way, as Elias proposed in his 
illuminating study of German nationhood, one must firstly carry out a kind of sociohistorical 
psycho-analysis of a national community’s developed (and developing) ‘pride-shame balance* of 
collective self-esteem. Only within such a historically informed frame of reference can one carry 
out a properly sociological ‘discourse analysis* of the symbolic forms which predominate in any 
given national context. Therefore, another essential lesson which I hope my thesis has 
successfully communicated is that the diverse ‘symbolic universes’ (Cassirer 1944) in which 
human beings live, and hence the ‘contexts of controversy* (Billig 1991) in which their rival 
ideological paradigms clash, evidently never emerge in a sociocultural vaccuum. Rather, they are 
always fundamentally conditioned and constrained by the particular historical trajectories (and 
therefore the collective memories) of the particular society in question.
From this theoretical and methodological perspective, my comparative-historical research on 
Britain and Spain has shown that the development of the European Union has hardly eliminated 
the we-images and we-feelings of people’s collective, national ‘face*. On the contrary, the very 
notion of ‘being European* has itself become a kind of ranking-measure in the symbolic status-
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evaluations which are continuously made in the political and media discourses of each member 
state of the EU. Indeed, the evidence of this thesis suggests that the fundamental issue in the 
discursive battles which have taken place within the context of the nationally bounded, media- 
transmitted political arena of each member state of the EU has always been: What does ‘Europe’ 
mean for ‘us’ (the national ‘we’)? What does ‘becoming European’ respresent for ‘our’ interests, 
‘our’ reputation, ‘our’ honour, ‘our self-respect’? Following the largely forgotten insights which 
Max Weber bequeathed to us in Politics as a Vocation, one could say that since the end of the 
Second World War, ‘Europe’ has actually become one of the key symbolic weapons which 
national politicians currently employ in the member states of the EU to ‘canvass votes’ and ‘win 
over potential followers’, by offering them ‘premiums of (national) vanity’ through the prospect 
of ‘European prosperity and prestige’ (or, on the contrary, to attack one’s political opponents by 
identifying membership in the future ‘Europe superstate’ with national shame, disgrace, and 
dishonour).
In an essay written in 1987, Elias suggested that a clash was gradually beginning to emerge 
in the European context between national we-feelings and the project of constructing a 
supranational political union. He argued that the old nation-states of Europe could no longer 
fulfil their classic security functions separately, given the competitive pressure toward the 
creation of increasingly larger survival units, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, 
However, the goal of creating a European federation was restrained by what he called a ‘drag 
effect’, an emotional resistance which blocked the shift of people’s affective loyalties towards a 
higher level of social integration. Elias stressed that this phenomenon could only be understood 
by taking into account the deeply ingrained, collective we-feelings of national habitus:
If resistance to integration at a higher level is presented as primarily a problem of thought, 
an intellectual problem, it can never be properly understood... It would make rational 
sense, and possibly bring benefits if the European nation-states combined into the United 
States of Europe, but in most cases the difficulty lies in the fact that the intellectual 
awareness of the logic of integration meets the resistance of emotive ideas which give the 
integration the character of ruin... The integration unit on the continental level may be 
understood to be a practical necessity, but unlike the older national units it is not 
associated with strong we-feelings.{1991 a: 225-6, my italics)
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Today, in the ‘brave new Europe* of the euro currency, people’s sentimental affections for their 
old nation-states may seem completely ‘absurd’, ‘archaic’, and even ‘immoral’ from an 
‘enlightened’, ‘Europeanist’, or ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective. Nevertheless, Elias emphasised that 
the predominant tendencies of national habitus cannot simply be changed overnight by a 
‘rational’ act of will, since ‘these things cannot simply be changed like clothes’ (1991a: 224-5). 
For this reason, he strongly emphasised that ‘the difficulties in the way of European Union will 
remain inaccessible to analysis, particularly scientific analysis, as long as... the we-ideal and we- 
identity in individual feeling and behaviour is misunderstood* (Elias 1991a: 221).
To a great extent, Elias’s sociological diagnosis was undoubtedly accurate, and can still be 
applied to the Europe of the early twenty-first century. As I noted in my introductory chapter, the 
collective passions ignited by international sporting contests repeatedly demonstrate that the 
affections people display towards their nation-states are much stronger in comparison to their 
feelings towards the relatively boring, mundane, ‘Eurocratic’ world of Brussels.15 One could 
therefore say, echoing Durkheim, that ‘the nation’ is still a sacred object of collective emotional 
devotion, while the European Union largely remains bogged down in the profane world of 
economic statistics, manufacturing regulations, and agricultural quotas. Furthermore, in all the 
member states of the EU, the affective dispositions of people’s national habitus can still make it 
extremely difficult for them to accept the political authority of ‘European’ power-holders and 
decision-makers whom they find it very difficult to trust, given that they are not ‘one of us’ (the 
national ‘we’). For this reason, in spite of the ‘Euro-enthusiasm’ which has generally
15 At a conference which took place at the University of Metz in September 2000, on ‘Norbert Elias and Social 
Anthropology’, Eric Dunning pointed out to me that there is actually one exception to this point with which I was 
not myself acquainted: the Ryder’s Cup golf tournament, in which ‘America’ is pitted against ‘Europe’ every two 
years, and the fans of each respective team enthusiastically wave either the stars-and-stripes flags of the USA, or the 
twelve-starred blue and gold flag of the EU. However, golf is largely an elite, minority sport which evidently cannot 
compete with the much greater bursts of mass national sentiment which explode every four years with the World 
Cup of football or the Olympic Games.
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characterized Spain, it is nevertheless rather difficult to imagine that most contemporary 
Spaniards would accept the authority of a Briton or a Frenchman as a fully empowered 
‘President of Europe’. At the same time, judging from the ‘Europhobia’ which continues to 
characterize the British tabloid press, it seems even less likely that the majority of Britons would 
accept the authority of a Spaniard or a German at the head of a ‘European government’.
As Weber pointed out when he famously outlined what he called the ‘ideal types of 
authority’, in the messy reality of the modem social world, the legitimacy of political institutions 
is never exclusively based on a ‘legal-rational’ type of order, but also on some degree of custom 
and tradition:
In the case of ‘legal authority’, it is never purely legal. The belief in legality comes to be 
established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional. Violation of the tradition 
may be fatal to it. (1978 [1918-20])
Today, following this Weberian insight, one could therefore say that the European Union largely 
lacks the crucial dimension of traditional authority with which the governments of its nation­
states have become endowed over the course of a long-term historical process.16 Most of those 
people who have recently been baptised as ‘European citizens’, in other words, are completely 
accustomed to being governed by political leaders with whom they share the same nationality, 
and who speak to ‘us’ in ‘our (national) language’. Although rivers of ink have flowed with 
regard to the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union, rarely does one hear it stated 
openly and explicitly that a fundamental obstacle to the resolution of this problem is the fact that 
even if the peoples of Europe were granted the opportunity to vote in an utterly ‘transparent’ and 
‘democratic’ manner for a fully empowered European Commission, Parliament, and President,
16 This has been explored by Helen Wallace in a paper entitled ‘Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy 
for the EC’ (1993), and in other contributions to García (ed., 1993). More recently, various authors have also 
examined this important problem from different angles in an interesting collection of essays edited by Banchoff and 
Smith (1999).
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many of them would still reject the utterly unpalatable prospect of being governed by ‘bloody 
foreigners’.
Nevertheless, as my comparative analysis of Britain and Spain has demonstrated, it is clearly 
a mistake to classify national we-images and we-feelings as obstacles which, always and 
necessarily, stand in the way of European unification. In reality, and to a considerable extent, the 
ideals and sentiments of nationhood have also played a fundamental role in building up the 
legitimacy and popularity of EC/EU membership amongst different populations. Hence, 
although Elias was undoubtedly right about the existence of a ‘drag effect' which has slown 
down, and indeed continues to block, the process of European integration, it is also evident that 
this phenomenon should not be viewed as a uniformly homogeneous trend which is identical in 
all national contexts. Instead, what one can observe is that some nations, such as Britain, seem to 
have a much greater tendency to ‘drag’ along reluctantly in this project of supranational bonding, 
while others, such as Spain, seem to be much more willing to push this process forward with 
enthusiasm. The evidence of my research suggests that these divergent symbolic and emotional 
tendencies can be explained by analyzing the historically conditioned, collectively shared ‘pride- 
shame balance’ which has developed, and is developing, within each member state of the 
European Union.
Future sociological and anthropological studies could undoubtedly continue to investigate 
this important phenomenon in other countries and historical periods, by employing the 
theoretical and methodological framework I have employed in this thesis. It would undoubtedly 
be worthwhile, for instance, to explore the relation between national pride and the affective 
meanings of ‘Europe’ which has emerged in the cases of Germany and Italy, given their own 
‘shameful past’ as the countries in which Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini became worshipped 
national ‘totems’; in France, with its own. attempts to recover global grandeur after the 
humiliations it suffered during World War H, and to continue its universal ‘civilizing mission' in 
the world, by leading the construction of VEurope\ in Greece and Portugal, with their own
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particular we-images of humiliating economic, political, and cultural ‘backwardness’; in Ireland, 
where ‘Europe* has been widely perceived as a way to build up national strength and self- 
confidence vis-a-vis Britain, through the status-boost provided by the platform of EU 
membership; in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they attempt to recover 
influence, prosperity, and respectability on the world stage, by being accepted into the EU, and 
so on. At the same time, although I have not focused on the discourse of sub-state minority 
nationalisms in this thesis, one could also investigate the way in which such movements, in areas 
like the Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales, have viewed the European Union as an 
opportunity to boost their own collective ‘status honour’, by liberating themselves from what 
they perceive as the humiliating, oppressive boots of Madrid or London, and hence by 
recovering an independent prestige-ranking in the world as separate ‘nations in Europe’. This is 
still a largely unexplored field of sociological and anthropological research which in my view 
could be fruitfully explored through the theoretical focus on the historically developed, collective 
emotions of national ‘face’ that I have employed in this thesis.
For the time being, with the sincere hope that my own work may inspire further 
investigations into the pride-shame balance of other national collectivities, I shall tentatively 
conclude this thesis with some final reflections on the future of the European Union.
10.3 Towards a European pride-shame balance?
In my introductory chapter, I cited a passage from Professional Ethics and Civic Morals in 
which Emile Durkheim suggested that ‘as long as there are states, so there will be national pride, 
and nothing can be more warranted’ (1992 [1950]: 75). Today, as this thesis has demonstrated, 
Europe’s nation-states are clearly still alive and well, and hence so is the national pride of their 
respective populations. At the same time, however, following this Durkheimian line of 
reasoning, one can expect that if a ‘European super-state’ truly emerges in the coming decades,
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then a European ‘we-layer’ of collective self-esteem is also likely to arise, and will undoubtedly 
grow if this process of supranational integration continues to develop successfully. Indeed, to 
some extent, one can already observe the early birth pangs of a kind of ‘European pride-shame 
balance', especially with regard to the creation of the ‘euro* currency. For instance, all those 
‘European citizens’ whose national economies have joined the ‘European’ monetary union are 
beginning to read in their daily newspapers, and to listen in the evening news broadcasts on 
television, the latests reports on ‘how the euro is doing’ in comparison to the dollar or the yen, 
and hence how much more (or less) prosperous we (as ‘Europeans’) are likely to be in 
comparison to them (the Americans or the Japanese). Hence, in the competitive field of 
economic prosperity, the members of so-called ‘Euro-land’ are now beginning to play this 
particular ‘game of international honour’ not as Germans, Italians, Spaniards, or Frenchmen, but 
rather as ‘Europeans’.
In fact, the emergence of a ‘European pride-shame balance* is also observable in other arenas 
of collective status-ranking. For instance, in the everyday evaluations which people routinely 
make in the sphere of cultural prestige, it is not infrequent -  at least in relatively educated circles 
-  to hear self-flattering remarks which seem to reflect the emergence of a ‘European group 
charisma’ with regard to the supposedly ‘much higher quality’ and the ‘profound intellectual 
depth’ of ‘European cinema’, in comparison to what is typically denigrated as ‘Hollywood 
rubbish’. The same undoubtedly applies to the frequent boasts which one hears about the 
‘exquisite cuisine of Europe’, in contrast and opposition to ‘American fast food trash’. Even 
more significantly, in the always potentially dangerous, competitive arena of political power and 
military muscle, one can also begin to perceive the timid emergence of a ‘European* collective 
self-esteem, as claims increasingly begin to be made in public discourses about how the creation 
of a common ‘European* foreign policy, and perhaps even of a future ‘European’ army, will 
finally make Europe ‘fully independent’ from the humiliating subordination to ‘the Americans’ 
which we (as ‘Europeans’) have suffered since the tragedy of World War II fell upon us.
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This kind of ‘European patriotism’ was clearly illustrated, for example, in the emotive 
rhetoric with which Jacques Delors described what he called ‘militant Europeanism’, during a 
speech he delivered at the College of Europe in October 1989, when he was still the President of 
the European Commission. This address was delivered in the very same place and almost exactly 
one year after Margaret Thatcher’s notorious Bruges speech. Delors’s choice of time and place 
was in no way a coincidence. On the contrary, his aim was evidently to strike back with 
discursive blows against the British Prime Minister, in response to the accusations she had made 
about the European Commission’s alleged attempts ‘to suppress nationhood*.17 As I showed 
previously in my chaper on Britain and Maastricht, according to Thatcher this was totally absurd 
and highly dangerous, since, as she put it, ‘our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or 
German’. For this reason, the British leader proclaimed that it would be ‘folly’ to try to force ; 
Europe’s culturally diverse nations into an artificial ‘identikit European personality’ -  the 
suffocating ideological straitjacket which was supposedly being fabricated by Delors and his 
army of sinister ‘Brussels bureaucrats’.
In opposition to Thatcher’s scaremongering tactics, however, Delors stated that the European 
federalism which he defended was ‘a way of reconciling what for many appears to be 
irreconcilable: the emergence of a united Europe and loyalty to one’s homeland’ (1994 [1989]:
52). Indeed, he explicitly declared that ‘nobody is being asked to renounce legitimate 1
I
patriotism’, and went on to explain that: )
I
I want not only to unite people, as Jean Monnet did, but also to bring nations together. As 1 
the Community develops, as our governments emphasize the need for a people’s Europe, is 1 
it heresy to hope that all Europeans could feel that they belong to a Community which they 1 
see as a second homeland? If this view is rejected, European integration will founder and 
the specter of nationalism will return to haunt us, because the Community will have failed 
to win the hearts and minds of the people, the first requirement for the success of any 
human venture.(1994 [1989]: 61)
17 The Times, 21 September 1988. Thatcher’ s speech is also reprinted in Nelsen and Stubb (eds., 1994).
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In today’s globalized world of ‘superpowers’, Delors argued, it was completely obvious that 
Europe’s nations could have very little ‘influence’ or ‘clout’ on their own. However, by fusing 
together their immense natural, industrial, and human resources through the project of European 
integration, the President of the European Commission assured that things could be very 
different in the future. Hence, after listing an impressive catalogue of all the economic and 
political successes which the European Community had achieved for its member states since the 
Treaty of Rome had been signed in 1957, Delors triumphantly proclaimed that ‘Europe’ was 
‘once again a force to be reckoned with’ (1994 [1989]: 55). In many ways, Delors’s speech was 
reminiscent of the famous address which Winston Churchill delivered half a century earlier, at 
the Congress of Europe in The Hague:
We must proclaim the mission and design of a United Europe whose moral conception will 
win the respect and gratitude of mankind, and whose physical strength will be such that 
none will dare molest her tranquil sway... I hope to see a Europe where men and women of 
every country will think of being European as of belonging to their native land, and 
wherever they go in this wide domain will truly feel ‘Here I am at home.’ (cited in Davies 
1997: 1066).
Today, it seems evident that the collective ideals and sentiments of this ‘European 
patriotism’ are still relatively weak, and largely limited to the elite circle of the EU’s own 
officials, as well as of the cosmopolitan-minded ‘jet-set’ of European businessmen, journalists, 
artists, scientists, and intellectuals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the timid emergence of a 
European ‘we-feeling* of ‘group charisma’ has actually been viewed by some authors not as 
something to celebrate enthusiastically, but rather as a cause for considerable ethical concern. 
Pierre Bourdieu, for one, has recently warned that ‘we will certainly not have gained much if 
Eurocentrism is substituted for the wounded nationalisms of the old imperial nations’ (1998b: 9). 
Similarly, the British anthropologist Cris Shore (2000), has ominously warned about the 
potential dangers of a future ‘Euro-nationalism’ which could lead, and perhaps is already 
leading, to new racist and xenophobic categorizations of ‘we (white) Europeans’ against 
‘threatening barbarians’ such as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, ‘uncivilized Africans’, and so on.
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Such fears are certainly not unfounded, as is illustrated by the reemergence of extremist right- 
wing parties and neo-Nazi groups, who sometimes invoke the purity of a ‘European culture* or 
of a ‘Christian Europe* which is to be defended from contamination by the ‘non-European 
Other’.18 In this sense, it is absolutely clear that a ‘European* form of collective narcissism could 
potentially be just as dangerous as the collective narcissism of nations has been in the past, and 
this is undoubtedly something which social scientists should be keeping an eye on in the years to 
come.
However, in the midst of all the self-doubting scepticism, cynical pessimism and dreary 
defeatism which has been one of the fundamental characteristics of our so-called ‘post-modem’ 
condition, perhaps we may derive some optimism from the second half of the passage I cited 
earlier from Durkheim’s lectures on the ‘civic morals* of patriotism. It was there that the great 
founder of French sociology suggested that societies could conceivably derive their collective 
pride not from being ‘the greatest or the wealthiest’, but from ‘being the most just* and 
‘possessing the best moral constitution* (1992 [1950]: 75). In an earlier section of this same 
lecture, Durkheim also stated that what he called ‘world patriotism’ was gradually beginning to 
emerge:
No matter how devoted men may be to their native land, they all to-day are aware that 
beyond the forces of national life there are others, in a higher region and not so transitory, 
for they are unrelated to conditions peculiar to any given political group and are not bound 
up to its fortunes. There is something more universal and more enduring. It is true to say 
that those aims that are most general and the most unchanging are also the most sublime. 
As we advance in evolution, we see the ideals men pursue breaking free of the local or 
ethnic conditions obtaining in a certain region of the world or a certain human group, and 
rising above all that is particular and so approaching the universal. We might say that the 
moral forces come to have a hierarchic order according to their degree of generality or 
diffusion^ 1992 [1950]: 72-3).
18 This problem has recently been explored in detail by the social psychologist Anna Tryandafyllidou (2000).
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Nevertheless, as I noted in the introduction, he observed that this emotional allegiance to 
humankind as a whole still clashed with people’s affiliations to their national states.
Durkheim also noted that some politicians and intellectuals of his day had already begun to 
propose the creation of a European federation to resolve the ethical tensions between nationalism 
and cosmpolitanism. However, he warned that this European polity would still merely include 
one limited portion of humanity, and hence that it would inevitably continue to conflict with the 
values of ‘world patriotism’:
A confederation of European states... is advanced, but vainly, as a half-way course to 
achieving societies on a bigger scale than those we know to-day. This greater federation, 
again, would be like an individual State, having its own identity and its own interests and 
features. It would not be humanity.(1992 [1950]: 74).
Hence, for Durkheim, the only conceivable solution to this moral problem was for ‘patriotism’ to 
become ‘a fragment of world patriotism’ -  in other words, for nation-states and all sub-sections 
of humanity to channel their energies towards the achievement of ‘human ideals’ (1992 [1950]: 
75). In his book on the sociology of education, he made exactly the same point:
The problem of whether humanity ought to be subordinate to the state, cosmopolitism to 
nationalism, is... one of those that arouses the greatest controversy today... The only way of 
resolving this difficulty, which troubles public thinking, is to seek the realization of the 
human ideal through the most highly developed groups that we know... that is to say 
throught the efforts of specific nations. To eliminate all such contradictions, thus satisfying 
the requirements of our moral consciousness, it suffices that the state commit itself as its 
main goal not to expanding, in a material sense, to the detriment of its neighbors, not to 
gaining greater strength than they; but to the goal of realizing among its own people the 
general interests of humanity... From this point of view, all rivalry between different 
countries disappears and, consequently, all contradiction between cosmpopolitanism and 
patriotism.(1961 [1925]: 75-7)
Hence, Durkheim concluded that although, ‘so far as we can now see, there will always be a 
plurality of states’, the nation-states of the world could conceivably collaborate together ‘to 
realize the goals of mankind’ though what he called ‘pacific’ rather than ‘aggressive’ forms of 
patriotism (1961 [1925]: 77-8]).
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Indeed, in the concluding chapter of his very first book, The Division of Labour in Society, 
Durkheim had already foreseen that ‘among European peoples there is a tendency to form, by 
spontaneous movement, a European society which has, at present, some idea of itself and the 
beginning of organization’ (1964 [1893]: 405). Furthermore, anticipating his later arguments on 
the ethical clash between ‘patriotism’ and ‘world patriotism’, he proposed a sociological 
hypothesis on the nature of human egotism, in which he suggested how people’s instinctively 
selfish tendencies could conceivably be constrained at both individual and collective levels:
Men have long dreamt of finally realizing in fact the ideal of human fraternity. People pray 
for a state where war will no longer be the law of international relations, where relations 
between societies will be pacifically regulated, as those between individuals already are, 
where all men will collaborate in the same work and live the same life... But they can be 
satisfied only if all men form one society, subject to the same laws. For just as private 
conflicts con be regulated only by the action of the society in which the individuals live, so 
intersocial conflicts can be regulated only by a society which comprises in scope all others. 
The only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power o f the group; 
and the only power which can serve to moderate the egotism o f groups is that o f some 
other group which embraces them.(\96A- [1893]: 405, my italics).
In other words, the only way to constrain individual selfishness and narcissism is by making 
people think and feel that they are part of a larger group to which they should be loyal; and the 
only way to constrain collective selfishness and narcissism is by making the members of a group 
think and feel that they are part of an even larger group which they should respect.
From this illuminating Durkheimian perspective, we could perhaps imagine a future world in 
which the egotism of Europe’s nation-states would be effectively constrained by a wider 
allegiance to their European patrie, and the egotism of the European Union would 
simultaneously be constrained by a wider planetary affiliation to what Edgar Morin (1999) has 
recently called terre patrie (‘homeland earth’).19 In short, it can conceivably be possible to make
19 In relation to Europe, Morin has similarly promoted the vision of an outward-looking European Union that would 
pursue what he calls ‘planetary anthropolitics’ in his book Penser UEurope (Paris, Gallimard, 1987), of which I 
have read the Spanish edition Pensar Europa (Barcelona, Gedisa, 1988).
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national sentiments compatible both with the unification of Europe, as well as with Durkheim’s 
ideal of ‘world patriotism’, as long as the maintenance of peaceful relations and solidarity with 
all peoples becomes a fundamental source of national and European pride, while the violation of 
these principles becomes a potent source of national and European shame.
To some extent, one can already observe that in recent times, a European pride-shame 
balance or ‘group charisma’ has also been emerging in the sphere of moral respectability, which 
is typically framed in contrast and opposition to the ‘yanks’ across the ocean. For instance, it is 
not infrequent these days to hear denunciations voiced by EU authorities, as well as by European 
intellectuals, concerning the American government’s ‘barbarous’ maintenance of the death 
penalty, its ‘scandalous’ attitude to the selling of guns amongst the general public, and the 
‘shameless’ way in which it has decided to ignore international treaties that have been 
established to protect the global habitat which all the world’s peoples share.20 As Elias pointed 
out (1991a: 232), over the course of history, humanity as a whole has clearly become one 
interdependent survival unit, given the overwhelming destructive capacity of modem weaponry, 
as well as the environmental dangers which threaten the sustainability of life on earth. In this 
sense, it is absolutely vital for the future of humankind as a whole to develop we-images and 
we-feelings about itself -  in other words, for ns, as human beings, to become conscious of 
ourselves as an interdependent global community, and to develop a sense of collective self­
esteem about how we are trying to build a better world for ourselves, as well as for the future 
generations that will populate the earth after we end our own individual life-journeys.
At a time when the original ethical objectives of European integration seem to have been 
largely abandoned or forgotten, and money appears to have taken over as the fundamental raison
20 For instance, the current President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, recently published an article in 
the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (5 April 2001), in which he criticised the American government, headed by 
George W. Bush, for deciding to reject the international Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of gas emissions which are 
provoking the phenomenon of global warming. The European Union, Prodi stated, will respect these agreements, 
with or without the support of the United States, because it considers them to be crucial for the future of humanity.
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d ’ être of the EU, there is undoubtedly a need to revitalize the ideal of ‘Europe*, by making it a 
morally worthwhile collective project. When Jean Monnet originally outlined his conception ol 
European integration in an article he wrote back in the early 1960’s, what he had in mind was 
precisely the construction of an outward-looking, globally responsible community:
One impression predominates in my mind above all others. It is this: unity in Europe does 
not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe and 
consequently in the world. People, more often outside the European Community than 
within, are tempted to see the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state 
with all the overtones of power this implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and 
the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely in order to find a way out 
of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-century power philosophy gave rise. The natural 
attitude of a European Community based on the exercise by nations of common 
responsibilities will be to make these nations also aware of their responsibilities, as a 
Community, to the world.(1994 [1962]: 24)21
When we read these words, perhaps the instinctive response of our detached, scientific habitus is 
to ridicule ‘the lofty and utopian rhetoric of a politician*. Nevertheless, we should also 
continuously remind ourselves of ‘the truth* which Max Weber believed had been confirmed by 
‘all historical experience*: the fact that ‘man would not have attained the possible unless time 
and again he had reached out for the impossible’ (1946a [1919]: 128).
21 The original text was published in the Journal o f Common Market Studies (1962), Vol.l, No. 1, pp. 203-11.
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